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ABSTRACT  
   
Emergentism offers a promising compromise in the philosophy of mind 
between Cartesian substance dualism and reductivistic physicalism. The ontological 
emergentist holds that conscious mental phenomena supervene on physical 
phenomena, but that they have a nature over and above the physical. However, 
emergentist views have been subjected to a variety of powerful objections: they are 
alleged to be self-contradictory, incompatible with mental causation, justified by 
unreliable intuitions, and in conflict with our contemporary scientific understanding 
of the world. I defend the emergentist position against these objections. I clarify the 
concepts of supervenience and of ontological novelty in a way that ensures the 
emergentist position is coherent, while remaining distinct from physicalism and 
traditional dualism. Making note of the equivocal way in which the concept of 
sufficiency is used in Jaegwon Kim's arguments against emergent mental causation, 
I argue that downward causation does not entail widespread overdetermination. I 
argue that considerations of ideal a priori deducibility from some physical base, or 
"Cosmic Hermeneutics", will not themselves provide answers to where the cuts in 
the structure of nature lie. Instead, I propose reconsidering the question of Cosmic 
Hermeneutics in terms of which cognitive resources would be required for the ideal 
reasoner to perform the deduction. Lastly, I respond to the objection that emergence 
in the philosophy of mind is in conflict with our contemporary scientific 
understanding of the world. I suggest that a kind of weak ontological emergence is a 
viable form of explanation in many fields, and discuss current applications of 
emergence in biology, sociology, and the study of complex systems. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION: FOUR CHALLENGES TO ONTOLOGICAL EMERGENCE 
 
§1. What is Emergence? 
1.1 The Ontological Landscape 
 Desert landscapes have a certain austere beauty to them. Some people may 
have the temperament to appreciate this beauty more than others. For instance, 
Willard Van Orman Quine had this sort of aesthetic sense, at least for ontological 
deserts.1 There is a certain simplicity and purity to a barren ontology, every feature 
an aggregation of the same particular grains of sand. Unburdened by commitments 
to multiple kinds of beings, physicalism enjoys freedom under the wide open skies. 
Unpretentious and humble, its perspective remains firmly rooted to the earth. 
 Compare this to a different sort of landscape: the view one gets from the top 
of a mountain, looking down from the snowy heights onto the dry valleys below. 
From this view, the world seems to be a place of radical differences: above and 
below, the higher realm and the lower, deep within the caves beneath the mountain, 
and up on top of it, nearly touching the sun. For a certain temperament, the view 
from on top of a mountain can be very exciting. A person who imports this aesthetic 
taste into metaphysics will begin trading in an ontology of oppositions. Perhaps it 
flatters the thinker too much, but dualism feels more uplifting than the desert floor. 
                                            
FOOTNOTES 
1 For example, Quine confesses this “taste for desert landscapes”, in Pursuit of 
Truth (1980) as well as in “On What there Is” (1968) 
  2 
 A third temperament is inclined neither towards radical division nor barren 
simplicity, but finds its focus fixed upon the many layers of in-between. At the 
bottom level lies the desert, and snow capped peaks arise at the top, but much of 
what’s interesting in the world occurs at the intermediate: the forests, the plains, 
the grassy hills. Reality is more like a Sky Island – a range of mountains surrounded 
by lowlands, where the landscape begins with desert cacti, transitions upward into 
the bushy chaparral, extends higher into forests of pine and oak, and near the 
summit packs in thick forests of Douglas fir. Here one finds drastically different 
kinds of things emerging at different levels of elevation, each thriving only at its 
own level and at no other. In a Sky Island, many different kinds of things exist, and 
they exist atop each other, in many different layers. This ontological landscape 
seems, to those so inclined by this particular temperament, both the more accurate 
to the world we find ourselves in, and the more beautiful. 
 The emergentist Samuel Alexander identified this temperament with a kind 
of “natural piety”. 2  The emergentist sees reductivistic materialism on the one hand, 
sees substance dualism on the other hand, and notices how much logical space lies in 
the vast distance between the two positions – and how many real things might fit 
into that space.  
 
                                            
2 “The natural piety I am going to speak of is that of the scientific investigator, by 
which he accepts with loyalty the mysteries which he cannot explain in nature and 
has no right to try to explain. I may describe it as a habit of knowing when to stop in 
asking questions of nature.” Alexander (1922). 
  3 
1.2 Emergence 
 We have good reasons to believe that the world is, in some sense, physical. All 
of these things we observe– rocks, rivers, light bulbs, lungs, stars, and so on – is 
made up of the same kind of stuff that the rest of this stuff we observe is: the stuff 
studied by physics. Perhaps numbers and sets aren’t physical, because they are 
abstract and necessary. But if something is located in space and time and has 
physical effects, then it seems suspicious to claim that it has no physical connection 
to the rest of this physical world. How can it be located somewhere if it isn’t 
physically located somewhere? How can it have effects on physical things without 
standing in physical relations to those things? How can it interact with the physical 
if it’s independent of it? So, we have prima facie reasons to believe that all 
contingent, concrete particulars (events, property instances, states of affairs, objects, 
kinds, and other phenomena) are either physical or, at least, entirely depend upon 
the physical. 
 We also have good reasons to believe there are certain phenomena which are 
located in space and time and causally efficacious, and yet that these phenomena are 
not wholly physical. If something is a physical kind of thing, then it ought to be 
possible, at least in principle, to fully describe it and explain it in physical terms. 
Consider the phenomenally3 conscious experience you are having right now. At best, 
                                            
3 I am using the adjective “phenomenal”, the adverb “phenomenally” , and the 
noun “phenomenology” to indicate the sort of conscious experience which I as a 
subject am having right now, smelling scent of perfume and listening to the birds 
outside, as distinct from the ordinary sense of “conscious” in which we mean that 
  4 
this might be partly explained by a statement about neurons firing in a brain. For 
one thing, there are neurons firing in billions of other brains around the planet 
elsewhere – but you are not having an experience over there. For another thing, 
nothing about neurons firing, as opposed to millions of other complex physical 
processes like cellular division or radioactive decay, makes it obvious that your 
experiences should appear where neurons are firing and nothing else. 
 Similarly, no statement about how a material object is makes it obvious why 
one ought to believe the truth, make valid inferences, or avoid causing harm. No 
non-intentional description of the phonology and syntax and social use of a language 
seems enough to explain why the words in it are about something. Phenomenology, 
normativity, and intentionality are real parts of our world, and yet they seem to 
require more explanation than physics could conceivably offer. This is why we have 
prima facie reasons to believe that these things are, at least partly, independent of 
the physical world – in the absence of some further explanation. 
 So, we have good reasons to think that everything entirely depends on the 
physical world, and yet we also have good reasons to think that some things are 
partly independent of the physical world. Yet, for anything to entirely depend on 
                                                                                                                                  
someone is aware and responsive to us. A comatose person might be unresponsive, 
and thus “unconscious”, yet having a rich variety of phenomenally conscious 
experiences; a body might display reflex-responses, yet there is nothing it is like to 
be it. Wherever I use the word “conscious” or “experience”, I am referring to 
phenomenally conscious experiences. See Block (1995) for discussion of this 
distinction. 
  5 
something else and yet be partly independent of it looks like a clear contradiction. 
How do we resolve this problem?  
 Physicalist (or materialist4) responses to the problem aim to preserve the 
dependence of everything on the physical by providing some sort of explanation for 
why the conscious mind (or normativity, or intentionality) isn’t really independent 
after all. For instance, a physicalist might hold that the mind isn’t real: an 
eliminativist position. A physicalist may hold that the mind is real but identical to 
some material thing: a reductivist position. More moderately, a physicalist might 
hold that the mind is independent in the sense that our concepts for it are 
independent of our physical concepts, so there could be no explanatory reduction 
from our theory of the mind to any physical theory – but that every token mental 
state is identical to some token physical state. This position represents a sort of non-
reductive physicalism.5 
                                            
4 Following recent conventions, I will often use the term “physicalism” rather 
than “materialism”, insofar as “materialism” suggests the claim that everything is 
made of matter whereas “physicalism” only suggests that physics is a theory of 
everything. Nonetheless, “physicalism” should be understood as the historical 
successor of the traditional materialism of Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, etc. 
5 For simplicity, I am grouping reductivist physicalism with type-identity theories 
on the one hand, and non-reductive physicalism with token-identity theories on the 
other hand. I recognize that there may be further logical space in between these 
views, or in different combinations of these views, but the eliminativist / reductivist / 
non-reductivist schema suffices for my purposes here. 
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 Traditional dualist6 responses aim to preserve the independence of the 
mental by providing some sort of explanation for why it merely seems to depend on 
the material. For example, a dualist might hold that the mind is an immaterial 
substance, but that material and immaterial substances interact. More moderately, 
a dualist might hold that the mind’s dependence upon the material isn’t really 
complete, but only partial and contingent.  
 Emergentism is an attempt to explain how both claims could be reconciled: 
the claim that everything depends on the physical in one respect, and the claim that 
minds are independent from the physical in some other respect. For the emergentist, 
in some situations novel phenomena7 arise out of a set of basal conditions while 
                                            
6 Both Cartesian and non-Cartesian substance dualism will qualify as “traditional 
dualism”. A kind of property dualism might also qualify as “traditional dualism”, if 
one asserts that something further is needed for the existence of phenomenal 
property instances over and above instances of physical properties. I prefer to 
distinguish varieties of dualism in terms of the degree of independence they assign 
the mental from the physical, rather than in terms of what they are a dualism of. 
7 Throughout, when I use the term “phenomena” as a noun with respect to the 
sorts of things which may be emergent, I mean it to include properties, events, 
states of affairs, entities, kinds, natures, and/or whatever sorts of items might be 
included in the reader’s ontology whose existence can be dependent on other 
phenomena – in other words, anything but substances as traditionally construed. 
Someone who holds that there are no events need not hold that there are emergent 
events; someone who holds that there are only events can hold that events are 
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remaining distinct from these basal conditions. For example, conscious properties 
might be said to emerge out of neuro-biological properties – they are dependent upon 
these neuro-biological properties, but they are novel properties which are not 
themselves found in neuroscience or biology. 
1.3 Cosmic Hermeneutics 
 What is “novelty” supposed to mean? The early British Emergentist C. D. 
Broad (1925) articulated a test for metaphysical “novelty” which might be called 
Cosmic Hermeneutics8. Suppose that an ideal reasoner has knowledge of all of the 
underlying properties of this material world – the fundamental physical laws and 
kinds, the locations of various particles and their respective masses and charges, 
and so on. Would that reasoner then be able to deduce a priori the truths of a higher-
level domain given only the knowledge of these fundamental physical facts? Broad 
held that if the higher-level domain is deducible, then it’s not emergent; if the 
higher-level domain isn’t deducible, then it is emergent. Since conscious properties 
can’t be deduced a priori from physical properties even by an ideal reasoner, 
according to Broad, conscious properties qualify as ontologically “novel”. 
                                                                                                                                  
emergent. In this, I am breaking somewhat with a contemporary emphasis on 
emergent properties, which seems to me to confuse what is distinctive about 
emergentism with the distinctives of property dualism. The term “phenomena” (used 
of the variety of objects in the world which might possibly be experienced) is not here 
being defined in terms of what is actually or possibly “phenomenal” (see footnote 3). 
8 This neologism can be credited to Horgan (1983) 
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 In this work, I aim to articulate and defend a form of emergentism which (i) 
preserves the physicalist claim that in some respect all spacio-temporally located 
properties and entities completely depend upon the physical world, yet (ii) does not 
sacrifice the dualist claim that phenomenal properties and entities, though spacio-
temporally located and causally efficacious, are yet in some respect independent of 
the material world. My view shares similarities with that of Almog (2009), and with 
the view which Horgan (2009) named “Moorean Minimal Emergentism”: the view 
that phenomenal properties supervene with metaphysical necessity upon physical 
properties, but that the supervenience relationships are fundamental and 
explanatorily basic. Unlike historical emergentism, the form of emergentism I will 
defend denies that novel forces can emerge above and beyond those at the physical 
level.9 
1.4 Four Objections 
 In this work, I will respond to four objections which have arisen against 
ontological emergence. 
 First, there are concerns about the coherence of the claim that physical basal 
conditions are sufficient for emergent phenomena to arise, and yet the emergent 
phenomena remain distinct from their basal conditions, a “genuine novelty”. On one 
interpretation of the sufficiency claim, the physical base must metaphysically 
necessitate the emergent phenomenon. However, this seems to conflict with the 
                                            
9 McLaughlin (1992) takes it as definitive of the British Emergentism of Mill, 
Broad and Alexander that emergentists believed in novel “configurational forces”, 
although O’Connor (2012) disputes that Alexander agreed with Mill on this point. 
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traditional interpretation of “distinct from”, on which emergent phenomena are not 
ideally deducible from their basal conditions. Kim (2010) has argued that the 
Emergentist’s criterion of ideal a priori non-deducibility amounts to nothing more 
than a lack of metaphysical necessitation.10 So, emergence seems to be self-
contradictory. 
 Second, it is objected that emergence cannot account for the causal powers of 
mental events: for instance, that my belief that I will be called upon if I raise my 
arm, and my desire to be called upon, can together produce the action of raising my 
arm. Kim (2010) has argued that, if mental events are able to cause other mental 
events, or physical events, then mental events must be identical to underlying 
physical events – or else, physics is not causally closed. The emergentist, unlike the 
substance dualist, does not want to deny the causal closure of physics. However, 
according to Kim, this commits the emergentist to the pervasive, regular, and 
inexplicable overdetermination of some physical events by both mental events and 
other physical events. Overdetermination of this sort does not seem plausible. 
 Third, there are concerns about the validity of Cosmic Hermeneutics as a 
criterion for emergence. The emergentist is making an inference from an epistemic 
                                            
10 Consider that, if something is a necessary truth, then it should be deducible a 
priori given any sound and complete derivation system. Presumably, any ideal 
reasoner will have a sound and complete derivation system. So, according to Kim 
(2010), an emergentist can’t coherently describe the dependence of the emergent on 
the physical as involving metaphysical necessity, and instead must accept at most 
nomological supervenience. 
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gap in what an ideal reasoner can infer about consciousness (or normativity, or 
intentionality) on the basis of the physical facts to a metaphysical gap between the 
nature of the conscious (or normative, or intentional) and the physical. But Kripke 
(1980) demonstrated that some necessary truths are a posteriori (and some 
contingent truths are a priori). So, without further bridge premises, one can’t derive 
conclusions about what’s metaphysical necessary from premises about what’s 
epistemically a priori. While Chalmers and Jackson (2001) have argued that two-
dimensional semantics provides a hurdle over the barrier, Soames (2005) and Block 
and Stalnaker (1999) have cast doubt on their plan. The relationship between cosmic 
hermeneutics and emergence remains unclear. 
 Fourth, all emergentist positions are subject to the concern that non-material 
properties and kinds have a certain “suspicious smell” to them – they are unlike the 
sorts of properties we encounter in the natural sciences. Any fundamental “laws of 
emergence” linking higher-level phenomena to their basal conditions would be 
“nomological danglers”, laws without precedent or parallel in physics, chemistry, or 
biology. The very “novelty” of emergent properties is reason to be dubious about 
their existence. 
 This work will be very limited in terms of providing any positive argument 
for emergentism. Rather, it will focus on defending emergentism from these four 
objections. I aim to: 
 (i) Develop a coherent account of emergence, on which emergent properties 
are those which supervene with manipulative necessity on their basal conditions, 
but whose natures are not grounded in the natures of their basal conditions. 
(Chapter 2) 
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 (ii) Explain how emergent phenomena can have causal powers, distinct from 
those of their basal conditions, without leading to widespread overdetermination or 
violations of the causal closure of physics. (Chapter 3) 
 (iii) Re-connect this account of ontological emergence with the project of 
cosmic hermeneutics, by defining emergent phenomena as those which aren’t 
deducible from their subvening base by means of analytic a priori inferences alone. 
(Chapter 4) 
 (iv) Suggest that, far from being an ad hoc response to the case of 
consciousness alone, a weak form of emergence might describe a wide variety of 
phenomena in the natural and social sciences, boosting the explanatory power of the 
concept of emergence. (Chapters 5 – 7). 
 In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I offer a summary of some of 
the history of Emergentist thought, clarify the distinctions between epistemic and 
ontological emergence, reflect on the relationship between Emergentism and 
“naturalism”, and introduce some of the major concepts which will appear in 
subsequent chapters. 
§2. History 
2.1 The Idea of Emergence 
 It is not unusual to think of the world as being made up of varying layers of 
complexity. Sometimes people say things like “that is a nice dog”. Then, someone 
less tactful will say “but really, it’s just a bunch of organs and tissue moving 
around,” or someone who wants to sound especially smart will add, “but really, it’s 
just a bunch of atoms floating around and bumping into each other.” Sometimes a 
loftier individual goes in the other direction: “but really, it’s just playing a small 
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function in the planetary ecosystem”, or even “but really, that dog is nothing when 
you think of the big picture, the stars and the galaxies.” One might think of the 
microphysical as one layer, the biological as another, the whole organism as another, 
the social or ecological as another, and the galactic as another layer still. 
 Sometimes, when people see large groups of things, nothing particular strikes 
them. A collection of grains of rice gathered into a heap is just that: a collection of 
grains of rice. This is ordinary composition: the whole is simply the sum of its parts. 
However, some of the time, people begin to worry that something more than 
ordinary composition may occur when things are grouped together. People 
sometimes admonish those in the midst of investigating the intricate details of a 
complicated problem, “don’t miss the forest for the trees!” or “the whole may be more 
than the sum of its parts!”  
 None of this is serious metaphysics. Still, this is more or less where the idea 
of emergence gets its start. Out of a system which is very complex on one level, 
something new appears at a higher level which seems very different from the system 
on the lower level – it emerges. 
2.2 Ancient Emergentism 
 In Plato’s Phaedo, Simmias proposes an alternative to Socrates’s account of 
the relationship between the soul and the body. Simmias suggests as a metaphor the 
relationship between a harmony and a tuned lyre: 
 
One might say that the harmony is invisible and incorporeal, and very 
beautiful and divine in the well attuned lyre, but the lyre itself and its 
strings are bodies, and corporeal and composite and earthy and akin to that 
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which is mortal. Now if someone shatters the lyre or cuts and breaks the 
strings, what if he should maintain by the same argument you employed, 
that the harmony could not have perished and must still exist? …. And I 
fancy, Socrates, that it must have occurred to your own mind that we believe 
the soul to be something after this fashion…. the soul is a mixture and a 
harmony of … elements, when they are well and properly mixed.11   
 
 On Simmias’s harmony theory, while the soul might be distinguished from 
the body as a harmony is distinguished from a lyre, nonetheless the soul wholly 
depends for its existence upon there being a body, much as a harmony wholly 
depends for its existence on there being a lyre. This is in contrast to Socrates’s 
theory of the soul, on which the soul does not depend upon the body and cannot be 
affected by changes in it. Simmias’s theory can be identified as a kind of 
supervenience thesis: there is no possibility of the change in the soul (or the 
harmony) without a change in the body (or the lyre). Simmias’s theory also suggests 
a kind of epiphenomenalism, since arguably it’s the lyre and not the harmony which 
does all of the causal work. 
 Victor Caston (1997) interprets Aristotle’s philosophy of mind in On the Soul 
as an emergentist response to the harmony theory. Aristotle adopts the 
supervenience thesis, but denies that the soul is epiphenomenal: the mind has the 
power to cause things.12 In accepting supervenience, while insisting that downward 
                                            
11 Plato, Phaedo, 85 - 88 
12 Caston (1997), 327 
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causation occurs, Aristotle’s position on the soul is reminiscent of contemporary 
emergentism.  
 Caston also interprets Galen as an early emergentist. Galen too endorsed the 
supervenience thesis of the harmony theory, without accepting its 
epiphenomenalism. Instead, Galen distinguished between effects which resulted 
from a mere compounding of causes, and effects which resulted from something 
more than a compounding of causes – cases in which a “novel characteristic” 
appeared. 13 
2.3 British Emergentism 
 Galen’s notion of the distinction between a mere compounding or aggregation 
of causes, and a “heterogeneous” mixing of causes, found its way into modern 
philosophy through the work of John Stuart Mill. In his System of Logic (1843), Mill 
distinguished between homopathic effects and laws and heteropathic effects and 
laws. A homopathic effect obeyed Mill’s law of the “composition of causes.” This law 
stated roughly that two or more causal forces exerted on the same object would 
produce a predictable result by means of something like vector addition. A 
heteropathic effect, on the other hand, was an effect which was not the result of 
mere addition of two causal forces, and which involved an effect of another type, or 
at another level, than the causes in the base. 
 Mill’s idea was adopted by George Henry Lewes (1874), who coined the term 
resultant to refer to Mill’s notion of a homopathic effect, and emergent to refer to 
Mill’s notion of a heteropathic effect. From Lewes, the concept of “Emergence” found 
                                            
13 ibid. 
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its way to the philosopher Samuel Alexander (Space, Time, and Deity, 1920), and 
from there to the psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan (Emergent Evolution, 1923). 
 Morgan’s emergentism was historical and diachronic. Morgan believed that 
at different points in history, a system at one level would necessarily reach a certain 
degree of complexity and then evolve into something at a higher level. The higher 
level system would be a genuine historical novelty in the universe, a new kind of 
thing, not merely a compounding of the things that came before it. For example, life 
would have been emergent on Morgan’s view – a new thing over and above what 
happened at the chemical level, yet which inevitably evolved out of the chemical 
level at a certain point of complexity. 
 C. D. Broad (1925) moved emergentism out of the domain of historical 
cosmology, and instead used it to analyze the synchronic relationships between 
“higher level” and “lower level” kinds and properties, within the practice of scientific 
explanation. Broad aimed to strike a middle of the road view between Substance 
Vitalism and Substance Dualism on the one hand, and “Mechanism” about life or the 
mind on the other. Unlike the Substance Vitalists, emergentists did not posit the 
existence of any non-physical vital substance or entelechy behind biology. Unlike 
Cartesian Dualists, emergentists did not argue for the existence of independent 
mental substances. Broad held that the only substance was a physical substance, 
and that all things depended on the physical for their existence. However, he 
rejected the mechanistic picture on which all of the higher-level properties (life, 
consciousness, and so on) were fully predictable from a micro-physical description of 
the world. 
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 Broad held that higher-order phenomena like life and consciousness emerged 
from lower-level physics as a result of contingent “trans-ordinal” laws, without the 
intervention of supernatural entelechies or Cartesian substances. However, these 
“trans-ordinal” laws were not predictable, even in principle, on the basis of physics, 
except by actually observing how things occurred. Contrast this with the 
mechanistic picture, on which the world could be compared to a kind of cosmic clock 
– anyone who knows exactly what is happening inside the clock will be able to 
predict the motions of the hands of the clock, without needing to know how to tell 
the time. For Broad, while it might be possible after knowing the laws of biology or 
psychology to match them up with the various microphysical events from which they 
emerge, not even an infinitely powerful mind (a “mathematical archangel”) could 
deduce the whole of biology or psychology simply by looking at microphysics. 
Biological and psychological properties were genuine novelties. Cosmic hermeneutics 
failed for the case of biology and psychology, and this indicated that these domains 
were emergent. 
 Unfortunately, according to McLaughlin (1992), many of the British 
emergentists took their paradigm example from chemistry. Consider how the 
properties of table salt (NaCl) have nothing in common with the properties of 
sodium (Na) or of chlorine (Cl). This sounds like a compelling example of emergence 
– the properties of NaCl are unpredictable even in principle from the properties of 
Na or of Cl. Alexander, Broad, and many other emergentists relied on this example 
from chemistry to build plausibility for emergence at a higher level. However, 
shortly after they wrote in the 1920’s, the discovery of quantum mechanical laws 
provided a comprehensive and satisfying explanation of chemical properties in terms 
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of microphysical ones – laws which successfully predicted, among other things, that 
table salt should have the chemical properties it does. The discovery of DNA shortly 
after, offered an explanation of supposedly “emergent” vital properties in biology, 
like reproduction. 
 Although Broad was not committed to emergentism about chemistry or 
vitality14, and acknowledged that chemistry or life might very plausibly turn out to 
be mechanistic, the association of Broad and other emergentists with this view lead 
to the dismissal of emergence as an outdated hypothesis. 
 The gravestone of any idea arrives when its language is co-opted by its 
opponents. The gravestone for British Emergentism was the redefinition of 
“emergence” within the Deductive-Nomological account of explanation of Hempel 
and Oppenheim (1948) and Ernest Nagel (1961). On this framework, in principle 
irreducibility or unpredictability from fundamental physics wasn’t a reason to call 
something a “new” or “novel” property – it was a reason to dump it from our ontology 
entirely.  “Emergence” now indicated a purely epistemic category, rather than an 
ontological one. Those higher-level phenomenal were emergent which, given our 
current state of knowledge, could not yet be reduced to fundamental physics by 
means of bridge laws.  
 
                                            
14 Broad (1923) sees “no a priori impossibility in a mechanistic biology or 
chemistry”, unlike the case of “secondary qualities”. (72). Chemistry is reducible to 
physics “at least in part” (54), and emergence holds at most “in certain cases” (55), 
“so far as we can tell” (63). 
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§3. Distinctions 
3.1 Epistemic and Ontological Emergence 
 Surprisingly, over the last few decades, “Emergence” has gradually returned 
as an increasingly popular topic both in the sciences and in the philosophy of mind. 
That said, it is worth distinguishing two different kinds of “Emergence” here: 
epistemic emergence, which occurs when a higher-level system is not predictable 
from a lower-level system, at least given the limitations of our present knowledge or 
perspective, and ontological emergence, which occurs when a higher-level system is 
something over and above a lower-level system.  
 The epistemic sense of emergence is used in the science whenever a 
phenomenon does not seem to be readily predictable from what happens on the level 
of its parts. In ecology, for example, ecosystems may be argued to be emergent in the 
sense that no amount of data gathering about the parts will permit a prediction 
about the behavior of the whole. Likewise, in the social sciences, patterns at the 
social level may produce prediction-enabling social laws, but these laws defy any 
form of modeling or predicting from the lower level. For example, market cycles, may 
not be predictable from the spending behavior of individuals; the actions of nations 
or governments may be predictable based on macro-scale political, social, and 
economic data, but not from a summary of the properties of the individuals in them. 
Simulations in the sciences may produce novel and interesting patterns which do not 
seem to be predictable except by performing the simulation over again. Nonetheless, 
none of these cases of epistemic emergence entails the ontological emergence of 
these properties. 
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 It is in the philosophy of mind that the stronger notion of ontological 
emergence tends to be discussed. Here, while it is acknowledged that chemical and 
biological properties have found reductive explanations in microphysics, there is still 
great resistance to the idea that conscious or phenomenal properties will find 
reductive explanations in microphysics. If anything is emergent, consciousness 
seems to be a good candidate. To many people, it does not seem as though even in 
principle that any microphysical description of reality will in itself enable a 
deduction of what it is like to experience something.15 
3.2 Weak and Strong Emergence 
 The distinction between epistemic and ontological emergence is often 
confused with a separate distinction, between weak (or weaker) forms of emergence 
and strong (or stronger) forms of emergence. “Weak emergence” is taken to mean 
“merely epistemic”, and “strong emergence” is taken to mean “ontological.”  For 
instance, Chalmers (2006), offers this definition: 
 
We can say that a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect 
to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-
level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even 
in principle from truths in the low-level domain . . . We can say that a high-
                                            
15 It might be deducible that I am having thoughts, or that I have beliefs, if 
‘thought’ and ‘belief’ are stripped of phenomenal quality and given a functional 
definition. But it seems difficult to see how my phenomenal experience of things, if it 
is real, could be deduced. 
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level phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a low-level domain 
when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths 
concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing 
the low-level domain. 
 
 Bedau (2008) develops a very different three-part hierarchy of nominal 
emergence, weak emergence, and strong emergence: 
 
The simplest and barest notion of an emergent property, which I term mere 
nominal emergence, is simply this notion of a macro property that is the kind 
of property that cannot be a micro property…. Strong emergence adds the 
requirement that emergent properties are supervenient properties with 
irreducible causal powers…. Assume that P is a nominally emergent property 
possessed by some locally reducible system S. Then P is weakly emergent if 
and only if P is derivable from all of S’s micro facts, but only by simulation…. 
Properties come in various degrees of derivability without simulation, so 
there is a spectrum of more or less weak emergence. (159-160) 16 
 
 In this work, I will be defending ontological rather than merely epistemic 
emergence, and my primary interest and source of examples will be the emergence of 
phenomenal consciousness. However, I will challenge the view that emergence need 
be merely epistemic in the social sciences, natural sciences, or computational 
                                            
16 Emphasis added.  
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sciences. Instead, I will suggest that in these sciences, there may be such a thing as 
weak ontological emergence. For example, while consciousness may be strongly 
ontologically emergent, the function of the heart in pumping blood may be 
considered weakly ontologically emergent. On my account, whether emergence is 
stronger or weaker will depend on what cognitive resources would be needed for an 
ideal reasoner to deduce the emergent phenomena. 
§4. Naturalism 
4.1 What is Naturalism? 
 Emergence is inconsistent with physicalism. At the same time, emergence is 
supposed to in some sense be a naturalistic project, unlike traditional dualism – 
emergent phenomena are supposed to “arise from” nature, rather than result from 
external impositions upon nature. So, is emergence a form of naturalism, or a form 
of non-naturalism? It depends what “naturalism” is supposed to mean, and whether 
it is supposed to be regarded as synonymous with “physicalism”. 
 Etymology offers little help. We get “physical” from the Latin physica, or “the 
study of nature”, which comes from the Greek φύσις, or “nature”, which comes from 
the root verb φύειν "to bring forth, produce, make to grow." This, in turn, descends 
from the proto-Indo-European root *bhū-, which is the root of many words associated 
with being and becoming, including “be”. The Latin natura, from which we get 
“nature” and “natural”, comes from the verb nasci, “to be born”, which descends from 
the proto-Indo-European *g’ene, which is the root of a number of words involving 
birth, including our modern English “generate”, “gene”, and “genus”.17 Perhaps one 
                                            
17 OED Online. March 2013. Oxford University Press. 
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can gather a very metaphorical picture from this of the natural as that which is 
brought forth, produced, grown, or born of its own accord, without some external 
intervention or manipulation. We say a landscape is “natural” if it isn’t by 
crisscrossed by power lines, and that a child’s behavior is “natural at that age” if 
there is no need to explain it as resulting from influences outside the order of 
nature. This definition of the “natural”, as “that which is not produced by outside 
intervention”, is broader than the typical deferential definition of the “physical” as 
“that subject matter studied by physicists”.18 
 We can distinguish methodological naturalism and epistemological 
naturalism from metaphysical naturalism. I understand methodological naturalism 
to be the claim that the mode of investigation typical of the natural sciences can 
provide a theoretical understanding of the world.19 Whether emergentism is 
consistent with this sort of naturalism for a domain will depend upon whether one 
regards the study of that emergent domain as a bona fide natural science, or 
whether only physics qualifies as the truly natural science. I understand 
epistemological naturalism to be ambiguous between either (i) the claim that, 
between competing scientific theories, it is rational to believe only the one which is 
the best by scientific standards20, a claim which is consistent with emergentism, and 
                                            
18 Stoljar (2009) 
19 That is, to the extent such an understanding is possible.  (Stoljar, 2009). It is 
assumed that some but not all changes in the scientific “mode of investigation” are 
possible within the constraints of the definition. 
20 Colyvan (2009) 
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(ii) the claim that there is no a priori knowledge or justification21, which is 
inconsistent with emergentism to the extent emergence is defined in terms of the 
success or failure of cosmic hermeneutics. 
  The more pressing question is whether emergentism is consistent with 
metaphysical naturalism. I believe that there are four senses of the term “natural” 
in which ontological emergentism is a form of metaphysical naturalism, despite 
being a form of non-physicalist dualism. There are two senses in which emergence is 
not a form of naturalism, largely in virtue of its being non-physicalistic. In this 
section, I will first consider the use of “naturalism” as a claim about the 
metaphysical nature (or essence) of a particular domain. I will then consider the use 
of “naturalism” as a claim about the cosmos as a whole. 
4.2 As a claim about the Nature of a Domain 
 If “naturalism” is used merely as a synonym for “physicalism”, understood as 
the claim that the nature of everything in a domain is exhausted by its physical 
nature, or that everything is fundamentally physical, then emergentism is not 
naturalism. 
 On the other hand, “naturalism” may be used to indicate that everything in a 
domain has a nature, or essence, which is partly physical. Here, what I call “strong 
emergentism” is not consistent with naturalism, but what I call “weak emergentism” 
is consistent with naturalism. For example, a strong emergentist about 
consciousness will hold that consciousness is not essentially physical, even in part – 
consciousness could possibly have arisen from non-physical ectoplasm rather than 
                                            
21 Devitt (2005) 
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physical brains. On the other hand, weak emergentism about biological functions, 
which I will defend in Chapter 6, does qualify as a brand of naturalism. Part of the 
nature of a biological function is that it is physically realized. While biological 
functions are multiply realizable, they are not realizable in non-physical ways: there 
could be no ectoplasmic hearts or lungs.  
 Lastly, in a weaker way, “naturalism” may be used to indicate that 
everything in a domain supervenes upon the natural. In this sense, emergentism is a 
form of naturalism. For instance, an emergentist about biological functions agrees 
that bio-functional properties supervene upon the properties of their underlying 
physical states with metaphysical necessity. An emergentist about phenomenal 
consciousness holds that conscious states supervene upon physical states with some 
form of necessity, whether metaphysical, nomological, or manipulative22 necessity. 
However, unlike the physicalist, the emergentist holds that this supervenience is not 
ontologically explainable in terms of the grounding of emergent phenomena in their 
physical basal conditions. 
4.3 As a claim about the Nature of the Cosmos 
 One might understand “naturalism” differently, as a claim about the cosmos 
as a whole. Here, “metaphysical naturalism” is most commonly understood as the 
view that all that exists are those properties, relations, and entities which are 
required for complete material and causal explanations of phenomena – that is, the 
                                            
22 A term I will Chapter 2. 
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sorts of explanations which constitute the methodology of physics.23 In this sense, 
non-reductive realism in any domain is in conflict with metaphysical naturalism.24 
Someone who is a naturalist in this sense may, of course, admit truth conditions for 
the claims in higher domains – he or she can simply be a nominalist rather than a 
realist. Alternatively, a naturalist may hold that these domains are in fact 
ontologically reducible to material and causal explanations without loss of 
explanatory content. However, the emergentist about a domain must be a realist 
and ontological non-reductivist about it. So, in this sense, the emergentist is not a 
metaphysical naturalist. 
 However, in a weaker sense, “naturalism” may be understood as a claim that 
denies that there are non-natural substances or forces which interact with the 
natural cosmos – for instance, there are no forces within the cosmos above and 
beyond the fundamental physical forces. Here, the minimal sort of emergentism 
which I defend (as opposed to historical British Emergentism) qualifies as 
naturalistic, insofar as it denies that there are emergent forces closely analogous to 
physical forces in any domain. Likewise, emergentism rejects the existence of non-
natural substances. 
                                            
23 Logical and mathematical properties may be admitted, insofar as they are 
necessary for the methodology of physics. 
24 For that matter, in this sense, it’s arguable that realism about the “natures” of 
things as mentioned above, including the claim that everything has a physical 
nature, is in conflict with naturalism. 
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 Lastly, “naturalism” may be used metaphorically to give an ontological 
picture on which the cosmos as a whole contains its own principles of change, and no 
external intervention from outside of the natural realm are needed to produce 
change in it. (Upon making nature, God successfully completed the work, and 
needn’t keep intervening to fix it.) In this metaphorical sense, emergentism is 
consistent with naturalism. To some extent, it is this metaphor which the 
emergentist appeals to in holding that emergent properties “arise from” their basal 
conditions and do not involve non-natural interventions, forces, or substances. 
 Thus, the form of emergentism which I am defending is inconsistent with 
some forms of naturalism, but consistent with others – particularly, it is consistent 
with the senses of “naturalism” which rule out all of the so-called “spooky” things in 
haunted houses and horror movies. One might say that emergentist theories involve 
“cranes” rather than “sky-hooks”.25  
§5. Overview of Subsequent Chapters 
 The remainder of this work will be occupied with providing a response to the 
four objections noted earlier: (i) the objection that emergence is either incoherent or 
collapses into non-reductive physicalism or traditional dualism, (ii) the objection 
that emergence entails widespread causal overdetermination, (iii) the objection that 
it is incoherent to define emergence in terms of the impossibility of the ideal a priori 
deducibility of emergent phenomena from their basal conditions, or cosmic 
hermeneutics, and (iv) the objection that emergence lacks explanatory power 
because it applies only to the special case of consciousness. 
                                            
25 Dennett (1996) 
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 In Chapter 2, I will attempt to clarify the definition of ontological emergence, 
and to provide a coherent concept which is distinct from non-reductive physicalism 
and from traditional dualism. On the one hand, physical phenomena are supposed to 
be sufficient for emergent phenomena to arise; on the other hand, emergent 
phenomena are supposed to remain distinct from physical phenomena. To define the 
relevant notion of sufficiency, I will introduce the concept of manipulative 
supervenience, on which there is no possible manipulation of a supervenient 
phenomenon through anything except for its basal conditions. To define the relevant 
notion of distinctness, I will attempt to connect emergence to the recent discussion 
in philosophy on grounding and ontological explanation. On my definition, emergent 
phenomena are those whose natures are not grounded in the natures in their 
subvening base, and are thus ontologically fundamental. 
 Kit Fine (1995) and others have introduced well-motivated distinctions 
between the sort of dependence involved in supervenience, and the sort of 
dependence involved in grounding. I believe that the emergentist’s acceptance of the 
total dependence of the phenomenal on the physical can be expressed as an 
existential dependence claim, corresponding to manipulative supervenience, 
whereas the emergentist’s acceptance of the partial independence of the phenomenal 
from the physical can be expressed as a claim about the ontological independence of 
the nature of the phenomenal from the physical, corresponding to an absence of 
grounding.  
 In Chapter 3, I will argue that emergentists need not be overly concerned 
about the causal overdetermination objections presented by Jaegwon Kim, on which 
mental-to-physical downward causation entails that some physical events have two 
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sufficient causes – one physical, and one mental. However, I will argue that the 
notion of sufficiency in “sufficient cause” is ambiguous between completive and 
deductive notions, and that overdetermination only applies in the case where an 
event has two deductively sufficient causes.  The sort of emergence I am defending 
denies that there are emergent downward causal forces (which would be deductively 
sufficient causes), while accepting that there is a form of genuine downward 
causation on which mental events are completively sufficient for their effects. 
 In Chapter 4, I will provide a history and analysis of the project of cosmic 
hermeneutics as it relates to emergence. There are a variety of “scrutability”26 or 
deducibility relations which might hold for an ideal reasoner between sets of base-
level phenomena and higher-level phenomena. I will argue that, with respect to 
considering whether a phenomenon is emergent or not, one ought to be concerned 
with ontological rather than propositional or sentential scrutability, and with 
analytic rather than a priori or simulative scrutability. Contrary to most current 
accounts, I will argue that an emergent property may be ideally a priori scrutable 
given its basal conditions, provided that an ideal reasoner would have to rely on 
cognitive resources over and above those involved in analysis. 
 Cosmic Hermeneutics tends to be discussed as a binary, yes/no sort of 
question: is a higher-level fact deducible a priori from the fundamental facts or is it 
not? Instead, I consider Cosmic Hermeneutics as a question of which a priori 
resources would or wouldn’t be needed in order for the ideal reasoner to deduce the 
higher-level facts. On the one hand, it seems unlikely to me that many higher-level 
                                            
26 A term from Chalmers (2012) 
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domains are deducible by means of the purely analytic reasoning procedures from 
some subset of the physical facts. On the other hand, these fields could be a priori 
deducible from their basal conditions. It is not entirely implausible that, were an 
ideal reasoner given all of the necessary truths as a priori premises, even 
consciousness might be deducible a priori. However, a priori deducibility by means of 
any non-analytic and normatively-guided mental simulation procedures does not 
establish any kind of dependence of the natures of high-level domains on their lower-
level basal conditions.  
 In Chapter 5, I suggest that my approach towards emergence in the 
preceding chapters offers a resolution to the concern that emergent laws are 
“nomological danglers” with no precedent outside of consciousness. Instead of being 
a strange and mysterious phenomenon that only occurs at the highest level, I will 
argue that emergence can be seen as pervasive, regular, and occurring in many 
forms and at many levels. I believe this can resolve a number of concerns about 
dualism raised by the work of J. J. C. Smart. 
 In Chapters 6 and 7, I offer a variety of examples of emergence in the natural 
and social sciences, hoping to reinforce my argument in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I 
argue that biological functions which supervene upon evolutionary histories of an 
organism should be regarded as weakly ontologically emergent. In Chapter 7, I 
argue that a similar form of weak ontological emergence might plausibly be 
extended to computational and natural patterns, various functional properties, 
phenomena in the social sciences, abstract and normative truths, and standards of 
representational correctness and accuracy. 
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 These chapters build upon one another and refer to each other to some 
extent, but I have tried to write them with adequate summaries of the material in 
previous chapters to make it possible to approach any given chapter on its own. 
 I have tried to err on the side of explaining too much rather than explaining 
too little. On occasion my discussion of emergence has required diversions into topics 
like the analytic/synthetic distinction, the varieties of grounding relation, the risks 
of teleological explanations, the purposes of ontology, the varieties of supervenience, 
debates over two-dimensional semantics, the project of radical interpretation, and 
many other topics which might not on the surface appear to be about emergence. A 
reader who is already familiar with these topics may be able to skim these sections 
without substantial loss. 
 William James may have been correct that, to some degree, divergent views 
and intuitions in philosophy are a reflection of temperament. If this is so, then my 
own temperament inclines me to seek reconciliation between divergent views and to 
try to satisfy conflicting intuitions, and this desire will guide much of my defense of 
emergence. 
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Chapter 2 
MAKING EMERGENCE COHERENT 
§1 Introduction 
 Traditionally expressed, emergentism is the position that some phenomena 
“arise from” a collection of lower-level basal conditions, but these phenomena 
nonetheless remain “genuine novelties”. Conscious properties and entities, for 
example, are sometimes said to “emerge from” some underlying set of physical 
properties and entities, and yet to amount to something “over and above” those 
physical properties or entities.27 An emergentist would say that the world being the 
way it is physically is sufficient for the phenomenal (or mental)28, but the 
phenomenal remains distinct from the physical. 
 These notions of sufficiency (“arising from”) and distinctness (“genuine 
novelty”) need clarification. One common complaint about emergentism is that, 
                                            
27 I do not think the emergent properties are limited to the conscious properties 
(see chapter 5), but insofar as consciousness presents us with the strongest and 
clearest case for emergence, and the goal of this chapter is to get clear on what 
emergence is, I will discuss emergentism in this chapter as if it were only relevant to 
the hard problem of consciousness within the philosophy of mind. 
28 I grant that, insofar as there are mental states which are not phenomenally 
conscious, these phenomenal states may admit of a sort of reductive explanation 
which consciousness does not admit of. For brevity, I will use “mental x” in this 
chapter as though it were synonymous with “phenomenally conscious phenomenal 
x”, even though I do not believe the two are synonymous.  
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whenever one tries to clarify these two claims, then it seems that either (i) 
emergentism collapses into traditional dualism, or (ii) emergentism collapses into 
non-reductive physicalism, or else (iii) emergentism turns out to be incoherent and 
self-contradictory. After all, non-reductive physicalists and traditional dualists will 
both accept some sense in which the physical is sufficient for the phenomenal, and 
yet the phenomenal remains distinct from the mental. 
 For example, emergentists since Broad (1925) have understood the 
distinctness claim to mean that the facts about emergent phenomena are not 
deducible from the facts about their basal conditions. Non-deducibility would not be 
ontologically interesting if it were merely a reflection of our contingent cognitive 
limitations. For this reason, it’s often held that ontologically emergent phenomena 
must not be deducible a priori even by an ideal reasoner or “mathematical 
archangel”. 
 However, this formulation of the distinctness claim invites conflict with a 
certain interpretation of the sufficiency claim. Sufficiency may be interpreted as 
involving the supervenience of emergent properties on their basal properties. 
Supervenience comes with different brands of necessity. Suppose that the existence 
of the subvening properties metaphysically necessitates the existence of the 
supervening properties. This raises a problem, as Kim (2010) notes: why wouldn’t 
the facts about the supervening properties be deducible by an ideal reasoner? Either 
the ideal reasoner has access to all of the necessary truths – meaning that the 
failure of ideal deducibility amounts to a failure of necessitation, and thus a failure 
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of supervenience29  – or else the ideal reasoner lacks access to some a posteriori 
necessity, in which case emergentism collapses into a posteriori physicalism.30 
 Van Cleve (1990) suggests that the emergentist should be understood as 
accepting supervenience with nomological necessity rather than metaphysical 
necessity. On this view, it is metaphysically possible for the same basal conditions to 
occur without the emergent phenomena (hence, ideal deducibility fails), but there is 
some law of nature which is sufficient for the emergent phenomena. These laws of 
nature must not be part of the ideal reasoner’s deduction base, since the emergent 
phenomena would then be deducible from the conjunction of the facts about the 
basal conditions and the laws of nature.31 So, the emergentist must hold that the 
relevant “trans-ordinal” laws linking basal states to emergent states remain 
contingent and non-deducible even given the other laws of nature. These trans-
ordinal laws are not physical laws of nature, but laws “added” to physical nature 
which make emergence happen. Besides raising Smart’s (1959) worries about 
“nomological danglers”, this seems to undercut much of the appeal of emergentism, 
and risks collapsing emergentism into traditional dualism. It suggests that the 
physical world being exactly as it is and having the laws which it does is no longer 
enough for emergence.32 Something further and non-physical must be present in our 
                                            
29 The argument appears in Chapter 4 of Kim (2010): “ ‘Supervenient and Yet Not 
Deducible’: Is there a Coherent concept of Ontological Emergence?”, 85-104 
30 Byrne (1993) 
31 Kim (2010), Ch. 4, makes this complaint. 
32 Braddon-Mitchell  (2007). 
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world to explain why emergence happens in our world and not in a physical 
duplicate: one must add contingent trans-ordinal laws, or mental substances, or so 
on. 
 To put the problem briefly: if emergent properties supervene with 
metaphysical necessity on the physical, then emergentism seems like repackaged 
non-reductive physicalism; if emergent properties only supervene on the physical 
given the addition of contingent trans-ordinal laws, then emergentism seems like 
repackaged traditional dualism. 
 In this chapter, I offer two strategies for the emergentist to express both the 
distinctness and sufficiency claims coherently, in a way which distinguishes 
emergentism both from traditional dualism and non-reductive physicalism. I will 
begin in Part A by exploring the notion of distinctness, the sense if an emergent 
phenomenon’s being a “genuine novelty”. I will attempt to relate this to recent 
discussions on grounding and fundamentality in metaphysics. In Part B, I will 
explore the notion of sufficiency and develop an alternative form of supervenience 
which better matches what the emergentist is saying. On my account, there are two 
distinct kinds of explanation at play in the debate: ontological explanation, or 
“grounding”, and existential explanation, or “supervenience.” 
PART A 
§2.  Emergence and Ontological Explanation 
2.1 Sufficiency and Distinction 
 Traditional dualists, ontological emergentists, and non-reductive physicalists 
all acknowledge that there is an “epistemic gap” between our physical concepts and 
our phenomenal concepts. The question which divides these positions is whether and 
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in what way this epistemic gap translates into an ontological gap.33 All sides 
acknowledge that phenomenal properties are distinct from physical properties: the 
question is what precisely this distinctness consists in.34 We’ll assume a physicalist 
cannot accept strong modal distinctness: that is, that it is possible that the same 
physical properties should occur without the same phenomenal properties.35 The 
traditional dualist does accept strong modal distinctness. If an emergentist denies 
strong modal distinctness, then something else must distinguish emergentism from 
physicalism. 
 What will do the trick? A physicalist can accept weak modal distinctness (or 
“multiple realizability”): the same phenomenal properties might occur, yet be 
realized by different physical properties. A physicalist can also accept that physical 
properties are numerically distinct from phenomenal properties; provided, that the 
right sort of further explanation must hold between the phenomenal properties and 
the physical properties.36 
                                            
33 Levine (1993) 
34 The following discussion of types of distinctness is adapted from Stoljar 
(forthcoming). 
35 ibid. 
36 For an argument for why supervenience (that is, a denial of strong modal 
distinctness) isn’t enough for physicalism without some further explanation of the 
supervenience, see Horgan (1993) 
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 What sort of further explanation is a physicalist committed to? Let’s call the 
relevant sort of explanation an ontological explanation.37 We can say that the 
physicalist holds that there is an ontological explanation for phenomenal properties 
in physical terms, that phenomenal properties ontologically depend upon physical 
properties, and that phenomenal and physical properties are not ontologically 
distinct.  
 If the emergentist can deny that this sort of ontological explanation holds 
between physical and phenomenal properties, then the emergentist can reject 
physicalism while maintaining an equally strong sense in which physical facts are 
sufficient for mental ones. The prescription for the emergentist who rejects strong 
modal distinctness is to hold that phenomenal and physical properties are 
nonetheless ontologically distinct insofar as the phenomenal does not ontologically 
depend upon the physical or admit of an ontological explanation in physical terms. 
 Of course, we have yet to define what an “ontological explanation” is 
supposed to be. One might be skeptical about the concept at this point and hold that 
ontological explanation just is modal explanation. In this section, I’ll argue that (i) 
                                            
37 The terms “ontological explanation” and “metaphysical explanation” are used 
inconsistently within current literature in a variety of contrastive ways, typically 
with one supposed to refer to some sort of modal explanation or supervenience, and 
the other supposed to refer to a “metametaphysical” grounding or fundamentality 
relation or to the traditional concept of essence or nature. I will be using 
“ontological” for the latter and “metaphysical”, “existential” or “modal” for the 
former. For the reverse usage, see Barnes (forthcoming). 
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there are a family of concepts of “grounding” in the present literature which diverge 
from modal explanation and which support a distinctive kind of ontological 
explanation, and that (ii) non-reductive physicalists need this notion in order to 
formulate the minimal commitments of physicalism, leaving the door open for 
emergentists to take advantage of it. 
2.2 Grounding as Ontological Explanation 
 Ontological explanation is a non-causal form of explanation. A causal 
explanation tells us how a thing came to be as it is; an ontological explanation tells 
us why a thing is the sort of thing that it is. For instance, suppose a burglar steals 
my television. A causal explanation of why the burglar stole my television will 
involve the burglar’s desire for dishonest gain, my door being unlocked, his patiently 
observing my being away from home, and the various physical movements involved 
in the burglar’s transporting the television into his minivan. An ontological 
explanation of the burglar’s stealing my television will begin with an explanation of 
what precisely stealing consists in: that is, the nature of private property in Western 
society, what sorts of transfers are legitimate and which aren’t, the various facts 
which explain why the television qualifies as mine, and so on – with each of these in 
turn requiring some ontological explanation in their own right. These ontological 
explanations appeal to some basic notion of “ontological dependence”38, which has 
come to be known as “grounding.” 
                                            
38 Note that various sources refer to the intended relation instead as 
“metaphysical dependence”, and reserve “ontological dependence” for a kind of modal 
dependence. 
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 Fabrice Correia (2008) distinguishes three forms of “ontological dependence.” 
One of these is the dependence of the existence of one thing upon another39, and a 
second is the dependence of the essence of one thing upon another40. The third, 
which is relevant to my purposes here, is a kind of non-causal explanatory 
dependence, on which one thing explains why another is the case. Putative examples 
of this include: (i) Sam is ill or 2=5, because Sam is ill; (ii) Something is human 
because Sam is human, and also because Kevin is human, etc.; (iii) This vase is 
colored because it is red; (iv) This ham sandwich exists because the slice of ham is 
between the two pieces of bread; and (v) The event that was Sam’s walking 
yesterday exists because Sam was walking yesterday.41 For simplicity, this is the 
relation I mean to indicate by “ontological dependence” or “grounding.” 
 Notably, the recent literature on grounding represents a revival of a sort of 
neo-Aristotelianism, and a move away from the debates between Carnap and Quine 
which occupied much of the 20th century. The central question in metaphysics shifts 
from what things exist to how things exist: that is, what grounds what.42 Jonathan 
Shaffer writes: 
 
The Quinean and Aristotelian tasks involve structurally distinct conceptions 
of the target of metaphysical inquiry. For the Quinean, the target is flat. The 
                                            
39 I identify this with supervenience – see section 3 of this chapter. 
40 I identify this as a variety of grounding – see 2.6.1 of this chapter. 
41 All examples taken from Correia (2008), 1022 
42 Corkum (2008) 
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task is to solve for E = the set (or class, or plurality) of entities. There is no 
structure to E. For any alleged entity, the flat conception offers two 
classificatory options: either the entity is in E, or not. 
 For the neo-Aristotelian, the target is ordered. The task is to solve for 
the pair <F, G> of fundamental entities and grounding relations, which 
generate the hierarchy of being. For any alleged entity, the ordered 
conception offers not two but four major classificatory options: either the 
entity is in F, in G, in neither but generated from F through G, or else in the 
rubbish bin of the non-existent. (If the entity is in the third class, then there 
will be further sub-options as to how the entity is grounded.)43 
 
 For example, metaphysical questions in the Quinean mode will be whether 
numbers exist, whether hurricanes exist, whether wars exist, and so on. 
Metaphysical questions in the neo-Aristotelian mode will instead take for granted 
that such things exist, but instead ask whether these things are grounded in some 
other facts about the world, or whether they are not grounded in anything further: 
that is, whether they are fundamental.  Hurricanes and wars are clear cases of 
entities grounded in other entities.44 Numbers are a case under debate: a Platonist 
will hold that numbers are fundamental, whereas on alternative views numbers will 
qualify as existing but as grounded in something else. Grounding relationships are 
                                            
43 “On What Grounds What”, 354 
44 We might instead speak of the property of being a hurricane as being grounded 
in other properties, or of the facts about hurricanes as being grounded in other facts.  
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supposed to help explain why certain necessary truths are so. It is a necessary truth 
that 2+2=4. If set theory is what grounds ordinary arithmetic, then 2+2=4 is 
explained by the facts about set theory. If something else grounds ordinary 
arithmetic, then 2+2=4 is not really explained by set theory, even though it is 
necessitated by it.45 Many of the far more ordinary facts about the world are believed 
to hold in virtue of some more basic set of facts.46 For example, the fact that Smith is 
a polygamist holds in virtue of the fact that Smith has more than one spouse, and 
the fact that Smith has a spouse holds in virtue of some complex set of social facts 
                                            
45 Psychologism thus is the view that the facts about a domain are grounded in 
certain psychological facts. In contrast, one might hold that psychological facts 
necessitate that 2+2=4 without being the grounds of 2+2=4.  
46 It is helpful to work in the mindset of a correspondence theory of truth. 
Sentences (basic units of language) express propositions. Propositions consist of 
various concepts structured together. Propositions represent the world and can be 
either true or false of it. Facts are those representable parts of the world in virtue of 
which propositions are true. (We might as easily speak of “states of affairs”.) The 
proposition <salt dissolves in water> is true iff the fact [salt dissolves in water] 
exists. Facts have a corresponding internal structure: facts consist of combinations 
of objects and properties: [salt dissolves in water] consists of two elements: the object 
‘salt’, and the property ‘dissolving-in-water’. Facts ground propositions, and facts are 
grounded in their elements or other facts. 
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about marriage and the public actions of Smith and his relevant spouse. This “in 
virtue of” relation can be identified with the notion of grounding.47 
 Suppose we accept a version of Occam’s razor on which we wish to minimize 
our ontological commitments. For the Quinean, this means minimizing the set of 
objects and properties which we assert positively exist. For the neo-Aristotelian, on 
the other hand, this only means minimizing the set of fundamental objects and 
properties. So long as a property is grounded in a property which is more 
fundamental, it doesn’t come with any ontological cost. 
 Other relations similar to grounding have been the source of recent 
discussion. One central motivation is concern about reference and indeterminacy: 
why it is that “pigs” refers to pigs and not to parts of pigs, pigs + random molecules, 
or something even more bizarre.48 The more fundamental properties are supposed to 
attract the reference of our terms. For Ted Sider, the question is whether or not 
something is “structural” (that is, a relation which “carves nature at its joints”).49 
                                            
47 So, x ontologically explains y = y is true in virtue of x = x grounds y = y 
ontologically depends on x 
48 For the origin of this discussion, see Putnam (1981) and Lewis (1984). Consider 
how “pigs have legs” could be made equally true of the world if every instance of 
“pigs” referred to eggs, and every instance of “legs” referred to yolks, with certain 
other changes to our vocabulary. In some way this would be an unusually 
“gerrymandered” interpretation of our language, so the more “natural” properties 
instead shape the reference of terms. 
49 Sider (2011) 
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For David Lewis, there is an important distinction between properties which are 
“perfectly natural” and those which aren’t.50 In the truthmaker literature associated 
with David Armstrong and others, the question is about what the minimal 
truthmakers are which make true various propositions.51 There are important 
differences between the theories and theorists associated with these terms, but for 
the purposes of this chapter it will suffice to bundle them together under the 
heading of “grounding” and pass over these disputes. 
 Note that grounding is supposed to be transitive. The fact that Smith has a 
multiplicity of spouses is grounded in some further facts about particular marriage-
events, distinct persons, and social practices in virtue of which there are such things 
as spouses. The fact that Smith is a polygamist is thus grounded in these further 
facts. The facts about the social practices which constitute marriage, in turn, are 
grounded in some more basic set of facts, and so on. It is plausible that at some point 
the grounding relation hits “bedrock”, certain facts which are more basic than any of 
the others, which are not further grounded in anything, and which taken together 
ground all of the other facts. We’ll call the thesis that this is so “fundamentalism”, 
and will use the term “fundamental” to describe any fact which is not grounded by 
any further fact. 
 The fundamental vs. non-fundamental distinction is helpful for sifting out 
these issues from the realist vs. nominalist distinction. All parties in a debate might 
accept that there are truths about ordinary-level facts (facts about tables and chairs 
                                            
50 Lewis (1983) 
51 Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers 
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and so on), and all might accept that ordinary-level facts are non-fundamental (they 
are grounded in facts about material composition, social practices, etc.). Nonetheless, 
one party might be a realist about non-fundamental facts, and the other party a 
nominalist about them. The nominalist may hold that only the fundamental facts 
are “real” or truly “exist”, in the proper sense of “real” or “exists”, and will provide 
anti-realist truth conditions for our speech about non-fundamentals. The realist will 
maintain that chairs are real without holding that there is anything fundamental 
about chairs. The concept of fundamentality or grounding allows us to safely bracket 
this debate and focus instead on determining what the fundamental facts must be: 
that is, what facts we need at a minimum to ground all of the others. 
2.3 Grounding, Reduction, and Supervenience 
 2.3.1  Reduction. So, what exactly is grounding? It might be a primitive 
notion (I think it is). But let’s entertain for a moment two attempts to analyze 
grounding in other terms which have had serious advocates over the years. 
 One relation it might seem natural to identify with grounding is reduction. 
Both grounding and reduction are “conservative” rather than eliminativist: that is, 
we can maintain realism about the higher-level in virtue of its being grounded in or 
reducible to some real lower-level domain. Both grounding and reduction are 
supposed to involve no added ontological costs for the grounded or reduced 
properties or entities, since they are “nothing over and above” what they are 
grounded in or reduced to. One might hold that there is a reduction of grounding to 
reduction.52 Call this the reduction-grounding hypothesis: 
                                            
52 Skiles (2013) 
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 (RGH) x grounds y iff y is reducible to x. 
 
 However, a non-reductive physicalist might wish to reject (RGH), since it 
suggests that if mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, then 
these mental properties are not grounded in the physical and come at added 
ontological cost.  
 Of course, “reduction” is ambiguous. We might distinguish a kind of 
explanatory/theoretical reduction from an ontological reduction: the first involves a 
translation of some of our sentences about the reduced domain (at least, those 
involving theoretical or causal roles) into the vocabulary of the reduction base, 
whereas the second involves a translation within the “language of ontology” of the 
nature of one thing into the nature of another. The non-reductivist might maintain 
that there is no possible explanatory or theoretical reduction of one domain to 
another – that the two represent independent domains which cannot be analyzed in 
terms of each other – and yet at the same time hold that the nature of the one 
domain contains nothing not already present in the nature of the other. (One might 
also hold the reverse)53. Clearly, for the non-reductive physicalist (RGH) must be 
                                            
53 That is, one might hold that all of the relevant sentences about the causal roles 
played by the reduced vocabulary can be translated into the vocabulary of the 
reduction base, but nonetheless hold that the one is ontologically irreducible into the 
other. See Chapter 6 for an account on which this would be true of biological 
functions. 
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interpreted in terms of ontological reduction rather than mere explanatory or 
theoretical reduction.  
 But what is an ontological reduction, if it doesn’t require explanatory or 
theoretical reduction? It seems as though the notion of ontological reduction is every 
bit as primitive as the notion of grounding: x is ontologically reducible to y just 
means that x is grounded in y. This makes (RGH) uninformative. 
 2.3.2  Entailment or Supervenience. One alternative relation it might seem 
natural to identify with grounding is entailment. For instance, Armstrong holds that 
truthmakers must necessitate the truths they make true. Call this the entailment-
grounding hypothesis: 
 
 (EGH) x grounds y iff x entails y 
 
Along similar lines, it may seem natural to identify grounding with supervenience, 
provided that supervenience is formulated in a way which involves metaphysical 
necessitation and entails (EH). Call this the supervenience-grounding hypothesis: 
 
 (SGH) x grounds y iff y supervenes on x with metaphysical necessity. 
 
 The advantage of identifying grounding with supervenience or entailment, 
rather than reduction, particularly for non-reductive physicalists, should be obvious. 
One gets to preserve realism about the higher-order domain, without the 
requirement of explanatory/theoretic reduction from one domain to the other. Frank 
Jackson’s From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998) provides an example of the application 
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of (SGH). Although Jackson does not use the term “grounding”, this is clearly the 
role which he means supervenience to play. The facts about ethics, for example, are 
supposed to supervene upon the physical facts. This means that the facts about 
ethics are real, but come at no added ontological cost. The same, naturally, is held by 
supervenience physicalists about the mental: the mental supervenes upon the 
physical, and thus is no addition to being. 
 However, grounding and supervenience are different forms of explanation, 
meant to answer to different sorts of questions. Grounding answers the question, 
“why is x the sort of thing which it is?” or “in virtue of what is x the sort of thing that 
it is?”  Supervenience is meant to answer the question, “why does x exist?” or “what 
can change whether or how x exists?”. The “because” of grounding is different from 
the “because” of supervenience.  
 This difference is reflected in three major problems with understanding 
grounding in terms of supervenience: the problem of asymmetry, the problem of non-
grounding necessities, and the problem of mere covariance. 
 2.3.3  Problem 1: Asymmetry.  Grounding is asymmetric. The fact that a ball 
has the power to roll holds in virtue of the fact that the ball is a sphere, but the fact 
that the ball is a sphere does not hold in virtue of its having the power to roll. In this 
respect, grounding is unlike necessitation: the fact that Smith is a polygamist 
necessitates that he has more than one spouse, and vice-versa, but it is having a 
multiplicity of spouses which grounds being a polygamist and not vice-versa.  
 The same problem applies to supervenience. Consider the example of the 
property of being a shape with three angles and the property of being a shape with 
three sides. It is plausible that these are distinct properties; certainly they are 
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distinct concepts.54 Being a shape with three angles supervenes upon being a shape 
with three sides, and being a shape with three sides supervenes upon being a shape 
with three angles. Nonetheless, it’s not clear that grounding explanations go one 
way or the other in this case – or that both properties aren’t grounded in some 
simpler property, that of being a triangle. So, supervenience can’t be grounding. 
 To take another example, consider the following properties of gasses: 
pressure supervenes upon temperature and volume, temperature supervenes upon 
pressure and volume, and volume supervenes upon temperature and pressure. Even 
though the distribution of any one of these properties will supervene upon the 
distribution of the other two, it is not clear which property could be said to be 
grounded in the other two. If anything, all three are grounded in molecular kinetic 
energy. 
 Alternatively, consider that one might hold that the property of being a true 
proposition supervenes upon the property of being known by a necessarily 
omniscient God and vice-versa, yet hold that God knows the propositions because 
they are true, not that they are true in virtue of their being known by God.55 
 Clearly, (SGH) is too permissive. One could try to block this objection by 
defining grounding in terms of asymmetric supervenience: 
 
                                            
54 See Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity 
55 That is, if one permits that God’s making p the case can be distinguished from 
God’s knowing that p is the case.  
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(SGH*)  x grounds y iff y supervenes on x with metaphysical necessity, but x 
does not supervene upon y with metaphysical necessity. 
 
 However, (SGH*) is now too restrictive. Suppose advanced philosophers in 
some ideal future discover the true analysis of the nature of knowledge – something 
like JTB+. Clearly, the property of knowing p to be the case should be grounded in 
the various JTB+ properties. It is not as though knowing p is something over and 
above JTB+. However, the knowledge properties will supervene on the conjunction of 
the JTB+ properties and vice-versa. So, under (SGH*), knowledge would not be 
grounded in the JTB+ properties. 
 2.3.4 Problem 2: Non-Grounding Necessities. A fact can necessitate another 
fact without grounding it. Two examples have been given by Kit Fine (2001, 2009). 
First, that the singleton set of Socrates exists necessitates that Socrates exists and 
vice-versa, but the existence of the singleton set of Socrates is grounded in the 
existence of Socrates and not vice-versa. Socrates does not exist in virtue of his 
singleton set’s existence. Similarly, it is a necessary truth that Socrates exists if he 
is not numerically identical to the Eiffel tower, but the existence of Socrates is not 
grounded in his non-identity to the Eiffel tower. There seem to be many such cases 
of “accidental necessity” along these lines, properties which do not form part of the 
ground of a thing even though they are necessary and/or sufficient conditions for it.56 
Fabrice Correia offers this example: 
                                            
56 We might also say it is a case of a necessary property which is not an essential 
property. The traditional notion of essence, should one choose to accept it, lines up 
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Define a cat-singleton as a singleton whose member is a cat. Then 
the property of being a cat supervenes … on the property of being a member 
of a cat-singleton, while it is very implausible to say that facts of whether or 
not something is a cat are ontologically derivative upon facts of whether or 
not something belongs to a cat-singleton.57 
 
 Because of this, an emergentist could plausibly hold the position that 
emergence is a case of an a posteriori necessity, while noting that not all cases of a 
posteriori necessities are cases in which the grounding relation holds. E. J. Lowe 
(1998) offers the example of an individual and the individual’s life. Suppose we grant 
that, given that Socrates exists in a world, Socrates’s life also necessarily exists in 
that world. “Socrates’s life” is plausibly a rigid designator: it designates the same life 
in all possible worlds regardless of qualitative differences between the worlds. In a 
world in which it was Euthyphro who was put on trial for corrupting the youth and 
died by drinking hemlock, and Socrates was a popular sophist who subverted the 
course of justice, “Socrates’s life” designates the life of the sophist and not the life of 
the man put on trial. However, this seems compatible with holding that Socrates 
                                                                                                                                  
much more clearly with ontological dependence than it does with mere modal 
dependence. Of course, one need not accept essentialism to accept grounding. 
Grounding is a broader notion than the notion of essence: the x’s might be grounded 
in the y’s without y being essential to x, though the reverse cannot hold. 
57 Correia (2008), 1029 
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does not live the life he lives in virtue of being Socrates: it is not as though it is 
essential to Socrates that he live his life. The properties of Socrates’s life may 
supervene upon the properties of Socrates without following in some way from the 
nature of Socrates. The posteriori physicalist needs to make an argument for why 
the grounding relation holds between the physical and the mental, above and beyond 
asserting that it is a case of some posteriori necessity resulting from a rigid 
designator. 
 2.3.5 Problem 3: Mere Covariation. The history of supervenience is often 
forgotten. Consider that our notion of supervenience is descended from the moral 
theories of R. M. Hare and G. E. Moore, who held that the moral properties 
supervened upon the descriptive properties as a way of promoting non-naturalism 
about moral properties.58 Because supervenience only purports to involve the co-
variation of two properties – no change in one without a change in the other – it did 
not imply any ontological dependence of the one upon the other. (By analogy, 
consider how two variables might be correlated over time without the one being 
causally dependent on the other.) It was in the work of Donald Davidson59 that 
supervenience found its conversion from a non-naturalist (or dualist) to a physicalist 
(or naturalist) thesis. However, as Horgan60 argues, supervenience never broke free 
                                            
58 Hare (1952) 80-81; Moore (1922), 261. Moore does not use the term 
‘supervenience’, but clearly endorses a supervenience thesis. 
59 Davidson (1970) 
60 Horgan (1993), 563: “Supervenience is ontological if it is an objective relation 
between lower-level properties and facts and genuine, objective, higher-level 
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of its history. It has remained a relation of mere covariance between properties: a 
kind of “synchronic correlation” without further explanation. 
 An emergentist dualist can just as well accept supervenience as a physicalist, 
if the emergentist is willing to hold that the supervenience is mere covariance 
without further explanation. Thus, supervenience alone is unable to serve as a 
definition of physicalism. What is needed is “superdupervenience”: supervenience 
with some sort of physicalistically-acceptable explanation for the supervenience, an 
explanation of why the is properties of the subvening base are definitive of the 
supervening property.61  
 In other words, what is needed is an ontological explanation for the 
supervenience. Supervenience must be explained in terms of the grounding of one 
property in another: one needs supervenience plus grounding for 
superdupervenience. So, supervenience (or entailment) can’t itself serve as the 
grounding relation, and (EGH) and (SGH) are false. 
 2.3.6 Problem 3: Wilson’s Rebuttal. Jessica Wilson (1999) argues that an 
explanation in terms of what is definitive of the supervening property in the 
subvening base is neither necessary nor sufficient for the sort of superdupervenience 
the physicalist needs. Explanations of the sort Horgan requires for 
superdupervenience, she acknowledges, are not likely to be forthcoming for either 
phenomenal states or for the domains of normativity and intentionality. Instead, for 
                                                                                                                                  
properties and facts ... supervenience for a given mode of discourse is robustly 
explainable if it is explainable as ontological.”  
61 ibid., 579 
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Wilson, what the physicalist needs for superdupervenience is for every causal power 
of a mental property to be numerically identical with some causal power of a 
physicalistically acceptable base property.62 Call this the causal-power-grounding 
hypothesis: 
 
(CPGH) x grounds y iff y supervenes on x with metaphysical necessity and 
each of the causal powers associated with y is numerically identical with a 
causal power x. 
 
 Motivating (CPGH) is a form of Alexander’s dictum, on which properties are 
to be individuated by their causal powers. Wilson reflects on the causal exclusion 
arguments of Jaegwon Kim, on which widespread overdetermination appears to be a 
problem for any view on which mental properties have causal powers which are 
numerically distinct from the causal powers of their underlying physical base. On 
Wilson’s view, the emergentist’s reply to Kim’s argument is to deny the causal 
closure of the physical, whereas the appropriate physicalist response is to hold to the 
numerical identity of causal powers.63 Thus, (CPGH) captures a way in which a 
physicalist can hold that mental properties are grounded in (and thus not distinct 
from) the physical which emergentists can’t accept. 
                                            
62 Wilson (1999), 41 
63 ibid., 42: “each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property 
is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property” 
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 However, the sort of emergence Wilson has in mind – the sort which is 
committed to the denial of the causal closure of the physical – is much stronger than 
the sort of emergence which I have been discussing in this chapter. As I argue in 
Chapter 3, both emergentists and non-reductive physicalists can accept a robust 
form of downward causation while denying neither causal closure nor the numerical 
distinctness of higher-level causal powers from physical causal powers, provided 
that (i) there are no novel or emergent causal forces at the higher level, and (ii) such 
“downward causation” does not have a structure on which effects are to be deduced 
as conclusions from a set of causes and laws as premises. Because emergentism can 
accept causal closure, causal closure cannot be the basis for distinguishing 
emergentism from physicalism or for establishing the physicalistic acceptability of a 
theory.64  
 Of course, emergentists and physicalists who accept Alexander’s dictum 
might still disagree about whether the causal powers possessed by mental properties 
are numerically identical with causal powers of various physical base properties, or 
whether there is merely a persistent covariation between the causal powers of each. 
But how would such a question be resolved? It would be resolved by whether or not 
there is an ontological explanation of the mental properties in terms of the physical 
base properties. Suppose no such explanation existed: we simply have two sets of 
numerically distinct properties, P and M, with P having one set of causal powers 
(PC) and M having a set of causal powers (MC). In the absence of an explanation of 
why M is nothing over and above P, given the numerical distinctness of P and M 
                                            
64 See also Horgan (2002) for his similar reply to Wilson. 
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(which the non-reductive physicalist accepts), what motivation would there be for 
holding that (MC) is a subset of (PC)? The non-reductive physicalist is left rather 
like someone insisting that there are two numerically distinct synchronized 
swimmers, but that their kicks and splashes are not numerically distinct. If the 
powers aren’t distinct, why think the properties are – and if the properties are 
distinct, why think the powers aren’t? 
 So, (CPGH) can’t serve as a definition of grounding for the physicalist, 
because resolving questions about the identity of causal powers depends upon 
resolving questions of grounding or ontological explanation for the properties which 
have those causal powers. 
 2.3.7 Other Differences. There are other distinctions between the grounding 
relation and supervenience. There is such a thing as partial grounding, but not such 
a thing as partial supervenience.65 Supervenience is reflexive, but grounding is not.66 
Supervenience is generally understood as a relation between properties in general, 
whereas grounding is generally held to be a relation between particular entities or 
                                            
65 See the discussion in 2.6 below 
66 Every set of properties supervenes upon itself, but nothing grounds itself 
(except perhaps the fundamental). I see this as presenting no problem, however, 
insofar as it would be easy enough to modify (SGH) to require that a thing not 
supervene upon itself, or to modify the notion of grounding so that everything is 
trivially grounded in itself. 
  55 
local facts.67 These are worth noting, but do not seem to prevent us from identifying 
the two in the way that the problems listed above do.  
 It is also worth noting that the preceding arguments show that supervenience 
is not sufficient for grounding, but none of them show that supervenience is not 
necessary for grounding. One might still hold a weaker, one-directional version of 
the supervenience-grounding hypothesis: 
 
(WSGH): x grounds y only if y supervenes on x with metaphysical necessity. 
 
However, since (WSGH) is compatible with an emergentist’s accepting 
supervenience with metaphysical necessity while denying the grounding of emergent 
properties in physical properties, the non-reductive physicalist needs something 
further which can play the role of grounding or ontological dependence. 
 
 
                                            
67 For instance, the chemical properties supervene upon the physical properties, 
but it’s the fact that there is water in the glass which is grounded in the H2O’s 
physical structure. However, this should not be regarded as a problem in the way 
the problems above are regarded as a problem. We can speak of grounding between 
sets of properties: a moral naturalist holds that the moral facts are grounded in the 
natural facts. We can also speak of local supervenience as opposed to global 
supervenience: the properties instantiated by the water in the glass locally 
supervene upon the properties instantiated by the H2O molecules. 
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2.4 Why Non-Reductive Physicalists Need Grounding 
 Let’s step back a bit. We are assuming there are truths about our 
phenomenal states. Given that it’s not prima facie obvious that phenomenal states 
are physical states, the physicalist needs to give an explanation for how the truths 
about the phenomenal are really truths about the physical. One suitable explanation 
is type-identity: every phenomenal property (or type) is identical to some physical 
property (or type). This can be understood as a kind of explanatory reduction. 
However, a dominant strain of contemporary physicalism does not claim that this 
sort of reduction is possible. It may or may not accept the identity of phenomenal 
event tokens with physical event tokens, but it does not accept the numerical 
identity of properties. So, the non-reductive physicalist has to give some further 
explanation for why phenomenal properties can exist and be numerically distinct 
from physical properties and yet not pose a worry for the physicalist’s doctrine that 
everything which exists is physical. 
 The non-reductive physicalist could simply assert that phenomenal 
properties come at “no additional ontological cost” above and beyond the physical 
properties, even though they are not identical to physical properties. This assertion 
might include an interesting account of why we should not expect a reductive 
explanation of the phenomenal in physical terms – perhaps that we fail to directly 
grasp the true nature of phenomenal properties (namely, their physical nature) 
through our phenomenal concepts, because phenomenal concepts are so weird and 
first-person-y. However, this doesn’t lift the original explanatory burden: how is it 
that physical properties are not distinct from phenomenal properties for the 
purposes of ontology, given that they are numerically distinct? 
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 At this point, we noted that the non-reductive physicalist can turn to the 
notion of a special kind of “ontological explanation”, or grounding. Either grounding 
admits of further analysis, or it doesn’t. Grounding cannot be analyzed in terms of 
either supervenience or asymmetric supervenience. Grounding might be analyzed in 
terms of an explanatory or theoretical reduction, but if we do so then non-reductive 
physicalism is false – so, that won’t do. Perhaps grounding can analyzed in terms of 
a primitive notion of ontological reduction, but this isn’t especially informative. So, 
in lieu of some further analysis of grounding, the best strategy at this point for the 
non-reductive physicalist is to accept a kind of primitivism about the concepts of 
grounding and fundamentality.  
 I must emphasize that it is the non-reductive68 physicalist who needs a 
primitive notion of grounding, not the emergentist. A physicalist who holds that 
mental properties are not identical to physical properties and yet are not truly 
distinct from them needs an ontological explanation of mental properties in terms of 
physical properties. Supervenience does not provide that explanation, and in the 
absence of other candidates the physicalist must hold that grounding cannot be 
further analyzed. It is not as though the emergentist invokes this novel form of 
explanation – “grounding” – in order to deny it. The emergentist simply denies both: 
 
(D1)  mental properties are identical to physical properties; and 
 
                                            
68  The reductive physicalist, recall, could define grounding in terms of epistemic 
or theoretical reduction. 
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(D2) there is some ontological explanation of mental properties in terms of 
physical properties, other than identity, such that mental properties are no 
addition to ontology. 
 
 The reductive physicalist can accept (D1); it is the non-reductive physicalist 
who bears the burden of denying (D1) while accepting (D2). A skeptic about 
grounding, who holds that (D2) has no further content beyond (D1), should hold that 
if (D1) is false then (D2) is false. Thus, a skeptic about grounding must hold that 
dualism is the immediate consequence of denying (D1), and that it is non-reductive 
physicalism which is incoherent. To formalize the argument: 
 
(P1) If physicalism is true, then either (D1) or (D2) is true 
 
(P2) If non-reductive physicalism is true, then (D1) is false 
 
(P3) Ontological explanations are either primitive or further analyzable. 
 
(P4) If ontological explanations are further analyzable, then the analysis is 
in terms of supervenience or entailment, or in terms of 
explanatory/theoretical reduction, or in terms of something else. 
 
(P5) If non-reductive physicalism is true, then ontological explanations are 
not analyzable in terms of explanatory/theoretical  reduction. 
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(P6) Ontological explanations are not analyzable in terms of supervenience 
or entailment. 
 
(P7) There is nothing else, besides supervenience, entailment, or 
explanatory/theoretical reduction, in terms of which ontological explanations 
can be analyzed. 
 
(C) If non-reductive physicalism is true, then there is some primitive 
ontological explanation of mental properties in terms of physical properties, 
other than identity, such that mental properties are no addition to ontology. 
 
 Premises (P1) – (P5) are supposed to be uncontroversial. Premise (P6) 
appeals to the rejection of (SGH), (SGH*) and (EGH) in section 2.3. Premise (P7) is 
an open question, and perhaps some further account of ontological explanation or 
grounding can be offered to give us a reason not to believe (P7) is the case.  
 I do not think this conclusion should trouble the non-reductive physicalist 
that badly. I see no reason to be a skeptic about primitive grounding or 
fundamentality relations69, and it seems to be a fruitful way to understand the non-
reductive physicalist’s claim. I regard this class of ontological explanation as just as 
legitimate a species of explanation as causal explanations, and existential (or modal) 
explanations.  
                                            
69 I use the plural, since one might be a pluralist and hold that there are many 
distinct grounding relations. 
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 What would an ontological explanation for consciousness in physical terms 
look like? Consider representationalist theories of consciousness, like those 
advocated by Tye (1995), Lycan (1998), and Dretske (1995). On these accounts, what 
it is to be in a conscious state is grounded in the nature of what it is to be in a 
representational state. Being a representational state is supposed to explain what 
consciousness is, on these accounts, not merely necessitate that it exists. An account 
like Tye’s would be an example of a non-reductive physicalist account of 
consciousness on which the mental is grounded in the physical representational 
state, contrary to emergentism. 
 For our purposes, the significance of the argument is that the emergentist is 
entitled to make use of this primitive notion of grounding in explaining how 
emergentism is distinct from non-reductive physicalism. 
2.5 Distinctness as a Denial of Grounding 
 Let’s return to the ontological emergentist’s original distinctness claim. We 
needed a sense of “distinctness” which the emergentist could affirm but the non-
reductive physicalist had to deny, even while the emergentist might join physicalists 
in denying strong modal distinctness. We now have one: 
 
(Distinctness) If a phenomenon e is ontologically emergent from basal 
conditions b, then e is not wholly grounded in b. 
 
 For instance, Smith’s being in pain p may supervene upon Smith’s overall 
physical state, but the truth of “Smith is in pain” is not grounded in the facts about 
Smith’s physical state. There is a causal sense of “because” in which Smith is in pain 
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because he is in the physical state he is in – e.g., because he was stung by a jellyfish 
while swimming off the coast of Cairns. There is also an existential or modal sense of 
“because” in which Smith is in pain because he is in the physical state he is in – e.g., 
if one were to change the chemistry of Smith’s brain, Smith would experience 
pleasure rather than pain. However, there is also an ontological sense of “because”, 
and the emergentist holds it is not true in this sense that Smith is in pain because 
he is in the physical state he is in. It is not in virtue of being in such and such a 
physical state that he is in pain, because what it is to be in a particular physical 
state and what it is to be in pain have two different natures. 
 The special attraction of grounding for emergentists goes back to issues about 
reference. There is something particularly bizarre and gerrymandered about 
reinterpreting the language of “thoughts” and “desires” and “beliefs” in terms of a 
complex of physical states. While, in principle, one might successfully map every 
occurrence of “__ believes the sky is blue” onto a particular disjunction of brain 
states in different brains, it seems as though why we’d have the resulting collection 
of brain states would be explained by their being the base for “___ believes the sky is 
blue”, not that they’d form some sort of natural pattern which suggests the content 
of “____ believes the sky is blue”.70 If reference fixes to properties which are more 
fundamental or “natural”, and the reference of mental terms seems not to be fixed by 
                                            
70 Contrast this with artifact kinds, like “table”. While “table” might have a 
complex physical realization, when the social and mental facts are included the 
reference of table becomes quite natural. 
  62 
anything else, perhaps this is a reason to think that mental properties are 
fundamental cuts in the structure of the world. 
 Understanding emergentism in this way is similar to a recent proposal by 
Elizabeth Barnes.71 On Barnes’s account, an emergent phenomenon is one which is 
dependent upon and sustained by its basal conditions, but which is nonetheless 
fundamental. She contrasts this with the “levels ontology” typically associated with 
emergence, on which the hierarchical structure of levels determines the facts about 
fundamentality: the simple stuff at the bottom is the most fundamental, and the 
higher you go in the hierarchy, the more complex and the less fundamental things 
get. In place of this, Barnes’s version of emergence is one on which the “higher level” 
phenomena can nonetheless be fundamental: minds remain the most salient 
candidate for emergence, but other examples she considers without committing to 
                                            
71 Barnes (2012). A brief summary of her project, taken from the abstract: “I 
argue for a new way of characterizing ontological emergence. I appeal to recent 
discussions in metaontology of fundamentality and dependence, and show how 
emergence can be simply and straightforwardly characterized using these notions. I 
then argue that many of the standard problems for emergence don’t apply to this 
account: given a clearly specified metaontological background, emergence becomes 
much easier to explicate. If my arguments are successful, they show both a helpful 
way of thinking emergence and the potential utility of discussions in metaontology 
when applied to first-order metaphysics.” 
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include persons72, living beings73, property tropes74, certain quantum phenomena75, 
and other cases76.  
 My account is similar to Barnes’s in appealing to a notion of ontological 
explanation to explain how emergent phenomena are distinct from their basal 
conditions. Particularly, if a property is not grounded at all in its basal conditions or 
anything else – as seems plausible for consciousness – then the property qualifies as 
fundamental, and it is emergent on both my account and Barnes’s account. However, 
my suggestion differs in a few notable ways. First, Barnes’s account supposes a 
much weaker connection between emergent properties and their basal conditions – 
emergents are sustained by their basal conditions – whereas the account I offer in 
this section is intended to be consistent even with the metaphysical necessitation of 
                                            
72 That is, if one adopts the views of Merricks (2003) 
73 That is, if one adopts the views of Van Inwagen (1990) 
74 That is, if one holds that property tropes are fundamental, but nonetheless 
depend upon other property tropes to exist: e.g., mass tropes are fundamental, but a 
thing must have size and shape to have mass – ‘point masses’ are a useful 
theoretical construct but not real. 
75 That is, on certain interpretations of phenomena like quantum entanglement 
and the generation of a field from constituent particles. 
76 She notes a novel use for emergence in the case of someone with a gunky 
ontology, on which everything has proper parts descending downward, infinitely 
smaller, whereby a gunk-theorist could nonetheless hold that some intermediate 
level is fundamental, and thus emergent from its parts. 
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emergents by their basal conditions. Second, Barnes’s account eschews talk of 
hierarchical levels, but I see no reason to reject talk of “levels”, provided that we 
recognize, as she does, that the facts about fundamentality and grounding need not 
line up with the facts about supervenience represented by the various levels.77 
Third, on my account, a phenomenon might count as emergent without being 
fundamental, provided that it is grounded in some other emergent phenomenon. For 
instance, suppose that persons and conscious experiences have the same physical 
basal conditions, and that conscious experiences are fundamental. Suppose further 
that facts about persons aren’t fundamental, but that these facts are wholly 
grounded in conscious experiences like memories, and not grounded in their physical 
basal conditions. On my account, persons would qualify as emergent, but not on 
Barnes’s account. 
 Finally, and most significantly, my account does not require that an entity be 
fundamental in order to qualify as emergent, but only that it not be wholly grounded 
in its basal conditions. My account is consistent with a notion of partial grounding, 
and thus with weaker and stronger kinds of emergence. 
2.6 Partial Grounding and Real Definitions 
 I have encouraged regarding the notion of grounding as conceptually and 
metaphysically primitive, not admitting of further analysis. However, there may be 
                                            
77 As I understand it, part of Barnes’s motivation in avoiding “levels” is a desire to 
avoid Kim’s overdetermination problem. However, I think we should be able to avoid 
Kim’s overdetermination problem without losing the “levels ontology”, so long as the 
emergentist does not hold to emergence of novel causal forces. See Chapter 3. 
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certain illuminating and useful ways of explaining and thinking about the notion of 
grounding without giving an analysis of it; particularly, these may help make clear 
how grounding could be “whole” or “partial”. 
 One useful notion is that of a thing’s real nature, or essence. Another useful 
metaphor involves the idea of trans-world counterparts. A final useful metaphor 
involves the idea of a “real definition.” Put together, these may illustrate the sense 
in which an entity can be partially or wholly grounded in another. 
 2.6.1 Essences. For someone who believes in essences, if A is part of the 
essence of B, then the fact that B exists is partly grounded in the fact that A exists. 
Essential to Socrates is the property of being a human. So, being Socrates is partly 
grounded in being a human. Of course, being Socrates is grounded in other things 
too.  We might assume that if we took all of the essential properties of Socrates, then 
we’d have the whole ground of Socrates, but this need not be the case. We shouldn’t 
conflate the notion of grounding and the notion of being an element in something’s 
essence. Kit Fine (2010) argues that the two should be kept sharply separate.78 For 
                                            
78 “I think it should be recognized that there are two fundamentally different 
types of explanation. One is of identity, or of what something is; and the other is of 
truth, or of how things are. It is natural to want to reduce them to a common 
denominator - to see explanations of identity as a special kind of explanation of truth 
or to see explanations of truth as a special kind of explanation of identity or to see 
them in some other way as instances of a single form of explanation. But this strikes 
me as a mistake. And it seems to me that [it is an error to attempt] to assimilate or 
unify the concepts of essence and ground. The two concepts work together in holding 
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example, the fact that someone is a philosopher is grounded in the fact that Socrates 
is a philosopher – but it is surely not an essential part of someone’s being a 
philosopher that Socrates is a philosopher. The notion of grounding is thus broader 
than that of essence – being an essential property may be one of many kinds of 
grounding. 
 An emergentist can distinguish a stronger type of emergence on which the 
facts about the emergent phenomena are wholly grounded in the facts about basal 
conditions (e.g., no part of a thing’s essence or other grounds includes its basal 
conditions), and weaker types of emergence on which the facts about the emergent 
phenomena are only partly grounded in the facts about their basal conditions (e.g., a 
proper part of a thing’s essence includes its basal conditions). For example, perhaps 
it is essential to my thought of water that the thought have a certain causal relation 
to water in space and time, but the thought is also essentially conscious. Then, the 
thought is weakly but not strongly emergent. 
 I also do not think someone has to accept classical essentialism full-force in 
order to accept that grounding could work in a similar part/whole way. We might use 
the term “nature” to remain neutral between essentialism and non-essentialist 
accounts of the grounding or constitutive conditions of various phenomena. 
Emergent properties would then be those whose natures included something over 
and above the natures of their basal conditions.  
                                                                                                                                  
up the edifice of metaphysics; and it is only by keeping them separate that we can 
properly appreciate what they are and what they are capable of doing together.” 
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 2.6.2 Counterparts. A platypus is a monotreme. A monotreme is a mammal 
which lays eggs. The fact that something is a platypus is partly grounded both in its 
being a mammal and in its laying eggs. There is no possible world in which there is 
a platypus which is a fish, or in which a platypus has live births, because whatever 
it is that is a fish or has live births in that world, it isn’t a platypus. However, we 
might legitimately ask in such a world which of two species is the closest 
counterpart79 of the platypus in our world: platypus*, a species which is in all other 
respects like our platypus, but has live births, or platypus+, a species which is in all 
other aspects like ours, but which feeds its young by regurgitation or some means 
other than providing milk. Alternatively, we might ask whether a world in which the 
platypus was replaced with the platypus* or the platypus+ is closer to our world. 
 What would this tell us? It could give us a sense of how much weight each 
property bore vis-à-vis the property of being a platypus. Perhaps they are equally 
weighted, and there is no sensible answer to the question. But we can imagine a case 
in which two grounds are not equally weighted: the fact that someone is a 
philosopher is grounded both in Aristotle’s being a philosopher and in what it is to 
be a philosopher, but in some sense the world where Alexander the Great was a 
philosopher is closer than the world in which being a philosopher involves 
performing magic tricks. Thus, that someone is a philosopher is grounded in the 
                                            
79  Note that I do not think that one has to accept David Lewis’s account of 
trans-world “identity” in terms of one’s closest counterpart at another possible world 
in order to find something interesting in it about the relative weight of various 
elements within the natures of things. 
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essence of being a philosopher to a greater extent than it is grounded in Aristotle’s 
being a philosopher. 
 2.6.3 Real Definitions. Earlier, I noted that someone might hold (WSGH), the 
view that grounded facts supervene on their grounds. However, if there are partial 
grounding facts, then we should grant that a fact can partly ground another fact 
without necessitating it. 
 For instance, the fact that Jeremy is a bachelor is partly grounded in the fact 
that Jeremy is male, and partly grounded in the fact that Jeremy is part of a society 
which practices marriage, but neither fact alone necessitates that he is a bachelor. 
The property of being a brilliant philosopher is not a mere conjunction of two 
properties – a person can be brilliant and a philosopher, yet do mediocre philosophy. 
Nonetheless, the property of being a brilliant philosopher is partly grounded in being 
brilliant, partly grounded in being a philosopher, and partly grounded in a certain 
relation obtaining between brilliance and philosophy. 
 It may be helpful to think of facts as structured entities, representable parts 
of the world consisting of pairings of objects and properties. It may also be helpful to 
think of properties as having “real definitions”: various other properties which serve 
as criteria for whether a thing has the target property or not. It may then be helpful 
to think of one fact as grounding another when the objects and properties in one fact 
are elements in the “real definition” of the objects and properties in the other. For 
instance, the fact that Jeremy is a bachelor involves the pairing of object named by 
“Jeremy” with the property of being a bachelor, and being a bachelor is really 
defined as “being male and never being married and being eligible for marriage and 
being part of a society which practices marriage.”  
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 We might accept that, in principle, for every property there is some canonical 
definition: that is, a definition of the property in terms of the fundamental elements 
which ground it. If being the Civil War is grounded in an extensive conjunction 
and/or disjunction of fundamental physical, social, and psychological facts, this 
conjunction or disjunction is the canonical definition of the civil war. 
 How far one wishes to go with the notion of a “real definition” is up for grabs. 
The term “definition” here involves a certain degree of hyperbole. The terms in our 
language do not generally have strict definitions. Neither are we likely to find strict 
necessary and sufficient conditions for most of our concepts, especially the most 
useful and important ones. Speaking of a “real definition” of what it is to be an F in 
terms of G1, G2, G3… does not commit one to there being an appropriate definition of 
the concept for F or the word for F, especially not one in terms of G1, G2, G3…. There 
may be nothing “definition-like” about the set of properties which ground another 
property except for their being structured together in a some complex way or 
another. The only commitment to there being “real definitions” for properties here is 
the commitment entailed by fundamentalism: for every non-fundamental property, 
there is some number of fundamental properties which ground it. 
 Supposing we adopt the metaphor of “real definition”, we could say that the 
strongest form of emergence is one in which no part of the definition of the emergent 
entity includes its basal conditions, and that weaker forms of emergence are those in 
which a proper part of the definition of the emergent entity includes its basal 
conditions, but something else (the “novelty”) is also included. Combining this with 
the notion of relative weight within the nature of a thing (from 2.6.2), we could say 
that a weaker kind of emergence is one in which the relative weight of the basal 
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conditions in the real definition is greater, and a stronger kind of emergence is one 
in which the relative weight of the basal conditions is lesser. 
 What’s the advantage of admitting stronger and weaker kinds of emergence? 
It allows us to distinguish the strongest case of ontological emergence (that is, 
consciousness) from various weaker forms of emergence which one might very well 
still wish to regard as ontologically significant.80 While the physicalist can 
acknowledge a distinction between our theories of phenomenal consciousness, and 
our theories about psychology, economics, sociology, biology, and ultimately physics, 
the physicalist is committed to these phenomena all having the same nature – being 
grounded in the same sorts of facts about microphysics. Yet the relationship between 
physics and macroeconomics seems very different from the relationship between 
physics and phenomenology, and the issue is not that one is a “bigger jump” than the 
other on the hierarchy (both involve a big jump, and if anything macroeconomics is 
“larger scale” than phenomenal experience). The issue is that, unlike in the case of 
economics, neither the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical nor 
anything characteristic about the nature of physical properties seems to give an 
ontological explanation of what it is to be a phenomenal property. This is not an 
issue if one maintains that phenomenal properties are identical to physical ones (we 
might just be really confused). However, if one rejects the identity of these 
properties as the non-reductivist does, and isn’t persuaded by existing ontological 
explanations of consciousness (like Tye’s Representationalism), then emergentism 
seems like a reasonable position to take. 
                                            
80 See Chapter 5 
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2.7  Where’d the Mathematical Archangel Go? 
 One might wonder where C. D. Broad’s notion of “ideal deducibility” has gone 
to. After all, nothing in the claim that emergent properties are not wholly grounded 
in physical properties rules out that emergent properties could be deduced a priori 
from physical properties by a mathematical archangel. I think this is a legitimate 
position for an emergentist to hold: even if a mathematical archangel could deduce 
the emergent properties a priori, they might still be emergent. 
 However, in Chapter 4 I offer a new and more complex way in which “ideal 
reasoner” tests of this sort can be taken to offer a guide to whether there is a 
physicalistically acceptable ontological explanation for some higher-level 
phenomenon, and thus whether a phenomenon qualifies as emergent. I suggest that 
the question of whether or not there is an ontological explanation of the As in terms 
of the Bs becomes a question of whether the As could be a priori deduced by an ideal 
reasoner by means of analysis alone. There is much to say about what precisely the 
relevant sort of analysis would consist in, so I will hold off on this question until 
later. 
2.8 Preliminary Conclusions for the Emergentist 
 So, we’ve uncovered one strategy for the emergentist about phenomenal 
consciousness to take in order to develop a coherent account. The emergentist can 
affirm the sufficiency of the physical for the phenomenal alongside the physicalist, 
while maintaining – contrary to the physicalist – that phenomenal facts are not 
grounded in physical facts. For the emergentist, the phenomenal facts are distinct 
from the physical facts in a way which the physicalist cannot grant. Because 
grounding is not entailed by supervenience, the emergentist is free to interpret the 
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sufficiency of the physical for the phenomenal as consisting in supervenience with 
metaphysical necessity: a position Horgan calls “Moorean Minimal Emergentism”.81 
Because it is the non-reductive physicalist, rather than the emergentist, who has to 
introduce a distinctive kind of ontological explanation into the dialectic, the 
emergentist does not have to be concerned with skepticism about ontological 
explanation, “grounding”, “essences” or the like: if there are no such explanations, 
then it is the non-reductive physicalist who must either give up non-reductivism 
(accepting type-identity) or give up physicalism (becoming an emergentist). 
 In Part B, I will pursue an alternative strategy. Instead of clarifying the 
distinctness claim in order to sharpen the line between emergentism and non-
reductive physicalism, I will attempt to clarify the sufficiency claim in a way to 
sharpen the line between emergentism and traditional dualism. 
PART B 
§3.  Emergence and Sufficiency 
3.1 Is Emergence Necessary? 
 One way to understand the emergentist’s claim that phenomenal states 
“arise from” physical states, or that physical states are “sufficient for” phenomenal 
states, is in terms of the supervenience of phenomenal states on physical states with 
metaphysical necessity. In Part A, I argued that this is consistent with the claim 
that phenomenal states are not grounded in physical states. However, there are 
three prima facie reasons why an emergentist might wish to resist supervenience 
with metaphysical necessity. 
                                            
81 Horgan (2010) 
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 First, it seems to violate Hume’s dictum, that there are “no necessary 
connections between distinct essences.” Whether or not Hume’s dictum is a valid 
metaphysical principle and what the relevant notion of distinctness is supposed to 
be (let alone whether Hume even held the dictum) can be debated.82 But suppose 
that someone does hold it, and interprets it as meaning that there are no necessary 
connections between properties or entities where neither is identical to or grounded 
in the other. This rules out the version of emergentism described above. 
 Second, an emergentist might be strongly motivated by conceivability 
arguments for the possibility of Zombie worlds or Invert worlds, where the physical 
facts remain the same but the phenomenal facts are different, even while wishing to 
resist the whole of the traditional dualist’s conclusions from these arguments. 
Emergentism with metaphysical necessity has to bear the same burden as 
physicalism when it comes to resisting these arguments, but it has even fewer tools 
at its disposal to do so. (For example, the physicalist might attempt a dual-concept 
strategy; the emergentist cannot.) It’s coherent to accept that my experiencing colors 
as I do and not in an inverted way is necessitated by my brain state but not 
grounded in it. But why hold it? If it’s not grounded, why think it’s necessitated 
when it seems as if it’s not? 
 Third, it seems on the face of things to conflict with the emergentist’s 
traditional claim that emergents are not ideally deducible from their physical basal 
conditions, thus tending to collapse emergentism into a posteriori physicalism. 
                                            
82 See Stoljar (forthcoming) 
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 Suppose an emergentist wishes to reject supervenience with metaphysical 
necessity. One alternative is to hold that mental properties supervene upon the 
physical with a kind of nomic necessity, in virtue of certain contingent trans-ordinal 
laws. However, many traditional dualists hold this same position: physical states are 
sufficient for mental states in the sense of nomically necessitating them.83 It seems 
as though emergentism risks collapsing into traditional dualism. 
 I have three goals in Part B. First, I wish to clarify the metaphysical position 
I have been calling “traditional dualism” and precisely what aspects of it 
contemporary emergentists may find objectionable. Second, I wish to further 
illuminate both the concept of “sufficiency” and its connection to supervenience, in 
order to produce a notion of manipulative supervenience which seems a bit richer 
than the present canonical forms of supervenience and more in line with the 
emergentist view of the world. Finally, I wish to show how this concept of  
manipulative supervenience can fulfill the emergentist’s sufficiency claim in a way 
which is intermediate between the positions of the traditional dualist and the non-
reductive physicalist. 
3.2 What is Traditional Dualism? 
 In the early works of C. D. Broad and Samuel Alexander, emergentism in the 
mind was set up in contrast to substance dualism, much as emergentism in biology 
was set up in contrast to substance vitalism.84 Similarly, the sort of emergentism 
                                            
83 For example, see Chalmers (1996) 
84 A common point of misunderstanding is to think that the British emergentists 
were vitalists in the sense of positing vital substances or entelechies. Their view was 
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which I have been defending is meant to be a dualist position which is in some sense 
weaker than what I have been calling “traditional dualism”. 
 The typical way to divide up dualist positions has been in terms of what there 
is a duality of, and whether there is a duality of properties, of property instances, of 
events, of entities, of objects, or so on. Another approach has been to divide dualist 
views based on their approach to the causal powers of the non-physical, and whether 
they are interactionist, epiphenomenalist, involving predetermined harmonies, or so 
on. I doubt either approach is particularly helpful in discussions of what emergence 
is. It seems as if one might be an emergentist about all sorts of these “grammatical” 
categories of phenomena and still hold a position distinct both from physicalism and 
from traditional dualism. It also seems to me that causation is a messy enough topic 
in its own right to require separate treatment. Rather, dualists might be more 
interestingly distinguished in terms of what degree of dependence they accept of the 
mental on the physical. 
 All dualists hold that there are at least two distinct types of something or 
other in the world: that which has a nature which is wholly physical, and that which 
has a nature which is not wholly physical. For all dualists about the mind, mental 
phenomena are ontologically independent from physical phenomena. (This 
“independence” was identified in Part A with a lack of grounding). The traditional 
dualist holds that this ontological independence indicates a failure of a different 
kind of dependence, which we might call existential dependence, or the dependence 
                                                                                                                                  
intentionally proposed against and in contrast to substance vitalism. See 
McLaughlin (1992). 
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of one thing upon another for its existence.85 The traditional category of “substance” 
might be expressed as something on which other things depend for their existence, 
but which does not itself depend upon anything for its existence.86 We might say that 
the traditional dualist holds both: 
 
Grounding Dualism (GD): mental phenomena are not wholly grounded in 
physical phenomena. 
 
Partial Existential Independence from the Physical (PEIP): mental 
phenomena do not wholly depend for their existence on physical substances. 
 
 The emergentist accepts (GD), but rejects the traditional dualist’s claim 
(PEIP) that mental phenomena don’t wholly depend for their existence on physical 
phenomena. The emergentist holds that mental phenomena do wholly depend for 
their existence on physical phenomena. Traditional dualism can be further 
categorized into three degrees of strength, based on whether or not the traditional 
dualist accepts these further claims: 
 
                                            
85 Correia (2008) 
86 Corkum (2012) 
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Partial Existential Dependence on the Mental (PEDM): mental phenomena at 
least partly depend for their existence on mental substances.87 
 
Total Existential Independence from the Physical (TEIP): mental phenomena 
do not even partly depend for their existence on physical substances, but 
wholly depend for their existence on mental substances. 
 
 Minimal Traditional Dualism  is the conjunction of (GD) and (PEIP). A 
Substance Dualist further holds (PEDM), the claim that mental phenomena partly 
depend for their existence on a mental substance in addition to some physical 
substance. A Cartesian Substance Dualist holds the strongest form of traditional 
dualism, by adding the claim (TEIP). Thus, the Cartesian holds that mental 
phenomena depend wholly on the mental substance and can “float free” of the 
physical substance.88 The emergentist rejects (PEDM) and (TEIP) for the same 
                                            
87 I am using the term “substances” to indicate something which is itself totally 
existentially independent from anything else, without meaning to connote by 
“mental substances” any ghostly translucent-green ectoplasms or the like.  
88 Lowe (2006) distinguishes his non-Cartesian substance dualism from Cartesian 
substance dualism in the following way: a Cartesian holds that persons (or minds) 
are substances which have no physical properties, whereas a non-Cartesian 
substance dualist accepts that persons (or minds) are substances which may have 
some physical properties without having only physical properties. This seems 
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reasons that the emergentist rejects (PEIP): the emergentist holds that mental 
phenomena wholly depend upon the physical for their existence and nothing further 
– the mind is ontologically independent from but wholly existentially dependent 
upon the physical.  
 There are two questions which need to be clarified further if the notion of 
existential dependence is to serve to distinguish emergentism from traditional 
dualism. The first involves defining what the relevant notion of existential 
dependence is. The second is determining the sense in which this dependence could 
be “total” or “whole”, as opposed to merely “partial”. 
3.3 From Existential to Manipulative Dependence 
 3.3.1 The Necessary Condition Account. We might at first interpret 
“existential dependence” as indicating a logically necessary condition – there are no 
worlds in which the dependent state occurs without the state it depends upon. 
 
(Necessary Condition Account) if y depends for its existence on x, then 
necessarily if y exists, then x exists. 
 
 However, this is far too strong to be the relevant sense of existential 
dependence. Both non-reductive physicalists and emergentists alike acknowledge 
the weak modal distinctness – or “multiple realizability” – of the phenomenal and 
the physical: that is, that it is possible that the same phenomenal properties should 
                                                                                                                                  
consistent with my account here. Lowe’s motivation for substance dualism involves 
reflection on the problem of personal identity. 
  79 
occur, yet be realized by different physical properties.89 Suppose we want to say that 
my being in pain depends upon my being in the brain state that I am in. On the 
Necessary Condition Account, it follows that I could not be in pain without being in 
this exact brain state. However, surely it is logically possible that I could be in pain 
and yet be in a slightly different brain state – or, for that matter, that my pain 
states could have been realized in a brain with a very different structure. 
 3.3.2 The Generic Account. Perhaps the problem is that the Necessary 
Condition Account is too specific. Perhaps all we must hold is that there must be 
some physical state which realizes the relevant pain state. Call this the generic 
account: 
 
(Generic Account) if y depends for its existence on F, then necessarily if y 
exists, then some x exists such that Fx. 
 
 The Generic Account forms the first conjunct of Kim’s definition of Strong 
Local Supervenience.90 However, the Generic account leads to two problems. First, 
                                            
89 One might suggest that x could be given a disjunctive account to account for 
multiple realizability: necessarily, if y exists, then either x1 exists or x2  or . . . 
However, this won’t capture the sense in which y is supposed to depend for its 
existence on the particular realizer which in fact occurs, and not merely a 
disjunctive state of affairs. 
90 Kim (1993), “Varieties of Supervenience”: F supervenes upon G iff necessarily 
for every f in F there is some g in G such that necessarily every x that has f has g. 
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many physicalists as well as emergentists would not accept that this sort of 
existential dependence holds between phenomenal and physical states. Jackson 
(1998), for example, holds that physicalism is a contingent truth, and so allows that 
physicalists may accept that there is some possible world in which my being in pain 
is realized by an epiphenomenal ectoplasm. Likewise, while emergentists might hold 
that emergent properties must by their very nature have some basal conditions or 
other, it’s not clear why we must hold that the basal conditions are necessarily 
physical in every way the world could have been. Perhaps “emergence from 
ectoplasm” seems conceivable. 
 Second, the Generic account is too general. We want to say that emergent 
properties depend upon their specific basal conditions, not merely there being some 
similar basal conditions or other. There is a sense in which my pain depends upon 
this specific brain state, not just on being in a brain state. While my pain could have 
been realized by another brain state, there is something about this specific brain 
state which is relevant to my pain. 
 3.3.3 The Counterfactual Account. One might then be tempted to identify 
existential dependence with a kind of counterfactual dependence: 
 
(Counterfactual Account) if y depends for its existence on x, then in the 
nearby worlds where x does not exist, y does not exist. 
 
 However, Elizabeth Barnes notes that my own existence is counterfactually 
dependent on the prior existence of my parents: were they never to have existed, I 
  81 
wouldn’t have existed either. 91 Nonetheless, my own existence would continue even 
if the existence of my parents ceased. Mere counterfactual dependency is far too 
weak, insofar as it permits a kind of diachronic dependency.  
 3.3.4 The Sustaining Account. As an alternative, Barnes offers an account 
in terms of one thing “sustaining” the existence of another, a relation which is 
necessarily synchronic: 
 
(Sustaining Account) if x depends for its existence on y, then for every 
moment t at which y exists, in the nearby worlds in which x does not exist at 
t, y does not exist at t.92 
 
 Fortunately, my parents do not sustain my existence in this sense. On the 
other hand, perhaps a complex object does depend upon its parts in this sense – for 
each time at which a statue exists, were it not for the parts which compose it, the 
object would not exist. The Sustaining account captures an intuitive way in which 
wholes can depend upon their parts. It is tempting to think that this is the 
relationship between the mind and the body: were it not for my body at t, my mind 
wouldn’t be there at t.  
                                            
91 (forthcoming). Not that Barnes refers to “existential dependence” as 
“ontological dependence”, and what I call “ontological dependence” she calls 
“metaphysical dependence”. 
92 Related to this is the notion of “permanent existential necessitation” in Correia 
(2008), 1016. 
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 However, similar concerns which applied to the Necessary Condition account 
also apply to the sustaining account. Perhaps there’s no nearby world in which my 
pain isn’t realized by some brain state or other – the world in which my pain occurs 
in a silicon chip is very far away. However, it still isn’t clear why there wouldn’t be a 
nearby world in which my pain occurs at t but is realized by a different brain state 
at t. Even in the case of a statue, it is plausible that the world in which the same 
statue is composed of one fewer molecule of iron is closer than the world in which the 
statue ceases to exist because of the removal of one molecule of iron.  
 3.3.5 The Generic Sustaining Account. We might consider instead a more 
Generic version of the sustaining account: 
 
(Generic Sustaining Account) if y depends for its existence on F, then for 
every moment t at which y exists, in the nearby worlds in which no x exists 
such that Fx at t, y does not exist at t. 
 
 This is much closer to what emergentists wish to say about the dependence of 
the phenomenal on the physical. It is a distinctively synchronic form of dependence 
that doesn’t rule out multiple realizability. However, this account is still subject to 
the same objections as the earlier generic account: it leaves out the sense in which 
it’s this specific brain state happening at t that my pain depends upon at t. My 
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experience of pain is not just sustained by the existence of some brain state in 
general, but the existence of particular brain state.93 
 3.3.6 The Manipulation Account. The trouble with all of these suggestions 
seems to be that the vocabulary of possible worlds is too coarse-grained for our 
purposes: we are forced to talk of worlds at which a proposition about an entity’s 
existence is or isn’t true, a very “on” or “off” question, instead of talking about 
gradations of different values which a variable might hold. Borrowing a page from 
recent work in causal explanations94, we might attempt an account in terms of 
possible manipulations of one variable for another. 
 
(Manipulation Account) if y depends for its existence on x, then for every 
moment t at which y exists, there are some nearby worlds in which the value 
of x is altered at t, and the value of every other variable not on the path 
between x and y is kept fixed at t, and the value of y alters at t because of the 
change in x. 
 
 I will explore further the various elements in this account (including the 
relevant notions of being “on the path” and “because of”) shortly. For now, it’s worth 
noting that on the Manipulationist account, y exists because of x insofar as how y 
exists can be changed by how x exists, not merely that whether x exists can be 
                                            
93 While the emergentist denies a token-identity theory, the emergentist ought to 
accept a token-dependence theory. 
94 Woodward (2005) 
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changed by whether y exists. What is interesting about pains and brain states is not 
merely that one can eliminate pains by eliminating brains, but that one can alter 
pains by altering brains.  
 Like the sustaining account, this manipulative dependence is supposed to be 
synchronic rather than diachronic. Unlike the Necessary Condition account and the 
Sustaining account, the Manipulation account doesn’t rule out multiple realizability 
as a nearby possibility. At the same time, unlike the Generic account and the 
Generic sustaining account, the Manipulation account is consistent with holding 
that it is this particular brain state on which my experience of pain depends, insofar 
as changes in this brain state lead to changes in my experience of pain. Given these 
advantages, I will identify existential dependence with synchronic manipulative 
dependence. 
 3.3.7 “On the Path” and “Because”. Part of the definition I offered invokes 
the notion of keeping the values of everything variable not “on the path” between x 
and y fixed. Keeping these values fixed is important to avoiding a kind of pre-
emption problem: for instance, if emergent variable e (say, a phenomenal state) 
manipulatively depends upon two independent basal condition variables, b1 and b2, a 
manipulation of b1 for e might be “overdetermined” by a simultaneous alteration in 
the value of b2. By keeping the value of b2 fixed, we prevent this problem. At the 
same time, those variables which are along the path between b1 and e (e.g., sub-
personal psychological states) should be expected to change “along the way” when b1 
and e are altered, insofar as they are “along the path”. 
  85 
 I am taking the notion of a “directed path” from Woodward (2005).95 To 
express it more formally: a change in one variable may alter another variable 
directly, unmediated by any other variable. Call this a “direct manipulation”. We 
understand “is a manipulation of” to be the ancestral of the “is a direct manipulation 
of” relation. If b is a manipulation of e but not a direct manipulation of e, then for 
any other variable p which mediates this manipulation (so that b is a manipulation 
of p, and p is a manipulation of e, and it is thereby that b is a manipulation of e) the 
variable p is said to be “on the path” between b and e. (Further, anything which 
entails b or is entailed by b should count as being on the path between b and e.)96 
 I’ve also relied upon the term “because” in the definition I’ve offered of 
existential dependence, thereby appealing to a notion of dependence or explanation 
in attempting to explain dependence. This rightly implies that the definition I’ve 
offered is not an analysis or reduction of existential dependence. This synchronic, 
upward “because” is supposed to be a conceptual and metaphysical primitive, much 
as the “in virtue of” in the earlier account of ontological dependence is primitive, and 
the “because” in accounts of diachronic causation is primitive. While this doesn’t 
amount to a reductive definition of existential dependence in terms of synchronic 
                                            
95 pgs. 38-61 
96 Consider that b entails b or c, but clearly b or c should not be counted as a 
distinct means of manipulating e; consider also that if a entails b, then a will 
naturally count as a means of manipulating e and b will be “along the path”, but if 
we take b as our starting point rather than a, then a ought not to be included as a 
distinct manipulation base. 
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manipulative dependence, it does seem informative enough to move on to clarifying 
how this sense of dependence can be used to divide up the dualist camps. 
3.4 Total and Partial Manipulative Dependence 
 In what sense can synchronic manipulative dependence be total or partial? 
Here is a simple enough explanation: partial dependence is the claim that the 
dependent can be synchronically manipulated by means of an intervention upon the 
base, and total dependence is the further claim that the dependent cannot be 
manipulated by means of intervention upon anything else besides the base – at 
least, not anything else which isn’t already on the path between the dependent and 
the base. 
 On this interpretation, the differences between emergentism and traditional 
dualism can be understood in the following way. First, let’s look at the three 
traditional dualist positions: 
 
(i) The minimal traditional dualist holds that phenomenal states can be 
synchronically manipulated by interventions on something fundamental, 
other than physical states.97 
 
(ii) The Substance dualist holds (i), and further that phenomenal states can 
be synchronically manipulated by interventions on an independent mental 
substance.98 
                                            
97 The minimal traditional dualist may still hold that having brain states is 
nomically necessary for having mental states, as Descartes did. 
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(iii) The Cartesian99 substance dualist holds (i) – (ii), and further that 
phenomenal states can not be synchronically manipulated by interventions 
on physical states100. 
 
 On this interpretation, then, the emergentist must deny (i) – (iii), holding 
that: 
 
                                                                                                                                  
98 So long as the mind is “hooked up” to the brain, these manipulations of 
consciousness will cause changes in the brain, but were the mind “unhooked”, the 
substance dualist holds it could continue to be manipulated by changes to the 
conscious substance. 
99 Obviously, an interactionist holds that phenomenal states can be diachronically 
and causally manipulated by interventions on physical states. However, the 
interactionist’s insistence that the relation between brain and mind must be 
specifically causal seems to rule out that the mind depends for its existence on the 
brain, and thus can be synchronically manipulated in the sense of “manipulation” 
under discussion here.  Note that I don’t mean to assert that this is the view of the 
historical Descartes; it may be a bit of a caricature. 
100 Given interactionist assumptions, phenomenal states may of course be 
diachronically (that is, causally) manipulated by changes in physical states on a 
Cartesian view. 
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 (iv) phenomenal states can be synchronically manipulated by interventions 
on physical states.  
 
 (v) phenomenal states can not be synchronically manipulated by 
interventions on anything fundamental other than physical states, including 
mental substances. 
 
 The conjunction of (iv) and (v) is supposed to capture the emergentist’s 
assertion that phenomenal states are totally dependent upon their underlying 
physical states for their existence – given sufficient changes to the underlying 
physical states, the phenomenal states will cease to occur. Notably, this sounds very 
similar to an intuitive and off-hand definition of supervenience: nothing makes a 
phenomenal difference without making a physical difference. 
 Consider how a guitar can be tuned to different keys or chord structures. Two 
guitars, despite being of difference sizes and shapes and having strings of different 
thicknesses, can be tuned to the same key. Still, the tunings of a guitar are closely 
connected to the physical properties of the various strings – their composition, 
length, tightness, temperature, and so on. There is no way to change the tuning of 
the guitar without changing the physical properties of the guitar strings. 
Nonetheless, the tunings of the guitar are not identical to physical properties of the 
guitar strings, since the same tuning can be realized by physically very different 
strings (or something other than strings). Guitar tunings could be said to supervene 
on the properties of guitar strings. There can be no difference in the tuning 
properties of two guitars for any reason other than a difference in the properties of 
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their strings (including relational properties, such as the humidity and temperature 
of their environment). We might express the intuitive notion of supervenience as 
follows, where A and B are sets of properties: 
 
Intuitive Supervenience: A supervenes on B if and only if nothing can make a 
difference in the distribution of A except by making a difference in the 
distribution of B. 
 
 Understandably, supervenience has long been considered a useful way of 
describing the relationship between the mind and the physical world.101 
Emergentists have historically accepted this intuitive notion of supervenience, and 
supervenience has been offered in various ways as a definition of the minimal 
commitments of physicalism. Traditional dualists necessarily deny supervenience.102 
If we can interpret “makes a difference” in terms of possible manipulations, then the 
intuitive notion of supervenience is nicely captured by the claim of total 
manipulative dependence: A supervenes upon B if there is nothing else but B (and 
that which is on the path between B and A) by which A can be synchronically 
manipulated.  
 
 
                                            
101 For instance, Socrates considers (and rejects) this same sort of “tuning” 
analogy in the Phaedo – an analogy on which the soul is a tuning of the body.  
102 Excepting a kind of supervenience with nomic necessity. 
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3.5 Existing Varieties of Supervenience 
 3.5.1 Global Supervenience. What is the relationship between this intuitive 
notion of supervenience, and the more formal notions of supervenience developed in 
contemporary philosophy over the last several decades? There are three distinctions 
in Supervenience relationships which are well established: Local versus Global 
Supervenience, Strong versus Weak Supervenience, and Supervenience with 
Metaphysical versus Nomic (or Nomological) Necessity. 
 Global Supervenience is the following claim: “A Supervenes on B if and only 
if every two possible worlds which are identical in the distribution of B properties 
are identical in the distribution of A properties.” Imagine the life of Francis of Assisi. 
Assume that in this world, St. Francis lived a good life. It does not seem as though 
there could be another world, exactly like our own with respect to the events of the 
life of St. Francis, the virtues he possessed, and the context they occurred in, yet in 
which St. Francis was an evil person rather than a virtuous person. So, it seems as 
though evaluative properties like the goodness of a life globally supervene on 
descriptive properties like virtue, action, and so forth.  
 Frank Jackson (1998) developed a variation on global supervenience, or 
minimal global supervenience: 
 
Minimal Global Supervenience. A supervenes on B iff any world which is a 
minimal B-duplicate of the actual world is an A-duplicate simpliciter. 
 
 Jackson’s variation is an attempt to formulate physicalism as a thesis which 
is true in the actual world, without needing to be true of all possible worlds. Suppose 
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we believe that there are no non-physical substances in the actual world, but there 
is some possible world exactly like our own physically which also contains a bit of 
epiphenomenal ectoplasm off in another corner of the galaxy. If this is correct – if 
physicalism is not a necessary truth in all worlds – then it would not be the case 
that phenomenal properties globally supervene on physical properties. However, 
consider a world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our own world – a world 
which is an exact copy of our own physically, and in which nothing additional is 
added (there is no epiphenomenal ectoplasm). If it’s true that in every such world, 
the phenomenal properties are distributed in exactly the same way as in our world, 
then phenomenal properties minimally globally supervene on physical properties.  
 3.5.2 Weak and Strong Local Supervenience. Global Supervenience 
relationships, which quantify over properties and pairs of possible worlds, differ 
from Individual Supervenience relationships, which quantify over objects and 
properties. Individual Supervenience theses were divided into weak and strong 
supervenience relationships by Jaegwon Kim’s early work on Supervenience as 
follows: 
 
Weak Supervenience. A weakly supervenes on B iff, necessarily, for every 
object which has property F in A, then there is some property G in B which 
the object has, such that every object in this world which has G also has F. 
 
Strong Supervenience. A strongly supervenes on B iff, necessarily, for every 
object which has property F in A, then there is some property G in B which 
the object has, such that necessarily every object which has G also has F. 
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 Suppose that Socrates has the property of being a virtuous person, and the 
property of being virtuous  strongly supervenes on the particular virtues that one 
has. Then there is some collection of particular virtues which Socrates has – say, the 
virtues of having courage, wisdom, and honesty – such that everyone in any world 
who has those virtues is a virtuous person. Of course, St. Francis had very different 
virtues than Socrates, but he was still a virtuous person. But – assuming the 
properties of being a virtuous person strongly supervene on the properties of having 
certain virtues – there could not possibly be a person who had the same virtues as 
Socrates, or the same virtues as St. Francis, and yet failed to be a virtuous person. 
 Weak supervenience differs from strong supervenience in that the second 
“necessarily” is missing from the definition – it need not be that in every world, 
every object which has the G property has the F property; it need only hold that in 
our world, every object which has the G property has the F property.103 
                                            
103 For example, suppose that someone holds artistic beauty is world-relative (as 
opposed to culturally or individually relative). Such a person might hold that the 
beauty of a painting weakly supervenes on its physical properties (the distribution of 
the paint on the canvas) without holding that it strongly supervenes. Such a person 
could say: “necessarily, every beautiful image has a certain physical constitution and 
arrangement, and there is no way that another image in this world with the same 
physical constitution and arrangement could fail to be equally beautiful. However, 
there is some possible world in which another image, exactly like that one in this 
world, would fail to be beautiful.” 
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 The distinction is relevant to formulations of the supervenience of 
phenomenal properties on physical properties. Jaegwon Kim observed that many 
would be non-reductive physicalists (including Davidson) expressed the 
supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical as merely weak supervenience: 
they allowed that in another world a brain could be arranged in the same way as my 
own, but fail to produce the same phenomenal properties that mine has in this 
world. According to Kim, this is insufficient for serious physicalism – the physicalist 
should hold that the phenomenal strongly supervenes on the physical, and any 
world in which a brain is arranged like my own is a world in which the same 
phenomenal properties are instantiated. 
 3.5.3 Metaphysical or Nomological Supervenience. The final important 
distinction applies to the second modal operator, “necessarily”, in the definition of 
strong local supervenience. As described above, this “necessarily” is taken to indicate 
metaphysical necessity: that is, it is true that every property which has G also has F 
across all logically possible worlds. With regard to modality, strong supervenience 
with metaphysical necessity is akin to Jackson’s minimal global supervenience. For 
simplicity, it’s conventional use the phrase “Metaphysical Supervenience” to indicate 
either minimal global supervenience or strong local supervenience with 
metaphysical necessity. 
 However, there is a weaker form of strong supervenience, where “necessarily” 
is interpreted as nomological (or “nomic”) necessity, and which quantifies over all 
possible worlds in which the laws of nature are identical to our own. For a dualist, 
these laws may include contingent lawful relations between mental and physical 
properties, synchronic “trans-ordinal” laws linking the lower level domain to the 
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higher level domain. This variant, which might be called “nomic supervenience”, is 
consistent with emergentism, but not with physicalism. 
 Which form of necessity should the emergentist accept for the relationship 
between the mental and the physical? An emergentist might accept nomic 
supervenience, as many property dualists like Chalmers (1996) do. However, in 
order to avoid collapse into traditional dualism, an emergentist must hold that the 
contingent trans-ordinal laws are not an “addition” to the world, a further means by 
which phenomenal states can be manipulated besides physical states. There are two 
options for an emergentist who wishes to hold nomic supervenience. First, it could be 
that the trans-ordinal laws are not fundamental – that is, the laws are mere 
“Humean”  regularities which hold in virtue of other features of the world. Second, it 
could be that the trans-ordinal laws are fundamental, but that they are not to count 
as “variables” in our definition whose values can be intervened upon – trans-ordinal 
laws aren’t the sorts of things which can be manipulated.  
 If an emergentist does not take one of these two options, then physical states 
would only be “sufficient” for emergence given the addition of the trans-ordinal law 
to the world. This suggests that total existential dependence is false, for it seems 
there is some other means (besides the physical) for manipulating mental states: 
namely, changing the contingent trans-ordinal laws. Were this so, emergentism 
would collapse into traditional dualism. 
 Should the emergentist accept metaphysical supervenience instead? This 
threatens to create a problem for the subclass of emergentists who wish to deny that 
emergent phenomena are ideally deducible from their basal conditions. After all, 
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why wouldn’t all of the necessary truths be part of the ideal reasoner’s deduction 
base?  
 To evade this objection, in Section 4, I will try to develop a version of 
supervenience intermediate in strength between metaphysical supervenience and 
nomic supervenience – manipulative supervenience, or supervenience with 
manipulative necessity. Although I recognize that coherent versions of metaphysical 
supervenience and nomic supervenience can be held by emergentists, I think this 
version of supervenience best captures the sort of intuitive supervenience to which 
emergentists have historically been committed. Manipulative supervenience 
captures the notion of “total existential dependence”, in a way which makes clear the 
differences between emergentism and traditional dualism and incorporates the 
scientific study of the mind through manipulations of the brain. Central to 
manipulative supervenience is the notion that there is nothing further on which 
emergent phenomena depend for their existence above and beyond their physical 
base: the physical basal conditions truly are sufficient for emergence. 
§4 Manipulative Supervenience 
4.1 An Illustration 
 Suppose that the set of possible worlds is like a scattering of towns in the 
Swiss Alps. Between some towns there are railway lines, so that one can travel by 
train from one town to another, even if the town is very far away. But there are not 
railway lines between all of the towns, even towns which are close. Sometimes there 
is no way to travel from one town to another. 
 In the town of Actual, where we live, the philosophers debate about another 
town. It is rumored that there is a town which is a perfect physical duplicate of 
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Actual, but where there is no phenomenal consciousness. They call it “Zombieland.” 
The dualists believe the rumors that Zombieland exists, and the physicalists do 
not.104 
 There are also a couple of perplexing emergentists in the town. Some say that 
Zombieland does not exist (but not for any explicable reason, mind you). Some say 
Zombieland does exist, but that it is in a distant canton with different laws of 
nature. Some admit Zombieland might even be a close neighbor of Actual, with the 
same laws, on the opposite side of the mountain. When they speculate, they are 
inconsistent. But when they stop speculating, they all insist together: 
 “There are no trains to Zombieland.” 
 Whether Zombieland exists or not, careful investigation has discovered that 
there are no trains from Actual which go there. In fact, there is no town in all of 
Switzerland in which there is consciousness which offers train service to a duplicate 
town in which there is no consciousness, or vice-versa. It is not a matter of distance, 
similarity, or canton law. It is a matter of inaccessibility. 
4.2 Manipulation Worlds 
 Obviously, one cannot take any form of transportation from the actual world 
to another. What I mean by there being a “train” from world w to world w* is this: 
world w* counts as a successful manipulation of world w. As discussed in the 
previous section, a manipulation is through some variable for some other variable.  
                                            
104 Similar things are said about the town of “Invertica”, which is supposed to be a 
physical duplicate of Actual where the phenomenal consciousness is inverted or 
different. 
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To be slightly more formal, when I call w* a successful manipulation of w through b 
for e, I mean that there is a change in the value of e between w and w* because of a 
change in the value of b. 
 Again, the traditional account of “manipulation” is taken from Woodward 
(2005), and it describes diachronic causal relationships. On Woodward’s account and 
my own, a “manipulation” or “intervention” does not require that there be any kind 
of agency (human or otherwise) which is or could possibly be in a position to 
intervene upon or manipulate the “intervened upon” or “manipulated” variable. 
 I have been adapting this account specifically for synchronic, non-causal 
relationships. Emergentists hold that emergent properties are neither identical with 
nor reducible to their basal conditions, but they are manipulable by their basal 
conditions. Suppose we define successful manipulation in this synchronic sense, for 
emergent e and basal conditions b, as a world w* with the following conditions: 
 
(i) Intervention: the value of b at t in w* differs from the value of b at t in w 
 
(ii) Constancy: every variable that isn’t on the path between b and e is held 
constant at t between w and w*. 
 
(iii) Success: the variable e has a different value in w* at t than w at t 
because105 of (i). 106 
                                            
105 Again, the “because” relation is primitive in the sense that it is not reducible to 
a kind of counterfactual dependence or a kind of entailment.  It is a synchronic 
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 A variable x is on the path between b and e if the manipulation of e through b 
consists of a manipulation of x through b and a synchronic manipulation of e 
through x.107 For example, neural states in the brain are “along the path” between 
lower-level fundamental physical states and higher-level phenomenal consciousness.  
If there is a manipulation through b for e, then I will say that e manipulatively 
                                                                                                                                  
relation, analogous to but not identical to efficient causation, the relation 
emergentists call e’s “arising from” b. It is a dependence relation in the sense that it 
e’s dependence on b explains why e exists.  
106 For Woodward (2005), these are the conditions on causal manipulations of c for 
e: 
(i) Intervention: the value of c differs in w* from w 
(ii) Constancy: every variable that isn’t on the path between c and e is constant 
between w and w*. 
(iii) Success: the variable c has a different value in w* than w because of (i). 
107 I would suggest we take “arises directly from” to be a primitive relation, and 
then “arises from” to be the ancestral of that relation. So x is “on the path” between e 
and b in a synchronic sense means the following: e arises directly from something 
which arises . . . which arises directly from x, and x arises directly from something 
which arises . . . which arises directly from b.  
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depends upon b. The emergentist holds that the existence of phenomenal states108 
manipulatively depends upon the existence of some set of basal conditions.109 
 For example, suppose infatuation is an emergent property of Gary’s brain. 
There is a possible world in which Gary has mild brain damage, and he is much less 
infatuated there because of it. That world is a successful manipulation of our world 
for Gary’s infatuation through Gary’s brain damage.110 
 There is also a possible world in which Gary has mild brain damage, but he is 
an equally infatuated person, because he has been exposed to more romantic 
comedies. That world is an unsuccessful manipulation through Gary’s brain damage 
and Gary’s cinematic experiences for Gary’s infatuation. However, that world does 
not count as a manipulation through Gary’s brain damage for Gary’s infatuation, 
because it fails the constancy condition: Gary’s cinematic experiences should have 
                                            
108 One might instead refer to the instantiation of phenomenal properties. 
109 Though a token conscious state need not manipulatively depend on its token 
physical basis, but only on there being such a state to serve as the needed basal 
condition. Note also that manipulative dependence here is a claim about the 
existential-dependence of one thing on another, not its identity-dependence. Were 
my thought of aluminum to arise from a bundle of silicon chips rather than a bundle 
of neurons, the nature of my thought would be the same, but the nature of my 
thought might change if “aluminum” were something else in another world. 
110 This account is adapted and simplified from Woodward (2005).  
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been kept constant, since they are not on the path between Gary’s brain damage and 
his infatuation.111 
 The successful manipulation of Gary’s infatuation through Gary’s brain 
damage will also probably lower his heart rate. But this doesn’t violate the 
constancy condition, Gary’s heart rate counts as being on the path112 between the 
two.  
 There is a possible world in which Gary is more infatuated and, 
coincidentally, Al Gore won the U. S. Presidential Election in 2000. It does not count 
as a successful manipulation of this world for Gary’s infatuation through Al Gore’s 
election, provided that the infatuation difference is not because of the electoral 
difference. 
 Suppose Gary could just so happen to be more infatuated than he is, but 
everything else in the world would remain the same. Any such world would not 
count as a manipulation of our world for his infatuation, because it would fail the 
intervention condition. 
 To return to our metaphor, we might say that there is a “train” between the 
actual world and the possible world in which Gary’s brain state changes his 
infatuation level. Likewise, there is a “train” between the actual world, in which I 
am experiencing a slight pain in my arm, and the possible world in which I am 
experiencing excruciating pain because different fibers in my brain are firing. There 
                                            
111 Though it may be that Gary’s brain damage is on the path between his 
cinematic experiences and his infatuation, of course. 
112 See Woodward (2005), 38-61 
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is a synchronic manipulation of this world for pain through the fibers in my brain, 
on which my experience of pain depends. 
4.3 Manipulative Exclusivity 
 Recall the notion of total existential dependence described earlier, as a way of 
separating the emergentist from the traditional dualist. The traditional dualist 
accepts that there is something else besides my brain states through which my 
phenomenal states can be manipulated. The emergentist does not accept this. 
 To return to our story, suppose there are some poets in Actual who claim that 
there is a train between Actual and Voodooburg. In Voodooburg, my brain states are 
the same, but I am in a great deal of pain, because in that world a miniature doll in 
my likeness is being stuck with pins while a shaman thinks nasty thoughts. Other 
poets claim there is a night train to the spooky village of Zombiegrad. In 
Zombiegrad, a psycho-cosmic vortex in Sedona, Arizona is closed, and so 
consciousness never emerged from brain states in the course of natural history.  
 The emergentists proclaim: these poets are liars! My phenomenal 
consciousness depends upon my brain states exclusively. It is in some sense 
determined by my brain states. My brain states suffice for emergence – nothing else 
is needed. One can not manipulate phenomenal consciousness in other ways while 
keeping brain states fixed, nor can one prevent or interfere with phenomenal 
consciousness emerging once the basal conditions are in place.113 
 Take all of the manipulations of the actual world wα for instantiations of an 
emergent property e. The emergentist could make the following exclusive claim 
                                            
113 I am interpreting here the views of Alexander (1920), 3-30 
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about the dependence of emergent properties on their basal conditions: every 
successful manipulation of wα for e is through e’s basal conditions b.  
 This rules out Voodooburg: there is no manipulation of wα for e that isn’t 
through b. It also rules out Zombiegrad, where something interferes with 
consciousness emerging as it does from its basal conditions. If a purported psycho-
cosmic vortex were closed, but everything else (brain states included ) were kept 
fixed, then this attempted manipulation of e that isn’t through b would not succeed, 
given the exclusivity principle.  
 We can generalize this principle to describe a kind of necessity: 
 
(Manipulative Necessity) x manipulatively necessitates y is true in world w 
iff if there is no successful manipulation w* of w for y through any z, where z 
is not identical to x and not on the path between x and y. 114 
                                            
114  p, w) = T iff (w*)(Rww*  
(V(p, w*) = T) ). On this definition, accessibility relation Rww*, “w* is a 
manipulation of w”, is defined relative to variables e and b such that: w* is 
accessible from w iff w* = w  [V(b, w) ≠ V(b, w*) & D(e, b) & (v)( V(v, w) = V(v, w*) 
 P(b, v, e))].  The dependence function D(x,y) is defined as: D(x,y)  ~x 
where a primitive relation of dependence (x “arises from” y) gives the semantics for 
 operator. The Path relation P(x,y,z) is defined as: P(x,y,z) iff { 
D(z,x) & [D(y,x) & D(z,y) & D(D(z,x),(D(x,y)&D(y,z)))]} – in other words, y is on the 
path between x and z when z depends on x and y depends on x and z depends on y 
and that it is the case that z depends on x depends on its being the case that y 
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 Notice that manipulative necessitation is relativized to a world.115 In a given 
world w, it is true in w that x manipulatively necessitates y when there is no 
manipulation of w in which something other than x could be intervened upon to 
change y which is not on the path between x and y. So, it may be that (x  y) is 
true in w but not in some other world w*. Manipulative necessitation defines an 
accessibility relation between worlds in terms of manipulations of a world, and then 
defines the necessity operator in terms those worlds accessible from a given world. 
 The emergentist claims that basal conditions manipulatively necessitate 
emergent phenomena in the actual world. This is why the emergentists deny the 
existence of Voodooburg and Zombiegrad: the poets define them as places with trains 
to Actual, but there could never be a train from Actual to such a place. 
4.4 Total Manipulative Dependence 
 On my account, emergentists hold that there is no metaphysically possible 
world in which consciousness arises from brain states, and yet can be manipulated 
by means of something other than brain states. Consciousness might possibly 
emerge from silicon states or complex social states rather than brain states, and in 
                                                                                                                                  
depends on x and z depends on y. For the notion of an accessibility relation and its 
role in various modal logics, see Hughes & Cresswell (1996). 
115 
similarly p, w) = T iff (w*)(Rww*  (V(p, w*) = T) ) and the 
accessibility relation Rww* is defined as w* is accessible from w iff {laws of w}{laws 
of w*}. 
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that case it could only be manipulated by whatsoever it emerged from.  There are no 
trains from any town where consciousness emerges from some base or other to any 
other town where consciousness has been changed through a change in something 
other than that same base. 
 The manipulative necessitation of consciousness by a physical world like ours 
does not rule out the existence of Zombieland. However, we can now see clearly why 
there could never be a train to Zombieland. The problem is not that Zombieland is 
too far away, or has different laws per se. Rather, the problem is that if Zombieland 
exists, then is not a manipulation of Actual. It fails the intervention condition. It is 
not a possible world in which consciousness has been manipulated by means of an 
intervention upon something else, keeping everything else constant. Rather, it is a 
world in which consciousness has been intervened upon directly (by some Leibnizian 
Deus ex Machina) and everything else has been kept the same. A train to 
Zombietown would be a manipulation of Actual for consciousness through nothing. 
 Here is what I have argued for. The existence of Zombieland is consistent 
with the exclusive dependence of consciousness on brain states. It is also consistent 
with brain states “fixing” conscious states, and being “enough” or “sufficient” for 
consciousness in the sense in which nothing further is needed.116 It is consistent 
with there being no possible intervention to prevent consciousness from arising once 
brain states are in place, and thus consistent with brain states making certain that 
consciousness emerges just as it does and making the emergence of consciousness 
                                            
116 But it is not consistent with the deductive sense of “sufficiency”; that is, brain 
states are not logical or metaphysically sufficient conditions for consciousness. 
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empirically predictable.117 All of these things are consistent with the metaphysical 
and even nomological possibility of “zombies”. 
4.5 Manipulative Supervenience 
 Let us return to our attempt to define ontological emergence118 in terms of 
the supervenience of emergent properties upon their basal conditions.119 Roughly 
speaking, one set of properties supervenes upon another whenever there can be no 
difference in the supervening property without a difference in its subvening base.120  
As discussed, supervenience is typically defined in terms of some sort of 
                                            
117 Again, this is the epistemic sense of a “guarantee”, not the logical sense in the 
premises of a valid argument guarantee their conclusion.  
118 Throughout this paper, I have had in mind ontological emergentism, a 
contemporary revival in the philosophy of mind of the views presented by the British 
Emergentists. There is also what is called epistemic emergence or “weak 
emergence”, which is not what I mean to discuss here. 
119 Van Cleve (1990) adopts the view that strong nomological supervenience 
expresses both the “dependence” and “determination” aspects of the Emergentist 
claim. Kim (2012), 85-104 argues that Emergentists were historically committed to 
supervenience in some form. McLaughlin (2008) holds that Emergentism should be 
defined in terms of nomological supervenience. 
120 Kim (1993), 53-91 in “Concepts of Supervenience” and “’Strong’ and ‘Global’ 
supervenience revisited” gradually moves from this intuitive but imprecise concept 
of supervenience, taken from R. M. Hare’s Language of Morals, to a more precise 
concept of Supervenience, which he calls “Strong Supervenience.” 
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necessitation of supervenient properties on their subvening base. Recall the 
following definition of strong supervenience: 
 
Strong Supervenience. A strongly supervenes on B if and only if necessarily, 
if any x has some property F in A, then there is at least one property G in B 
such that x has G, and necessarily everything that has G has F.121 
 
 We asked: in what sense of necessarily need everything that has G have F? 
 One option we discussed was metaphysical necessity, or strong metaphysical 
supervenience. Although there is no conceptual or explanatory connection between 
the basal conditions and emergent phenomena, on this interpretation there is a kind 
of fundamental metaphysical principle such that in no metaphysically possible world 
do basal conditions occur without the emergent phenomena.122 
 Another option was nomic necessity, or strong nomic supervenience.123 Here, 
nature contains explanatorily primitive and metaphysically contingent “trans-
ordinal laws” such that there is no world with the same laws as the actual world in 
which the basal conditions occur without the same emergent phenomena.  
                                            
121 This definition is taken from Horgan (1993). 
122 Horgan (2009) suggests this ‘Moorean Minimal Emergentism’ as a coherent 
position on emergence, though he does not himself endorse it. 
123 Van Cleve (1990) and McLaughlin (2008) adopt this definition when 
interpreting the emergentist claim. 
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 (Of course, some emergentists opt to deny supervenience altogether.124) 
 However, here I offer a new option for the emergentist: strong supervenience 
with manipulative necessity, or manipulative supervenience. For everything with a 
phenomenal property, the emergentist can say, there is necessarily some physical 
basal property which it has, such that it is manipulatively necessary that everything 
with that physical basal property G has that phenomenal property F. In every world 
in which F manipulatively depends upon G, there is no manipulation-world of that 
world in which F is manipulated through an intervention upon something other 
than G. 
 In one regard, this is a weaker claim than metaphysical supervenience, 
insofar as it does not rule out the metaphysical possibility of “zombie” worlds, since 
such worlds would not count as manipulation worlds for any world in which 
consciousness emerges.125 Yet, in another regard, this is a stronger claim than some 
versions of metaphysical supervenience for four significant reasons: 
                                            
124 See Humphreys (1997) and O’Connor (2000), although each author does so for 
different reasons. 
125 To be a manipulation world, the world would have to be one in which some 
variable was changed. But zombie worlds and invert worlds are perfect duplicates. 
Someone might argue that a zombie world with one ammonia particle changed 
would count as a manipulation of the actual world. However, to be a successful 
manipulation for consciousness, consciousness would also have to manipulatively 
depend upon the ammonia particle both in the actual world and in the manipulation 
world. But consciousness does not, according to our best theories, depend on a 
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 First, manipulative supervenience entails the existential dependence of 
emergent properties on their basal conditions. Jackson’s minimal global 
supervenience does not entail any sort of existential dependence relation. Kim’s 
strong local supervenience entails the “Generic Account” of existential dependence, 
but – as mentioned – this account is problematic. On the other hand, manipulative 
supervenience meshes with an intuitive account on which existential dependence is 
understood as manipulative dependence. 
 Second, manipulative supervenience is not subject to the “blockers” problem 
raised by Hawthorne (2002)126, unlike Jackson’s minimal global supervenience.  
Suppose that there are non-physical substances in our world which can be “red” or 
“green”. When they are “green” in a world, or altogether absent, nothing blocks the 
emergence of the mental from the physical. When they are “red” in a world, however, 
the emergence of the mental from the physical is blocked. Fortunately for us, these 
non-physical substances are green in the actual world, and so emergence happens. It 
is true that every minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate with respect 
to the mental properties, since a minimal physical duplicate won’t have the non-
physical substances at all, and so nothing will block emergence. However, it is 
strange to think that this is a picture of the world on which either physicalism or 
emergentism is true: it is clearly a substance dualist account of our world. 
                                                                                                                                  
particular ammonia particle in the actual world. Likewise, notice that it does not 
rule out “invert” worlds, since an inverted world does not count as a manipulation of 
its non-inverted physical duplicate or vice-versa. 
126 See also Leuenberger (2008) 
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Fortunately, manipulative supervenience rules this out explicitly – there can be no 
world in which the mental properties in our world are manipulated (let alone 
eliminated or blocked) by means of an intervention upon a non-physical substance. 
 Third, manipulative supervenience is not subject to the “lone ammonium 
molecule” objection raised by Kim (1993). It is consistent with some forms of 
metaphysical supervenience that there is another possible world, w*, which is an 
exact physical duplicate of our world save that one ammonium molecule has been 
added to the rings of Saturn, and as a result the phenomenal properties in that 
world are different. However, this seems seriously at odds with both physicalism and 
emergentism. Fortunately, it is inconsistent with manipulative supervenience. Why? 
Because manipulative supervenience rules out that there is a world in which 
emergent properties are manipulated by means of interventions upon something 
other than their basal conditions, and the ammonium molecule is presumably not 
part of any conscious property’s basal conditions. 
 Finally, manipulative supervenience does not face the problem of necessary 
beings.127 It follows from metaphysical supervenience that necessary beings 
(mathematical abstracta, God) supervene upon the physical world. This is a very 
strange result for the sort of work supervenience is supposed to play in capturing the 
notion of total existential dependence. However, necessary beings most certainly do 
not manipulatively supervene upon the physical world, insofar as there is no 
manipulation of necessary beings through interventions upon physical properties or 
entities. 
                                            
127 See Jackson (1998) 
  110 
 Manipulative supervenience is in most respects stronger than nomological 
supervenience, insofar as it rules out worlds in which the physical remains the 
same, and yet the mental differs because of something else – e.g., a change in the 
laws operating in that world. In this regard, it is able to capture a way in which 
emergentism is distinct from traditional dualism: the traditional dualist can at most 
accept nomological supervenience, whereas the emergentist can accept manipulative 
supervenience. 
4.6 Does the Distinction Collapse? 
 I have argued that what I am calling “manipulative necessity” is a distinct 
and strictly weaker sense of necessity from metaphysical necessity. However, one 
might object that the distinction depends on admitting certain background 
conditions into manipulative necessity: considerations about contingent laws of 
nature, dependence relationships, or facts about what is or isn’t manipulable in a 
given world. Given these background conditions, manipulative necessity may be 
seen as distinct from metaphysical necessity, but this isn’t a fair comparison. But 
without any such background conditions, the objection goes, manipulative necessity 
“come what may” simply is metaphysical necessity. 
 It is certainly true that metaphysical necessity entails manipulative 
necessity. If b metaphysically necessitates a, then there is no possible world in which 
b occurs without a. It follows that, given a world w in which both a and b occur, 
there is no manipulation world w* in which the value of a changes by means of a 
change in some third variable c, while the value of b remains the same. 
 However, it is false that manipulative necessity entails metaphysical 
necessity, even if we remove from consideration contingent facts about dependence 
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relations in the actual world. Consider the following three models of worlds and the 
propositions which are true at them. On the M-model, b manipulatively necessitates 
a but does not metaphysically necessitate a. On the N-model, b both manipulatively 
and metaphysically necessitates a. On the O-Model, b neither metaphysically nor 
manipulatively  necessitates a. The model makes no reference to contingent 
dependence relationships. 
 
M-Model 
w: a, b, p1 . . . pn 
w1: ¬a, ¬b, p1 . . . pn 
w2 a, b, ¬p1, p2 . . . pn 
w3 ¬a, ¬b, ¬p1, p2 . . . pn 
w4 a, ¬b, p1 . . . pn 
w5 a, ¬b, p1 . . . pn 
and there is no wm in which ¬a & b & ¬p, for some p in p1 . . . pn such that ¬p 
is not tautological given ¬a 
 
N-Model 
w: a, b, p1 . . . pn 
w1: ¬a, ¬b, p1 . . . pn 
w2 a, b, ¬p1, p2 . . . pn 
w3 ¬a, ¬b, ¬p1, p2 . . . pn 
w4 a, ¬b, p1 . . . pn 
and there is no wm in which b & ¬a 
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O-Model 
w: a, b, p1 . . . pn 
w1: ¬a, ¬b, p1 . . . pn 
w2 a, b, ¬p1, p2 . . . pn 
w3 ¬a, ¬b, ¬p1, p2 . . . pn 
w4 a, ¬b, p1 . . . pn 
w5 a, ¬b, p1 . . . pn 
w6 ¬a, b, ¬p1, p2 . . . pn 
 
 Note that on these models, we are omitting to display all of the tautological128 
(e.g., truth-functional and quantificational) consequences of a, b, ¬a, and ¬b; for 
instance, clearly ¬¬a is true in the world at which a is true. So, p1 . . . pn should be 
taken to represent all of the propositions which are not tautologically independent of 
a and b, in the sense of not being truth-functional or quantificational consequences 
of a, b, ¬a, or ¬b.129 Note also that this model does not require that the number of 
                                            
128 One might be tempted to say “logical consequences”, but one worries this 
would be question begging. 
129 It might also be necessary to exclude from the model any propositions which 
are analytic truths given a or b or their negations, if these are to count as distinct 
propositions. This wouldn’t beg any questions, since the point of the model is to show 
a way in which a can fail to occur without b failing to occur, without requiring that 
something else p fail to occur beyond the obvious cases. Of course, on the M-model p1 
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possible worlds m and the number of propositions n be finite, though it does require 
that every proposition p1 . . . pn defined at w also be defined at every world.130 
 This model offers a counterexample to the claim that manipulative necessity 
entails metaphysical necessity. On the M-model, a manipulatively necessitates b, 
insofar as there is no proposition p which is true at w and isn’t a tautological 
consequence of b or a. Contrast this with the O-Model, on which p1 is false and a is 
also false at w6. At the same time, on the M-model, a does not metaphysically 
necessitate b, insofar as there is a world w5 at which a occurs without b. Contrast 
this with the N-model, where there is no such world and metaphysical necessity 
holds. Thus, while we developed the concept of manipulative necessity relying on the 
idea of some special synchronic dependence relationship (“manipulative 
dependence”), the formal properties which make manipulative necessity modally 
distinct from metaphysical necessity remain even when we give no special 
consideration to “manipulative dependence”. 
                                                                                                                                  
is in fact logically independent of a, whereas on the N-model it is not. If someone 
objects that the distinction between the M-model and the N-model would then only 
hold on the assumption of the existence of synthetic necessities, our reply is that if 
one rejects synthetic necessity, then this is a reason which should count for 
manipulative necessity and against metaphysical necessity as a way of capturing 
close modal relationships between non-analytic pairs of propositions. 
130 If some proposition is undefined at w, we can omit it from the model, since it 
has no bearing on either manipulative or metaphysical necessitation of a by b. 
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 One response to the counterexample which I have offered here goes 
something along the following lines: there must be some further reason why a failed 
to occur in w5 even though it actually occurred in w. Since b can’t be the reason, 
something else must be – there must be a reason why we are in w and not w5. This 
response appeals to a particularly strong version of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason: 
 
(PSR+) If actually q, then there is no possible world w* at which ¬q unless 
some further proposition p has a different value at w* than its actual value, 
and p explains why actually q. 
 
 Even advocates of some form of the PSR are unlikely to accept PSR+.131 For 
one thing, PSR+ is inconsistent with the existence of objectively chancy phenomena. 
More troublingly, PSR+ is also prone to problems of infinite regress: whatever p in 
the actual world which explains why actually q in turn needs some explanation 
which rules out ¬p, a proposition true in the actual world which will in turn need an 
explanation which rules out its negation, and so on and so forth. Perhaps one 
resolves the regress by holding that the actual world is necessarily the case, and no 
other world is possible – and if that is so, then the distinction between manipulative 
and metaphysical necessity becomes a moot point. 
                                            
131 In its more traditional form, the PSR only requires that there be some 
explanation for every actual fact, without requiring that there be an explanation 
which rules out every other possibility. 
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 If, without appealing to some principle like PSR+, one cannot object to the 
coherence of the M-model or to its distinction from the N-model, then one must 
accept that manipulative necessity is a distinct and weaker modal relation than 
metaphysical necessity. In this case, it is coherent for the emergentist to hold that 
basal conditions are sufficient for emergent phenomena (that is, they manipulatively 
necessitate them) without being sufficient conditions of them (that is, 
metaphysically necessitating them). 
4.7 Replying to the Incoherence Argument 
 Why might this be an interesting option for the emergentist? I have already 
suggested one motive, which is that defining emergence in terms of manipulative 
supervenience permits the emergentist to remain neutral on controversial questions 
like whether philosophical zombies or inverted worlds are possible. Rather than 
divide over these questions, it may be useful for emergentists to share a common, 
neutral, empirically justifiable, non-speculative notion of supervenience. 
 But there are other motives. For one thing, Jaegwon Kim’s well-known causal 
exclusion arguments rely upon metaphysical or nomological supervenience. 
Emergentists who do not have a reply to these arguments risk being convicted of 
epiphenomenalism. However, I suspect that overdetermination arguments pose no 
threat for manipulative supervenience.132 
                                            
132 Consider that overdetermination is possible with metaphysical or nomological 
necessitation: A and B can both independently on their own necessitate C in the 
relevant sense. But manipulative necessitation rules out overdetermination. It 
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 Perhaps less well known is the incoherence argument against emergentism 
Kim (2010) offers.133 Suppose that conscious states supervene with metaphysical 
necessity on brain states. Let B be the brain state which serves as the basal 
condition for conscious state C, such that B metaphysically necessitates C.134 The 
emergentist is traditionally committed to the claim that C is not deducible on the 
basis of B, even by an ideal reasoner.135 But surely an ideal reasoner would reason 
according to nothing less powerful than a derivation system which is both sound and 
complete with respect to the set of necessary truths – all and only the necessary 
truths would be axioms of the system.136 Yet that would mean BC would be an 
axiom for the ideal reasoner, and C would be ideally deducible from B – making 
emergence with metaphysical supervenience incoherent. Further, according to Kim, 
                                                                                                                                  
cannot be that both A manipulatively necessitates C and B manipulatively 
necessitates C, unless A is on the path between B and C or vice-versa. 
133 The argument appears in Chapter 4 of Kim (2010): “ ‘Supervenient and Yet 
Not Deducible’: Is there a Coherent concept of Ontological Emergence?”, 85-104 
134 Of course, for the ontological emergentist (as opposed to the non-reductive 
physicalist) this metaphysical supervenience must be held to be primitive and 
inexplicable in other terms, perhaps like many hold the axioms of set theory are 
metaphysically necessary and not subject to further analysis. See Horgan (2009) 
135 It may well be that C can’t be deduced from B by any actual being or any 
potential mechanism an actual being might create. See C. D. Broad (1925) and his 
discussion of the “Mathematical Archangel”. 
136 Kim (2010), 96-104 
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accepting nomological supervenience instead won’t get us out of the problem.137 If we 
accept that the supervenience base must be identical to the deduction base, 
including the relevant trans-ordinal laws, then nomological supervenience entails 
ideal deducibility. 138 
 Manipulative supervenience is compatible with the metaphysical or even 
nomological possibility of B without C, and I do not see a clear way in which an ideal 
reasoner could construct a derivation of C from B using the elements provided in the 
definition of manipulative supervenience.  In this regard, manipulative 
supervenience may offer the emergentist a way to resolve the tension between the 
claim that basal conditions are sufficient for emergence and the claim that 
emergents are not ideally deducible from them. 
                                            
137 ibid. 
138 I suspect that there is another way out of this argument that does not require 
adopting manipulative supervenience. Nonetheless, the argument does reveal a deep 
tension between supervenience and non-deducibility in the emergentist’s view. My 
suggestion in defense of metaphysical supervenience would be to understand the 
emergentist as denying not a priori deducibility, but deducibility by means of 
analysis alone. Provided that BC is a synthetic necessity, C may be necessitated 
by B but not deducible in the intended sense. Alternatively, a critic of Kim’s 
argument might spot something suspicious about Kim’s move from a priori 
deducibility to the discussion of the properties of derivation systems, although I am 
unable myself to pinpoint any error here. 
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 Here are two claims which are often taken to be equivalent in the literature. 
The first is this: “the phenomenal facts are fixed by the physical facts”139, or “no 
change is possible in the phenomenal facts without a change in the physical facts”, 
or, often intended metaphorically, “once God had made the physical facts, there was 
nothing further he had to add to get the phenomenal facts.”140 The second is this: 
“Given the physical facts, it is not possible for the phenomenal facts to have been 
different”, or “the physical properties metaphysically necessitate the phenomenal 
properties”, or “any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a 
duplicate simpliciter.”141  I have offered an explanation for why the two claims are 
not equivalent to each other. The second involves an aspect of manipulative 
supervenience (at least, the condition of manipulative exclusivity), whereas the 
second is explicitly metaphysical supervenience. The second entails the first, but not 
vice-versa, and an interesting form of emergentism can be developed by affirming 
the first while denying the second. 
§5.  Conclusions: Weighing the Options 
 This chapter has developed several coherent versions of emergence which can 
be distinguished both from physicalism and from traditional dualism. These 
                                            
139 Kallestrup (2006) 
140 Chalmers (1996), 41. Of course, Chalmers would say that God does have to add 
something further even on my account – namely, the emergent mental facts 
themselves. My point is only that it is not as though he adds something else (a 
mental substance) in order to get the emergent mental facts. 
141 Jackson (1998) 
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distinctions were made by asking four questions: (i) do the higher-level facts 
ontologically depend upon the physical – that is, are they grounded in the physical 
facts? (ii) with what sort of necessity do the higher-level properties supervene upon 
the physical? (iii) do the higher-level phenomena existentially depend upon the 
physical – that is, can they be manipulated synchronically by means of the physical? 
and (iv) do the higher-level phenomena existentially depend upon anything else? 
Consider the options presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
Varieties of Emergence 
 
 Ontological 
Dependence 
on physical 
Supervenience 
on physical 
Existential 
Dependence 
on physical 
Exist. 
Dep. on 
non-
physical 
Physicalism Whole Metaphysical Whole None 
Weak 
Necessary 
Emergence 
Partial Metaphysical Whole None 
Weak 
Contingent 
Emergence 
Partial Manipulative Whole None 
Strong 
Necessary 
Emergence 
None Metaphysical Whole None 
Strong 
Contingent 
Emergence 
None Manipulative 
/ Nomic 
Whole None 
Traditional 
Dualism 
None Nomic/None Partial None 
Substance 
Dualism 
None Nomic/None Partial Partial 
Cartesian 
Dualism 
None None None Whole 
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 Weak necessary emergence is the view that the relevant sort of emergent 
properties are totally existentially dependent upon the physical and necessitated by 
it, and that it is part of the essential nature of emergent properties that they are 
physical, but that there is something further and fundamental to their nature. In 
this regard, it seems equivalent to the “Dualistic Materialism” of Joseph Almog 
(2009), when he holds that it is by their very nature that conscious states depend 
upon physical states, yet they are distinct in nature. This view can make only 
limited use of the usual conceivability or knowledge arguments for dualism, and is 
perhaps the closest one can get to being a physicalist without actually qualifying as 
one. It has the advantage that nearly every argument for physicalism against 
dualism counts as an argument for it rather than against it. 
 Strong necessary emergence is the view that emergent phenomena are 
ontologically independent from their physical base even while being metaphysically 
necessitated by them. Unlike forms of weak emergence and contingent emergence, 
strong necessary emergence has the burden of explaining the apparent violation of 
Hume’s dictum – how there can be metaphysically necessary relations between 
ontologically independent properties.  
 Strong contingent emergence is the view that emergent phenomena are 
totally dependent upon their physical base for their existence, without being 
necessitated by them. This total dependence can be expressed in terms of 
manipulative supervenience of emergents on their physical base, or it can be 
expressed in terms of nomic supervenience provided that the trans-ordinal laws 
count as “nothing further” and are not a means by which a manipulation can occur 
(i.e., if nomic supervenience is so defined as to entail manipulative supervenience). 
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The challenge to this view involves asking why we should be in a world in which 
emergence occurs as opposed to a world in which it doesn’t, given that the two 
worlds are physically identical and nothing else can interfere with emergence. 
Someone who accepts manipulative supervenience must reject that there is an 
answer to such a question. However, this may be hard to accept. 
 Weak contingent emergence is the view that emergent phenomena of the 
relevant sort are partly but not fully grounded in the physical, while remaining 
totally existentially dependent upon it – and that this partial lack of grounding in 
the physical means that it is possible that zombies or inverts exist, although no such 
world is a manipulation of our own. This view shares the costs of strong contingent 
emergence but is somewhat less forcibly dualistic. 
 I believe that it is perfectly legitimate to refer to the view I’ve called minimal 
traditional dualism as a fifth brand of emergentism, when the minimal traditional 
dualist accepts nomic supervenience and partial existential dependence on the 
physical. Many emergentists do hold this sort of view about consciousness, 
interpreting the sufficiency claim as involving nomic supervenience and holding in 
virtue of emergent “trans-ordinal” laws. Because my purpose in this chapter has 
been to distinguish emergentism from traditional dualism, I have focused on ways in 
which emergence might hold with stronger forms of necessity than nomic necessity. 
By doing so, it isn’t my intention to rule out emergence with nomic necessity, by 
definition. 
 It may of course be that different forms of ontological emergence apply to 
different phenomena in the world – in fact, I believe it is so. When attempting to 
place phenomenal experiences in the world, it turns out the emergentist has a 
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variety of coherent options. In Chapter 3, I will put aside many of these distinctions 
and presume a kind of metaphysically necessary emergence. However, in Chapter 4, 
I will return to these distinctions and attempt to relate them to the traditional 
question of whether emergent facts would be deducible a priori by an ideal reasoner 
or “mathematical archangel”. In Chapter 5, I will focus specifically on the 
advantages of weak necessary emergence in describing a variety of phenomena 
outside of the philosophy of mind. 
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Chapter 3 
EMERGENCE AND CAUSATION 
§1. The Problem of Mental Causation 
 The sandwich is half-finished when I hear my phone ring. I am in the middle 
of spreading mustard on the bread – my knife stalls in mid-air. My brother is 
calling. I hate to delay eating my sandwich, but a long time has passed since I last 
talked to him. I decide to answer the phone. I push a button and say, “Hello.” 
 The movement of my finger to push the button and the vibration of my vocal 
chords in such a way so as to make the sounds for “Hello” – these are physical 
events. They happen because I decide to answer the phone. I decide to answer the 
phone because I hear the phone ring and see my brother’s name on the Caller-ID, 
and because my desire to talk to my brother outweighs my desire to eat a sandwich. 
These are conscious mental events. Conscious mental events cause physical events.  
 The alternative is epiphenomenalism: the claim that, contrary to 
appearances, our thoughts and reasons and decisions play no part in making 
anything happen, but float freely above all the physical phenomena and their causal 
patterns. Although physical events cause mental events, mental events do not cause 
physical ones. Like other views that entail widespread massive illusions, we should 
prefer to avoid epiphenomenalism if we can. 
 At the same time, we should prefer not to explain mental causation as an 
instance of telekinesis. Telekinesis would be said to occur if some physical event 
were caused by mental events alone, with no physical causes – or if a physical event 
had physical causes, but these causes were somehow missing something without the 
addition of a mental cause. The sciences generally eschew telekinesis, for good 
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reasons. So, widespread telekinesis seems like a rather implausible theory for how 
people go about answering their phones. 
 A very simple explanation which avoids both epiphenomenalism and 
telekinesis is the type-identity theory. On the type-identity theory, conscious mental 
properties (or types of mental events) are identical to certain physical properties 
(e.g., types of events in the brain). My belief that my brother is calling and my desire 
to speak to him are identical to two distinctive kinds of events in the brain – a belief-
type event and a desire type event. Together these cause a third event in my brain – 
my decision – which goes on to cause more events in my brain which transmit the 
signal to my extremities to push the button and say “Hello.” Conscious mental 
events142 cause physical events because consciousness is by nature physical. 
 An emergentist holds that mental events are not identical in nature to 
physical events. Emergentists do not accept any form of identity theory. In contrast 
to historical emergentism, the form of emergentism I have been defending does deny 
that are novel fundamental causal forces which arise at the mental level, and 
accepts the causal closure of the physical as normally understood. By accepting 
causal closure, it leaves no room for telekinesis. Emergentism also accepts a kind of 
                                            
142 For the remainder of this chapter, I will use “mental x” as shorthand for 
“conscious mental x.” I accept that there are unconscious mental events, properties, 
kinds, and states, but what is most of interest in my discussion of emergentism is 
phenomenal consciousness. Further, for the remainder of this chapter, I will use the 
language of mental and physical “events”, with the understanding that it could be 
freely translated into claims about mental and physical properties, states, etc. 
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strong supervenience of the mental on the physical – necessarily, for every mental 
event, there is some physical event which necessitates the existence of that mental 
event. So, to avoid epiphenomenalism, the emergentist must give an explanation for 
how mental events can cause physical events while remaining distinct from them – 
the problem of “downward causation”.143 
 It can be argued that the non-reductive physicalist is in the same boat as the 
emergentist on this issue. Unlike the emergentist, a non-reductive physicalist 
accepts that mental events are by nature physical events, and may accept that 
particular mental event tokens are identical to particular physical event tokens. 
However, like the emergentist, the non-reductive physicalist denies the type-identity 
theory, and holds to a kind of strong supervenience instead. I suspect the non-
reductive physicalist will also need to give an account of how downward causation is 
possible. 
 In this chapter, I will attempt to tackle a well-known and compelling 
argument that against both emergentism and non-reductive physicalism. The causal 
exclusion arguments of Jaegwon Kim have for over two decades thrown a wrench 
into emergentist and non-reductive physicalist accounts of mental causation, by 
arguing that accepting supervenience and causal closure, while denying type-
identity, leads either to epiphenomenalism or to an implausible form of widespread 
overdetermination.144  
                                            
143 Notably, this problem applies to any emergent property with causal powers, 
not just to conscious mental states. 
144 See Kim (1993), (2005), (2010), (2011), (2011b), and elsewhere. 
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 I believe the response I offer in this chapter has the advantage of offering a 
very simple explanation of the error in Kim’s argument, in a way which doesn’t 
require serious revisions to our ordinary pre-theoretical understanding of causation 
or causal closure. On my account, there is an ambiguity between the ordinary use of 
the word “sufficient”, meaning that something is complete and nothing more is 
needed, and a technical sense of “sufficient” used in formal logic, meaning that a 
deduction of a particular conclusion from something would be valid. The ordinary 
sense of “sufficient” is the one which appears in discussions of downward causation 
and intuitive prohibitions on overdetermination.145 However, Kim reinterprets both 
as instances of the logician’s sense of “sufficient” – a tricky move which philosophers, 
so immersed in the specialized language of logic, are perhaps the least likely of all 
people to notice. 
 Many rebuttals to Kim’s arguments have been offered before mine, of course. 
By adding my response to other recent responses to Kim’s argument, I hope to show 
that there are now many plausible routes by which an emergentist or non-reductive 
physicalist can give an account of mental-to-physical “downward causation” which 
meet Kim’s objection, and that concerns about overdetermination should no longer 
stand in the way of either of these theories. 
 I will begin in section 2 by providing some important background on the topic 
of causation. Following this, in section 3, I offer a summary of the major stages of 
Kim’s argument. In section 4, I will describe some recent responses to Kim. Then, in 
                                            
145 As well as, arguably, definitions of causal closure. 
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Sections 5-7, I offer my argument for the distinction between the ordinary and 
technical senses of “sufficiency”, and develop this into a reply to Kim. 
§2 Background: Causation 
2.1 Force 
 At the risk of over-simplifying a complex issue, it may be helpful to clarify a 
few important ideas in the broader discussion of emergence and causation. 
 First, the notion of force is used in a technical way in these discussions, as 
opposed to the more ordinary notion of an exertion of strength, power, or control. 
Here, “force” is meant to refer deferentially to whatever kind of thing it is which the 
physicists are referring to when they talk about “fundamental forces”. At the 
moment, the standard model in physics has four fundamental forces: electro-
magnetism, gravity, the strong force, and the weak force. These are fundamental 
insofar as their force cannot be explained in terms of any other force. The term 
causal force, as I use it here, means anything which is either a fundamental force, or 
else a higher-level force whose force is entirely derived from fundamental forces. 
When a S.W.A.T. team uses “brute force” to open a door, they need not use an 
electro-magnet. Their action involves causal force insofar as it “borrows” all of its 
force from various fundamental forces occurring in the same spacio-temporal region. 
 Historically, emergentists like J. S. Mill believed that there were emergent 
fundamental forces: that at higher levels of organization in chemistry, biology, and 
psychology, new forces arose, both comparable to the forces of physics and over and 
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above them.146 While this was a legitimate position to hold given the state of 
knowledge at the time, this is no longer a credible view: we now have an explanation 
of how high-level causal forces in chemistry and biology entirely derive their force 
from the fundamental forces of physics. If anything, the push of current physics is 
towards consolidating or unifying the fundamental forces further, rather than 
expanding them. So, all sides in this discussion – reductivist, non-reductivist, and 
emergentist – should be in agreement as to what the causal forces in the world are 
and are not. 
2.2 Accounts of Causation: Deductive, Counterfactual 
 Two general classes of accounts of what causation is are especially relevant to 
understanding Kim’s argument. Obviously, causation is a rich topic in philosophy 
with a long history. Many accounts of causation do not fit either of these classes I 
will give.147 However, understanding these highly influential types of account is 
helpful for understanding Kim’s argument. 
 2.2.1  Deductive Accounts. Deductive (or “nomological”) accounts model 
causation along the lines of a formal deduction. Such an approach can be found in 
                                            
146 One might speak of “emergent causal forces” in the sense that a causal force 
might be exercised by an emergent phenomenon, so long as the causal force is 
entirely derived from the fundamental physical forces. However, this locution is too 
easy to confuse with historical claims about emergent fundamental forces, so I will 
omit it. 
147 For one such example, see the account of Salmon, (1971). 
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Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.148 In the deduction, the effect serves as the conclusion 
of an argument in which the cause, a series of background conditions149, and some 
general law serve as premises. For example, suppose I knock over a table on which a 
cup of coffee is sitting: 
 
A1. (Background Conditions). The cup of coffee is on the table, and 
nothing else is between the cup and the floor.  
A2. (General Law) Ceteris paribus, if there is nothing between an object and 
the floor, the object will fall to the floor. 
C. The table is removed from underneath the cup of coffee. (Cause) 
E. The cup of coffee falls to the floor. (Effect) 
 
 Laws play a prominent role in deductive accounts of causation. These laws 
should not be understood too strictly – they might hold only given ceteris paribus 
conditions, or they might be probabilistic. Laws can apply at all levels – from folk 
psychology or sociology down to fundamental physics – and it is debatable whether 
the high-level laws can be reduced to the low-level laws.150 One might be a robust 
                                            
148 cf. Book I, Ch. 6-22; Aristotle held that that causes were natural laws which 
served as middle premises in valid syllogisms. 
149 Background conditions tend to be implicit in ordinary explanations. In most 
situations, an explicit list of all the relevant background conditions could never be 
given. 
150 The classic reductionistic approach is found in E. Nagel (1961) 
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realist about these laws, maintaining that they are part of the natural fabric of the 
actual world which is being uncovered by scientific investigation. One might instead 
give a deflationary account of these laws, understanding them merely to be true 
generalizations of observed regularities without observed exceptions. 151 
 2.2.2  Counterfactual Accounts. Counterfactual accounts model causation as 
involving some element of difference-making:152 a cause makes some difference in 
what happens in the event it affects. This may take the form of a strict 
counterfactual account, like that of David Lewis (1973): C causes E iff in the nearest 
world where C is not the case, E would not have occurred. Which world qualifies as 
nearest may be determined by maintaining as many of the background conditions 
and general laws in the actual world as possible (cf. A1 and A2 from the deductive 
model), or it may be determined by some contextual or normative ranking of 
similarity relations between worlds. 
 However, a counterfactual account may be more complex, as on the 
interventionist account of Woodward (2005). For the interventionist, C causes E 
when C provides a means of manipulating E – that is to say, when changes in the 
                                            
151 Hempel, C. and P. Oppenheim., (1948) 
152 It’s misleading to say that counterfactual accounts are those which make 
claims about other possible worlds. Deductive accounts make claims about other 
possible worlds too – namely, which ones are ruled out. But deductive accounts do 
not require that causes make a difference: nothing rules out overdetermination. 
Further, one might develop a counterfactual account which makes no reference to 
possible worlds. 
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values of the variables in C will lead to changes in the values of the variables of E. 
Woodward’s account has some advantages over Lewis’s account, including moving 
away from a binary system to a much richer set of values, avoiding causal pre-
emption problems153, resolving more clearly the issue of which alternative scenarios 
are relevant, and providing a clear non-deflationary account of how counterfactual 
causes can be generative and productive.154 In this chapter I will focus on Lewis’s 
account because it is likely more familiar to my audience, I should note that I prefer 
Woodward’s account, since many objections to counterfactual accounts of downward 
causation can be answered by the manipulationist but not the Lewisian. 
 Finally, accounts of causation on which causes involve some kind of “pushing” 
or “pulling” – or a transmission of information or energy – also fall into the category 
of accounts where causes must make some difference or other. Even though these 
accounts are not typically expressed in counterfactual terms, they are in agreement 
that effects would not happen without the “push” of their causes, and that causation 
need not be modeled as involving any sort of deduction. 
 
                                            
153 Problems which, notably, lead Lewis (2000) to modify his prior view. 
154 Again, debates between deflationary vs. non-deflationary accounts of causation 
are not essential to any of these views. Lewis (1973) gives a counterfactual account 
of causation which is deflationary, and Woodward (2005) gives an interventionist 
counterfactual account which is not deflationary; however, there are non-
deflationary strict counterfactual accounts of causation, and perhaps someone will 
develop a deflationary interventionist counterfactual account someday. 
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2.3 Related Causal Concepts. 
 2.3.1 Cause and “Cause”. There are a number of other causal terms which it 
will be helpful to distinguish. The term “cause” itself can be used both to indicate the 
real causes (according to some account of causation), and to indicate a sub-class155 of 
the real causes – the causes it is permissible in ordinary discourse to use the word 
“cause” for. For instance, on some counterfactual accounts of causation, earth’s 
narrowly escaping a large asteroid in the 12th century counts as a cause of why 
Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo – for, had an asteroid struck earth in the 12th 
century, life would have been wiped out, and there would have been no Napoleon or 
battle of Waterloo. However, it is not permissible for historians to discuss how 
“missing the asteroid caused Napoleon’s defeat”, because this falsely implicates that 
missing the Asteroid was especially significant or relevant to Napoleon’s defeat. 
Similarly, on some regularity accounts, a man’s taking birth control pills qualifies as 
the cause of his not getting pregnant (since men who take birth control pills 
regularly fail to get pregnant). However, this doesn’t make it permissible to 
advertise birth control pills to naïve young men. 
 2.3.2 Causal Responsibility. Whether or not it is permissible to call one 
thing a cause of some effect depends upon the degree of causal responsibility the 
                                            
155 Perhaps on some deflationary accounts of causation, the real causes are 
actually smaller than the set of things which it is permissible to call “causes”, and 
the ordinary sense of “cause” is more an extension or metaphor of the real sense. 
Because it is difficult to reconcile this view with any sort of non-reductive approach 
to mental causation, I’m omitting it here. 
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cause has for the effect. Degrees of causal responsibility are likely determined by a 
mixture of probabilistic, normative, and contextual factors, although may be no 
precise formula for it. One cause may be more responsible than another cause for an 
effect: for instance, the rainstorm may be more responsible than the broken water 
main for the flood, though both contributed to it. 
 It is conventional in ordinary English to give some causes the honorific title 
the cause, e.g.: “Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination was the cause of World War I.”  
Strictly speaking, there is rarely such a thing as the cause of an event (surely, the 
First World War had too many causes to name). What someone means by “c is the 
cause of e” is that the c has a greater degree of causal responsibility than any other 
cause. 
 2.3.3  Causal Power and Generative Causes. A causal power is a property 
that some phenomenon (object, property, etc.) has, by which it is able to generate, 
produce, influence, or prevent changes in other phenomena. Boiling water has the 
power to dissolve sugar. A causal power may remain merely potential; when 
exercised, it produces an instance of causation.  
 However, not every instance of causation needs count as an exercise of causal 
powers. For instance, one might accept that there is such a thing as causation by 
absence, yet deny that absences have causal powers, insofar as they do not produce 
or generate anything. For emergentists, it is important that mental-to-mental and 
mental-to-physical causation both be considered generative or productive causes: 
that is, that they be real exercises of causal powers. Non-reductive physicalists need 
not assign the same importance to mental properties having distinct causal powers: 
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it may be enough that they represent real causal dependencies and figure in true 
causal explanations. 
 2.3.4 Dependence, Overdetermination, Explanation. A causal dependence 
relation holds between an effect and some temporally prior156 cause without which 
the effect would not have occurred as it did. Causal dependence is often expressed as 
counterfactual dependence. The movement of a car causally depends on the gasoline 
in the tank: were there no gas in the tank, the car wouldn’t move. Not all 
counterfactual dependencies need be considered causal dependencies.157  
 Not every instance of causation is a case of causal dependency. In a case of 
overdetermination, for example, there is causation without causal dependency. 
Suppose a man is sentenced to be executed by a firing squad of three soldiers, each 
of whom is an expert marksman aiming at the heart, such that any one shot is 
certain to kill the man. Each shot is a cause of the man’s death, but for no shot is it 
true that, were it not fired, he would not have died. This case of causal pre-emption 
                                            
156 Causal dependence thus should be distinguished from the synchronic, 
“upward” dependence of emergent phenomena upon their subvening bases, without 
which they would not exist as they did. For clarity, I believe it is better to regard 
this “metaphysical dependence” or “existential dependence” relation as non-causal, 
although Kim and other authors from time to time discuss it as though it were a 
kind of causation. 
157 For instance, back-tracking counterfactuals are generally regarded as non-
causal. See Lewis (1973) 
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raises issues for counterfactual accounts of causation.158 How precisely to define 
overdetermination is debatable, of course. It isn’t simply a matter of having two 
causes: there must be two sufficient causes to be an overdetermination case. 
 A causal explanation is an explanation of why some phenomenon happened 
in terms of what caused it at a prior time.159 On deductive accounts of causation, a 
causal explanation has the form of derivation of effects from a set of premises, 
including the cause, the relevant background conditions, and the general law. On 
counterfactual accounts of causation, causal explanations correspond to causal 
dependence relations. For instance, the gas explains the movement of the car insofar 
as the movement of the car causally depends upon it – but something more is needed 
to explain the movement of the car, because the movement of the car causally 
                                            
158 Lewis (2000) revises his previous account to address the issue of pre-emption; 
Woodward (2005) sees an advantage of his account in that it escapes pre-emption 
problems.  
159 Diachronic causal explanations are probably not the only types of 
explanations: there may also be a synchronic metaphysical explanations of higher-
level phenomena in terms of lower-level phenomena. In the interest of full 
disclosure, I also believe we ought to accept synchronic ontological explanations of a 
thing in terms of its nature (see Chapter 4), and diachronic teleological  explanations 
of present states in terms of some non-arbitrary possible future state (see Chapter 
6), given a bit of demystification of each, thus completing the Aristotelian quartet. 
However, nothing I say in this chapter depends upon accepting either of these latter 
two forms of explanation. 
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depends upon a whole host of other phenomena, like the running of the engine and 
the inflation of the tires. In either case, one thing might cause another without 
providing a useful causal explanation for it.  
 Causal explanations occur at distinctive levels. On one level, asphyxiation is 
the cause of a suffocated person’s death; on another level, the deaths of particular 
cells are; on another level, the cessation of certain chemical processes involving O2 
movement are; on another level, getting involved with the mafia might be the cause 
of death. It is open for debate whether these “levels” are mere conveniences, or part 
of the metaphysical structure of the world. If levels are part of the metaphysical 
structure of the world, then levels of causal explanation will correspond to 
distinctive laws operating at that level, and/or to distinctive causal dependence 
relations at that level. The emergentist, naturally, takes all talk of “levels” very 
seriously, and the reductivist does not. 
 With these distinctions in mind, I will turn now to Kim’s arguments against 
emergentism and non-reductive physicalism based on the objection from widespread 
overdetermination. 
§3 Kim’s Argument 
3.1 Overview 
 Jaegwon Kim’s well-known causal exclusion arguments have many 
variations, all of which argue that middle positions in the philosophy of mind (e.g., 
non-reductive physicalism and emergentist dualism) are committed to there being 
physical events which have both a sufficient mental cause and a sufficient physical 
cause. According to Kim, this would amount to an implausible kind of widespread 
overdetermination, leaving as the only alternatives (i) epiphenomenalism, or (ii) a 
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reductivist physical-mental type-identity theory.160 Two principles play an important 
role in Kim’s arguments: 
 
(CCPD) Causal Closure of the Physical Domain. If a physical event has a 
cause (occurring) at time t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t. 
 
(EP) Exclusion Principle. No event has two or more distinct sufficient causes, 
all occurring at the same time, unless it is a genuine case of 
overdetermination.161 
 
 The definitions of both principles invoke the notion of a sufficient cause.  As 
mentioned, I believe the phrase “sufficient cause” admits of two interpretations: one 
on which a cause is “sufficient” in the technical sense of being a logically “sufficient 
condition” of its effect, and one on which a cause is “sufficient” in the ordinary 
language sense of being “enough”, such that nothing else is needed to bring the effect 
about.  However, Kim interprets “sufficient cause” in his principles CCPD and EP as 
involving sufficiency in the technical sense, and he holds the same for mental 
causation of physical events. 
 Kim’s objections are typically divided into two sub-arguments. First, his 
supervenience argument makes the case that the non-reductivist who accepts both 
supervenience and the distinctness of mental and physical properties is committed 
                                            
160 Kim (1993), 350-357.  
161 Kim (2011), 215-217 
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to downward “mental-to-physical” causation. Second, his exclusion argument makes 
the case that mental-to-physical downward causation presents an implausible case 
of widespread overdetermination. Obviously, it is the exclusion argument which 
troubles the emergentist – emergentists already accept the conclusion of the 
supervenience argument. However, understanding the supervenience argument is 
helpful to seeing exactly what form of downward causation is entailed by non-
reductivist accounts of the mind.  
3.2 Kim’s Supervenience Argument 
 At a minimum, both non-reductive physicalists and emergentists agree that 
mental properties supervene upon physical properties but are not identical to 
physical properties. Let M be some mental state of mine – say, my belief that I am a 
human and all humans are mortal. It follows that there is some underlying physical 
state (i.e., brain state) P, such that P necessitates M. (See Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
  
M 
 
P 
Figure 1 
M Supervenes Upon P 
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 Kim cites the following principle, which he calls “Alexander’s Dictum”: to be 
real is to have causal powers.162 He concludes from this that for mental properties to 
be real, distinct, and not reducible to physical properties, mental properties must 
have their own real, distinct, and non-reducible causal powers. M must have some 
causal power which is not a causal power of P. (See Figure 2) This could be the 
power to bring about some physical effect, but Kim doesn’t want to assume 
downward causation off the bat. Instead, we can assume that mental properties 
simply have the power to bring about other mental events on their own level – which 
sounds innocent enough. Let M* be my mental act of concluding that I am mortal, 
an event which is caused by my belief M that I am human and all humans are 
mortal. There will be some physical event P* such that M* supervenes on P*.  
 
 
 
 
 All of this sounds uncontroversial enough – non-reductive physicalists and 
emergentists both hold that there are causal patterns and relations at the mental 
                                            
162 Kim (1993), 348; citing the emergentist Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and 
Deity, vol. 2, p. 8 
Figure 2 
M* is overdetermined by M and P* 
M  M* 
   
P  P* 
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level of some sort. However, the supervenience argument soon becomes more 
serious. 
 Kim argues that M must cause M* by causing M*’s supervenience base, P*. 
Since M must cause P*, anyone who accepts both supervenience and the distinctness 
of M and M* is committed to downward causation. How does Kim argue for this? 
 Why is the instance of M* present? Ex hypothesi, it is there because an 
instance of M caused it; that’s why it’s there. But there is another answer: it’s there 
because P* physically realizes M* and P* is instantiated on this occasion.163 
 Kim sees M and P* as competing claims for why M* has occurred. Why did I 
conclude that I am mortal? Was it because I believed that I was human and all 
humans are mortal? Or was it because I was in a certain brain state? It’s not that M 
and P* caused my conclusion jointly, each contributing a piece of the puzzle: P* 
necessitated M* on its own. To simplify the argument from here, it is helpful to 
assume one must adopt either a deductive or a counterfactual account of mental 
causation.164  
 Option A. On a deductive account of causation, an argument with M and 
various background conditions and laws as a premise must offer a valid deduction of 
M*. It follows that “the given instance of M was a sufficient condition for that 
                                            
163 Kim (1993), 352. Emphasis original. 
164 I am simplifying the argument for ease of exposition. Kim is well aware that 
there are accounts of mental causation which fall into neither category, of course, 
and has argued that his objection applies to them equally.   
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instance of M*”.165 My beliefs that I am human and that all humans are mortal 
must, given certain laws of thought, necessitate that I conclude that I am mortal. 
However, since my brain state P* also necessitates my conclusion M*, P* is also a 
sufficient condition of M*.  (See Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 Kim understands the fact that both P* and M are sufficient conditions of M*  
to entail that both are sufficient causes of M*. According to (EP), no event has two or 
more distinct sufficient causes, all occurring at the same time, unless it is a genuine 
case of overdetermination. But Kim does not believe this is a genuine case of 
overdetermination: 
 
Nor is it plausible to suppose that the occurrence of M* on this occasion was 
somehow overdetermined in that it has two distinct and independent origins 
in M and P*. For this, too, conflicts with the assumption that M* is a 
property that requires a physical realization base in order to be instantiated, 
                                            
165 Kim (1993) 352, Emphasis added. 
Figure 3 
M causes P* (Deductive Model) 
M  M* 
    
P   DEDUCTIVE  P* 
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and that this instance of M* is there because it is realized by P* . . . I believe 
the only coherent story we can tell here is to suppose that the M-instance 
caused M* to be instantiated by causing P*, M*’s physical realization base, to 
be instantiated. 166 
 
 If one accepts Kim’s claim that this cannot be a case of overdetermination, 
then it follows that M’s causing M* and P*’s causing M* cannot be distinct causes of 
M*, but that instead M must cause M* by causing P*. 
 
 
  
 
 Option B.  On a counterfactual account (See Figure 4), for M to cause M*, the 
following counterfactual must be true: were M not to have occurred, then M* would 
not have occurred. Remember, P* necessitates M*. Were M not the case but P* still 
the case, then M* still would have occurred because of P*. In other words, were I 
still in the brain state corresponding to my conclusion, I still would have concluded 
that I was mortal, even if I had not believed beforehand that I was human and all 
                                            
166 Kim (1993), 352. Emphasis original. 
Figure 4 
M causes P* (Counterfactual Model) 
M    M*  
                
COUNTERFACTUAL 
P                  P* 
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humans were mortal. So, the only way for the counterfactual to be true is for P* 
itself to counterfactually depend upon M: were it not for my believing that I am 
human and all humans are mortal, I never would have gotten into the brain state 
corresponding to a conclusion to begin with. We have the downward causation of P* 
by M.167  
 However, one should note that Kim can only compel an opponent at this stage 
to accept the counterfactual causation of P* by M. He can’t compel his opponent to 
accept that M is a cause of P* on a deductive account of causation by the 
supervenience argument alone, so long as Option B remains open. This will be 
important to keep in mind as we move into the exclusion argument. 
3.3 Kim’s Exclusion Argument 
 Kim now cites his principle of causal closure, (CCPD), to argue that P* must 
itself have some sufficient physical cause – call this P+. This move should be 
uncontroversial enough – the emergentist accepts that P* has a sufficient physical 
cause. Kim makes the further choice to identify P+ with P, although he does not 
further justify this move. It follows that P* now has two causes: P and M. Kim wants 
to know: which of them does the work? Does my believing that I am human and all 
humans are mortal cause my brain state? Or is it my brain state corresponding to 
these beliefs which really causes the brain state corresponding to my conclusion? 
 At this stage, Kim assumes that for M to be a serious cause of P*, M must be 
a sufficient cause of P*. (As noted earlier, this is not guaranteed by the 
                                            
167 Thus, “same level causation can occur only if cross level causation can occur”. 
Kim (1993), 353. 
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Supervenience argument: P* need only counterfactually depend upon M). Granting 
that M must be a sufficient cause of P*, and that P is also a sufficient cause of P*, it 
follows under Kim’s definition that P* has two sufficient causes. According to (EP), if 
M and P are distinct causes, then P* must be overdetermined by M and by P. This 
step is crucial to Kim’s argument – and it is why his arguments are often identified 
by their involving “overdetermination”. (See Figure 5) 
 
 
  
 
 Kim’s trap is now set for his opponent. In the final phase of his argument, he 
argues that overdetermination of P* by both P and M is implausible, since 
overdetermination only happens either by an accident or as a result of some sort of 
intentional planning, but this case is not either of those cases. According to Kim, 
then we should reject that M has any causal power over and above the causal power 
of P in causing P*. It is really P which produces P*, not M. Kim’s opponent is left 
with two options – either to hold to a kind of epiphenomenalism on which M is 
distinct from P and yet has no causal powers over and above P, or else to follow 
Alexander’s dictum and conclude that M is identical to P, acceding to the type-
identity theory. 
Figure 5 
P* is Overdetermined by M and P 
M  M* 
    
P    P* 
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§4 Existing Responses to Kim 
4.1 Redefining Overdetermination 
 While Kim’s objection is remarkable for its difficulty and staying power 
within the philosophical community, a number of insightful and persuasive 
rebuttals to Kim’s objection have been offered recently. The first, by Karen Bennett 
(2003) proposes a more plausible definition of overdetermination, which ultimately 
gets the emergentist off of the hook. 
 Kim defines overdetermination as any case in which an event has two 
distinct sufficient causes. Bennett accepts that this may be a necessary condition of 
being an overdetermination case, but she rejects it as a definition. She adds further 
necessary conditions to what it is to be a cause of overdetermination.  
 
(Bennett’s Definition) c1 and c2 causally overdetermine e only if: 
 (SF)  c1 is a sufficient cause of e, and c2 is a sufficient cause of e. 
 (O1) were c1 to occur and not c2 , then e still would occur. 
 (O2) were c2 to occur and not c1 , then e still would occur. 
 (NT) (O1) and (O2) are not trivially true.168 
 
 Notably, these additional conditions tie the definition of overdetermination 
into a counterfactual account of causation. To clarify, “trivially true” in this case 
would mean that there is no possible world in which the antecedent conditions 
obtain. For example, if c1 entails c2, then the antecedent of (O1) is impossible, 
                                            
168 Bennett (2003) 
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making (O1) trivially true. We wouldn’t want this to generate overdetermination 
cases. 
  Returning to Kim’s causal exclusion argument, the following conditions must 
be true non-trivially for P and M as causes of P* in order to qualify as a case of 
overdetermination: 
 
(O1) There is a possible world in which M occurs without P, and in the 
nearest world in which M occurs without P, P* still occurs. 
 
(O2) there is a possible world in which P occurs without M, and in the nearest 
world in which P occurs without M, P* still occurs.169 
 
 Bennett argues that either condition (O2) is false, or else condition (O1) is 
trivially true. First, she observes that neither M nor P is realistically a sufficient 
cause of P* on its own. Rather, they are sufficient causes only in light of certain 
background conditions. The event P in my brain at t is sufficient to cause the event 
P* in my brain at t* only ceteris paribus, in light of background conditions involving 
my neurons firing in the appropriate way, my not being hit by a bus or suffering an 
aneurysm between t and t*, a nuclear blast not obliterating earth between t and t*, 
and so on. Call this conjunction of events P^A. 
 Second, recall how at the beginning of the Causal Exclusion argument, Kim 
identified the physical cause of P* in the brain, P+, with P, the supervenience base of 
                                            
169 ibid. 
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M. However, this is implausible for a number of reasons. For one thing, an 
externalist about mental content will hold that mental event M – my belief that I am 
human and all humans are mortal – supervenes upon a much larger set of physical 
states than simply my brain event P+, now identified with P.170 Among other things, 
its supervenience base must include the natural kind human and on the natural 
kind mortal and the history by which I obtained the concepts human and mortal. For 
another thing, we have no reason to believe that the causal patterns in the brain 
strictly obey folk psychology: the pattern of neurons which fire to cause brain event 
P* is highly unlikely to be identical to the pattern of neurons which fire when I 
experience the conscious mental state of believing that I am human and all humans 
are mortal. It is far more likely that M will supervene on some conjunction of P and 
various background conditions: something like P^A, where A includes a number of 
facts about the world besides what is going on in my head, such as the fact that the 
earth is not destroyed by a nuclear blast. 
 Nonetheless, suppose it is the case that P on its own, without any background 
conditions, necessitates M. It follows that condition (O2) is trivially true. Since P 
entails M, there is simply no possible world in which P occurs but M does not occur. 
So, there is no threat of overdetermination. 
 Suppose, more realistically, that it is a complex statement containing a 
number of background conditions on which M supervenes, like P^A . Now, condition 
(O2) is false. Were M not the case, yet P still the case, then A would have had to be 
different in some way (again, if A were not different, then M would still have 
                                            
170 See Kobes (2009), and Burge (2009) 
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occurred). However, if A had been different, then P would no longer be sufficient to 
guarantee P*. To illustrate why this is the case, suppose instead that P is the event 
in my brain from which my desire to move my arm M arises. Let P* be the moving of 
my arm.171 Suppose one were to replicate P in a slice of brain in a vat that is being 
artificially stimulated. This is a case in which P occurs, but M does not occur (I can’t 
desire to move my arm, since “my arm” fails to refer to anything). It’s also, not 
coincidentally, a case in which P* does not occur – the brain in a vat doesn’t move 
anything. So, the nearest world in which M is absent but P is the case is a world in 
which P* does not occur. Thus, there is no overdetermination. 
 Bennett’s response provides a plausible and well-justified escape route for the 
emergentist from Kim’s snare. Most notably, Bennett’s account reveals the 
importance of counterfactual accounts of causation to our understanding of what is 
objectionable about overdetermination: it is not simply an event’s having two 
sufficient conditions which makes something a case of real overdetermination, but 
an event’s causally depending upon neither cause. However, in part because the 
response is so highly technical, one is left worrying that she has never really 
diagnosed the central problem with Kim’s argument. I will turn next to an approach 
which aims to identify the problem with Kim’s argument in a mistaken intuition. 
 
 
                                            
171 Note that, while the illustration substitutes for P* a bodily state instead of a 
brain state, the same applies even if P* is a brain state: something which it causally 
depends upon could be missing were A changed. 
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 4.2 Contextual Parameters 
 To many people, it certainly seems as though there is something wrong with 
a physical event having both a physical cause and a mental cause. To them, it seems 
as though the physical cause ought to exclude the mental cause: it cannot be both 
that my arm moves because I decide to move it, and at the same time that my arm 
moves because of an underlying neurophysiological process which guarantees that it 
will happen. My decision to move my arm can only count as exercising causal powers 
if (i) my decision is a joint cause alongside the neurophysiological process, which 
adds novel causal forces to it (i.e., a theory of telekinesis), or else (ii) my decision 
overdetermines the movement of my arm. These are the only options. 
 While I do not share this intuition, if one does have a strong intuition that 
mental causes must be either joint or overdetermining to be real, then technical 
solutions like those given by Bennett (2003) are unlikely to be very convincing – it 
will seem more probable that something has gone awry in the mechanics of the 
rebuttal than that the underlying intuition is mistaken. Even if there is nothing 
wrong with mental causation, it would be helpful to understand why it seems so. 
 One explanation is that our intuition results from ignoring features of 
context.172 Recall that causal explanations occur at different levels, and recall also 
that counterfactual accounts of causation require alternative possibilities to be 
ranked in terms of their nearness to the actual world, a ranking which may depend 
                                            
172 Horgan, T. (2001). Maslen, C., Horgan, T., and Daly, H. (2009). 
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upon the context of study.173 Suppose that one important contextual feature is the 
level at which causal relationships are being studied: which alternative possibilities 
are nearer the actual world will change depending upon whether one is talking 
physics, biology, or psychology. Normally, this implicit level-parameter doesn’t cause 
many problems; normally, we are only discussing causation at a particular level, in 
which case it is safe to assume that overdetermination only occurs in the case of 
intentional arrangement or coincidence. 
 When philosophers discuss downward causation, they ignore this contextual 
parameter. Consider my decision to answer a phone call, and the physical movement 
of my hand to push a button. On what does the movement of my hand causally 
depend? If we ask the question at the level of physiology, then the relevant 
alternative possibilities will be cases in which things went differently 
physiologically: I wouldn’t have pushed the button if my muscles hadn’t contracted. 
These will be different alternative possibilities than those relevant at the level of 
psychology, on which I wouldn’t have pushed the button if I hadn’t wanted to, even if 
my muscles were functioning in the same way. Both of these will be different than 
the possibilities which are relevant when we ask the question at the level 
microphysics. Philosophers have the intuition that there is something wrong when 
they run roughshod over the contextual parameters and treat downward (mental-
physical) or upward (supervenient) causes as same-level causes.   
                                            
173 This context-sensitivity does not entail a deflationary account of causation. 
One can hold that different real causal relations are picked out depending upon the 
context of a discussion.  
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 This solution to the exclusion argument has the disadvantage of requiring a 
denial of many of the underlying assumptions in Kim’s argument: Kim might, for 
example, reply by ruling out contextual counterfactual accounts of causation as in 
conflict with the more “serious” productive or generative causation that an 
emergentist wants.174 However, it offers a clear and plausible explanation for why 
we should not trust our intuitions about overdetermination. Thus, Horgan (2001) 
explains the intuition in Kim’s arguments as a kind of cognitive illusion – one which 
persists even if one knows the contrary to be the case. 
4.3 Who’s Afraid of Overdetermination Anyway? 
 A third response to Kim’s argument which I wish to highlight is that of 
Bernstein (2010), who embraces the conclusion of Kim’s Reductio that there is 
widespread overdetermination in the case of downward mental causation, but 
argues that widespread overdetermination in the absence of coincidence isn’t 
problematic after all. Consider that there are a variety of events in the world which 
occur regularly and might be called “overdetermination”: does the rock thrown at the 
window break it, or do the particles of which the rock is composed break the 
window? In some sense, both do. But this isn’t problematic, because the rock and its 
parts aren’t mereologically distinct. Overdetermination needs to be defined in a way 
which excludes these “trivial” cases and yet includes what the nonreductivist or 
emergentist wishes to say about the relationship between the mind and the brain. 
                                            
174 For instance, it is often observed that counterfactual accounts allow for 
causation by absence, but absences are not supposed to be productive or generative 
(or so it is said). See Kim (2010), 251-253 
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 Why should anything be wrong with overdetermination to begin with? It’s not 
generally objected that overdetermination is physically or conceptually impossible. 
Does overdetermination in mental causation seem too widespread to be a 
coincidence and demand further explanation? Perhaps, but the emergentist offers a 
further explanation, in terms of predictable trans-ordinal laws (or manipulability 
relations). We don’t generally complain that law-like regularities in nature are 
prima facie implausible by arguing that regularities have to be either intentional or 
coincidental. 
 Bernstein’s reply has the advantage of compatibility with the whole of Kim’s 
supervenience and exclusion arguments, without requiring modifications to his 
definition of overdetermination or his assumptions about causation – she simply 
embraces the conclusion.  At the very least, those who defend Kim’s argument need 
to give a further explanation of why overdetermination is supposed to be 
unacceptable.  
 I will now turn to develop my own response to the problem of 
overdetermination. I believe that Bernstein, Horgan, and Bennett have given 
plausible responses to the problem of overdetermination which are fully compatible 
with my own. Like Bennett’s account, mine recognizes the difference between an 
event with two sufficient conditions and a genuine case of overdetermination. That 
said, my own response does not require modifying Kim’s definition of 
overdetermination nor embracing the conclusion he considers a Reductio. It does 
require commitment to a counterfactual account of downward causation, but not to a 
specifically contextualist account. I also believe it has the advantage of explaining 
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why a certain form of overdetermination is supposed to be unacceptable and why so 
many philosophers find the intuition in Kim’s case compelling. 
§5 Two Notions of Sufficiency 
5.1  Two Ways to be Sufficient 
 I believe that all humans are mortal. I also believe that I am human. From 
these two premises, I form a new belief – I conclude that I am mortal. There are two 
relationships between my beliefs and my conclusion which could be described with 
the word “sufficient”. First, there is the sense in which the truth of my beliefs is 
sufficient for the truth of my conclusion: given that I am human and all humans are 
mortal, I couldn’t fail to be mortal. Second, there is the sense in which that I hold 
these beliefs is sufficient to bring about my conclusion, even though I could have 
held the same beliefs and yet failed to come to the conclusion, because nothing 
further was needed for me to come to the conclusion that I was mortal.175 I’ll label 
these the deductive and the completive notions of sufficiency, respectively. 
 I believe that the causal incompatibilist makes the mistake of reasoning 
within Kim’s argument as follows: 
 
 Given A, S is sufficient for T to be the case 
 Given A, S is a sufficient condition of T 
                                            
175 For example, it does not seem to me that some further act of will is needed for 
me to make the inference. But I could have failed to make the inference when I did 
nonetheless, even taking as background assumptions that I reflect on my beliefs and 
that I am not suffering from any obvious defect of rationality. 
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 I believe this is fallacy of equivocation, where the ordinary completive sense 
of “sufficiency” is confused with the logician’s deductive sense of a sufficient 
condition. In this section, I will describe each notion of sufficiency, and attempt to 
explain why neither entails the other. 
5.2  The Deductive Notion 
 The deductive notion of sufficiency – call it sufficiencyD – is the technical 
sense of sufficiency familiar from introductory logic, the sense of “sufficient” used in 
the phrase “sufficient condition”. One state of affairs (or property instance, or event) 
is sufficientD for another when and only when it entails the other.  
 Let S and T be states of affairs, and A be some complex background176 state of 
affairs (the background may include laws of nature, definitions, ceteris paribus 
clauses, etc.). Then: 
 
(sufficiencyD) S is sufficientD for T, given background assumptions A, iff it is 
not possible for S and A to be the case and yet T fail to be the case.  
 
 Assuming A, that S is the case guarantees that T is the case: one could 
structure a valid argument with A and S as premises and T as a conclusion. There is 
                                            
176 Bennett (2003), pp 23-25 notes the difference between a “strong” and a “weak” 
sense of sufficient cause, depending on whether or not background conditions are 
permitted. My definition of sufficiencyD is her “weak” interpretation of sufficiency, 
since A is permitted for the deduction of T from S.  
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no way it could fail to be that T is true, given that S and A are true. S and A together 
logically necessitate T. If the contents of A are limited to laws of nature, then S can 
be said to nomologically necessitate T. 
 5.3  The Completive Notion 
The completive sense of sufficiency – I’ll call it sufficiencyC – is the sense familiar 
from ordinary language, where the word “sufficient” means something like “that’s all 
you need” or “that’s enough”. For instance, a diet of 2,000 calories a day provides 
sufficient energy for the average adult human, a credit card is sufficient to put down 
a hotel reservation for a vacant room, and, for most people, a measles vaccine is 
sufficient to avoid getting the measles. Nothing about the possibility of a valid 
deduction is implied by these statements. 
 We might specify a relation of minimal sufficiency, on which one thing is 
minimally sufficient for another when (i) nothing more than it is needed, and (ii) it is 
still needed. For instance, $1,000,000 is sufficient to purchase a movie ticket in 2013 
US dollars. It’s also “more than sufficient”: one hardly needs $1,000,000 to purchase 
a movie ticket. So, while $1,000,000 may be sufficient to purchase a movie ticket in 
the completive sense, it’s something more like $12 which is minimally sufficient to 
purchase a movie ticket. One actually needs at least $12 to buy the movie ticket – 
one doesn’t need $1,000,000. A few Gigabytes of RAM is minimally sufficient to run 
the software on my computer; a billion Terabytes of RAM would be sufficient also, 
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but not minimally sufficient.177 My eating a popsicle is sufficient for any necessary 
truth, but not minimally sufficient. 
 When I consider the fact that all humans are mortal and the fact that I am 
human, nothing else needs to happen for me to conclude that I am mortal. My beliefs 
compel me to come to the conclusion that I am mortal, whether I want to or not. 
Nothing further is needed, given these two beliefs and my considering them, for me 
to conclude that I am mortal. Further, though these particular beliefs were not 
necessary for me to come to the conclusion (“all mammals are mortal” and “I am a 
mammal” might have done it), my conclusion counterfactually depends on my 
having had the beliefs I had – in those nearby worlds in which I doubt the mortality 
of all humans, or doubt my own humanity, I wouldn’t have come to the same 
conclusion. 
 Let S and T be states of affairs, and let A be the same sort of complex 
background state of affairs mentioned earlier. Let V be the vocabulary in which S, T, 
and A are expressed. Let P be any arbitrary true sentence in V. Then we’ll define 
minimal completive sufficiency, or sufficiencyC as: 
 
(sufficiencyC) S is sufficientC for T, given background assumptions A, iff both: 
 
i. (dependence condition) were S not the case, then T would not have been the 
case in some nearbyA world, & 
                                            
177 Credit belongs jointly to Jennifer Matey and to David Chalmers for convincing 
me of this point on separate occasions. 
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ii. (exclusivity condition) there is no P which is counterfactuallyA independent 
of S and not entailed178 by T for which is it true that, if P were not the case 
and yet S were the case, T would not have been the case in some nearbyA 
world.  
 
 Here, the background conditions A play the role in evaluating the 
counterfactual of sorting other possible worlds into those which are more or less 
nearby the actual world (with respect to how much they differ relative to A).179 This 
differs from the role A plays in the definition of sufficiencyD, where it serves as a 
premise in the deduction of T. 
 Notice that sufficiencyD doesn’t require T to depend on S, but sufficiencyC 
does. On the other hand, sufficiencyC doesn’t rule out the possibility of S and A being 
the case and yet T failing to be the case, but sufficiencyD does. However, both 
sufficiencyC and sufficiencyD rule out the possibility that some other P  independent 
                                            
178   Otherwise, it would be possible for all T that P = “T v U”, in which case T 
counterfactually depends on infinitely many instances of P. 
179 On a sophisticated method of evaluating counterfactuals, like Woodward 
(2005)’s interventionism, the counterfactuals which are relevant (e.g. to causation) 
are restricted in some way – to those involving possible interventions, for example. 
Here I would take these restrictions to be something built into A. Likewise, on 
various contextualist methods of evaluating counterfactuals, A should be construed 
as containing a contextual parameter. 
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of S is a necessary condition of T – sufficiencyC does so explicitly, and sufficiencyD 
entails this is the case. 
5.4 A formal example of the distinction 
 To see how it can be the case that S might be sufficientC for T but not 
sufficientD for T, or that S might be sufficientD for T but not sufficientC for T, 
consider the following two models (see Table 2), where a, b, and c are independent 
sentences in some vocabulary which are true in wα, the actual world, and wn are the 
various other possible worlds at which they are assigned truth values. Let’s further 
specify that worlds w1-6 are nearby wα, where our set of background assumptions A 
ranks the nearness of worlds.  
 
 Table 2 
 Completive and Deductive Models 
C-Model 
 
wα: a, b, c 
w1: ¬a, b, c 
w2: a, ¬b, ¬c 
w3: ¬a, ¬b, ¬c 
w4: a, b, ¬c 
& there is no wn nearby wα with: ¬b, c  
& there is no wn nearby wα with: ¬a, b, 
¬c   
D-Model 
 
wα: a, b, c 
w1: ¬a, b, c 
w2: a, ¬b, ¬c 
w3: ¬a, ¬b, ¬c 
w5: ¬a, ¬b, c 
& there is no wn with: b, ¬c 
 
 
  Notice that b is sufficientC for c on the C-model and not on the D-model. The 
dependence condition holds on the C model but not the D model: on the C-model it is 
true that, in all nearby worlds in which ¬b is the case, ¬c is also the case. But the D-
model contains w5, in which ¬b is the case and ¬c is not. (The exclusivity condition 
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holds on both the C model and the D model: on neither model is there a world in 
which ¬a is the case and b is the case, yet ¬c is the case.) 
 Notice also that b is sufficientD for c on the D-model and not on the C-model. 
There is no possible world on the D-model on which b is the case but c is not the 
case. However, there is such a possible world on the C-model: w4. Even though b is 
sufficient for c in the ordinary sense – b is enough for c and nothing more than b is 
needed for c – b is not sufficient for c in the technical sense, and it would be invalid 
to deduce c from b.  
5.5 Intuitive Examples 
 Intuitive examples where a state of affairs is sufficientD but not sufficientC for 
some other state of affairs are easy to find in existing philosophical literature about 
causal explanation. That a man takes birth control pills is sufficientD but not 
sufficientC for his not getting pregnant.180 Each soldier’s bullet in the firing squad 
was sufficientD for the execution but not sufficientC.181  
 In other words, nomological necessitation is not the same thing as 
nomological dependence.182  
                                            
180 See Salmon (1971), 34 
181 Since the dependency condition involves a counterfactual, it faces the 
“preemption” issue: it isn’t true for any one soldier’s bullet that the execution 
depended on it. See Lewis (2000). Only the sum of the bullets is sufficientC for the 
execution. 
182 Consider how the height h of a pole and the angle θ of the sun above the 
horizon, are sufficientD causes of the length s of a shadow cast by a flagpole, since s 
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 Intuitive examples where a state of affairs is sufficientC but not sufficientD for 
some other state of affairs are much more difficult to come by. Practically speaking, 
we can usually get away with the fallacious inference that because nothing else is 
needed besides a cause to bring about a certain effect, the effect was guaranteed by 
the cause.183 Nonetheless, suppose a historian truthfully says: “Once hope of 
economic improvement had dissipated and social media made organizing possible, 
the attempted assassination of the opposition leader was sufficient to cause the 
                                                                                                                                  
can be deduced from h and θ given laws about the rectilinear propagation of light. Of 
course, h and θ are also sufficientC for s – were they different, s would have been 
different. But while s and h are also sufficientD for θ – because θ can be deduced from 
them – they are not sufficientC for θ. Changing the height of the flagpole and the 
length of its shadow will not change the angle of the sun on the horizon in nearby 
world. Example from Woodward  (2011) 
183 Note that coming up with a clear example requires considering causal patterns 
that occur on a particular higher level than fundamental physics – those of a special 
science like forestry or economics or history – in large part because CCPD rules out 
any physical event with a cause that doesn’t have a sufficientD cause. This isn’t a 
problem with forestry or history, since closure does not apply to higher domains. 
This doesn’t mean there are no law-like, predictable regularities in higher domains. 
Just that it isn’t plausible that every historical event (for example) could be deduced 
from antecedent conditions in history with the use of these historical laws, even in 
an ideal and perfect Historical Science of the future. 
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revolution.”184 The historian seems to be claiming that the assassination was 
sufficientC for the revolution – nothing more was needed 185 But the historian almost 
certainly does not mean the assassination was sufficientD for the revolution. The 
historian can’t mean that it would be impossible for the assassination to have 
happened with the same background, and yet for there to have been no revolution. 
In fact, it might even have been a nearby possibility.  
5.6 Towards a Causal Distinction 
 Neither notion of sufficiency is intrinsically causal.186 However, we might 
develop this distinction into one between a sufficientD cause versus a sufficientC 
                                            
184 This is not intended as reference to an actual historical event. I’m working off 
the view that things like economic hardship, violated expectations, a government’s 
lack of perceived legitimacy, ability to organize an opposition, or so on, are 
something like the ingredients of revolution. 
185 I take the historian to mean that the attempted assassination was sufficientC 
for revolution because (i) were there no assassination, there wouldn’t have been a 
revolution, and (ii) beyond the assassination, given the other ingredients already in 
place, nothing else was needed for a revolution. The claim is thus that if these 
antecedent conditions obtained, and yet revolution failed to come about, then there 
would be no other sentence in the historian’s vocabulary left such that the failure of 
the revolution could be attributed to the failure to obtain of the state of affairs 
expressed by the sentence. 
186 For one thing, both notions of sufficiency are as compatible with synchronic 
relationships as they are with diachronic relationships. 
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cause. Let’s say an event S is a sufficientD cause of some effect T given certain 
background assumptions A only if it is not possible for S and A to be the case but not 
T. 187 An event S is a sufficient cause of some effect T given background assumptions 
A only if in the nearby worlds with respect to A where S is not the case, T is not the 
case, and there is no other sentence P of which this can truly be said while keeping 
A fixed (where P is some sentence in the relevant vocabulary188 which is 
counterfactually independent of S, keeping A fixed189, and not entailed by T) 190 
                                            
187 It might be noticed that each sense lines up imperfectly with a different class 
of accounts of what a sufficient cause is. Deductive accounts of causation (like those 
which follow after the D-N model of explanation) are those on which all causes must 
be sufficientD for their effects given background conditions and laws of nature.  
Counterfactual accounts of causation are those on which causes must meet the 
dependence condition (but not the exclusivity condition) of the definition of 
sufficientC with respect to those worlds which are nearest given background 
conditions and laws of nature. 
188 By the “relevant vocabulary”, I mean those predicates which express 
properties within the special science which operates at the level at which the 
purported cause occurs. Microbiology and Forestry operate on different “levels”, and 
one need only exhaust the vocabulary of Forestry to make true a ‘nothing else is 
needed’ claim on the level of forestry, without having to further exhaust the 
vocabulary of microbiology in order to meet the exclusivity condition. 
189 Notice why it is essential that A be kept fixed for all counterfactual 
evaluations. Otherwise a distal cause (for which the counterfactual is true) will rule 
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It should be noted that the distinction between a sufficientD cause and a sufficientC 
cause is not whether they involve laws or background conditions or not – both of 
them do.191 Likewise, the difference is not that a sufficientD cause is generative in 
some way that a sufficientC cause is not.192 Nor is the difference that one sense of 
                                                                                                                                  
out every more proximal cause. Let C1 be a cause of E at t1, and C2 be a cause of E 
at t2. Suppose were it not for C2, E would not be the case; and were it not for C1, E 
would not be the case. This seems to rule out the exclusivity condition, even if 
nothing else was needed at t2 for C2 to cause E. Surely C1 does not depend on C2, 
which happened later in time! However, this is only true when we use a different set 
of background assumptions than A. A is generally taken by Lewis (1973) and others 
to include all events prior to t2. If A is kept fixed, then “were it not for C2, C1 would 
not be the case” becomes a backtracking counterfactual, which is in fact true. 
190 Both of these are “only if” claims, not “if and only if” claims, because I want to 
leave it open that something further is needed to make the relationships specifically 
causal. 
191 One might suppose that counterfactual accounts do not rely upon laws of 
nature or lawful regularities, but they must in fact do so in order to differentiate 
near from distant worlds. This remains true even if contextual factors are in some 
cases given priority. (Kim 2011, 211-213) Instead, the distinction is between whether 
these laws are used as part of a deduction from causes to effects, or whether they are 
used to map out the nearness of other possible words. 
192 In fact, it seems to me that the ordinary “that’s enough” sense of sufficientC is 
exactly what we tend to have in mind when we talk about causes bringing about 
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“sufficient cause” is deflationary and the other realist.193 The difference is between a 
cause that rules out all alternative effects, and a cause that exhausts all causes that 
could change the effect. That is, the difference is between a deductive account of 
causation, on which a cause must be sufficientD for its effects, and a counterfactual 
account of causation, where causation is causal dependence, and the exhaustive set 
of all causes on which an event depends sufficientC for its effects. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
their effects. I seems clear to me that my belief that I am human and that all 
humans are mortal generates and produces in me the conclusion that I am mortal. 
Whereas it is a common mistake for introductory logic students to suppose that 
sufficient conditions bring about that which they are sufficient conditions of, and so 
it seems like a fallacy to me to suppose that there is something productive or 
generative going on simply because one can get a deduction going. 
193 Indeed, the distinction between deflationary vs. realist accounts of causation is 
orthogonal to the distinction that I am making here. Lewis (1973) gives a 
counterfactual account of causation which is deflationary, but Woodward (2005) 
gives an interventionist counterfactual account which is not deflationary. Deductive 
accounts of causation can be deflationary, like that of Hempel (or, famously, Hume), 
under which laws of nature are only regularities without an observed exception. 
Deductive accounts can also be non-deflationary – we can take laws of nature to be 
real laws, uncovered by scientific investigation. The deductive/counterfactual 
distinction involves the form that causal claims take, as opposed to the ontological 
status of causal relations. 
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§6 An Alternative Response to Kim 
6.1  Return to the Scene of the Crime 
 Let’s return to Kim’s Supervenience Argument. Notice that Kim’s opponent 
need not accept that mental events are sufficient causes of physical events in the 
technical sense, and should at most accept that mental events are sufficient causes 
in the ordinary sense. This move offers another way out of Kim’s exclusion 
argument. It allows for a robust sense in which mental events are sufficient causes 
of physical events, while remaining compatible with the supervenience of the mental 
on the physical. 
 Let M and M* be mental events and P and P* be physical events, where P is 
the supervenience base of M and P* is the supervenience base of M*, and M causes 
M*. For simplicity, suppose that P also causes P*.194 This is the sort of picture of 
mental causation which middle positions on the mind are generally willing to accept. 
 Kim argues that M must cause M* by causing M*’s supervenience base, P* as 
follows. First, assume one must adopt either a deductive or a counterfactual account 
                                            
194 Of course, a good deal hangs on this assumption, and I see in Bennett (2003) 
two reasons for why this assumption isn’t plausible. First, if externalism about 
mental content is true, then the physical base of M and the physical base of M* 
aren’t just in the brain – they include historical relations between the brain and the 
world and how things actually are in the world. But one of these states is unlikely to 
be a sufficient cause of the other. Second, the sorts of background conditions A which 
are needed for P to be a sufficient cause of P* are unlikely to be part of the 
supervenience base of M. 
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of mental causation.195 On a deductive account, M causes M* only if M is sufficientD 
for M* to happen. But M* supervenes on P* -- which means that P* is also 
sufficientD for M*. So, M* has two sufficient causes, and according to the Exclusion 
Principle, either this is a genuine case of overdetermination or M and P* are not 
distinct causal chains – M causes M* by causing P*.  
 On a counterfactual account, on the other hand, M causes M* only if M* 
counterfactually depends on M. But, once again, M*’s supervenience base P* is 
sufficientD for M*.  So, were M not the case but P* still the case, M* would still 
necessarily be the case because of P*. For M to be the cause of M*, then it would also 
have to be true that were M not the case, then P* would not be the case. So, on a 
counterfactual account, M must cause P*.  Either way, Kim forces his opponent to 
accept the downward causation of P* by M.196 
 However, one should note that the Kim can only compel his opponent at this 
stage to accept, at most, the counterfactual causation of P* by M. He can’t compel his 
opponent to accept that M is a sufficientD cause of P* by the supervenience 
argument alone. (See Figure 6) 
 
                                            
195 I am simplifying the argument for ease of exposition. Kim is well aware that 
there are accounts of mental causation which fall into neither category, of course, 
and has argued that his objection applies to them equally.   
196 Thus, “same level causation can occur only if cross level causation can occur”. 
Kim (1993), 353. 
  167 
 
 
 
6.2  Kim’s Exclusion Argument 
 Kim’s Exclusion argument follows from here. Kim notes that P* has two 
causes – a physical cause (P) and a mental cause (M). Now, according to CCPD, P 
must be a sufficientD physical cause of P*. Kim also thinks we must accept that M is 
a sufficientD cause of P*. Why? 
 To vindicate M as a full and genuine cause of P*, we should be able to show 
that M can bring about P* on its own, without there being a synchronous physical 
event P that also serves as a sufficient cause of P*.197 
 In other words, a full and genuine cause can’t rely on something else in order 
to bring about its effect. M must be all that is needed for P*, why it must be enough 
to bring about P – why it can’t be that a particular synchronous physical event P is 
also needed for P*.  
 Of course, this is an argument for why M must be a sufficientC cause of P*, 
not a sufficientD cause. And this seems to me the most plausible claim that can be 
                                            
197 Kim (2011), 215. Note: I have adjusted the use of P* and M* from the original 
for consistency with the model used elsewhere in this paper. 
Figure 6 
M need only be sufficientC for P* 
M  M* 
       
P P* 
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made about “downward causation” from the mental to the physical. Mental causes 
are enough to bring about their physical effects. The physical effect would not have 
occurred in the absence of the mental cause, so the dependency condition holds. The 
physical effect doesn’t depend on anything else in this way either – had the 
particular physical base P of M not occurred, but M had still occurred (which, in all 
nearby possible worlds, happens through some physical base or other), then P* still 
would have occurred. So, the exclusivity condition holds.  M is sufficientC for P*. 
 However, it is not plausible to suppose that mental causes entail their 
physical effects or that physical events can be deduced from mental events, even 
given background conditions and ceteris paribus clauses. It is not true that M 
guarantees the occurrence of P* – in fact, M might occur and P* fail to occur. 
Nothing could rule out the possibility of M failing to cause P*, though it might be a 
very distant possibility. So, it is not plausible that M is sufficientD for P*. 
 If M is merely sufficientC for P* but not sufficientD for P*, then the exclusion 
principle doesn’t apply. Only if we were to grant that M is a sufficientD cause of P*, 
and that P is also a sufficientD cause of P*, would it follow under the Exclusion 
Principle that either P and M aren’t distinct, or else that P* is overdetermined by 
both M and by P.  
6.3 Reformulate the Exclusion Principle? 
 One might wonder if Kim really is committed to interpreting the Exclusion 
Principle as involving sufficientD causes. He is. The exclusion principle makes 
reference to overdetermination. For Kim, an event is overdetermined iff it has two 
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distinct sufficientD causes.198 The firing squad case is intended to be an example of 
this.199 In genuine overdetermination, two causal chains converge, where each cause, 
independent of the other, guarantees (necessitates, determines) the outcome. This is 
something which, one might argue, could happen only by chance or in designed 
scenarios (like the firing squad). 
  Why not define a different sense of overdetermination, one in which an event 
has two distinct sufficientC causes? Call it “overdeterminationC”. P* is 
overdeterminedC by M and by P – since P is also a sufficientC cause of P*.200 Why not 
reformulate the exclusion principle in terms of overdeterminationC?  
 But overdeterminationC doesn’t describe firing squad scenarios, since both 
causes are sufficientD but neither is sufficientC. So the classic “genuine cases of 
overdetermination” aren’t overdeterminationC. In fact, the only possible cases of 
overdeterminationC are cases where one cause counterfactually depends on the other 
cause. So, whereas Kim’s Exclusion Principle is a substantive claim, the sufficiencyC 
                                            
198 Kim defines overdetermination for effect E and causes C and C* as “E would 
have occurred even if either C or C* had not occurred … the other would have been 
sufficient to bring it about.” Kim (1993), 252. Note on 253, however, Kim identifies 
this relationship with “completeness” and contrasts it with the D-N model. 
199 Kim (2011) and elsewhere. 
200 Since P is sufficientD for P*, it meets the exclusivity condition. Since M 
depends on P (ex hypothesi per the emergentist and non-reductive physicalist), and 
P* depends on M, then by transitivity P* depends on P, meeting the dependence 
condition. 
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version of the exclusion principle is analytic simply given the definition of 
sufficiencyC. By definition, if two causes are minimally completively sufficient 
(sufficientC) for one event, then the two causes must be dependent on each other.201 
Hence the following is principle: 
 
(EPC) Exclusion PrincipleC. No event has two or more independent sufficientC 
causes.202 
 
 This is, of course, exactly the relationship which emergentists and non-
reductive physicalists have been claiming holds between M and its supervenience 
base P: M is dependent upon P.  
                                            
201 Otherwise, it would be false that “there is no P counterfactually independent of 
S and not entailed by T for which is it true that, if P were not the case and yet S 
were the case, T would not have been the case in some nearbyA world.” 
202 Notice three differences. (i) “independent” (which follows from the definition of 
sufficiencyC), rather than “distinct”. Obviously, the emergentist holds that M and P 
are metaphysically dependent but distinct. (ii) this principle doesn’t make reference 
to time. Thus, an event can’t even have a sufficientC distal cause and a sufficientC 
proximate cause with the same background conditions A – whereas an event can 
have a sufficientD distal cause and a sufficientD proximate cause without involving 
overdetermination. (iii) this principle doesn’t add ‘unless it is a genuine case of 
overdetermination’, since all cases of overdeterminationC are cases where one cause 
is dependent on the other. 
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6.4 Summary 
 In summary, Kim’s supervenience argument at most compels the 
supervenience theorist to accept counterfactual downward causation. I have argued 
that the most plausible accounts of mental-to-physical downward causation involve 
sufficientC (“all you need”) causation but not sufficientD (“no way to fail”) causation. 
Neither counterfactual mental-to-physical causation nor sufficientC mental-to-
physical causation are cases to which Kim’s Exclusion Principle applies, and they 
present no threat of overdetermination with the sufficientD physical-to-physical 
causes guaranteed by causal closure, leaving a way out of Kim’s Exclusion 
argument.  
 It is my suspicion that the principle that no event has two or more 
independent sufficientC causes is the sort of thing which might be at work leading us 
to find Kim’s Exclusion Principle intuitive. No event can have more than one 
minimally “complete cause”, unless one cause depends in some way on the other. It 
seems to me that a serious form of emergentism is compatible with this intuitive 
claim, and with the causal closure of the physical. I will briefly turn to a few 
objections which might be levied against my reply to Kim. 
§7 Objections to Emergence and Mental Causation 
7.1 Who Needs Ordinary Language? 
 Philosophers can start to become weary and exhausted by arguments 
claiming there are multiple senses of a word – particularly ones which contrast a 
“folk” use against a technical use. “Who cares what the folk think?” someone might 
say. On this objection, logicians have discovered the real sense of sufficiency – the 
notion of a sufficient condition – and it is up to everybody else to catch up. 
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 I do not share this disdain for ordinary language. However, in defense of my 
particular argument about the two senses of “sufficiency”, it is worth pointing out 
that the “ordinary” notion of sufficiency (the sense of being “enough”) is the sense in 
which the sciences regularly use the term and the only notion of sufficiency which 
can be justified by the process of experimentation. The question of whether a cause 
is sufficientC for its effect is empirical; the question of whether it is sufficientD for its 
effect is not empirical. The notion of completive sufficiency should not be dismissed. 
 Consider an experiment in which a researcher is establishing the relationship 
between the temperature of a liquid and the rate at which it evaporates. The 
researcher might set the value of the temperature variable at a variety of settings, 
keeping the values of all other variables fixed, and then measure the corresponding 
changes on the evaporation-rate variable. A process like this establishes a kind of 
dependence of the evaporation-rate variable on the temperature variable. 
 Suppose a researcher wished to compile a set of all of the variables on which 
evaporation rate depends, and that this researcher had an inexhaustible source of 
grant money, technological ability, graduate assistants, and time. Perhaps he is a 
scientific archangel, who can conceivably go through every single variable in the 
entire cosmos and test it in this manner: for every x, keeping other variables fixed, 
what effect does a change in variable x have on evaporation rate? Perhaps he could 
even tweak around with the fundamental laws of physics. What would the result of 
this experiment be? The result would be an exhaustive list of everything on which 
evaporation rate depends: pressure, temperature, density of the substance, and so 
on. Perhaps he could then say with full confidence, for any given setting of these 
variables, exactly what the evaporation rate would be, because a setting on this 
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exhaustive list of variables would be sufficientC for the given effect. The evaporation 
rate would depend upon these variables and upon nothing else.  
 He might express his results as a law of evaporation-rate. However, he would 
have to mean “law” in the regularity-theorist’s sense of “law”. He could not mean 
that there is some law of nature such that, if the antecedent conditions of the law 
hold, some effect must follow with logical necessity. Observation of experiments does 
not give us laws of that sort. So, the researcher cannot mean that the set of causal 
variables is sufficientD for the given effect because his process of experimentation 
has not involved observing all of the logically possible worlds and ruling them out. 
The only way to establish that S is a sufficient condition of T is to show either that 
the definition of what it is to be S contains what it is to be T (that is, from the 
perspective of ontology203, T is analytic given S) – or else to maintain that there is 
some sort of necessary brute fact which links T and S which admits of no further 
explanation.204 Neither of these are studied by controlled experiment. 
 
 
                                            
203 Of course, in a given language, T might be synthetic and a posteriori given S, 
as Saul Kripke famously showed in the case of Water = H2O. However, from the 
perspective of ontology, what it is to be Water is identical to what it is to be H2O: 
there is nothing contained in the “real definition” or essence of one which is not 
contained in the essence of the other (regardless of sociolinguistic facts).  
204 For instance, certain kinds of non-naturalism in meta-ethics hold that the 
natural facts are sufficientD for the moral facts without being analytic given them. 
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7.2 Compatibility with Laws? 
 It should be clear, then, that I am not denying the existence of causal laws. 
My response given here is compatible with holding a nomological account of 
physical-to-physical causation, of mental-to-mental causation, and of the physical-to-
mental supervenience relationship. All that my response to Kim requires is that one 
deny that downward mental-to-physical causation can be expressed by laws which 
carry any sort of modal force (that is, beyond mere statements of regularity). When 
my decision to answer the phone causes my hand to push the button, it is incorrect 
to say that my decision made it necessary that my hand move to push the button. 
Regardless of which account one prefers of causation generally, I think it is quite 
strange to hold that mental causation fits the deductive model of causation, or that 
mental causes are ever sufficientD for physical effects. 
 Consider how my believing that I am human and that all humans are mortal 
causes me to conclude that I am mortal, which causes me to utter the word “shucks”. 
My utterance of “shucks” is a physical effect of a mental cause – my believing a pair 
of propositions.  
 Let p* be a description of the physical and neurological state corresponding to 
my utterance of “shucks”, and let m be my belief that I am mortal. There seem to be 
many slightly different ways205 that p* could have occurred which are equally 
compatible with m: a different neuron could have fired, a molecule could have been 
missing from my brain. My utterance of “shucks” could have been realized in ways 
                                            
205 Two distinct “way things could have occurred” are two distinct physical states, 
which could be described differently in the language of fundamental physics. 
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which are different at a fine-grained level. This shouldn’t be a worry for the claim 
that m caused p* – mental causation just doesn’t operate at such a fine-grained 
level. But it is a worry for any claim that m was – given some law of nature and set 
of initial conditions – sufficientD for p*. My belief that I am mortal didn’t guarantee 
or entail or necessitate my saying “shucks”. 
 What does it mean to say that my belief in my own mortality caused me to 
say “shucks”? It seems natural to think it means something along one of these lines: 
I wouldn’t have said “shucks” if I didn’t just come to the conclusion that I was 
mortal; or I wouldn’t have said “shucks” in the time and manner that I did if I didn’t 
come to the conclusion that I was mortal in the time and manner that I did; or that 
the best way to have stopped me from saying “shucks” right then, if you had wanted 
to, would have been to prevent me from coming to the conclusion that I was mortal.  
 Maybe one could compile an exhaustive list of everything that could have 
possibly gone wrong and prevented me from saying “shucks” once I had come to the 
conclusion that I was mortal. That list together with the fact that I concluded I was 
mortal would then sufficeC for me to say “shucks”, since nothing else would be 
needed. But there’s no reason to be so optimistic as to think that even an ideal 
reasoner could derive from all of that together that I, as a matter of logical necessity, 
must say “shucks”. This isn’t to suggest that something further had to intervene to 
make sure that I actually said “shucks” upon concluding that I was mortal. 
Concluding I was mortal was enough to make me say “shucks”. It’s just to deny that 
my failing to say “shucks” would be contradictory to my concluding that I was mortal 
given the laws of nature, and some set of background conditions. 
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 Most counterfactual accounts do not require that causes be sufficient for their 
effects in either sense – causes may be only partially responsible for their effects. 
That said, the strongest causal claim possible on counterfactual accounts is that of 
sufficiencyC  – that an effect depends (in the relevant counterfactual way) on its 
cause, and that it doesn’t depend on anything else. It is not asserted that causes 
must be sufficientD for effects. 
7.3 Forces, Powers, and Production 
 Someone might believe that in order to be a productive cause – to really make 
something happen – a cause has to be deductively sufficient for its effect. Someone 
who forms this belief falls into the converse of the fallacy mentioned earlier: 
 
 Given A, S is a sufficient condition of T 
 Given A, S is sufficient for T to be the case 
 
 There is a certain phenomenology associated with drawing a conclusion from 
a set of premises. Introductory Logic students often have to be taught that this 
feeling of being oomphed or “following from the premises” is not part of validity. As 
discussed earlier, that a set of premises is a sufficient condition for the conclusion of 
a valid argument does not mean that the conclusion depends upon the premises in 
any sense. The dependence condition of the ordinary sense of “sufficiency” does not 
hold. 
 So, deductive causation is no more productive or generative than 
counterfactual causation. The notion of a productive cause is most likely tied to the 
pragmatic notion of a possible manipulation of one variable by another, as discussed 
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in Woodward (2005).206 In this sense, since it is possible for someone to manipulate 
whether I push buttons or not by intervening upon the decisions that I make and my 
reasons for making them, my reasons and decisions count as productive causes of my 
moving my hand to push the button. The ability to manipulate states of my hand 
counts as a causal power of my decision, legitimizing the ontological status of my 
decision for one who follows Alexander’s dictum. 
 Does my decision exercise causal force? Here, I would hold that my decision 
exercises no causal forces over and above those which occur at the fundamental 
physical level. I would deny any sort of novel, emergent causal forces, and nothing 
on my reply to Kim requires that such forces exist. 
7.4 Deny the Argument at an Earlier Stage? 
 Someone might notice that my distinction between deductive and completive 
sufficiency might be used to halt Kim’s argument at an earlier stage, blocking the 
supervenience argument rather than the exclusion argument. Someone might deny 
instead (a) that supervenience requires P to be sufficientD for M, (b) that P is a 
sufficientD cause of P*. This is correct. I’ve chosen to focus on the exclusion 
                                            
206 I believe my notion of a sufficientC cause is compatible with Woodward’s 
account of causation – i.e., a sufficient cause of y would be a set of all of the variables 
by which the value of y can be changed. Woodward offered a unique response to 
Kim’s supervenience argument at the 2012 meeting of the Philosophy of Science 
Association; Woodward’s response is very different from my own approach, but not 
incompatible with it either. 
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argument because an emergentist is committed to downward causation anyway, and 
because there are independent reasons which Kim can cite for holding (a) and (b). 
 To see how someone might deny (a), consider the account of manipulative 
supervenience which I offered as one option for the emergentist in Chapter 2. On 
this account, the supervenience of M on P does not require that P metaphysically 
necessitate M, nor that there be a strict law by which P necessitates M, but only that 
it be impossible for M to be manipulable by any means except for an intervention 
upon P: in other words, that P necessarily be sufficientC for M without being 
sufficientD for M. This would block Kim’s use of the supervenience argument to infer 
downward causation. 
 To see how someone might deny (b), consider my reflections about 
experimentation given earlier, and how some contemporary theories of physics make 
it consistent to deny that prior states of the world are sufficientD for future states 
even while holding that nothing else is responsible for future states being as they 
are, making them sufficientC for future states. From this perspective, the strongest 
version of principle (CCPD) justified by experimental evidence is one on which every 
physical event has a sufficientC physical cause, but not necessarily a sufficientD 
physical case. Thus, within Kim’s argument, CCPD at most offers us that P is 
sufficientC for P*, much like M is sufficientC for P*. 
7.5 Commitment to Determinism? 
 While I believe that discussions about the nature of free-will and 
determinism in the philosophy of action are not going to be settled by debates about 
mental causation in the philosophy of mind, it is not uncommon to connect the two 
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on some level. Suppose that someone asks whether Emergentism is a form of 
determinism, or a form of libertarianism? 
 I believe the best answer is that the form of Emergentism I have offered 
strongly suggests (though it does not entail), a unique brand of compatibilism. On 
this view, one can accept the following claim of the Libertarian: 
 
For at least some human actions, an agent chooses to do A at time t, and yet 
could have done otherwise than A at t, given the whole state of the universe 
prior to t. 
 
 At the same time, one can accept the following claim of the Determinist: 
 
Every human action is an event, and every event at time t has a sufficientC 
cause in the whole state of the universe prior to t. 
 
 This form of compatibilism is neither in the spirit of orthodox determinism 
(which envisions a world in which prior states of the universe are deductively 
sufficient for future ones) nor is it in the spirit of orthodox libertarianism (on which 
something further is needed for events to happen – the force of will – given prior 
states of the universe). At the same time, this form of compatibilism is consistent 
with the literal claims of both determinists (that every future event has a sufficient 
cause) and of libertarians (that there is a possibility of doing otherwise). While I 
highly doubt that this resolves the debate, or that droves of adherents will flock to 
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this sort of emergentist compatibilism, it does show that the current debate may 
need to be framed in a different manner. 
§8 Conclusions 
 There are many plausible replies to Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion 
argument against emergentism. On the reply which I have offered, Kim’s argument 
depends on equivocating between the logician’s deductive sense of a sufficient 
condition and the ordinary completive sense on which something is sufficient when 
nothing else beside it is needed. It is the ordinary sense alone in which it is plausible 
to think that mental events are sufficient to cause physical events. Because the form 
of overdetermination which Kim finds objectionable requires that an event have two 
sufficient conditions, no such overdetermination occurs when a physical event has 
both a completively sufficient mental cause in addition to some deductively sufficient 
physical cause. 
 My response to Kim’s argument has the advantage of leaving Kim’s definition 
of overdetermination intact, accepting (for the sake of argument, at least) that there 
is no widespread overdetermination, and not requiring a commitment to a particular 
account of causation generally – except to require that high-level mental-to-mental 
causes and downward mental-to-physical causes admit of some counterfactual 
account. Like Bennett’s response to Kim, my response involves observing the 
differences between deductively sufficient conditions and counterfactual dependence 
claims, but without requiring as technical a mastery of Kim’s argument. 
 My account gives a simple explanation for why overdetermination is 
supposed to be unacceptable. Contrary to Kim, it is not overdeterminationD which is 
unacceptable – that is, the claim that an event has two distinct sufficientD causes. 
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Rather, it is overdeterminationC which is unacceptable – that is, the claim that an 
event has two independent sufficientC causes. This is unacceptable because it is 
analytic that it is not so: necessarily, if an event depends on one cause alone and on 
some other cause alone, then one of the causes must depend on the other. 
 I also believe my account offers a simple explanation for why so many 
philosophers find the intuition in Kim’s case compelling. Philosophy often makes use 
of a certain heuristic device, on which questions remain open so long as alternate 
possibilities have not been ruled out by contradiction. If nothing else is needed for 
my pushing the button but my decision to answer the phone, then surely my decision 
guarantees my pushing the button; it simply has to happen, because if it didn’t, then 
why wouldn’t it? Surely there would have to be some reason that my pushing the 
button failed to happen – and that would mean that the physical button-pushing 
depended upon something other than my decision, and so my decision wasn’t enough 
after all. So long as not every possibility has been ruled out, a true philosopher will 
expect an answer to the question of why one is the case and not another. And so, 
philosophers conclude that a truly sufficient explanation would naturally be a 
deduction-enabling sort of thing. Intuitions say that a complete explanation rules 
out all other possibilities. Yet, nothing in the logic of things requires this to be the 
case. 
 In the next chapter, I will consider the objection that the lack of a priori 
deducibility of consciousness from physical descriptions fails to justify the 
emergentist’s belief in an ontological gap between the physical and the mental.  
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Chapter 4 
COSMIC HERMENEUTICS 
PART A 
§1. Introduction 
 Let P be a true sentence in some language, and Q be a sentence in the same 
language or some other language. Imagine that there exists an ideal reasoner, like 
Laplace’s demon or C. D. Broad’s Mathematical Archangel – a conscious intellect not 
subject to any of the contingent limitations, biases, or errors of finite minds. Suppose 
this ideal reasoner knows that P, and is tasked with deducing Q a priori. There are 
two questions we might ask. First, if the ideal reasoner could deduce Q from P a 
priori, what would that say about Q? Second, if the ideal reasoner couldn’t deduce Q 
from P a priori, what would that say about Q? 
 Suppose that P is the conjunction of all of the true sentences in the language 
of fundamental ontology, and Q is the conjunction of all of the true sentences in any 
language. Is Q ideally deducible from P? This special assignment for the ideal 
reasoner might be called Cosmic Hermeneutics.207 We might ask is whether cosmic 
hermeneutics is possible, and what its possibility or impossibility would mean for 
metaphysics. 
 Suppose that we restrict the sentences in P to true sentences in the language 
of fundamental physics. Suppose we restrict Q to a conjunction of sentences about 
some higher-level domain, such as the sentences about the qualitative experiences of 
a subject. Call this Physical-to-Phenomenal Cosmic Hermeneutics (PPCH). Would Q 
                                            
207 The term belongs to Horgan (1983) 
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be deducible from P by an ideal reasoner? If not, what would it mean for the 
relationship between the physical domain and the higher-level domain? 
 Many hold that PPCH is possible if and only if physicalism is true. Jackson 
(1998) holds that physicalism is true because he holds that PPCH is possible. Byrne 
(1999), alongside Chalmers (1996) and Jackson (1982), holds that physicalism is 
false because PPCH is not possible. Chalmers (2012) holds that because Cosmic 
Hermeneutics is not possible for sentences about qualia and for indexical truths, we 
ought to conclude that qualia and indexicals need to be added to the set of 
fundamental truths. Then, when we take the resulting set of fundamental truths as 
our basis – the truths about physics, the truths about conscious experiences, the 
truths about indexicals, and a totality sentence stating that there are no further 
truths which can’t be deduced from this set of fundamental truths – Chalmers holds 
that Cosmic Hermeneutics is possible. 
 Many, such as Block and Stalnaker (1998), have attacked one half of the 
biconditional: they argue that physicalism might nonetheless be true, even though 
PPCH is not possible. For Block and Stalnaker, truths about phenomenal states or 
other higher-level domains are plausibly cases of a posteriori necessities, which are 
entailed by the truths of fundamental physics, but which are not deducible from 
them even by an ideal reasoner. In response, Jackson and Chalmers (2001) have 
defended a robust form of two-dimensional semantics on which certain a posteriori 
necessities are guaranteed to be a priori for an ideal reasoner with an adequate 
understanding of the relevant concepts. 
 Few have attacked the other direction of the biconditional: the claim that 
PPCH might be possible, and yet physicalism might be false. However, in this 
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chapter, I will argue that a form of emergentism is compatible with the possibility of 
Cosmic Hermeneutics. An emergentist could hold coherently that Cosmic 
Hermeneutics is possible, and yet that physicalism is false. 
 My position will appear at first to be at odds with Broad (1923), in which 
emergentism for a domain is defined in terms of the inability of an ideal reasoner to 
deduce the facts of that domain from the physical facts. Nonetheless, I will locate the 
emergentist’s interest in the task of Cosmic Hermeneutics not in the question of 
whether the higher-level truths are ideally a priori deducible from the physical 
truths, but rather in the question of what resources would need to be a priori for the 
ideal reasoner in order for the deduction to occur. In itself, that a higher domain of 
facts is ideally deducible from certain fundamental facts does not tell us that the 
higher domain is not also fundamental. However, on my view, if a higher domain of 
facts is merely derivative from a set of fundamental facts, then the higher domain of 
facts should be ideally deducible from those fundamental facts given only analytic a 
priori premises. If a higher domain of facts is emergent from a set of facts, then it 
may be deducible from them, but it will be deducible only given synthetic premises – 
and the strength of the synthetic a priori resources minimally needed for the 
deduction will indicate something about the strength of the kind of emergence 
involved. 
 I will begin in Part A with an overview of the topic of Cosmic Hermeneutics 
and relevant history and background. I will start in section 2 with its origins in 
Laplace and Broad’s ideal reasoners, and connect the topic to debates about realism 
and fundamentality in the 20th century. I will continue in Section 3 by describing the 
project of Radical Interpretation in the 1960s-1980s. In section 4, I will follow the 
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shift of the conversation into conceptual analysis and two-dimensional semantics 
over the last few decades, ending with a discussion in Section 5 of the most recent 
work on the topic, Chalmers’s Constructing the World (2012). 
 In Part B, I will develop my own account, on which Cosmic Hermeneutics 
may be possible for ontologically emergent domains, provided that the deduction 
only makes use of ontologically analytic premises. 
§2. Background 
2.1 Broad’s Mathematical Archangel 
 
Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces 
by which nature is animated, and the respective situation of the beings who 
compose it – an intelligence  sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis 
– it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies 
of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be 
uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes. (Laplace, 
1840) 208 
 
If the emergent theory of chemical compounds be true, a mathematical 
archangel, gifted with the further power of perceiving the microscopic 
structure of atoms as easily as we can perceive hay-stacks, could no more 
predict the behavior of silver or of chlorine or the properties of silver-chloride 
without having observed samples of those substances than we can at present 
                                            
208  Laplace (1840)  
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. . . If the mechanistic theory be true, the archangel could deduce from his 
knowledge of the microscopic structure of atoms all these facts but the last. 
He would know exactly what the microscopic structure of ammonia must be; 
but he would be totally unable to predict that a substance with this structure 
must smell as ammonia does when it gets into the human nose. The utmost 
that he could predict on this subject would be that certain changes would 
take place in the mucous membrane, the olfactory nerves and so on. But he 
could not possibly know that these changes would be accompanied by the 
appearance of a smell in general or of the peculiar smell of ammonia in 
particular, unless someone told him so or he had smelled it for himself. 
(Broad, 1923)209 
  
 Both C. D. Broad’s “mathematical archangel” and the Laplace’s “sufficiently 
vast intelligence” attempt to resolve a metaphysical question through an epistemic 
test involving an ideal reasoner – a mind short of omniscient, but with infinite and 
infallible inferential powers. Laplace’s demon is tasked with deducing the past and 
future facts from the present facts, and the demon’s success is taken to entail the 
truth of diachronic determinism. In contrast, Broad’s mathematical archangel is 
tasked with deducing the higher-level facts at a time from the lower-level facts at 
the same time, as a test of synchronic determinism. The archangel must deduce  the 
chemical behavior of ammonia given a description of its atomic structure at that 
same moment, or what it’s like to smell ammonia given the simultaneous events in 
                                            
209 Broad (1923), 71 
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the mucous membrane and olfactory nerves. The mathematical archangel’s success 
would indicate that mechanism is true; the archangel’s failure would indicate that 
ontological emergentism is true. 
 Broad accepts that, given empirical observations of the behavior of silver 
chloride, or of the smell which accompanies ammonia, it is possible to formulate laws 
which predict the presence of emergent phenomena given a description of their 
underlying conditions. However, Emergentists like Broad and Lewes210 and others 
have tended to define an emergent domain as one which is not deducible a priori 
from its basal conditions, even by an ideal reasoner. The metaphysical claim is to be 
cashed out in terms of an idealized epistemic test. 
 It’s generally accepted that emergentism was wrong about chemistry. 
Although it might be impossible in practice, in principle an ideal reasoner given the 
sub-atomic facts and laws would be able to deduce the events which we describe as 
the behavior of silver-chloride. The theoretical reduction from chemistry to physics 
we have now was not yet available when Broad wrote.211 Broad recognized the 
possibility he was wrong, noting that there appeared to be no a priori barrier to 
                                            
210 “The distinction here indicated between Components and Constituents, or 
between Parts and Elements, will be seen hereafter to have its importance. . . . The 
combinations of the first issue in Resultants, which may be analytically displayed; 
the combinations of the other issue in Emergents, which cannot be seen in the 
elements, nor deduced from them.” Lewes (1874), 98 
211 See McLaughlin (1992).  
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mechanism about chemistry or biology in the way in which mechanism seemed to be 
incompatible with phenomenal experience.212 
 However, emergentism might be still right about phenomenal consciousness. 
No widely-accepted reductive account for phenomenal consciousness has appeared in 
the years since Broad wrote, and there seems to be little hope held out for one. 
Emergence for consciousness remains on the table, as an open matter for debate. 
 Within this debate, whether or not consciousness qualifies as ontologically 
emergent continues conventionally to be defined in terms of the possibility of an 
ideal reasoner deducing the facts about phenomenology from the facts about the 
brain.213 An “epistemic gap” between basal conditions and an emergent property is 
supposed to remain under ideal conditions if and only if an “ontological gap” holds 
between the two. 
 But why should we consult with a mathematical archangel on matters of 
ontology? What is the link between ideal deducibility and the structure of the world? 
What is the task of ontology – and what, if anything, does it have to do with 
considerations about what can in principle be known or deduced? 
2.2 The Task of Ontology: From Reality to Fundamentality 
 One answer is that that the task of ontology is to tell us what exists.  This 
assumes that we do not tell ontology what exists. That is, it assumes that to exist is 
not merely to be the sort of thing about which people are disposed to say “yes”, when 
asked “does such-and-such exist?”. Rather, ontology is supposed to have a regulative 
                                            
212 Broad (1923), 72. 
213 O’Connor et. al. (2012) 
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role in telling us whether it is or isn’t correct to say that x exists. Unless one is a 
Meinongian, there are a whole host of things which don’t exist that people talk 
about. Perhaps we should say ontology is all about what really exists, as opposed to 
what is merely being represented in language or thought as though it existed.214 
 Yet, this distinction between what really exists and what is merely 
represented as existing has posed persistent problems over the last two-and-a half 
millennia.215 In one direction, the distinction between appearance and reality has 
been at times drawn in such sharp contrast that one loses all hope of knowing 
anything about reality as it is and not merely as it appears to be.216 In another 
direction, the distinction between the two may be so thoroughly obscured that it 
becomes trivial that everything is as it seems to us to be.217 
 One hopes that philosophy has learned something from these detours over 
time and recognizes its freedom to pursue a middle path. Suppose someone 
approaches us with a radically revisionary ontology, which tells us that what really 
exists is inconceivably different from the sorts of things we ordinarily say exist – 
                                            
214 Reynolds (2006) identifies the function of “real” as indicating that one is 
reporting on the world rather than on the content of other representations. This 
gives a clearer understanding of “real” than the usual opposition of “real” to “mind-
dependent” or “evidence-dependent”, or the collapsing of “real” onto the question of 
whether a domain is one in which every sentence is true or false. 
215 e.g., at least since Parmenides’s On Nature. 
216 Kant (1781) 
217 Ayer (1936) 
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perhaps that matter and energy are a mere projection of some greater mind.218 We 
can recognize that this is the sort of claim which goes beyond anything we could 
possibly hope to know about, and so exclude it from the sorts of propositions which 
for all intents and purposes are to be regarded as true or false. We can decide that 
the words real and world for our purposes should still pick out the matter and 
energy in this scenario, not the greater mind, because even though matter and 
energy would turn out not to be ultimate reality, this isn’t the kind of scenario the 
word “real” developed in our language to deal with.219 
 Suppose instead that someone seeks to push us in the other direction, and 
insists that what is “real” simply is our linguistic representation of the world. They 
insist that there is no added “metaphysical” sense of “really” or “merely” in which 
something could be really real or merely a representation. They argue that our 
sentences are the result of shared experiences and could only possibly be about 
possible shared experiences – how else would they find their way into our language 
to begin with?220 Such a person might suppose that he or she is offering a 
deflationary account of ontology. However, we can respond that there no way in 
which to express the account being’s “deflationary” in the framework it offers. After 
all, if “reality” just means “appears to be” and “what we talk about in our language”, 
then, well, reality really is as it seems to be to us, and as we speak about it – and, as 
a matter of fact, we speak about it as the sort of thing which sometimes isn’t as it 
                                            
218 Berkeley (1713) 
219 See Neuber (2012) on Carnap’s “empirical realism”. 
220 See Carnap (1928) 
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seems and which our representations can occasionally get wrong. So, what appears 
at face value to be an anti-metaphysical account turns out to vindicate common 
sense metaphysics.221 
 Now, suppose that someone gets going too far on this new path, adopting 
wholesale the naïve realism of ordinary language. Chairs and birthday parties and 
loans and rabbits exist, and their existence is a “brute fact”.222 Unfortunately, the 
same applies to the feminine mystique, the white man’s burden, the American 
dream, and the average family of 2.5 children. To resolve this, we ought to stop and 
recognize that it is also part of our ordinary way of speaking about the world that we 
defer to experts in the sciences, and permit them a greater burden in telling us what 
kinds of things there are. Perhaps they even tell us that we are all drastically 
mistaken (such as when we believe that solid objects contain no empty space). In 
ordinary language, we respect that chairs and loans and birthday parties should not 
be regarded as having the same metaphysical status as electrons, because we defer 
to external sources to help us determine what reality really is.223 
 We might let the sciences handle all of the work. We might choose to let the 
word “exists” include all and only those things which appear in our best scientific 
theories and are needed in order to explain phenomena. This might include quarks 
                                            
221 The methodology of Wittgenstein (1953)  and Austin (1956) reflects this 
deflation of the deflationary account.  
222 Strawson (1959), Anscombe (1958) 
223 Putnam (1975), Burge (1979) 
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and gravity and electromagnetism and, with a deep sigh, mathematics.224 But chairs 
and rabbits and birthday parties won’t really exist, since they aren’t necessary to 
explain how things appear to us.  
 Yet this seems odd. It is not as though chairs and loans and rabbits and 
birthday parties are supposed to be fakes. There is something there in the world 
which the words “chair” and “loan” and “rabbit” and “birthday party” are about, 
which they naturally latch on to. There are truths about them, which are true in 
virtue of the way the world is. But they aren’t something more in the world, new 
things in addition to the physical stuff (the quarks and electrons and gravitational 
forces) and the psychological stuff (our thoughts about them).225 
 And so, at this stage in the dialectic, philosophy seems to be reaching for a 
compromise – a way to reconcile the permissive naïve ordinary ontology and the 
eliminative austere Occamist ontology. What we need are two ways to be “real” or 
“exist”. One can apply to every object and property which we ordinarily make 
positive existence claims about: horses and apes are real, but unicorns and Big Foot 
are not. Another can be that of being fundamentally real, and it applies only to the 
very special properties and objects in virtue of which truths are true, the genuinely 
“brute” realities: quarks or strings might be real in this sense, but chemical 
compounds or mereological sums of particles – though only one step up from the 
fundamental level – are not. 
 
                                            
224 Quine (1992) 
225 Lewis (1984) 
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 2.3 From Fundamentality to Cosmic Hermeneutics 
 This is how ontology came to have a new task. Not only does it tell us what 
exists, but now it also tells us which of the things which exist are fundamental or 
brute, and which of them exist only in a derivative way, as nothing “over and above” 
the more fundamental things. Assigned this new task, ontology will need some 
principled way to tell the difference between (i) the things which are (relatively)226 
fundamental, (ii) the things which are real but not fundamental, and (iii) the things 
which are not real at all.  
 There are some obvious cases. It is obvious that a pair of potatoes is nothing 
over and above the two potatoes taken by themselves. So long as you know all of the 
facts about the potatoes, you know all of the facts about the pair of potatoes. Nothing 
will surprise you about the pair if you know the potatoes taken alone. It should be 
just as obvious that a heap of rice is nothing over and above the rice in the heap. You 
probably can’t know everything about the rice in the heap. But surely, if you knew 
everything about the rice and its spacio-temporal location and the relations in which 
it stood to everything else, you’d know everything about the heap. You could deduce 
it all, if you were smart enough and had the time. The heap is reducible ontologically 
to the rice, and the potato-pair to the potatoes. 
 What does this mean? Well, on the one hand, if you believe that potatoes and 
grains of rice are real, then you should also believe that pairs of potatoes and heaps 
of rice are real. Being committed to the existence of one commits you to the existence 
of the other, since the existence of one can be deduced from the other. On the other 
                                            
226 See Dunnaway (2013) for the motivation for relative fundamentality. 
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hand, it suggests that pairs and heaps aren’t as close to the fundamental level as 
individual potatoes or grains. If you have the individuals, you get the groupings for 
free. 
 What makes the obvious cases of ontological reducibility so “obvious” is our 
sense that the facts about the higher-level domain would be easily scrutable given 
the facts about the basis they are being reduced to. When you have grains of rice in 
front of you, it’s obvious you also have a heap – there’s no mystery as to where the 
heap of rice came from.227 Because it’s so obvious, it’s hard to see why anyone would 
want to insist that ontologically the heap is fundamental. The heap plays no added 
explanatory role. Recall that, as part of our compromise, we’re allowing the demands 
of scientific explanation alone to tell us what is fundamentally real, in exchange for 
preserving non-fundamental realism for most of the ordinary things we talk about. 
 Sometimes there are less obvious cases. It is not so obvious that knowing all 
the facts about the subatomic particles in a grain of rice would give you the ability to 
know all of the facts about a grain of rice. Even the most intelligent human being 
likely couldn’t deduce the facts about the grain from the facts about the subatomic 
particles. Nonetheless, it’s uncommon to hold that the grain of rice is something over 
and above the subatomic particles. 
 In order to preserve the analogy with the “obvious” cases, we may appeal to 
an ideal reasoner – given infinite computing power and memory – whom we suppose 
                                            
227 There might be a conundrum as to when the heap comes into existence from 
the addition of grains of rice or when it goes out of existence from the subtraction of 
grains of rice, but not a mystery. 
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in principle could deduce the facts about the grain of rice from the facts about 
subatomic particles. The subatomic particles are fundamental, but the grain is not, 
we say, because the grain facts would be a priori scrutable for an ideal reasoner 
given the subatomic particle facts. It’s not as though we actually consult with any 
mathematical archangels when making this claim. Rather, the claim is meant to 
illustrate the ontological reducibility of the grain to the particles, by helping us 
imagine a mind for which it would be obvious that when you have the particles you 
have the grain, much as it is obvious for us that when you have the two individual 
potatoes you have the pair. 
 Let’s sum up our story so far. Epistemology was troubled by conflicting 
tendencies to be skeptical about reality and to take everything at face value. In 
metaphysics, this translated into a tension between austere and permissive accounts 
of reality. A compromise intended to resolve this tension allows there to be many 
real things, but some especially real, or fundamental – the minimally necessary set 
needed for a scientific explanation of the world – and others whose reality is derived 
from or grounded in those fundamental things.  In some obvious cases, whenever one 
phenomenon is grounded in a more fundamental phenomenon, the facts about it are 
easily and obviously scrutable from the facts about the fundamental phenomenon. 
We came to expect the same to apply in non-obvious cases – if one phenomenon is 
grounded in a more fundamental phenomenon, the facts about it ought to be a priori 
scrutable from the facts about the fundamental phenomenon by an ideal reasoner, 
even if we can’t do so ourselves. A failure of ideal deducibility then became an 
indicator that either something was fundamental or else that it wasn’t something we 
ought to regard as real at all. The ideal reasoner became the means of arbitrating 
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the real and reducible on the one hand, and the unreal or irreducibly real on the 
other hand. 
 Thus, the new task of ontology becomes identified with trying to show how 
most of the “folk” properties and objects referred to in ordinary language are the 
sorts of things which an ideal reasoner would be able to deduce given as small a set 
of concepts and facts as possible. This can be a revisionary project: perhaps some of 
our ordinary folk theories are bad theories and should be thrown out. However, if we 
are to be charitable to ourselves, the hope is that most of our sentences will be 
translatable into the language of the fundamental. This is how the task of ontology 
in locating the fundamental properties comes to be identified with the task of cosmic 
hermeneutics. 
2.4 Forms of Scrutability 
 Philosophers have thought of Cosmic Hermeneutics in several different ways. 
There are at least three questions which have to be answered when considering 
whether or not some truth would be scrutable by an ideal reasoner, given the 
fundamental truths. I use the term “scrutable” as synonymous with 
“understandable” or “knowable” on some basis,  including but not limited to that 
which is “deducible”.228 Combining the answers to these questions in various ways 
gives us a variety of types of scrutability. 
                                            
228 I’m borrowing ‘scrutable’ from Chalmers (2012), insofar as some people may be 
uncomfortable with calling some of these forms of scrutability ‘deductions’, which 
perhaps suggests that one could construct a finite derivation, that the premises 
must be relevant to the conclusion, that the premises must logically guarantee the 
  197 
 2.4.1   Base. First, what is the content of the scrutability base? The ideal 
reasoner is given some starting point B, perhaps a domain of facts229. This domain 
might be taken to be the “fundamental” facts, though it need not be. For example, A 
might be scrutable given the fundamental facts, but not the fundamental physical 
facts taken alone; A might be scrutable given any basis, including an empty basis 
(for instance, if A is itself a priori); A might be scrutable from B without B being 
fundamental; A might also be locally scrutable given some subset of the physical 
facts, or it might only be globally scrutable given the totality of physical facts, and so 
on. 
 2.4.2  Form. Second, what form of representation appears in the scrutability 
base for the ideal reasoner (e.g., the premises of the deduction), and what form of 
representation is the ideal reasoner supposed to output (e.g., the conclusion of the 
deduction)? Some options: 
  (a) Sentential: representations in natural or idealized language, 
  (b) Propositional:  conceptual representations, sets of worlds230 
  (c) Ontological: real properties, truthmakers, natures of things.231 
                                                                                                                                  
conclusion rather than merely making it epistemically certain or a matter of 
warranted belief, and so on. Perhaps there are non-deductive forms of scrutability. 
229 I’m using “fact” here as ambiguous between “true sentence”, “true proposition”, 
and “truthmaker”, depending upon the answer to 2.4.2 
230 Whether one is a Russelian or a Fregean about propositional content, or takes 
a possible-worlds view of content, will obviously produce different interpretations of 
a scrutability claim. 
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 2.4.3 Resources. What sorts of rules of inference or logical transitions is the 
ideal reasoner allowed to apply to the premises in order to reach the conclusion? We 
might think of this as asking about which cognitive “resources” are to be provided to 
the ideal reasoner, when the ideal reasoner is attempting to “scrute” A from its 
scrutability base B. Below, I list a number of options for what forms of scrutability 
might hold between output A and base B. Chalmers (2012) distinguishes varieties of 
scrutability by the relation between a sentence S, scrutability conditions C, and a 
subject s. Instead, here I have distinguished a broader set of varieties here in terms 
of which inferences or cognitive abilities the ideal reasoner is permitted to use to 
understand one thing on the basis of another. 
 I have divided the sorts of resources an ideal reasoner might be given into 
three classes, with each consisting of 3-4 distinct categories within that class. This 
list of resources is supposed to be progressively less restrictive, with categories 
further down the list including all resources available higher on the list in addition 
to some new type of inference pattern or reasoning capacity. 
 Class A: Analytic A priori Resources Only (a) – (d) 
  (a) Minimal logical scrutability holds iff A is scrutable from B when 
only classical first-order logic (with identity) is permitted as a rule of inference.232 
                                                                                                                                  
231 Chalmers (2012), 73-91 distinguishes only Sentential and Propositional 
scrutability. However, an ideal reasoner might be imagined as having access not 
only to our representations but to the “language of ontology”. 
232 Or, if some other logic is the correct one, the rules of that logic alone will be 
permitted. If pluralism about logic is true, and there is no fact of the matter about 
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  (b) Definitional scrutability holds iff A is scrutable from B when only 
(a) and definitions of words in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, or 
translations of synonymous terms between languages, are permitted as rules of 
inference. Chalmers identifies definitional scrutability with the project of Carnap in 
the Aufbau.233 
  (c) Mechanical-Analytic scrutability holds iff A is scrutable from B 
when only (b) and all analytic a priori inferences which involve only the mechanical 
application of a rule, independent of content or meaning, are permitted. 
  (d) Conceptual-Analytic scrutability holds iff A is scrutable from B 
when only (c) and intuitions about the application of a concept to various possible 
scenarios are permitted.234 
                                                                                                                                  
whether classical or non-classical logic is correct, then there will be various types of 
minimal logical scrutability. 
233 Chalmers (2012), 6-12 notes a number of problems with definitional 
scrutability which have been raised since Carnap by Quine, Wittgenstein, Kripke, 
and others. While these are a problem for definitional scrutability, they need not be 
a problem for analytic scrutability more broadly conceived. 
234 Chalmers (2012), 388-392 does not distinguish between (c) or (d) as varieties of 
analytic scrutability. However, it seems to me that the contemporary philosophical 
practice of “conceptual analysis”, with its heavy reliance on intuitions about 
concepts, can be meaningfully distinguished from those forms of the analytic a priori 
which does not rely on intuitions about meaning. I take (c) to be the more basic 
concept of the analytic – i.e., a mechanical procedure; intuitions about concepts are 
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 Class B: Analytic and Synthetic A priori Resources (e) – (g) 
  (e) Mathematical scrutability holds iff A is scrutable from B when only 
(d) and inferences which utilize the axioms of set theory are permitted. 
  (f) Simulative scrutability holds iff A is scrutable from B when the 
ideal reasoner is permitted only (e) and whichever inferences can be justified by 
means of conducting a mental simulation of some aspect of the world. For example, 
charitable reconstructions of a speaker’s intentions are permitted as a means of 
inferring the meanings of their terms. Likewise, imagining what would happen, or 
what patterns would appear, given a system following certain rules or procedures, 
counts as justification by simulation. 
  (g) A priori scrutability holds iff A is scrutable from B when all 
inferences which could be justified a priori are permitted, including (f). Thus, a 
sentence S is inferentially scrutable from conditions C for subject s iff s is in a 
position to know a priori that if C, then s. 
 Class C: A Posteriori and A priori Resources (h) – (j) 
  (h) Inferential scrutability holds iff A is scrutable from B when all 
inferences which justify belief in A on the basis of knowing B are permitted, both a 
priori and a posteriori, even if these do not guarantee the truth of A.235  Thus, a 
                                                                                                                                  
regarded as analytic in virtue of the assumption that they inform us about 
meanings, and when the meanings of terms are sully specified translations can be 
performed mechanically. 
235 See Chalmers (2012), 47-52. S is conditionally scrutable from C for s when s is 
in a position to know given C that S is true. 
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sentence S is inferentially scrutable from conditions C for subject s iff, if s were to 
come to know C, s would be in a position to know S.236 
  (i) Conditional scrutability holds iff A is scrutable from B when all 
inferences which justify belief are permitted, both a priori and a posteriori, on the 
assumption that B is the case, even if one is not justified in believing B. Thus, a 
sentence S is conditionally scrutable from conditions C for subject s iff s is in a 
position to know that if C, then s.237  
  (j) Entailment scrutability holds iff A is scrutable from B when all 
necessary truths are known by the ideal reasoner and available for use in inferences, 
including those which can only be justified a posteriori. 
 Which of these varieties of ideal scrutability should we be concerned with, if 
our interest in Cosmic Hermeneutics is determining the fundamental ontological 
structure of the world? In the remainder of Part A, I will consider three approaches. 
On the approach of Radical Interpretation, which I will discuss in Section 3, Cosmic 
Hermeneutics is concerned with sentential simulative scrutability. On the approach 
of Conceptual Analysis, Which I will discuss in Section 4, Cosmic Hermeneutics is 
concerned with propositional, conceptual-analytic scrutability. On the Cosmoscope 
approach, which I will discuss in section 5, Cosmic Hermeneutics is concerned with 
sentential, a priori scrutability. In Part B, I will advocate for an alternative to all 
three approaches. 
 
                                            
236 ibid., 40 
237 ibid. 
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§3 Cosmic Hermeneutics as Radical Interpretation 
3.1 Radical Translation to Radical Interpretation 
 Normally, the task of translating from one language into another is aided by 
prior linguistic knowledge. One does not generally try to translate 19th century 
German philosophy into English without first knowing ordinary German. A 
knowledge of related Slavic languages may aid a translation into Macedonian. Quine 
(1960) invoked the thought experiment of “radical translation” to see what a pure 
translation unaided by prior linguistic knowledge would look like. In radical 
translation, the project is to translate sentences238 from a language one knows 
nothing about (jungle) into one’s own language, given no intermediary, no common 
tongue, no dictionary, but only observations of various behaviors. This was meant to 
illustrate how limited the information one could obtain about meaning from 
superficial observations of behavior was, and so was meant to lead to skepticism 
about any sort of analytic “meaning” beyond what could be obtained empirically. 
 Donald Davidson modified Quine’s thought experiment in a way which avoids 
the skepticism about meaning. Davidson replaces the notion of translation with that 
of an interpretation – our task is not merely to find synonymous sentences in one 
language for sentences in another, but to understand what the words in the 
language mean. In ordinary interpretation, we know ourselves to be speaking the 
same language as others. We can reflect on what we mean by a term and then 
                                            
238 The emphasis on holistic sentences as opposed to words is important, and 
perhaps one reason Quine’s view of language is seen as in conflict with 
contemporary generative linguistics. 
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presume, in the absence of evidence otherwise, that others mean by their terms 
what we would mean by them. When others speak in a way which is amiguous 
between multiple interpretations, we assign an interpretation to their speech based 
on assumptions about their beliefs, goals, and intentions in the context of our 
conversation. However, in radical interpretation, we know neither the meanings of 
the other speaker’s utterances (since we do not speak the language ourselves) nor 
the intentions or beliefs of the speaker in question (which would be necessary to 
form hypotheses about what they might mean). We must simultaneously form a 
theory about the meaning of the speaker’s utterances in order to interpret their 
psychology, and a theory about the speaker’s psychology in order to interpret their 
utterances. How would we ever get started? 
 For Davidson, the starting point is a principle of charity:  
 
This is accomplished by assigning truth conditions to alien sentences that 
make native speakers right as often as plausibly possible, according, of 
course, to our own view of what is right. What justifies the procedure is the 
fact that disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible only against a 
background of massive agreement. Applied to language, this principle reads: 
the more sentences we conspire to accept or reject (whether or not through a 
medium of interpretation), the better we understand the rest, whether or not 
we agree about them. The methodological advice to interpret in a way that 
optimizes agreement should not be conceived as resting on a charitable 
assumption about human intelligence that might turn out to be false. If we 
cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behavior of a creature 
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as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, 
we have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as 
saying anything.239 
 
 David Lewis (1974) made the connection between Davidson’s project of 
Radical Interpretation and the older tradition of Cosmic Hermeneutics from Laplace 
and Broad. Whereas Davidson’s interpreter is supposed to be relatively like a human 
being, and thus not radically different from the speaker, despite the lack of a shared 
culture, Lewis conceives of the project of Radical Interpretation as performed by an 
ideal reasoner like Laplace’s demon. Davidson’s project is intended to provide a 
theory of how we might come to interpret natural languages through observations of 
behavior, and thus to support a coherence theory of truth and knowledge. On the 
other hand, Lewis’s Radical Interpretation is conceived of as giving the ideal 
reasoner access to some set of fundamental facts and no further facts, such as the 
facts of the speaker and his or her material parts as a physical system.240 Lewis is 
not trying to figure out how we perform the real-life task of determining what other 
people mean or believe, but rather asking “how do the facts determine the facts?”241 
How is it that the physical facts determine the psychological facts and the semantic 
                                            
239 Davidson, “Radical Interpretation”, 324 
240 Lewis (1974), 331; although Lewis recognizes the same thought experiment 
can be performed if taking as fundamental any non-physical “psionic fields, astral 
bodies, entelechies, or what-not”. 
241 ibid., 334 
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facts? Lewis assigns the ideal reasoner the task of getting to know a person, Karl, as 
an instance of the sorts of psychological and semantic facts which are often thought 
to avoid reduction to the physical – his goal is Physical-to-Phenomenal Cosmic 
Hermeneutics. 
3.2 Interpretive Principles 
 The ideal reasoner wishes to know the facts about both Karl as a speaker, in 
terms of the meanings of the utterances in his language M, and Karl as a person, in 
terms of his attitudes (his beliefs and desires). The ideal reasoner starts knowing 
nothing about either, but has a complete physical description P of Karl and the 
cosmos in which he lives (which we assume his meanings and his psychology both 
supervene upon)242. We can distinguish Karl’s attitudes as expressed in Karl’s own 
language, Ak, as well as his attitudes as expressed in our language, Ao. The ideal 
reasoner is thus constrained by a few principles: 
 3.2.1  Principle of charity.  On Lewis’s modification of Davidson’s principle, 
the interpretation of Ao should ascribe to Karl beliefs and desires which are not so 
drastically removed from our own that, if we were to give Karl our own life histories 
                                            
242 Lewis seems to have in mind only “Karl as a physical system”, and thus seems 
to require local supervenience. However, Lewis’s thought experiment need not 
conflict with externalism about semantic content, and so instead we should 
understand the whole physical cosmos as the global supervenience base for both 
Karl’s meanings and Karl’s beliefs. Local supervenience entails global 
supervenience, but only local supervenience conflicts with externalism.  
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and give ourselves the entire life history which Karl has given in P, we would end up 
with Ao and Karl would end up with attitudes more or less like our own.  
 3.2.2  Rationalization Principle. Much as the principle of charity constraints 
Ao by Karl’s past life history, so the rationalization principle constrains Ao by the 
prediction of Karl’s future behavior in P. The beliefs and desires ascribed to Karl 
should provide good reasons for his behavior, generally speaking – he should be 
presumed to be a rational agent following something much like rational decision 
theory. 
 3.2.3 Principle of Truthfulness. When M assigns a truth condition to the 
meaning of Karl’s language, then Ao should ascribe to Karl beliefs and desires which 
are consistent with a convention of truthfulness. If ‘Ionlay’ is true when a Lion is 
present, for example, then Karl should generally believe that a lion is present when 
he hears others utter ‘Ionlay’. 
 3.2.4 Principle of Generativity. The truth conditions assigned by M to the 
meaning of Karl’s language should be as uniform and simple as possible. They 
should be consistent with our ability to generate or construct novel sentences out of 
old words in rule-governed ways. 
 3.2.5 Manifestation Principle. Karl’s attitudes in Ak should manifest 
themselves publically in his dispositions to speech behavior in P, except where in Ao 
we prescribe him as having some special reason for secrecy. 
 3.2.6 The Triangle Principle. Given the meaning of Karl’s language in M, it 
should be that Ao = Ak: the beliefs and desires we assign him in our language should 
translate into the ones which, given the meaning of his language, we assign in his 
language. 
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3.3 Interpretive Methods 
 Given these principles, Lewis sees three methods by which the ideal reasoner 
might successfully interpret Karl’s language. Each of these methods might be 
iterative – the reasoner might go through the steps many times.   
 3.3.1 Method One - Davidson’s Method. Use the principle of charity to 
develop Ao from P. Use the Manifestation principle to develop Ak from P. Revise the 
beliefs in Ao and fill in M according to the Triangle Principle, so as to balance the 
degree of match between the beliefs in Ao and  the beliefs in Ak with the demands of 
the Principle of Generativity on M. Revise the desires in Ao based on the 
Rationalization Principle and P, and then fill in the desires in Ak to match the 
desires in Ao according to the triangulation principle. Repeat until a stable solution 
is reached. 
 3.3.2 Method Two - Lewis’s Preferred Method. Start by determining Ao from 
P by means of the Rationalization Principle and the Principle of Charity. Fill in M 
from Ao based on the Principle of Truthfulness and the Principle of Generativity. 
Finally, given Ao and M, fill in Ak by means of the Triangle Principle. 
 3.3.3   Method Three –Quinean Holistic Non-Method. Try to fill in Ao, Ak, 
and M all at once, balancing the various principles as best as possible. Because we 
have no guarantee of determinate answers to the meanings or attitudes of Karl 
given the principles assigned above, we can’t operate in stages, and the best we can 
do is use the theory we are building of Karl to continue building our theory of Karl. 
 3.3.4   A Burgean Variation. A variation on Lewis’s methods might be 
obtained by substituting the principle of charity with Principle (B) from Burge’s 
(2010) Origins of Objectivity. Charity requires that the interpreter assume the 
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speaker is every bit as rational as the interpreter would have been if the interpreter 
had the speaker’s life history. However, it is not implausible that humans, by and 
large, are far less rational than an ideal reasoner given an identical life history and 
biological composition would be. Instead, Burge’s principle requires that “for an 
individual to have any representational state (such as a belief or perception) as of a 
subject matter, that state must be associated with some veridical representational 
states that bear referential, indicational, and attributional representational 
relations to a suitably related subject matter.”243 To simplify somewhat, in order to 
attribute to a subject the mental state of a false belief that p, we must assume that 
there are nearby244 mental states, subjects, beliefs, or contents p’ closely related to p 
for which there exist true beliefs that p’. Such a principle might be used in place of 
the principle of charity to obtain a similar simulation of a subject’s beliefs and a 
similar interpretation of a subject’s language, but without the need for optimism 
about the rationality of human beings. 
 3.3.5   Ebbs’s Variation. Ebbs (2009) proposes what might be taken as a 
fourth method for radical interpretation. For Ebbs, the project of “radical 
interpretation” is not all that different from our everyday interpretation of what 
others are saying. Ordinarily, we are entitled to take for granted in the absence of 
                                            
243 Burge (2010), 68 
244 “Nearby” might be understood metaphysically, as involving the nearness of 
other worlds, or it might be understood in terms of some other suitable causal or 
constitutive relation; it should go without saying that “nearby” is not understood 
here geographically. 
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other evidence that other speakers of our language are using words with the same 
meanings as we have when we use them, for the same reasons that we are entitled 
to take for granted that our present selves are using words with the same meanings 
we gave them in the past. Ebbs introduces the notion of an intersubjectivity 
constraint: our theory of the truth conditions of terms in M must be accompanied by 
an account of why it is epistemically reasonable for one to apply M to other speakers’ 
sentences and to one’s own sentences as one used them in the past. On Ebbs’s 
account, the only way in which the ideal reasoner could come to know the meaning 
of Karl’s sentences would be to become a speaker of Karl’s language and begin to 
participate (at least mentally) in Karl’s linguistic community – the Mathematical 
Archangel couldn’t stand apart and interpret from above. 
3.4 Radical Interpretation as Simulative Scrutability 
 Notably, all three methods – if we understand them to tell us about how “the 
facts determine the facts” and not merely how the process of translation works – 
involve the ideal reasoner attempting a kind of mental simulation of Karl’s 
psychology. All three methods make heavy use of the Principle of Charity and the 
Rationalization Principle, which require the ideal reasoner to consider what he 
would consider rational, reasonable, and good where he in Karl’s shoes and to 
explain Karl’s behavior in terms of reasons for acting. All three methods depend 
upon the “simulated” Ao – the ideal reasoner’s theory of Karl’s action in the 
interpreter’s own language – in order to derive Karl’s M and Ak, with the 
dependence being direct in Lewis’s Method Two. Ebbs’s approach would be the most 
dramatic example where interpretation requires simulation; the Burge-esque 
approach would be a more moderate example. 
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 Since it requires the interpreter to simulate in some way the speaker’s 
internal mental states, the Radical Interpretation model is best categorized as 
involving the simulative scrutability of the semantic and psychological facts given 
the physical facts. Insofar as once accepts Lewis’s principles of interpretation as a 
priori, this simulation of Karl’s beliefs also qualifies as a priori scrutability. 
However, it certainly does not qualify as either a kind of mechanical-analytic or 
conceptual-analytic a priori. Getting to Karl’s beliefs via simulation is very different 
from getting to Karl’s beliefs via analysis. 
 What’s the ontological upshot of Radical Interpretation, then, whichever of 
these four methods guide it? On the one hand, Radical Interpretation tells us that if 
Cosmic Hermeneutics from the physical facts to the psychological and semantic facts 
is possible with simulative scrutability, then the psychological and semantic facts, 
insofar as they are determinate,245 are exclusively determined by the physical facts. 
On the other hand, if Radical Interpretation suggests that Cosmic Hermeneutics is 
only possible by means of simulation, and is not possible by means of analysis, then 
this provides some motivation for thinking that semantics and psychology are at 
least weakly emergent. 
 Notably, Lewis does not expressly discuss the radical interpretation of Karl’s 
phenomenology – if Karl could have the same beliefs and desires yet a different 
phenomenology, then a simulation which determines Karl’s beliefs and desires will 
still underdetermine what it is like for Karl to believe and desire what he does. 
                                            
245 e.g., Davidson acknowledged a degree of indeterminacy for radical 
interpretation. 
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3.5 Interpretive Constraints as Meaning Constraints? 
 I have categorized the project of radical interpretation through interpretive 
constraints as involving simulative scrutability, understanding a simulation to be a 
procedure which is a priori but not analytic.246  However, Horgan (1984) made the 
case that the “interpretive constraints” in Lewis’s project should instead be 
understood to involve only “meaning constraints” – that is, to involve only 
conceptual-analytic scrutability. Horgan holds that if Cosmic Hermeneutics were 
possible through “meaning constraints” alone, then that should be sufficient to 
demonstrate the truth of physicalism. Thus, Horgan interprets Lewis’s radical 
interpretation as making a case for non-reductive physicalism.247 
 The notion of a “meaning constraint” reflects a looser notion of meaning than 
the pre-Wittgensteinian, pre-Quinean understanding of meanings as “definitions”, 
but it still connotes a sort of analyticity. A “meaning constraint” is what helps us 
adjudicate cases in which a familiar word is used by a speaker in such a peculiar 
way that we determine the word simply doesn’t mean in the speaker’s mouth what it 
means in our own. Supervenience is not a meaning constraint. Consider that, 
                                            
246 The process of simulation is “empirical” in the broad sense – it is the sort of 
thing one must perform, and observe the results, and not merely reason through – 
and yet the beliefs one forms on the basis of a simulation are justified a priori for the 
same reason that derivations from conditional proofs are a justified a priori: one sees 
what necessarily follows from a given assumption, and concludes the conditional. 
247 On the assumption that there is no other way to derive conclusions about 
mental states, except through simulation. 
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although Moorean  non-naturalists in Meta-Ethics accept that ethical truths 
supervene upon the physical truths, they would deny that the meanings of ethical 
language are in some way dependent upon the meanings of physical terms. On the 
other hand, Horgan held that Lewis’s interpretive principles are meaning 
constraints – particularly, the principles of Charity and Rationalization are 
supposed to be entailed by our concept of a person.248 
 It is not clear to me why either principle must be a constitutive part of our 
concept of a person, or why our concept of a person must be an constitutive part of 
either the concept of meaning or the concept of an attitude like a belief or a desire; 
perhaps one could hold that there are sub-personal beliefs or desires, or that some 
non-human animals can be assigned rationality or meaningful units of thought 
without meeting other criteria of persons. However, putting this aside, even if it is 
analytic from the concept of belief or of meaning that beliefs and meanings are the 
sorts of things which are to be interpreted by means of Lewis’s constraints, the 
process of interpreting Karl by means of Lewis’s constraints is not thereby made 
analytic or mere application of a concept.  Intuiting from introspection that I would 
have to hold certain beliefs in order to rationally exhibit particular behaviors in 
given circumstances is every bit as much a candidate for the synthetic a priori as 
intuiting that I would have a reason to exhibit particular behaviors in given 
circumstances. Cosmic Hermeneutics still involves a kind of simulation. 
 I will turn now to a method by which Cosmic Hermeneutics is supposed to be 
possible by means of conceptual analysis alone. Whereas the subject matter for 
                                            
248 Horgan (1984), 34  
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Radical Interpretation took the form of sentences, the subject matter for conceptual 
analysis involves propositions and the categories of everyday thought. 
§4 Cosmic Hermeneutics by Conceptual Analysis 
4.1 The Plan 
 Frank Jackson’s From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998) sets up the project of 
“serious metaphysics” as involving a particular method of Cosmic Hermeneutics. 
This method is concerned with the propositional conceptual-analytic scrutability of 
ordinary truths from a limited, compact base of fundamental ingredients. It occurs 
in four stages. 
 4.1.1  Stage One: Determining Application of Concepts. In the first stage, the 
ideal reasoner conducts an analysis of the various concepts which occur in ordinary 
language and thought. For every concept helped by speakers of English, or Spanish, 
or American Sign Language – including concepts which have no linguistic expression 
whatsoever – the ideal reasoner attempts to determine, for all of the possible 
scenarios and entities in the cosmos, which entities are included under each concept. 
This process is supposed to be entirely a priori.249 
                                            
249 Jackson (1998), 46-52. Notably, this is a much stronger notion of the a priori 
than those inclined to methodological naturalism in philosophy will admit. Devitt 
(2005) and others have expressed a concern that one cannot be a naturalist or a 
materialist and accept that Jackson’s form of a priori conceptual analysis tells us 
anything significant about reality. However, although I am not a materialist, I do 
not share this concern. In contemporary philosophy, the a priori is understood to be 
a type of non-empirical justification for belief which does not depend upon sensory 
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 For example, suppose that T is a sentence in folk psychology, like “John 
believes what he sees.” The proposition expressed by T contains the concept of belief 
and the concept of seeing. The ideal reasoner considers the concepts of believing and 
of seeing in terms of various ways the world might be such that the concepts 
“believes” or “sees” would apply there to various things. The ideal reasoner would 
identify various descriptions as cases of believing and others not as cases of 
believing. Notably, the ideal reasoner need not be able to define “belief” in order to 
do this.250 
                                                                                                                                  
experiences like perception, memory, or testimony – claiming that a belief is 
justified a priori is not a claim about the origins, history, or source of the justified 
beliefs. There is no need for anamnesis. A materialistically-acceptable history of how 
I came to possess various a priori beliefs might be told, such as a life history of how I 
came to learn a concept through social interactions with others who spoke my 
language, or an evolutionary history involving the death of my ancestors who failed 
to grasp logical, moral, or mathematical truths. A history of a belief is not the same 
as a justification for a beliefs.  
250 “Once an essential role for explicit definitions is eschewed, the model of 
conceptual analysis that emerges is something like the following. When given 
sufficient information about a hypothetical scenario, subjects are frequently in a 
position to identify the extension of a given concept, on reflection, under the 
hypothesis that the scenario in question obtains. Analysis of a concept proceeds at 
least in part through consideration of a concept's extension within hypothetical 
scenarios, and noting regularities that emerge. This sort of analysis can reveal that 
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 Most ordinary speakers have some level of conceptual competence like this, 
not only for highly concrete concepts but for rather abstract ones: given a description 
of a scenario and asked whether or not it is a case in which “Smith knows that 
Brown is in Barcelona” or “Al’s disease is not arthritis”, most people will find 
something to say much of the time. There are, of course, borderline cases and 
unclear cases. Running through every possible scenario would require infinitely 
more conceptual competence than any human has! However, the ideal reasoner can 
be assumed to have complete competence when it comes to the relevant concepts. So, 
the ideal reasoner might, given his infinite capacities, run through every single 
possible world, in order to determine every application of the concept believed or 
seen or any other concept in that world.251  
 4.1.2  Stage Two. Determining the Functional Role. Given this intuitive 
knowledge of the application conditions of various concepts, the ideal reasoner will 
then attempt to relate the various concepts to one another, in terms of the 
characteristic role they play vis-à-vis the other concepts. This will produce a list of 
all of the conceptual truths for each concept. For instance, beliefs are the sorts of 
things which are ‘characteristically caused by perceptions’, ‘combine with desires to 
generate actions’, and ‘are a necessary condition of knowledge’.252 These conceptual 
truths are a priori – one does not have to look at whether there are actually beliefs 
                                                                                                                                  
certain features of the world are highly relevant to determining the extension of a 
concept, and that other features are irrelevant.” Chalmers and Jackson (2001), §3 
251 Jackson (1998), 31-37 
252 Papineau (2009) 
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in a world and what sorts of things people there believe in order to determine these 
facts about beliefs. The ideal reasoner develops an exhaustive list of the conceptual 
truths for each concept. This list is a specification of the functional role the concept 
plays for those who use it. 
 Note that the functional roles in these cases need not involve an explicit 
analysis.253 They might only include only characteristic roles for the application of 
each concept, not necessary and sufficient conditions.254  These functional roles are 
not definitions. 255 
 The only concepts for which the ideal reasoner is unable to determine a 
functional role will be those which can’t be given a role in terms of other concepts. 
These primitive concepts will be the “building blocks” out of which all of the others 
are constructed, the “semantic primes” such that every concept in every human 
language can be given a functional role in terms of them.256  
                                            
253 Chalmers and Jackson (2001) 
254 One supposition at this stage is that a concept which can be given some 
functional analysis by the ideal reasoner can be given a complete functional 
analysis. However, even if we eschew talk of “definitions” or “necessary and 
sufficient conditions”, it still seems possible that the ideal reasoner will only know a 
priori some of what is characteristic of some concept or part of the role that it plays. 
255 Chalmers (2012), 320 
256 Chalmers (2012), 2 cites Wierzbicka (2009) as claiming that all expressions in 
all human languages can be analyzed in terms of 63 ‘semantic primes’.  
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 4.1.3  Stage Three: Ramsification. The ideal reasoner then takes his list of all 
of the functional roles of each given concept, and quantifies over them in order to 
form a Ramsey sentence.257 “Beliefs are characteristically caused by perceptions and 
combine with desires to generate actions and . . . ”  would translate into “There is 
some x such that x is characteristically caused by perceptions and x combines with 
desires to generate actions and . . .”. The same process would be repeated for every 
occurrence of other concepts within this concept of actions, perceptions, desires, and 
so on. The result will be a sentence which begins with an existential quantifier and 
contains only primitive concepts, logical operators, and variables. The ideal reasoner 
will continue until he has obtained Ramsey sentences for all of the non-primitive 
concepts which make use of the primitive concepts alone.258 
 4.1.4  Stage Four: Hunting. The ideal reasoner now turns to the scrutability 
base he has been given. For Jackson (1998), the scrutability base is the set of 
fundamental physical facts – Jackson’s interest is in physical-to-phenomenal cosmic 
hermeneutics. For each of the sentences obtained at Stage three, the ideal reasoner 
now hunts around in the domain of physics to find which physical properties (or 
relations, mereological sums of objects, kinds, etc.) satisfy these sentences. For 
example, the ideal reasoner discovers a bundle of physical properties which is 
“characteristically caused by perceptions and combines with desires to generate 
actions . . .” (where ‘perception’, ‘desire’, ‘action’, etc. are all replaced with their 
                                            
257 Papineau (2009) 
258 Jackson (1998), 140-145 
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Ramsified translation), and the ideal reasoner is now able to identify this physical 
bundle as what a “belief” is. 
 It may be that no bundle of physical properties perfectly satisfies the 
concept’s functional role, but that there is a bundle of physical properties which 
mostly satisfies the concept’s functional role and which stands out distinctly from 
the others. In this case, the bundle should be still identified as what the concept 
refers to. This means the process can be revisionary. It may turn out that out that 
many of our folk concepts are a bit off and need to be corrected by further 
theorizing.259 It may turn out that some of our ordinary concepts stand for a 
disjunction of two or more natural bundles of physical properties. It may turn out 
that some of our ordinary concepts have conditional intensions – they pick out one 
bundle of properties if the world is one way and a different bundle of properties if 
the world is another way. And, of course, it may turn out that some of our ordinary 
concepts are not even close to being filled by anything in the physical world, in 
which case our beliefs and thoughts about them are false. 
 If the scrutability base contains all and only the fundamental facts, then the 
ideal reasoner can come to know all of the true propositions expressed in human 
thought and language through these four stages. This process required only a priori 
reflection on the meaning of the non-primitive concepts and a knowledge of the 
scrutability base. The things humans talk about which are deducible from the 
                                            
259 Chalmers (2011) 
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fundamental facts will enter by entailment260, and the things humans talk about 
which are not so deducible will be eliminated. 
 Suppose there are some primitive, unanalyzable concepts left over after Step 
3, but these concepts do not occur in the scrutability base. We are supposed to 
conclude from this that these concepts are either mistaken, or that they refer to 
fundamental properties which were not included in the scrutability base. For 
instance, if the scrutability base consists only of physical facts, and there are 
primitive concepts which do not occur in physics, then either the primitive concept is 
a mistaken one (and should be eliminated) or else some non-physical facts must be 
fundamental which match up with the primitive concept. 
 Suppose there are some non-primitive concepts which we have a conceptual 
analysis for, but nothing in fundamental physics comes close to satisfying the role 
played by these concepts. If this is so, we must either choose to hold that nothing 
satisfies propositions with those concepts in our world, or else we must hold that 
there is something non-physical but fundamental which satisfies these propositions. 
 Jackson holds that Physical-to-Phenomenal Cosmic Hermeneutics is possible 
by this method; because of this, phenomenal properties are metaphysically nothing 
over and above fundamental physical properties. Chalmers (1996) holds that 
Physical-to-Phenomenal Cosmic Hermeneutics is not possible along this method, 
because we can clearly conceive of physical duplicates of ourselves with absent or 
inverted phenomenal experiences. He concludes from this that phenomenal 
properties must be metaphysically fundamental. 
                                            
260 Jackson (1998), 25-27 
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4.2 Challenges to Conceptual Analysis 
 Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker (1998) challenge the conclusion that the lack 
of a conceptual analysis for concepts of consciousness in physical terms entails that 
consciousness cannot be explained in physical terms – the so-called “explanatory 
gap”, which suggests the “metaphysical gap” between conscious properties and 
physical ones. One might put their objection in this way: while conceptual-analytic 
scrutability might fail for A from B, it might nonetheless be that A is inferentially 
scrutable from B by the ideal reasoner. For Block and Stalnaker, it is inferential 
scrutability or its failure, rather than conceptual-analytic scrutability or its failure, 
which might entitle us to come to metaphysical conclusions. Contrast the following 
two claims:  
 
(Inferential Scrutability from a Physical Base) Were one to know all of the 
physical facts about the world, one would be in a position to know all of the 
facts. 
 
(Conceptual-Analytic Scrutability from a Physical Base) Were one to know all 
of the physical facts about the world, one would be able to deduce all of the 
facts a priori by means of conceptual analysis alone. 
  
 Block and Stalnaker argue that for ordinary macroscopic truths about 
natural kind terms, the facts about things like water and tigers and rivers and 
mountains, conceptual-analytic scrutability fails. But ordinary macroscopic truths 
are truths which no one doubts are grounded in the fundamental physical facts, and 
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which no one questions are fully explainable and knowable given the physical facts. 
If this is so, then there’s nothing special about the failure of conceptual-analytic 
scrutability in the case of consciousness, and we can’t infer from this failure that 
consciousness is explanatorily or metaphysically irreducible to physics.   
 Consider the well-known example from Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1973) of 
water and H2O. Water is identical to H2O – they are one and the same thing. This is 
a metaphysically necessary identity. However, the concept of “water” is not identical 
to the concept of two hydrogen atoms bonded to an oxygen atom; at least, it certainly 
wasn’t the same concept in the era before water’s chemical composition was known. 
Nothing about the concept of water – that it is the sort of thing which is in the lakes 
and streams, which refreshes thirst, and falls from the sky when it rains – suggests 
that water is H2O. 
 It is true that, given all of the physical facts in the world, we (and the ideal 
reasoner) are justified in believing that Water = H2O. We are in a position to know 
that Water = H2O, given only our concept of water and the physical facts. However, 
our justification cannot be a priori in this case. Why not? For one thing, consider 
that we can’t rule out from any of the information we’ve been given the strange and 
spooky scenario in which, for every molecule of H2O, there is a unit of non-physical 
‘ghost’ water located nearby, so that the term “water” in fact refers to both H2O and 
to ghost water. We can rule this out empirically: we have no evidence for ghost 
water, and our evidence is that H2O is enough to fill the role supplied by water. So, 
we can know confidently, given only our limited physical description of the world, 
that Water = H2O. Perhaps the ideal reasoner could be even more certain than we 
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are. But neither we nor the ideal reasoner can rule out this scenario simply by 
reflecting our concept of “water”. 
 Block and Stalnaker further suggest that we consider the example of “life”. 
How did scientists come to conclude that vitalism was false, and to close the gap 
between the physical and the biological sciences? What they didn’t engage in was an 
analysis of the concept of ‘life’. Consider the functional roles which ‘living thing’ 
plays: something like ‘being the sort of thing which reproduces, digests, and 
respires’. These functional roles relate life to other concepts in the same biological 
family of terms, not to anything in microphysics.261 Instead, what scientists did 
involved picking out a few paradigm cases of life, came to understand how life 
worked physically in simpler cases, and extended the explanation upward from the 
simpler cases to the complex paradigm cases.  
 Presuming that one does not want to hold that ‘water’ or ‘life’ or other 
ordinary macroscopic truths are ontologically irreducible to the microphysical, we 
can’t infer from their lack of conceptual-analytic scrutability that there is either an 
explanatory gap or a metaphysical gap between them and microphysics. If this is so, 
                                            
261 Block and Stalnaker also express concern that these functional are neither 
sufficient nor necessary conditions for life – nothing in the concept of life rules out 
non-reproducing beings; a moving van also excretes wastes. However, as noted 
earlier, nothing in the conceptual-analysis model of Jackson and Chalmers requires 
that one find an definition of a concept in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions.  
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we must follow the same policy in the case of consciousness – unless someone offers 
an argument for why we should regard consciousness differently. 
4.3 Totality, Identity, and 2-Dimensional Semantics 
 Chalmers and Jackson (2001) offer a number of responses to the objections 
raised in Block and Stalnaker’s article against the conceptual-analytic scrutability of 
ordinary macroscopic truths. I will focus on three of them. 
 First, in response to the worry about the epistemic possibility of ‘ghost water’ 
preventing the a priori deduction that water = H2O, Jackson and Chalmers 
acknowledge that part of the ideal reasoner’s scrutability base must be T, the so-
called “totality condition”.  Condition T states of everything else in the scrutability 
base, “this is all there is!” – in other words, that every truth is scrutable from the 
facts in the base. Chalmers and Jackson acknowledge that T itself doesn’t follow 
from the other fundamental facts. However, when added to the base for the ideal 
reasoner’s deduction, the union of the physical facts with T allows the ideal reasoner 
to rule out the possibility of “ghost water”, a priori. In fact, T will successfully allow 
the a priori deduction of all of the other negative truths from the fundamental facts 
– not only that there is not ghost water, but there are no ghosts.  So, when added to 
the other fundamental facts T will be sufficient to rule out competition to the 
physical scrutability base when hunting for physical properties to fill a conceptual 
role.  
 Second, Jackson and Chalmers add to the deduction base two further sets of 
facts which are supposed to make the possibility of conceptual-analytic scrutability 
more plausible for ordinary macroscopic truths. The first are the indexical truths, I: 
the facts about who’s me, where’s here, and when’s now. The second are the 
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phenomenal truths, Q. If Jackson’s physicalism is correct, then Q should be 
scrutable from the physical truths P + the totality fact T + the indexical truths I – 
so, if one takes PTI as the scrutability base for some ordinary macroscopic truth, 
then one gets PQTI as a scrutability base for free. If, instead, Chalmers’s dualism is 
correct, then Q is not scrutable from PTI and Q belongs alongside P in the set of 
fundamental facts. Either way, Chalmers and Jackson are licensed in allowing the 
ideal reasoner to use PQTI as the scrutability base for the ordinary macroscopic 
facts about lions and oceans and tables and chairs. 
 Third, given this expanded scrutability base, it is arguably more plausible 
that an ideal reasoner given access to PQTI would be able to deduce the macroscopic 
truths. The ideal reasoner now knows not only the physical arrangement of the 
atoms in the ocean, after all. The ideal reasoner also knows what it’s like for 
someone to see the ocean – what it’s like for every member of a speech community to 
think about or conceive of an ocean – and what physical phenomena the various 
members of the speech community were referring to when one of them first used the 
word ‘ocean’ and others adopted this use. The same applies to “water” – and the 
ideal reasoner will see that the watery stuff that the speakers of English call “water” 
is in fact actually H2O. 
 Perhaps the methodology of science does not involve conceptual analysis 
when concluding that, for instance, there is a reductive explanation of life as a 
physical process. But while scientists may be better than average reasoners, they 
are not ideal reasoners. For scientists, identities like water = H2O remain a 
posteriori in large part because there are other physical facts about the world which 
are unknown. Against the backdrop of our ignorance of the world, our knowledge of 
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some part of it will remain a posteriori and subject to doubt, but for an ideal 
reasoner who knows everything fundamental and knows that he knows everything 
fundamental (given the totality condition) identities like water = H2O will be 
entirely certain. Block and Stalnaker wrongly suppose that because identities are 
metaphysically primitive and “rock bottom”, the identities must also be 
explanatorily primitive – once one gets an identity, there is nothing further to 
explain. However, there is still an explanatory story to be told about by what means 
and on what evidence one came to conclude that an identity holds and whether that 
conclusion is justified. In the case of the scientist, this story will involve a posteriori 
justification only, but in the case of the ideal reasoner, Chalmers holds, if p is 
necessary then p is a priori. 
 This is a difficult and controversial view to defend, given the popularity of 
anti-descriptivist causal-historical accounts in the philosophy of language, and the 
widespread acceptance since Kripke (1980) that there are a posteriori necessities. To 
try to ease the burden, Chalmers offers a defense of two-dimensional semantics, 
which is supposed to offer a way in which accepting that there are genuine a 
posteriori necessities can be made consistent with holding that in some cases a lack 
of ideal a priori deducibility amounts to a lack of metaphysical necessity. This use of 
two-dimensional semantics is controversial, but if it is successful it provides a way in 
which at least in some cases a failure of Cosmic Hermeneutics is a reliable guide to 
the failure of metaphysical necessitation, and thus a failure of ontological reduction.  
4.4  Chalmers’s 2-Dimensional Semantics 
 Two-dimensional semantics was developed early on by Kaplan (1979) and 
Stalnaker (1978), as a way to account for apparent changes in the content of an 
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assertion depending on the context in which it occurs. Stalnaker understands the 
content of an assertion to be a narrowing of the field of epistemic possibilities – by 
asserting that p, I rule out some number of possible worlds, and this is the meaning 
of my utterance p. In most cases, the content of an assertion of p will be identical to 
the semantic content which p has in our language: the worlds which I rule out by 
expressing p will be the same worlds which the semantic content of p in our 
language rules out. When I say “The car is in the driveway”, there is no difference 
between what my sentence means and what I mean to communicate. The worlds I 
rule out epistemically are the same as the worlds at which the sentence is false – 
ones at which the car is not in the driveway. 
 However, there are situations in which the content of my assertion that p 
cannot plausibly be identical to the semantic content of p. Suppose that you and I 
are watching a hockey game, and a player comes quickly from out of our line of sight 
and checks another player into the boards. You complain, “he doesn’t play fair”. 
Neither of us knows, however, whether the player referred to by he is player #48 or 
player #52. Suppose the player who ran the other into the boards is actually player 
#52. The semantic content of your sentence was thus “Player #52 doesn’t play fair.” 
However, this can’t be the content of your assertion, because nothing ruled out, in 
our context, the epistemic possibility than player #48 is the one who ran the other 
into the boards.  In this case, my assertion that p narrows the field of epistemic 
possibilities which for the semantic content of p aren’t possibilities at all.  
 To take another example, suppose I assert that “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. 
The semantic content of my utterance is a necessary truth – it doesn’t rule out any 
metaphysically possible ways the world could be. However, my utterance clearly did 
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communicate something and did rule out a number of epistemically possible worlds: 
namely, those in which the star one sees in the morning is distinct from the star one 
sees in the evening. 
 Chalmers (1996) adapts two-dimensional semantics into an account on which 
every proposition is associated with two (rather than one) intensions.262 The 
secondary intension is the set of worlds at which the content of the proposition is 
satisfied, where any rigid designators in the proposition (like ‘water’, or ‘Aristotle’) 
retain their actual value. The secondary intension of “Aristotle drank water” is the 
set of worlds in which the person who is Aristotle in our world drinks H2O, even if in 
those worlds Aristotle is illiterate rather than the teacher of Alexander, H2O is a 
rare and valuable substance, and XYZ is the stuff in the lakes and streams. The 
primary intension is the set of worlds such that, were the world considered as 
though it were actual, then the characteristic descriptions associated with the terms 
in the proposition would justify us in believing that the proposition was satisfied in 
that world. The primary intension of “Aristotle drank water”, in other words, is the 
world in which the Greek philosopher who was the teacher of Alexander the Great 
drank the clear, odorless, colorless substance which flows in lakes and streams and 
falls from the sky when it rains.  
 What is the upshot of this distinction supposed to be? According to Chalmers, 
in many cases, the primary intension of a concept will diverge from its secondary 
intension for ordinary reasoners. “Water” is such a case, as mentioned above: the 
secondary intension of water picks out H2O in every world, whereas the primary 
                                            
262 also see Chalmers (2010). 
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intension picks out whatever it is in that world which most closely matches with the 
characteristic features of our own concept of water. However, the primary intension 
of a concept will not diverge from its secondary intension for an ideal reasoner. 
 Why not? Recall for a moment why there are a posteriori necessities in the 
first place. They exist because some terms in our language like proper names, 
natural kind terms, and demonstratives are rigid designators: they designate the 
same individual in every possible world, without regard to the conceptual or 
descriptive properties we may happen to associate with the term. Part of what it is 
to be water is to be the actual watery stuff; part of what it is to be Aristotle is to be 
the actual teacher of Alexander the Great, as opposed to someone else who could 
have been his teacher. This ‘actual’ operator is part of the secondary intension of 
these terms. However, epistemically, we’re in a non-ideal spot: we don’t know which 
world is actual. When we consider or imagine various scenarios where our concept of 
watery stuff applies, we have to treat the scenario we are considering as if it were 
actual, but also have to admit that we could be seriously wrong about which world is 
the actual one. We (epistemically) could be wrong that the thing we’ve been calling 
water is H2O, although if we are right, then it couldn’t (metaphysically) be anything 
other than H2O. 
  On the other hand, an ideal reasoner knows which world is actual, and knows 
everything in PQTI for our world. The ideal reasoner does not have to wonder what 
the thing people refer to by ‘water’ is: he can see what they are thinking about when 
they say ‘water’ and he can see what physical entity it is which causes their talk 
about ‘water’ and gets used whenever they say ‘water’. Because an ideal reasoner 
has no epistemic limitations when it comes to determining which world is actual, the 
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primary intension and the secondary intension will be the same for every term. So, 
given PQTI, an ideal reasoner will be able to deduce the ordinary macroscopic facts, 
even though we cannot hope of every doing so. 
 According to Chalmers, consciousness is supposed to be a special case, where 
we can be confident that the primary intension of our concept of a “conscious 
experience of pain” lines up exactly with the secondary intension of our concept of a 
“conscious experience of pain”. As Kripke (1980) argued, anything which seems like 
pain simply is pain. So, for consciousness, the primary intension will pick out the 
same worlds as the secondary intension – anything that has the characteristic 
features of consciousness is consciousness. So, even though we don’t have the mind 
of an ideal reasoner, we are justified in concluding that even an ideal reasoner could 
not deduce Q from PTI.  
 To put it differently, Chalmers argues that ideal conceivability entails 
epistemic possibility, and that in the special case of consciousness epistemic 
possibility entails metaphysical possibility, offering a bridge from conceivability to 
metaphysical possibility.263 Any epistemically possible world where P & ~Q is 
necessarily a metaphysically possible world.264 
                                            
263 Chalmers (2010): Section 3 
264 For example, it is conceivable that Mary, a neuroscientist who lacks color 
vision, could know all of the facts about neuroscience and color vision, and yet not 
know what it is like to see the color red. (Jackson, 1982) It follows that there is a 1-
possible world in which Mary knows all the facts about neuroscience and color 
vision, but yet does not do anything qualitatively similar to knowing what it is like 
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4.5  Challenges to 2-Dimensional Semantics 
 Scott Soames (2005), Block and Stalnaker (1998), and others have raised a 
number of challenges to Chalmers’s project of ‘ambitious’ two-dimensional 
semantics. I will mention only three here, as well as the relevant replies by 
Chalmers (2010). 
 4.5.1  Constancy. First, it’s not clear what should be kept constant. Suppose 
the conceptual analysis of water tells us that water is the clear odorless liquid which 
fills lakes and streams, but doesn’t tell us what water’s chemical composition is. This 
is a fairly rich description, and we can imagine a scenario s in which a clear odorless 
liquid fills lakes and streams and has a very different chemical composition than 
water does. However, this isn’t quite fair: we’re relying on a rigid interpretation the 
terms “clear”, “odorless”, “liquid”, “lakes”, and “streams” in the description which 
picks out s. Each of these takes a conceptual analysis and has a primary intension. 
Suppose we replace all of the concepts in our descriptions with their respective 
analysis, and remove any rigidifying expressions. What will we be left with, if 
anything? Will it be enough to still pick out s? It would be absurd if the answer is 
                                                                                                                                  
to see the color red. (That is to say, were this world considered to be actual, it would 
be true that "Mary does not know what it is like to see red"). But any (1-possible) 
world in which Mary do anything qualitatively similar to knowing what it is like to 
see the color red is a (2-possible) world in which Mary really does not know what it is 
like to see red, insofar as anything qualitatively like a conscious state is a conscious 
state. So we can move from the conceivability of a case like Mary's to the possibility 
of a case like Mary's. 
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that we are just supposed to keep fixed orthography, but there seems to be no other 
clear answer. 
 In reply, Chalmers emphasizes that it clearly isn’t orthography which is held 
constant – evaluating the primary intension of water does not involve evaluating 
what “water” would mean in the mouths of speakers of another language in another 
scenario.265 Primary intensions are evaluated in terms of the epistemic properties of 
a concept in our world. However, this still leaves the question of whether there will 
be much of anything left to pick out s when those epistemic properties are traded in 
for their non-rigid conceptual-analytic description.  
 4.5.2  Ascriptions of Belief. Primary intensions are supposed to capture the 
epistemic features of our expressions. Soames raises a concern that “S believes that 
F is G” ought to be true, on a two-dimensionalist account, if and only if the content of 
S’s belief matches up with the primary intension of “F is G”. This would entail that 
the content of “S believes that F is G” is identical to the content of “S believes that 
the actual F is the actual G”. This leads to a contradiction. It is a necessary truth 
that, if S believes that the actual F is the actual G, and that belief is true, then the 
actual F is the actual G. But it is not a necessary truth that, if S believes that F is G, 
and that belief is true, then the actual F is the actual G.266 Were two-dimensionalism 
correct, these two sentences would be equivalent. 
 Chalmers responds by denying the original charge – he rejects the claim that 
ascriptions of belief that p are true if and only if the primary intention of p is the 
                                            
265 Chalmers (2010), 561 
266 Soames (2005), 272.  
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content of the belief. Soames’s objection is a straw-man, an attack on a position 
which may seem prima facie intuitive for a two-dimensionalist but which neither 
Chalmers nor any other two-dimensionalist has held. In fact, Chalmers holds that it 
is the secondary and not the primary intension which is relevant in belief 
ascriptions.267 
 4.5.3  Intuitions aren’t Fine Grained. Intuitions about the application of a 
concept to various scenarios aren’t likely to be fine grained enough that one will 
successfully be able to find a match in PQI. While the ideal reasoner’s concept of 
water may include a characteristic description in terms of lakes and streams, there 
is no reason to hold out how that pursuing this strategy will lead to an analysis 
which only makes use of purely microphysical properties. Many of our concepts are 
vague, they shift over time and between different contexts of use, and few of them 
invoke quarks. At the very least, it seems unlikely that primary and secondary 
intensions are all there is to meaning, because primary intensions can’t distinguish 
between pairs of propositions which are a priori (consider logical and mathematical 
truths, which have different cognitive significance and different meanings, but will 
have identical primary intensions). 
 Chalmers accepts the latter point – that primary and secondary intensions 
need not be all there is to meaning. However, the robust two-dimensionalist’s 
argument only requires that the primary intension be some part of meaning, not all 
of it. It is also clear that the output of a conceptual analysis is unlikely to be in 
terms of quarks and leptons. However, this is why the role of Q is so essential to the 
                                            
267 Chalmers (2004) 
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project of cosmic hermeneutics. Although quarks and leptons may not plausibly be 
part of the canonical analysis of ordinary macroscopic truths, collections of 
perceptual experiences may play this role. 
 In his most recent work, Chalmers (2012) moves away from concerns about 
conceptual-analytic scrutability towards a much broader thesis, that of the a priori 
scrutability of all of the truths from PQTI. Although it is clear that he thinks of 
conceptual analysis as continuing to play a significant rule in the a priori deduction 
of the macroscopic facts from PQTI, other sorts of a priori reasoning might be 
acceptable as well. I will turn lastly to Chalmers’s argument for a priori scrutability, 
through what might be called the “Cosmoscope” approach to Cosmic Hermeneutics. 
§5 Constructing the World 
5.1 The Cosmoscope 
 We have been supposing that the ideal reasoner has “access” to all of the 
truths in PQTI, by which we must mean that the ideal reasoner has access to 
representations of these truths in some form or another. Conventionally, these 
representations have been thought of as sentences, perhaps in some formal 
language, and the ideal reasoner has been thought of as methodically attempting to 
derive one sentence from another. However, Chalmers offers the ideal reasoner a 
particular device – a “Cosmoscope” – which offers a representation of PQTI through 
perception rather than through language. 
 The Cosmoscope is loaded with all of the information in PQI, infinite storage 
and processing power, and an excellent virtual reality program. It is supposed to 
allow the ideal reasoner to explore all of the information in PQI as though he were 
watching a three-dimensional movie (or four-dimensional, since one must count the 
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distribution of P and Q across all of time). It allows the ideal reasoner to “zoom in 
on” any region of the world, no matter how remote, and to “zoom into” the 
phenomenal states of other minds in the world through a kind of virtual reality in 
order to experience them first hand – all the while marking these movies with a 
stamp which lets the ideal reasoner know the relevant indexicals in I. It even allows 
the ideal reasoner to simulate counterfactual scenarios. The only thing the 
Cosmoscope doesn’t do for the ideal reasoner is tell him whether a sentence is true 
or false. The reasoner looks at the world through the Cosmoscope to verify 
propositions, but isn’t given verification.268 
 The Cosmoscope is useful for showing the plausibility of the conditional 
scrutability of all of the positive macrophysical facts from PQI. (The negative 
macrophysical facts require the addition of T). Take any sentence in the world that 
you like – for example, my utterance of “the dog is hungry” earlier today. The 
Cosmoscope will allow the ideal reasoner to see, first of all, what was in my head 
when I uttered this sentence, and what I meant by ‘the dog’ (namely, my own dog) 
and by ‘hungry’. If meaning ain’t all in the head, then it will also allow the ideal 
reasoner to see what is the heads of everyone else in my linguistic community 
associated with the words ‘dog’ and ‘hungry’, and the complete causal history of 
speech behaviors involving ‘dog’ and ‘hungry’ going back to various Indo-European 
tribes and including plenty of instances of doghood and hunger along the way, and 
what any authorities I defer to for the meaning of ‘dog’ would decide were they hard-
pressed with the question of whether or not a dingo is a dog. The ideal reasoner will 
                                            
268 Chalmers (2012), 108-110 
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learn from our concept of dog both what sorts of phenomenal experiences dogs 
characteristically play a role in and what sorts of physical structures are dogs – the 
indexical facts will be helpful for locating the experiences where the physical events 
are. The Cosmoscope will allow the ideal reasoner to see my occasion of utterance, 
and the presence of my dog in the room when I said “the dog is hungry”, and our 
convention for referring by definite descriptions. It will allow the ideal reasoner to 
experience first-hand the conscious states of the dog, and to know whether or not the 
dog is experiencing something relevantly similar to the experience I call hunger. 
(Although, it may cause the ideal reasoner to experience what it’s like to be a dog by 
imagination rather than getting full experience, since the ideal reasoner needs 
retain the ability to reason while observing). At this point, the ideal reasoner can 
offer a judgment as to whether my sentence was true or false.269 
 A similar process can be performed in a “Twin Earth” scenario: 
 
If a Cosmoscope tells us only that there is a watery liquid made of H2O, we 
cannot thereby conclude that water is H2O, as we cannot rule out a 
hypothesis on which the Cosmoscope is showing us a distant planet with H2O 
and on which water (our water) is XYZ. However, this sort of hypothesis will 
be ruled out by indexical truths fixing our relation to the objects. Given these 
truths, we can determine that the H2O we are seeing is in our own 
                                            
269 ibid., 110-125 
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environment and that H2O has been the relevant liquid in our environment 
all along. 270 
 
 Chalmers believes it is plausible on this basis that all of the ordinary macro-
scale truths are conditionally scrutable from PQI: the ideal reasoner can use the 
Cosmoscope to determine the meanings of various sentences, can calculate what 
would follow on the assumption of a given PQI, and can look through the cosmos to 
see if those sentences are verified. Notice that this process appears to be partly 
empirical – the ideal reasoner looks and “perceives” what follows from the 
assumption that PQI is the case. In itself, it not a priori scrutability. Yet it is a priori 
scrutability which is of metaphysical interest to Chalmers. So, how do we get from 
conditional scrutability to a priori scrutability? 
5.2 From Conditional to A priori Scrutability 
 Chalmers offers two arguments meant to bridge the gap between the 
conditional scrutability of macroscopic truths from PQTI, which he justifies by 
means of the Cosmoscope thought experiment, and the a priori scrutability of 
macroscopic truths from PQTI.  
 5.2.1  The Argument from Suspension of Belief. Suppose that the ideal 
reasoner uses the Cosmoscope’s ability to process the information in PQI into an 
imaginative experience, but is able to disregard entirely the way the world actually 
is. The ideal reasoner engages in a kind of Cartesian skepticism about the actual 
world and ceases to believe that PQI are actually the case. Conditional scrutability 
                                            
270 ibid., 124 
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works the same way as before: the ideal reasoner concludes on the basis of the 
Cosmoscope’s rendering of PQI that if PQI, then M, for the set of positive 
macroscopic truths M. However, nothing in the ideal reasoner’s process of reasoning 
appeals to perceptions of the actual world. It appeals to the experience of imagining 
of what would be the case if PQI, much like an armchair thought experiment turned 
into immersive virtual reality. The ideal reasoner’s justification for the conditional 
belief that if PQI then M can’t be empirical, Chalmers argues, since it’s not 
perceptual. So, it’s justified a priori. So, PQI  M is a priori, and M is a priori 
scrutable from PQI. (The negative macroscopic truths are then scrutable a priori 
from PQI+M+T). 
 5.2.2  The Argument from Frontloading. Suppose instead that there is some 
empirical evidence which justifies the ideal reasoner’s conclusion of M from his 
conditional assumption of PQI. Often our background beliefs about the world or our 
contingent epistemic position as human reasoners may lead us to feel that certain 
inferences are “intuitive” or “natural” or “automatic”, and thus we wrongly conclude 
that they are a priori, even though they are dependent for their justification on past 
experiences. For instance, it is ‘intuitive’ and ‘obvious’ that when I drop a coin, it will 
fall down towards the earth. However, my justification is not a priori, but rather a 
variety of empirical evidence which I have obtained over a lifetime of living on the 
surface of an object with substantial gravitational pull. Likewise, it is ‘intuitive’ that 
living things move. However, my justification is not a priori from the concept of 
‘living thing’, but empirical from observations of living organisms. Perhaps the ideal 
reasoner relies on evidence like this when discerning the macroscopic truths through 
the Cosmoscope. If so, call this evidence E.  
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 If it is the case that the conditional belief that if PQTI then M is justified by 
E, then from PQTI+E the macroscopic truth M should follow a priori. PQTI  (E  
M) is equivalent to (PQTI & E)  M by exportation. The evidence E needed for the 
scrutability of M from PQTI can thus be “front loaded” into the scrutability base, and 
M will be a priori scrutable from this newly expanded base. 
 However, Chalmers argues, empirical evidence is necessarily evidence 
obtained by conscious experience. Thus, E is already part of Q, the totality of 
phenomenal properties in the cosmos. The ideal reasoner should be able to deduce E 
from Q, meaning that PQTI+E follows a priori from PQTI. So, it follows that M is a 
priori scrutable from PQTI alone. 
5.3 Hard Cases 
 To sum things up so far, Chalmers (2012) has proposed that we adopt a 
model on which Cosmic Hermeneutics amounts to a priori scrutability. He has 
argued that his thesis of the a priori scrutability of all of the facts from PQTI follows 
from accepting the less controversial claim of the conditional scrutability of all of the 
facts from PQTI. In the Cosmoscope, he has provided a thought experiment which 
makes the conditional scrutability of all of the facts from PQTI for an ideal reasoner 
seem plausible. 
 Chalmers’s notion of a priori scrutability is broader and more permissive 
than the notion of conceptual-analytic scrutability discussed in Section 4. This can 
be seen most clearly when Chalmers handles certain “hard cases”, like mathematical 
truths, normative and evaluative truths, ontological truths, intentional truths, 
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counterfactual truths, and social truths.271 It is agreed by many that all of these 
truths are a priori given PQTI. For some cases, like certain universal normative 
truths (if any) and mathematical truths, these truths might be a priori for the ideal 
reasoner given any scrutability base. 
 What is far more controversial is Jackson (1998)’s claim that these truths 
would be analytic from PQTI, obtainable by means of conceptual analysis. So, 
Chalmers’s move away from conceptual analysis alone and towards a broader notion 
of the a priori, which includes a priori synthetic truths, allows him to justify the a 
priori scrutability thesis. Chalmers does suggest that conceptual-analytic 
scrutability is possible if the base is expanded from PQTI to include a much richer 
set of truths, such as mathematical, spatiotemporal, nomic, ontological, and 
normative truths.272 However, without the addition of these to the scrutability base, 
analytic scrutability is likely not possible. 
 Chalmers is aware that his project is concerned only with the conceptual 
structure of reality, rather than its metaphysical structure.273 Cosmic Hermeneutics 
conceived of in terms of a priori scrutability will tell us which concepts are 
conceptually fundamental, but it will not tell us which entities are ontologically 
fundamental or answer the question of what grounds what. Yet it is ontological 
analytic scrutability, not sentential a priori scrutability, which is most likely to tell 
us about the metaphysical structure of reality. Whereas a priori scrutability from 
                                            
271 See Chalmers (2012), Chapter 6 for these topics 
272 Chalmers (2010), 390 
273 ibid., 442 
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one set of sentences or propositions to another tells us about the fundamental 
“relations between ideas”, if our goal is to understand the relations between the 
natures of things, our concern should be with what would be ontologically and 
analytically scrutable from the fundamental facts: that is, which are wholly 
contained in the others and thus ontologically reducible to them. I will develop this 
idea  of ontological analyticity further in Part B of this chapter. 
5.4 Preliminary Conclusions 
 Chalmers also offers an account on which P and Q are clearly equal partners 
in the project of cosmic hermeneutics, in notable contrast to the older tradition on 
which P alone is supposed to play this role. It does seem plausible to me that, given 
the addition of Q, Cosmic Hermeneutics would be possible. So long as Chalmers 
limits his project to telling us the structure of our concepts, everything will be okay. 
However, ambitious metaphysics might be tempted to identify the ideal reasoner’s a 
priori deduction of the world as telling us which facts are fundamental or emergent, 
and which are reducible. For three reasons, this seems to me to be a mistake. 
 First, discerning macrophysical objects at various scales above the level of 
microphysics depends on the Cosmoscope reaching the right ‘zoom’ level and the 
ideal reasoner’s use of Q to ‘perceive’ the distinctive phenomenology of observing 
chairs, elephants, or so on, at their respective levels. Why does the ideal reasoner 
care about the aggregations of physical pieces which we call chairs and elephants? 
Why not half-chairs, or elephant-pairs? Why wouldn’t the ideal reasoner consider 
these as equally interesting as a rather arbitrary mereological sum of physical 
particles distributed across space and time? Chalmers must appeal to the ideal 
reasoner’s interest in our interest, as speakers of a language with ‘chairs’ and 
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‘elephants’, and the ideal reasoner might rely on our phenomenal states when we 
perceive chairs and elephants to discern them through the Cosmoscope. Yet the 
notion of perceiving macro-scale objects as such (as opposed to perceiving them as 
aggregates) suggests that there is something real and intrinsically interesting 
occurring at the macro-level of organization, a “joint in nature”, a “perfectly natural” 
property, a nature over and above the nature of its parts. 
 Second, Chalmers’s notion of the a priori is so broad that it risks including 
any truth which the ideal reasoner would find “intuitive” or “obvious”. However, 
there are good reasons to be skeptical about a notion of the a priori which involves 
only “intuition”. Someone might charge that it is intuitive that one ought to bring a 
gift to a wedding worth more the cost of one’s share of the meal at the reception, or 
intuitive that objects with heavier masses will fall faster than objects with lighter 
masses, or intuitive that men by nature have short hair and women by nature have 
long hair. These intuitions are not a very good guide to truth. We are justified in 
believing them only insofar as they involve veridical experiences of the actual world. 
Again, so long as we limit ourselves to discerning the structure of our concepts, 
perhaps there is nothing wrong with a reliance on “intuitions” like this. However, if 
our purpose is to learn something about metaphysics, then the sort of a priori 
scrutability which tells us about the structure of reality must be more narrow and 
not simply a matter of seeming to be intuitive. 
 Third, it’s not clear what the metaphysical significance of cosmic 
hermeneutics with such a permissive notion of the a priori is supposed to be. If the 
only purpose is (in conjunction with two-dimensional semantics) to allow us to 
conclude that macro-scale objects are real and that they are metaphysically 
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necessitated by the distribution of properties in PQTI, then the project succeeds. 
However, it seems that we are being encouraged to infer that there is something 
metaphysically fundamental about PQTI and something non-fundamental about 
everything which can be deduced from it. Whereas definitional scrutability and 
analytic scrutability seem more clearly connected to the notion of an ontological 
reduction, a priori scrutability does not seem to offer us an ontological reduction. 
The constraints Chalmers puts on the a priori are not “meaning constraints”, to use 
Horgan’s (1982) expression. Consider the following observation by C. D. Broad 
(1930), in discussing the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism in 
ethics: 
 
It is very common to find that the following two propositions are not clearly 
distinguished from each other, viz.:  
 (a) "The ethical characteristic E synthetically entails and is entailed 
by the non-ethical characteristics N1, N2, . . ."; and 
 (b) "The ethical characteristic E is analyzable without remainder into 
the conjunction of the non-ethical characteristics N1, N2, . . ." 
 Many moralists are liable to think that they believe (b) when they 
really only believe, or only have produced reasons for believing (a). Non-
naturalistic theories can, and generally do, accept some propositions of the 
first kind. … [but deny] that to be good can be analyzed into containing a 
positive balance of happiness.274 
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 The ethical non-naturalist accepts the a priori entailment of ethical 
properties by the descriptive properties in the world (both physical and 
phenomenal), much like the naturalist. Yet the non-naturalist holds that ethical 
properties are fundamental in a way in which the naturalist does not, because the 
non-naturalist holds that there is no analysis of the ethical properties in descriptive 
terms. 
 If the project of Cosmic Hermeneutics is to have any ontological significance 
in distinguishing emergent from non-emergent properties, as Broad originally 
conceived of it, then it must involve a much more narrow sort of scrutability than 
Chalmers, Jackson, or Lewis conceived of it has having. Chalmers’s a priori 
scrutability is too broad, as I have discussed: it includes ethical truths, even if non-
naturalism is correct. Lewis’s simulative scrutability is also too broad, I will argue, 
and suggests a kind of emergence. Carnap’s older definitional scrutability is too 
narrow, since we rarely have definitions for relevant terms. 
  Jackson’s conceptual-analytic scrutability is much closer to the mark of an 
ontologically significant program, but it is concerned with the wrong subject matter 
(propositional instead of ontological), bound up with a defensible but controversial 
use of two-dimensional semantics, conflates the ontological grounding relationship 
with supervenience, and remains committed to the ‘analyticity’ of intuitions about 
meaning despite recent evidence that philosophers ought to be more skeptical about 
the universality and objectivity of their intuitions.275 
                                            
275 See Stich, S. (2000) for a critique of Jackson; see Knobe and Nichols (2008) for a 
critique of philosophers’ intuitions. 
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 I will argue instead that, if cosmic hermeneutics is to be a guide to 
fundamentality, then cosmic hermeneutics must be conceived in terms of ideal 
ontological mechanical-analytic scrutability.  
PART B 
§6 Reconceiving Cosmic Hermeneutics 
6.1 Introduction to Part B 
 In part A, I discussed a number of historical approaches to the question of 
how an ideal reasoner might come to know all of the truths from a base of some 
concise category of truths, or the question of “cosmic hermeneutics”. I distinguished 
varieties of what Chalmers (2012) calls scrutability in terms of: 
 1. The scrutability base: whether the ideal reasoner must start from the 
physical truths, the phenomenal truths, and/or some other fundamental or non-
fundamental truths. 
 2. The form in which the base truths are represented: sentential, 
propositional, or ontological. 
 3. Cognitive resources: which patterns of inference the ideal reasoner is 
permitted to use, and whether these are limited to a priori truths and/or analytic 
truths.276 
                                                                                                                                  
 
276 That is, whether conclusions must follow a priori from premises without a 
posteriori bridge statements, and whether conclusions must follow analytically from 
premises without synthetic bridge statements. 
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 Jaegwon Kim (2010) and others have held that a truly “ideal” reasoner would 
seem to have a priori access to all of the necessary truths. I call this entailment 
scrutability. If cosmic hermeneutics is understood in terms of entailment 
scrutability, then the distinction between what an ideal reasoner can and can’t 
deduce from a given base simply collapses into the distinction between those truths 
which are or aren’t metaphysically necessitated by that base. If this is so, then 
cosmic hermeneutics is not of any special philosophical interest, except as an 
illustration of what metaphysically necessary supervenience might mean. 
 David Lewis’s project of Radical Interpretation involves what I call 
simulative scrutability, a case where the ideal reasoner has access to all inferences 
which are analytic a priori justified, mathematics, and a subcategory of synthetic a 
priori justified inferences which involve running a simulation of what might be 
happening within a system without being able to directly perceive that system. 
Whether the ideal reasoner runs this simulation within his or her head, or whether 
the ideal reasoner relies on a “Cosmoscope”277 or other device to run the simulation 
and observes the output, it makes no difference. For Lewis, the simulation involves 
the application of Davidson’s “principle of charity” in order to deduce the beliefs and 
desires of a subject, Karl, which give rise to Karl’s speech. 
 In his recent work, Chalmers (2012) argues for a priori scrutability on the 
basis of conditional scrutability. For Chalmers, when an ideal reasoner is given 
access to all inferences which are justified a priori, all truths are scrutable on the 
                                            
277 The reference is to Chalmers (2012); see the discussion in Section 5 of this 
Chapter 
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basis of PQTI, which consists of the fundamental physical truths, the phenomenal 
truths, the indexical truths, and the “totality condition” that all truths are scrutable 
from PQTI. Chalmers’s project provides insight into the relationships between our 
concepts, and a priori scrutability (or the lack thereof) can be used to argue 
(somewhat controversially) for metaphysical necessity (or the lack thereof). 
However, because a priori scrutability is so permissive, it fails to distinguish 
between the claim that one domain is necessitated by another and the claim that one 
domain is grounded in another. 
 A closely related project involves conceptual-analytic scrutability, where an 
ideal reasoner’s resources are limited only to those inferences which are analytic a 
priori justified, including inferences from the meanings of terms which come from 
intuitions about the application conditions of various concepts. Because this project 
is more restrictive than a priori scrutability, since the ideal reasoner is limited to 
‘analytic’ resources alone, it comes closer to supporting an ontological thesis. If our 
concepts for macro-level properties can be given an analysis in terms of a functional 
role which is filled by physical properties, then this gives us an account of how the 
macro-level properties really are just physical properties, though it hardly entails it. 
 However, even this is still short of the role which cosmic hermeneutics is 
supposed to play in the definition of emergentism, on which emergent properties are 
those which are not ideally deducible from the basal conditions which give rise to 
them. The absence of a conceptual analysis in physical terms for some property is 
not enough to justify a belief that the property is ontologically something over and 
above the physical: a conceptual gap, or a gap in the sorts of scenarios people are 
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able to form meaningful intuitions about, does not entail a metaphysical gap.278 
Common physicalist responses to dualist arguments emphasize that the same 
phenomenon might be apprehended under two different concepts (one first-person or 
phenomenal, and the other third-person or physical), or call into question the 
reliability of the intuitions on which dualism is built: it might be that our intuitions 
about inverted or zombie worlds are the product of a kind of cognitive illusion.279 
Conversely, the existence of a conceptual analysis for some property in terms of a 
functional role which some physical property can fill suggests, but does not 
guarantee, that the property is grounded in the physical property. 
 In this section, I offer a competing proposal, on which the ideal reasoner’s 
deduction base is more restrictive still. On my account, cosmic hermeneutics should 
be thought of in terms of ontological mechanical-analytic scrutability for the purpose 
of distinguishing emergent from non-emergent properties. On my account, cosmic 
hermeneutics is supposed to tell us whether the nature of some phenomenon is 
fundamental or non-fundamental.  
 In Section 7, I will extend this account of scrutability to allow for stronger 
and weaker kinds of emergence, depending upon which sorts of ontologically 
                                            
278 At least, not without extensive argument, as discussed in Section 4 of this 
chapter. 
279 For two examples of an extensive literature, see Tye (1999) and Loar (1997). 
For critiques of this strategy, which I will not discuss in detail, see Stoljar (2005) 
and Horgan and Tienson (2010).  
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synthetic a priori inferences are needed for a deduction of an emergent property 
from its basal conditions. 
 In Section 8, I will attempt to further clarify the relevant notion of 
“analyticity” for discussions of emergentism and the analytic a priori. It is unlikely 
that there is one single analytic/synthetic distinction. Rather, there are a series of 
contrasts to be drawn between various forms of reasoning and justification. 
Emergent phenomena may be understood as those which are not ideally deducible 
from their basal conditions by means of mechanical procedures alone. 
 Finally, in Section 9, I will suggest some surprising consequences of 
understanding ontology in terms of cosmic hermeneutics. In particular, I will 
conclude that that (i) emergentism remains plausible for consciousness even if the 
“epistemic gap” is merely a feature of our contingent cognitive limitations, and 
conscious facts are a priori deducible from physical ones, (ii) emergentist accounts 
are motivated by the failure to find an analysis of emergent phenomena rather than 
by philosophers having or lacking certain intuitions, and (iii) emergentist accounts 
might apply to a much wider variety of phenomena across the special sciences than 
generally assumed – a point which I will explore further in Chapters 5 - 7. 
6.2 Grounding and Deducibility 
 6.2.1 Does Grounding Entail Deducibility? Recall that C. D. Broad defined 
an emergent phenomenon as one which was not predictable from a knowledge of its 
basal conditions, even by the Mathematical Archangel, except by actually observing 
the correlations between the two properties. Compare this to the definition of an 
ontologically emergent phenomenon which I offered in Chapter 2, on which basal 
conditions must be sufficient for the emergent phenomenon, but the emergent 
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phenomenon is nonetheless ontologically distinct from the basal conditions, defined 
in terms of grounding: 
 
(Distinctness) If a phenomenon e is ontologically emergent from basal 
conditions b, then e is not wholly grounded in b. 
 
 What is the relationship between ideal deducibility or scrutability (an 
epistemological question) and grounding (a metaphysical question)? The 
biconditional doesn’t likely hold: it is not the case that E is ideally deducible from 
base B if and only if E is grounded in B. After all, grounding is usually conceived of 
as being irreflexive and asymmetrical, but every truth is ideally deducible from 
itself. Further, consider that it is ideally scrutable from the fact that s knows that p, 
that p is true, given that the ideal reasoner has access to the definition of knowledge 
– but p’s truth is not grounded in s’s knowledge. However, perhaps the following 
one-way conditional claim is worth exploring: 
 
(GD) if E is grounded in B, then E is ideally scrutable from B. 
 
 It could turn out that (GD) is trivial. If grounding is not distinct from 
metaphysical necessitation, and ideal scrutability is interpreted as entailment 
scrutability, then the two collapse into each other. However, we will assume that 
grounding, as a type of asymmetric ontological explanation, can be distinguished 
from mere necessitation. Consider then two different ways in which (GD) might turn 
out to be defective: (i) the grounding relation could fail to be represented in the ideal 
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reasoner’s representational system, or (ii) we could choose the wrong scrutability 
relation, so that the resources given to the ideal reasoner could be either too weak or 
too strong. 
 6.2.2 Representational Failures. It might be none of the cases in which E is 
grounded in B are cases in which E is ideally deducible from B, because the form in 
which the truths in E and B are represented is not the sort of thing whose deductive 
relations can be used to represent truths about grounding. We know that well-
formed sentences can fail to express any meaningful proposition: colorless green 
ideas sleep furiously. We also know that sometimes the concepts in our propositions 
fail to match up with the natures of things, like the proposition that phlogiston is 
released during combustion. We can recognize in history that many concepts in the 
past were loaded with racist, sexist, or culturally-limited biases, and we are likely 
often blind to the same errors in our own concepts today. In a worst-case scenario, 
all of our concepts and all of our sentences could be error. 
 Of course, to borrow a theme from Burge (2010), I suspect the fact that some 
errors exist is good reason to think that, on the whole, our sentential and 
propositional representational systems do successfully represent the world. To be in 
error, a system must represent to begin with. A system which never represented 
successfully couldn’t represent at all, and thus couldn’t be in error. Nonetheless, we 
could still be wrong in many cases, especially difficult cases – a point the 
phenomenal concept theorist exploits. 
 For this reason, it seems to be preferable to me to interpret the 
representations with which the ideal reasoner is supposed to work as ontological 
rather than sentential or propositional: that is, things will represent themselves. We 
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might imagine (granting ourselves a heavy bit of metaphor) that the ideal reasoner 
starts out speaking the ‘language of ontology’ in which every real thing is in one-to-
one correspondence with the terms of his language, and that the ideal reasoner has 
access to a dictionary in which the natures or essences of all of the properties are 
written out as ‘real definitions’.280 Of course, the ideal reasoner will still have the 
task of deducing from this base all of the true sentences (e.g., those that come out of 
Karl’s mouth) and the true propositions (e.g., those in Karl’s thoughts), but what he 
starts out with will be a form of representation which we stipulate aligns with the 
way the world is perfectly, or at least to the maximum extent that the world is in a 
way which can be represented at all.281 The grounding relations between things will 
then appear within the ideal reasoner’s representation of the world.  
                                            
280 I recognize that many philosophers will cringe at this open discussion of 
essences. Yet it seems to me that disguising a discussion which we all know to really 
be about essences by putting it in terms of linguistic practices or conceptual 
necessities is generally unhelpful, except on occaision as a way of reminding 
ourselves how philosophy got back into the metaphysical discussion to begin with. 
281 We are assuming that the world is representable – that is, it has the sort of 
structure which can be represented by our concepts or our language. It need not be 
that the world is representable. It may be only that some portion of what is real is 
representable – this will be what we indicate by “the world”. It could be that the 
world is empty, in the sense that nothing of what is real is representable – that is to 
say, the world may be transcendent. We are assuming that this is not the case; if it 
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 It remains an open question as to how much we can know about whether 
something is ideally deducible or not. Our concepts may not align with the ideal 
reasoner’s concepts. So, our intuitions about whether or not a concept applies in a 
given thought experiment will only be as good as a guide to ideal scrutability as the 
degree to which our concepts accurately represent the natures of things. Choosing 
an ontological base (as opposed to a sentential or propositional base) in no way 
eliminates the problem, but locates it safely outside of the mathematical archangel’s 
task. It would certainly not be ontological interesting if cosmic hermeneutics failed 
only because the ideal reasoner’s representational system failed.  
  6.2.3 Wrong Resources. Our scrutability relation might be too restrictive: it 
might be that some of the cases in which E is grounded in B are cases in which E is 
not ideally deducible from B. Alternatively, our scrutability relation might be too 
permissive: some of the cases in which E is not grounded in B are cases in which E is 
ideally deducible from B. If we give the ideal reasoner too few resources to perform 
the deduction of E from B, then a commitment to (GD) will lead us to conclude that 
E is emergent even in cases in which it is grounded in B. On the other hand, if we 
give the ideal reasoner too many resources to perform the deduction, then a 
commitment to (GD) will lead us to fail to recognize that E is emergent even in cases 
where it is. 
 An obvious case of too few resources is minimal logical scrutability. Here, the 
ideal reasoner is limited to those inferences which are justified in classical first 
                                                                                                                                  
is, then what we say will apply to that portion of the world which is representable, 
or will apply (trivially) to the empty set. 
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order logic with identity.282 A great many cases of grounding are not likely to be 
minimally logically scrutable. For instance, it is not minimally logically scrutable 
from an object’s being red that the object is colored. Nonetheless, assuming 
determinables are grounded in determinates, an object’s being colored is grounded in 
its being red. 
 A case of too many resources, discussed earlier, can be found in a priori 
scrutability, assuming that there is such a thing as the synthetic a priori.283 For 
instance, assuming there are normative ethical facts of some sort284, the ethical facts 
will be a priori scrutable by an ideal reasoner from a physical description of the 
world, given a sufficiently robust conception of the a priori. Naturalists, who believe 
that the ethical facts are grounded in the physical facts, will accept this. Non-
naturalists, who believe that the ethical facts are not grounded in the physical facts, 
                                            
282 Or, if one prefers, some named alternative to classical first order logic with 
identity. 
283 Of course, someone might hold that the a priori is coextensive with the 
analytic and deny that there are synthetic a priori truths. In this case, the a priori 
may be sufficiently constrained to be ontologically significant. 
284 If someone holds that there are no such facts, a similar problem can be raised 
for the metaphysics of causation or claims about the ontology of mathematics. 
Platonists and anti-Platonists agree that the mathematical truths are a priori; two 
philosophers could agree that causal facts are a priori knowable given the 
regularities in nature, but one holds that they simply are regularities, while another 
holds that causation is something over and above regularity. 
  254 
will equally accept this – on their view, it is supposed to be a priori that pain is 
morally bad, or a priori that one ought according to a maxim which one can will to be 
a universal law. Yet, if non-naturalism is true, then it should be possible to perform 
Modus Tollens on (GD). The word ‘derive’ in “you can’t derive an ‘is’ from an ‘ought’” 
presumes that there is a sense of scrutability which is more restrictive than the 
synthetic a priori, a sense which the non-naturalist takes to indicate that ethical 
facts are not grounded in descriptive facts. 
 This isn’t to say that a priori scrutability tells us nothing about metaphysics. 
If E is a priori deducible from B, then this fact strongly suggests that, assuming the 
base B is real, E is also real.285 Certainly, if B is an accurate representation of the 
world, and an ideal reasoner can deduce E from B, then E must also be a true 
representation of the world. We might be tempted to adopt a claim like this: 
 
 (DER) Deducibility Entails Reality. If E is ideally deducible from B, and B 
only refers to real objects and properties, then E only refers to real objects 
and properties. 
 
 For instance, from “Tom is a bachelor” one can deduce “Tom is unmarried”; 
from “Roses are red” one can deduce “Some flowers are colored.” It would be strange 
to hold that bachelors are real, but marriage is an illusion. It would be strange to 
hold that roses and redness are real, but flowers and colors are not.  Granted, 
                                            
285 In the everyday sense of ‘real’ identified earlier, as opposed to the sense in 
which ‘real’ is synonymous with ‘fundamental’. 
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depending on the view one takes of truth in literary fiction, there may be 
counterexamples to (DER).286 However, whether (DER) is true or not, a priori 
scrutability at most tells us what properties or entities our ontology should preserve, 
or what facts we are committed to when we are committed to a certain base of facts, 
but it does not tell us about the relations between these facts or what grounds what. 
A failure of a priori scrutability may tell us that a phenomenon is emergent, but the 
success of a priori scrutability is not enough to tell us that a phenomenon is not 
emergent. 
 There are several options between a priori scrutability and minimal logical 
scrutability. Which one is relevant to Broad’s test for an emergent property? Which 
one should we adopt for our interpretation of (GD), so as to weed out all and only the 
non-emergent properties? I will turn to this question next. 
6.3 Simulative Scrutability? 
 Slightly weaker than a priori scrutability is the relation I called simulative 
scrutability. While simulative scrutability does not allow the ideal reasoner to have 
                                            
286 Suppose that the ideal reasoner is given a sentence which contains a complete 
description of the life of Leo Tolstoy, including which words he wrote while 
authoring of Anna Karenina. From this, the ideal reasoner can deduce that the 
sentence “Anna Karenina was the sister of Stepan Oblonsky” is true. Nonetheless, 
unless modal realism is true, Anna Karenina is not real, nor is Stepan Oblonsky. Or, 
suppose that one holds that abstract mathematical properties are not real, but that 
mathematics is a priori. Then mathematics could be deduced from any sentence S – 
including Tolstoy’s life story – but one would not want to hold (DER). 
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a priori intuitions about normative truths (to extent they might exist), it does permit 
the ideal reasoner a number of other a priori resources, including mathematical and 
analytic a priori inferences. In addition, the ideal reasoner is permitted to engage in 
a kind of perspective-taking or simulation, in which he replicates (or uses a 
computing device to replicate) the macro-scale behavior of some rule-governed 
system, and notices certain patterns which re-appear regularly in the system. In 
some cases, the ideal reasoner is not able to deduce the patterns which appear given 
the rules and initial conditions alone without actually applying them step-by-step 
(as in the case of so-called “artificial life”). In certain very complex cases, the ideal 
reasoner makes inferences about the intentions and goals of the system, including 
that it composes a reasoner or an agent, guided by a principle of charity.  
 Some may regard it as debatable whether such simulation counts as a priori 
rather than a posteriori – it certainly involves some form of ‘observation’ – but it is 
not empirical in the traditional sense of running an experiment or perceiving the 
deduced states of affairs directly. Conversely, others may regard it as debatable 
whether simulation of this sort qualifies as non-analytic, as I have defined it, since 
the running of a computational simulation requires only that a system act on 
predictable set of rules. However, while some computational simulations are the sort 
where one can predict the output simply by knowing the rules, others are of the sort 
which one can only predict by actually mentally running through a step-by-step 
application of the rules: running, as it were, a mental simulation of what the 
computational simulation will do. Compare this to having to determine which is the 
“shortest proof” of some conclusion from a set of premises and rules of inference. 
While the rules of the game are fully specified, and determining the outcome only 
  257 
requires applying the rules, it might not be possible to determine the shortest proof 
without actually running through various possible proofs to see which is shortest, 
because the conclusion is about the system of rules itself. Simulation seems to 
occupy an intermediate position on the border between the analytic a priori and the 
a posteriori. 
 Someone might also be concerned that the sorts of phenomena which humans 
are inclined to “deduce” by observing simulations – whether computational 
simulations of artificial life or our own psychological simulations of what someone 
else must be thinking or feeling – are cases in which a certain evolutionary history 
and biological make-up predisposes us to finding certain ‘patterns’ particularly 
interesting or certain conclusions about someone’s mental states particularly 
‘obvious’, whereas there is no reason an ideal reasoner would find these patterns 
particularly interesting or notable in comparison to other patterns. However, while 
it is reasonable to believe that an ideal reasoner would notice far more patterns than 
we do in the world, and would find interesting patterns in the world which do not 
strike us as interesting or obvious, this does not undermine the possibility that the 
patterns we notice are interesting to us in part because they are real patterns: our 
evolutionary history and biological composition has been molded by the structure of 
reality, thus permitting us to (fallibly) notice some (but not all) of the patterns in 
nature. While our biological purposes might be different than the ideal reasoner for 
noticing these patterns – we’re interested in survival, he isn’t – ideal reasoner might 
still find patterns like life or psychology interesting for the purposes of 
understanding the world (perhaps the reason why these patterns are useful for 
survival is precisely because they are real). There is no guarantee that this is so, and 
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it is respectable to believe that the patterns we notice are interesting only relative to 
our biological purposes, not ideally, but nothing in an evolutionary account of human 
psychology requires that we believe this to be so. 
 Bedau (1997) has argued that this sort of “deducibility only by simulation” 
constitutes a distinctive sort of ‘weak emergence’. We might interpret Bedau’s 
definition as indicating as weakly emergent those phenomena which are 
simulatively scrutable from their basal conditions, but not scrutable from any 
strictly weaker set of resources. Thus, to find the form of scrutability relevant to 
(GD), we will need to reduce the resources available to the ideal reasoner. 
6.4  From Conceptual Analysis to Ontological Analysis 
 I will pass over what I have called mathematical scrutability287, and turn 
next to conceptual-analytic scrutability. When the scrutability base has a sentential 
or propositional form, then the topic of conceptual-analytic scrutability aligns closely 
with the project of Jackson (1998) and others outlined in Section 4. However, I 
argued in section 6.2.2 that we ought to take the base for the ideal reasoner’s 
deduction to be ontological – to consist in things structured as their natures truly 
are, representing themselves. In this case, instead of “conceptual-analytic” 
scrutability we have cosmic hermeneutics conceived of as consisting in ontological-
analytic scrutability. The ideal reasoner is not permitted to rely upon intuitions 
                                            
287 I included this in the class of synthetic a priori forms of scrutability because of 
a preference towards this position in the philosophy of mathematics, but don’t wish 
to press the point here, and don’t know how much of ontological interest is tied to 
this. 
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about the application conditions of various concepts, since the natures of things 
themselves are sitting right in front of his face. Instead, the resources the ideal 
reasoner uses in an attempt to deduce the higher-level facts from the base facts will 
be those which I identified as involved in mechanical-analytic scrutability: 
 
(c) Mechanical-Analytic scrutability holds iff A is scrutable from B when only 
logic, definitions, and all other analytic a priori inferences which involve only 
the mechanical application of a rule, independent of content or meaning, are 
permitted. 
 
 Here, it seems to me, we have a test for minimally emergent properties which 
gives us a useful interpretation of (GD): if E is grounded in B, then the nature of E 
will be ideally mechanical-analytically scrutable from the nature of B, since part of 
E’s nature will be its grounding in B. However, unlike a priori or simulative 
scrutability, it is not plausible that even weakly emergent properties (those whose 
natures aren’t grounded in their basal conditions) are mechanically-analytically 
scrutable from their basal conditions.  
 Why should mechanical-analytic deducibility be relevant to ontological 
emergence? Consider that on the ontologically “mechanistic” account which the 
emergentist is opposed to, only basal conditions themselves are fundamental. No 
new ontological “content” can be added to the nature of the higher-level property 
beyond what is already contained in the nature of its base, since this new content 
would then have to be fundamental also. So, any apparent differences between the 
natures of higher-level properties and their basal conditions must be explainable in 
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terms of relations which involve no addition of content. For instance, an object’s 
being red grounds an object’s being colored because coloredness is contained in what 
it is to be red, where “contained in” is a relation which can be represented in a 
purely mechanical way with no addition of content. 
 One might wonder why we haven’t chosen the even weaker criterion of 
definitional scrutability. Mechanical-analytic scrutability does allow the ideal 
reasoner access to definitions (since we are dealing with the natures of things, these 
take the form of “real definitions”), so it includes anything which would be 
definitionally scrutable. However, it also includes any deduction by means of a fully 
determinate mechanical decision procedure where the procedure itself adds no 
additional content, even if the procedure is not part of classical logic and does not 
involve definitions.288 For instance, it is implausible that one can find a definition for 
what it is to be a ‘heap’ of rice, given the vagueness of a term like ‘heap’. However, 
for any property the heap has (ignoring external relations to outside objects), an 
ideal reasoner in principle could specify a mechanical procedure for determining the 
heap’s property on the basis of the properties of the rice in the heap and their spacial 
                                            
288 Consider Hilbert’s finitism in mathematics as an attempt at establishing 
mechanical-analytic scrutability for arithmetic without the logicist’s commitment to 
definitional scrutability. Although Godel’s proof put finitism to rest for mathematics, 
were something else scrutable by means of the sorts of procedures Hilbert would 
have accepted, it would count as mechanical-analytically scrutable without counting 
as definitionally scrutable. 
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locations – the reasoner does not have to rely on intuitions about norms, simulating 
the structure of the heap, or so on. 
 If I am correct that it is ontologically analytic scrutability which is relevant to 
ontological emergence, the emergentist need not be committed to the two-
dimensionalism of Chalmers and Jackson or the view that the ideal a priori 
deducibility or non-deducibility of one set of concepts from another informs us about 
whether a phenomenon is emergent or not. It may in fact be that an emergent 
phenomenon is a priori deducible from its basal conditions, provided that the 
deduction requires further resources above and beyond those involved in 
ontologically analytic scrutability. 
 In the next section, I will expand further on this account of “ontologically 
analytic” and “ontologically synthetic” properties, and use it to fill out the notion of 
weaker and stronger kinds of emergence which I discussed above. 
§7. Ontological Analysis 
7.1 Essences and Ideal Deducibility 
 In chapter 2, I proposed that an emergent phenomenon is one which (i) 
wholly depends for its existence (or manipulatively supervenes) upon some set of 
basal conditions, but nonetheless (ii) does not ontologically depend upon those basal 
conditions – it is not grounded in them. In this chapter, I have identified this second 
condition with the question of whether an emergent phenomenon has a nature 
which is ontologically analytic given the nature of its basal conditions, and is thus 
analytically scrutable from them. 
 Being an essential property of another thing is one type of grounding 
relation, though not the only grounding relation. I am here understanding “essence” 
  262 
to indicate the consequential or constitutive essence of a thing, Although it’s 
contentious whether essences really are all that much like the ontological 
counterparts of linguistic definitions, particularly given that semantics is not so very 
concerned with finding definitions for terms, it remains a useful metaphor to think 
of the essential nature of a thing is something like a “real definition” of that thing – 
a relation between it and the set of properties in virtue of which it has the identity it 
has. Of course, something may have multiple true definitions, but has only one 
essence289 -- an essential property is what is common to all possible definitions of the 
thing.290  
 I will assume that while all essential properties are modal properties, not all 
modal properties are essential properties. In this regard, my assumptions align with 
a more or less Aristotelian approach to essence291, but differ markedly with the 
modalist approach towards essence which has gradually become popular over the 
last half-century or so, on which all necessary relations are supposed to be essential 
relations. I will assume that the fact that f has G does not tell us that G is essential 
to f, since it need not be the case that f has G in virtue of being f. Consider the 
following example from Kit Fine: 
 
                                            
289 Kit Fine (1995) offers the following example: for an Aristotelian, it is essential 
that red be the color of some x, and red can be defined as “the color of that actual 
tomato”, but it is not essential that red be the color of that actual tomato. 
290 ibid. 
291 See Corkum (2008) 
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Consider two objects whose natures are unconnected, say Socrates and the 
Eiffel Tower. Then it is necessary that Socrates and the Tower be distinct. 
But it is not essential to Socrates that he be distinct from the Tower; for there 
is nothing in his nature which connects him in any special way to it.292 
 
 Just as necessary relations need not be essential relations between things, so 
too, as I have discussed in this chapter, a priori relations between things need not 
involve grounding relations between things, provided that non-analytic resources 
are relied upon in the deduction. Instead of looking to the a priori / a posteriori 
distinction to carve up he world, we might instead look to some parallel of the 
analytic / synthetic distinction. Here’s how. 
 Typically, the analytic / synthetic distinction is applied to sentences or pairs 
of sentences. The analytic is supposed to be that which is “true in virtue of 
meaning”, a definition which is no longer so clear as it once seemed. For instance, 
“all bachelors are unmarried” is supposed to be analytic given the meanings of the 
relevant terms in English. One also may speak of analytic or synthetic propositions, 
or of a sentence being analytic given the relevant concepts, regardless of what 
language they are spoken in: for any language which has a term for the concept blue 
and term for the concept colored it will be analytic that all which is blue is colored. 
To be analytic isn’t to be trivial: perhaps we can learn interesting things through 
careful analysis of the meaning of a term. We might learn through considering the 
meaning of “harm” that some practice we regarded as harmful is in fact not harmful, 
                                            
292 From “Essence and Modality”, Fine (1993) 
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or through considering the meaning of “part” that some things which we didn’t 
regard as proper parts of a whole in fact are. An analysis of rich terms like 
“marriage” or “person” can teach us something new. 
 However, as many undergraduates ask, why should philosophers spend so 
much time investigating semantics? Shouldn’t we be concerned about real persons 
and real parts, not what “person” or “part” means? Presumably, it’s because we 
believe that our words and concepts align in some way with the way things really 
are, and so the meanings of our words and an analysis of our concepts will yield us 
some information about the “real definitions” or essences of things.293 This 
information need not amount to knowledge: it can be prone to serious error and bias, 
and so it should be subject to healthy skepticism – one should seek more intuitions 
rather than fewer. One should not be naïve in thinking that a complete semantics 
for the term “harm” will be sufficient to tell anyone whether a government should 
legalize prostitution or recreational drug use. Nonetheless, the weight many 
philosophers put on semantics suggests that at some level many hope that analysis 
will tell us something or other about essence. 
7.2 Ontologically Synthetic and Ontologically Analytic 
 Let’s adopt a specialized, ontological sense of “analytic” and “synthetic” – 
where analysis not relative to one’s language or set of concepts, but operates within 
the language of ontology. Using our metaphor of a “real definition”, we might say 
that one thing is ontologically analytic given another if the “real definition” of the 
one is wholly contained in the other. Alternatively, understanding grounding to be 
                                            
293 Fine (2009) 
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broader than essence, we might say that if one thing is wholly grounded in another, 
then it is ontologically analytic given the other.294 On the other hand, if one thing is 
ontologically synthetic given another, then it is not wholly grounded in the other, 
and it is not wholly contained in its definition. 
 Consider the well-worn sentence, “Water = H2O.” This sentence is a posteriori 
and it is (linguistically) synthetic given the semantics of English. Likewise, take the 
proposition this sentence expresses, <Water = H2O>. This proposition is also a 
posteriori and synthetic, because the concept of H2O is not contained in the concept 
of water. However, consider what would be analytic or synthetic were objects and 
properties to represent themselves, and their essences represented as definitions – 
or else, a language used by an ideal reasoner in a one-to-one correspondence to such 
a representation. (There is no reason to think any real language capable of fitting 
the bill.) In this language, it would be analytic that “Water = H2O” – because this 
would just be to say, “H2O = H2O”. In other words, it is ontologically analytic that 
the thing we refer to by “water” is identical to the thing we refer to by “H2O”.  
 One should not over-apply ontological analyticity, and thereby confuse it with 
necessity or the a priori. Laplace held that every past and future fact was 
necessitated and a priori given the present facts, but not that the future or past was 
                                            
294 Note that neither biconditional holds. One thing may be ontologically analytic 
from another without being contained in its definition; one thing might be 
ontologically analytic from another without being wholly grounded in it. These are 
ways in which one thing might be ontologically analytic, not a definition for 
‘ontological analyticity’. 
  266 
ontologically analytic given the present: they were ontologically distinct states of 
affairs.  
  For contemporary physics, the essential properties of the fundamental 
particles in one part of the world are ontologically synthetic given the essential 
properties of some other fundamental particles in some other part of the world, for 
the most part, except perhaps in special cases involving entangled electrons. 
However, on most accounts of mereology, for any non-emergent macroscopic entity – 
say, a heap of rice – the properties of the whole are ontologically analytic given the 
properties of the spacio-temporal parts, even if the whole has different identity 
conditions than its parts. 
7.3 Emergence and Ontologically Synthetic Entities 
 A monist holds that all of the particular entities are ontologically analytic 
given the cosmos as a whole. An atomist holds the cosmos as a whole is ontologically 
analytic given the particular entities in the world. In contrast, an emergentist holds 
that there are distinctive levels in nature, and that at certain levels there are 
distinctive cases where particular facts remain ontologically synthetic given the 
lower-level facts. In some cases, one thing is “nothing over and above its parts”, and 
so it is a mere “resultant”, or ontologically analytic given the facts about its parts. In 
other cases, however, an entity at one level may be “something over and above its 
parts”, and so the entity is emergent and ontologically synthetic given the entities at 
any other level. 
 So, a phenomenon E is ontologically emergent from basal conditions B if and 
only if E supervenes on B and E is ontologically synthetic given B. Returning to the 
task of cosmic hermeneutics, this means that an ontologically emergent phenomenon 
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may be a priori scrutable from its subvening base, provided that for an ideal 
reasoner the deduction would require an ontologically synthetic bridge premise – 
that is, the deduction would not be possible by the analytic a priori alone. On the 
other hand, a phenomenon which is not ontologically emergent (though it may be 
‘epistemically emergent’) may fail to be conceptually a priori scrutable from its 
subvening base for an ideal reasoner, because the ideal reasoner lacks access to 
some ontologically analytic but a posteriori necessary identity. 
 A phenomenon which is simulatively scrutable but not analytically scrutable, 
as Bedau (2008) holds for “weakly emergent” phenomena in complexity science, 
would qualify as emergent on this definition. Likewise, a normative or teleological 
property might be a priori scrutable but nonetheless ontologically emergent. 
Discussions of “weak emergence” have not typically distinguished between 
ontologically analytic and ontologically synthetic a priori transitions. As a result, we 
may mistakenly infer that when a phenomenon is a priori deducible from another it 
must be ontologically reducible.  
7.4 The Spectrum of Emergence 
 My account thus suggests a hierarchy of emergent phenomena, though there 
may be many grades of emergence in between, with no clear borderline between 
them. There are weaker forms of ontological emergence, on which an ideal reasoner 
is able to deduce the emergent phenomena from its subvening base, but the 
deduction is not ontologically analytic – and then there are progressively stronger 
forms of ontological emergence, on which an ideal reasoner needs more and more 
resources in order to be able to perform the deduction – perhaps a kind of 
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simulation, perhaps a certain kind of normative reasoning, or perhaps resources 
beyond our comprehension. We might divide things up roughly as follows: 
 
(a) Empirically predictable, but not a priori scrutable: the strongest kind of 
ontological emergence. 
 
(b) Deducible a priori, but only by normative intuitions: a kind of ontological 
emergence stronger than (c), weaker than (a). 
 
(c) Deducible a priori, but only by simulation: the weakest kind of ontological 
emergence. 
 
(d) Deducible a priori by mechanical-analytical means alone: Not 
ontologically emergent even in a minimal sense. 
 
 Consciousness would fall into category (a), insofar as it is arguably not a 
priori scrutable even by an ideal reasoner. Of course, were consciousness to be a 
priori scrutable by an ideal reasoner – perhaps the ideal reasoner could simply look 
at the patterns in a brain and deduce the presence of a conscious mind there by 
some method beyond us – it might still qualify as emergent, just more weakly so. 
Normative and teleological properties would fall somewhere into category (b), with 
certain higher-level patterns in complex systems which are deducible only by 
simulation falling into category (c).  
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 Someone might wonder how reliable our own judgments as to whether or not 
something is “ontologically” analytic could possibly be. On the one hand, it is true 
that the natures of many things are hidden from us until the empirical details come 
in  – as in the case of heat being molecular kinetic energy. One might even be a 
pessimist and suppose that, even when all the empirical details have come in, there 
will be some things whose natures will remain obscure or hidden from us – which 
will appear deducible only by synthetic means, but in fact will turn out to be 
ontologically analytic. On the other hand, to whatever extent the nature of 
something is evident to us, our judgments as to whether or not something is analytic 
from it can be regarded as fairly reliable. While the “loftier” forms of the a priori are 
unclear and are the subject of much skepticism – how is it that one intuits the 
badness of pain or the wrongness of torture? – the mechanical-analytic a priori is the 
sort of thing we have confident mastery over, since it involves only content-free 
processing of the sort a computing device can be programmed to perform. 
 There may be, however, an abiding skepticism about the whole analytic / 
synthetic distinction to begin with – even though I have clarified that I am using 
these terms in a specifically ontological way, with the analytic corresponding to a 
kind of mechanical procedure, not as involving concerns about semantics or 
conceptual analysis. Rather than become entrenched in a discussion of post-Quinean 
attempts to revive the analytic / synthetic distinction or weigh various proposals for 
these highly disputed terms, in the next section I will try instead to offer an intuitive 
distinction – between calculating and counting – which I think maps up to the 
relevant differences between the way an ideal reasoner would deduce an emergent 
theory as opposed to a mechanistic theory of some phenomenon. Is this the real 
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analytic / synthetic distinction? I doubt it. However, it will suffice to clarify the sense 
of “analytic” and “synthetic” I have in mind when saying that emergent properties 
are ontologically synthetic given their subvening base. 
§8. Counting and Calculating 
8.1 Mechanism 
 As mentioned, I do not hope to find a definition of the “analytic” / “synthetic” 
distinction which applies to all domains and debates in philosophy and is free from 
counterexample. My purpose to try to distinguish those cases in which ideal a priori 
scrutability of A given B justifies us believing that there is an ontological reduction 
from A to B, and those in which a priori scrutability is consistent with emergence. 
 Recall that the early British emergentists opposed their program not to 
materialism per se, but rather to mechanism – the view that the cosmos worked 
more or less like a piece of industrial age machinery. The ideal deducibility of A from 
B matters to the debate between the emergentist and the mechanist when ideal 
deducibility is understood to be a kind of mechanical procedure, an intellectual 
model of the sorts of levers and pulleys which operate in the mechanist’s cosmos. 
 If there are sorts of a priori scrutability which do not involve mechanical 
procedures, as many philosophers believe there are, then these sorts of a priori 
scrutability are compatible with emergentism: one can hold that A emerges from B, 
even though A is a priori scrutable from B, provided that A is not scrutable by 
means of mechanical procedures alone. So, for my purposes, “analytic” will indicate a 
derivation which relies upon this sort of mechanical procedure. As mentioned, there 
are uses of “analysis” in contemporary philosophy which will fall into the category I 
call “synthetic”.  
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 Instead of using the terms “analytic” and “synthetic” to modify a proposition 
or pair of propositions, suppose instead that we come up with a pair of terms to 
describe two distinctive processes of reasoning which an ideal reasoner might be 
engaged in. One of these, we will call “calculating” – reasoning which involves only a 
mechanical procedure, and whose outputs are analytic. The other, we will call 
“counting” – reasoning which involves something more than a mechanical procedure, 
and whose outputs are synthetic. I will try to draw an intuitive picture of the many 
varieties of reasoning process which counting or calculating might be applied to. 
8.2  Calculating 
 Calculating is a mechanical procedure whereby a given input is transformed 
into a particular output as determined by the application of some rule. By a 
“mechanical” procedure, I mean a procedure which can be reproduced by some in 
principle constructible mechanism, whether or not the mechanism is constructible in 
practice. For example, given “2+3” as an input, I apply the rule for the ‘+’ sign and 
obtain the output “5”. Given “~p & ~q”, I apply DeMorgan’s law and obtain “~(p v 
q)”. 
 Of course, the plus sign rule and the DeMorgan’s law are obtained by similar 
calculations from the rules of ZFC set theory and first order logic, and these rules 
are obtained by mere calculation from truth functions – a truth table is a sort of 
calculation. There is nothing in the nature of calculation which requires that we 
start from the basis of the axioms of Zermelo-Frankel set theory or that we start 
from the basis of classical logic. We might start from a non-standard set of axioms, 
or we might adopt an intuitionistic logic instead. We could then derive from these 
axioms a different set of rules which lead us to calculate in a different way. 
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 Calculation is the sort of procedure which is entirely neutral with regard to 
the content of the thing being calculated. DeMorgan’s law is not concerned with 
what p and q mean. This is consistent with the fact that calculations can be 
sophisticated and complex, far outstripping the abilities of the human mind. We now 
have the ability to construct mechanisms which can perform calculations which the 
mind cannot perform, though these calculators are not concerned with the content of 
what they are calculating. 
 Calculators cannot count. They can represent counting, in the sense of 
“represent” in which numerals represent numbers. Given as input a representation 
of times (t1, t2, t3 . . . ) through an internal clock, a calculator can attach an index to 
those times, and so produce in time an output which, upon interpretation by a 
viewer, appears to be a sequence representing ordinal numbers. I might program a 
function which can “count” the number of characters in some paragraph. But the 
calculator is no more counting characters in paragraphs than a watch is counting 
minutes. One counts times with a watch; it is not the watch which does the counting. 
8.3 Counting 
 8.3.1 Making a Count. In contrast, it is hard to say what counting amounts 
to except by illustration. For example, counting is what I do when I define moments 
in time by assigning them distinct names: “1”, “2”, “3”. Imagine a conductor of a 
symphony orchestra, who is assigned the task of keeping the whole orchestra in 
time. He might set a metronome to perform this task, which would calculate the 
next beat for him. But suppose he starts from scratch. He begins to count “1, 2, 3 . . 
.” and then the orchestra plays. Once he has defined the times by counting, then the 
others can begin the process of calculating when one should play. But the rhythm 
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itself that he established, the count, was not something he calculated from 
something else. 
 Suppose there are two conductors, and two orchestras, each playing the same 
symphony, isolated from one another so that neither can hear the other. Perhaps one 
conducts a bit fast, and the other is a bit slow. If each conductor has calculated his or 
her time from the same starting point – something like the metronome – then 
necessarily there exists some way of bringing the two counts together. If one has set 
the metronome at 60 bpm, and the other at 90 bpm, then the half notes of one will be 
the dotted quarter notes of the other. 
 However, suppose that instead each conductor simply begins counting. Even 
if each conductor maintains his or her respective count perfectly, there is no 
immediate guarantee that there exists a means of translate from the time of one to 
the time of another. 
 Counting time is one sort of counting. A different sort of counting involves 
counting objects. I count the flowers in a garden: 4, 5, 6 . . . and so I engage in an 
activity, assigning a time stamp to each object, where the stamp is determined by 
aligning my count of time with my perceptual contents.  
 One could create a computer which given certain light-patterns as inputs 
would spit out certain outputs which closely correspond to my counting. For that 
matter, it may turn out that my neurology is such that this computer provides an 
excellent model of the process that I actually engage in. But this only would qualify 
as counting given a certain phenomenology – and only if such a phenomenology were 
to arise in the computer would it be appropriate to say that the computer was 
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counting. Counting is a creative act rather than a mechanical one – one creates T1, 
T2, T3… the calculating transforms data into representations of T1, T2, T3… 
 I don’t mean to give the impression that temporal order is the only sort of 
ordering which counts as counting. Any ordering might do. An ideal reasoner might 
have many ways to count; perhaps humans have many ways to count. Time is only a 
clear and obvious example. 
 Naming is another form of counting. When I baptize an object, or a natural 
kind, or a child, and assign a name to that child, what I am doing is counting a 
certain word – the name – as a representation of that child. The name refers to the 
child, the name is connected to the child by our counting the name as referring to 
the child. There may be certain characteristic properties associated with a name, but 
it is not the properties associated with the representations which refer to the child 
by the name. Suppose one held it was the bundle of characteristic descriptions which 
referred to the child, since the child held the properties referred to in the 
description. Aside from the obvious difficulties identified by Kripke, this only pushes 
the issue back one step – for how did the predicates come to refer to the properties? 
 All of these ways of counting so far we might call making a count. It is from 
making a count that we develop the notion of numerical identity. A demonstrative 
count directly refers to a particular object. given that two demonstratives on two 
occasions can co-refer, we say the two things are numerically identical – they are one 
thing. a demonstrative at one time refers to itself – this is also numerical identity. 
Numerical identity is part of logic but it is not something mechanically derivable 
from the other axioms of logic. It is not mere assignment of rows on a truth table 
  275 
(and in fact is needed in order to assign rows on a truth table in a meaningful way). 
The numerical identity facts tell us precisely what counts as one thing. 
 8.3.2 Keeping Accounts. A different sort of counting might be called keeping 
accounts. Making a count involves assigning names, asking what they refer to, and 
asking whether the things we have so named refer to one another. Having done so, 
we might then ask if certain things might be related to one another in some way, 
assigned to one another – we might ask what something has or possesses, what its 
“properties” are, whether an object has a given property in its account or not. (We 
might in turn ask about the properties of properties, and so on.) It is within the 
practice of keeping accounts that it becomes necessary to talk about truth. We can 
create a representation of an object-property pair (a name which refers to each) and 
then ask whether what is assigned in the representation belongs to the object or not. 
If we line them up and if the representation matches what it represents, we say they 
are accurate, veridical, or true.  
 What is it to match? Again, it is no mechanical procedure to match up a 
representation to reality. It involves another sort of counting activity: coming to a 
judgment on whether the representation counts or not. The notion of a truthmaker 
is important to keeping accounts. A truthmaker is that in virtue of which a 
representation counts as matching. Again, this “in virtue of” is a kind of asymmetric 
ordering and a kind of counting and not mere calculation.  The notion of qualitative 
identity is also connected to the activity of keeping accounts. We say two things are 
qualitatively identical based on a comparison of what is in their accounts. 
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 To call counting an ‘activity’ or ‘coming to a judgment’ is not to suggest that 
there is no right way to count. There is an a priori correct way in which to count. But 
it is the sort of a priori which is not mechanical. 
 8.3.3 Giving an Account. The notion of ordering is central to counting. 
Events may be ordered by the time at which they occur. Objects may be ordered in 
terms of which are parts of others. Properties and essential natures can be ordered 
in terms of which ground the others. Possible worlds can be ordered in terms of their 
nearness or distance given some similarity relation, perhaps in terms of how one 
should have expected things to go if this or that hadn’t occurred. 
 A causal ordering is one such ordering which ranks worlds, explaining the 
future in terms of the past. A teleological ordering is a different sort of ranking of 
worlds, explaining the past in terms of the future – not “backwards causation” or 
causation in reverse, but the reverse of causation. Varieties of supervenience and 
ontological dependence are also sorts of orderings which rank worlds or entities 
within worlds. 
 We might call these varieties of explanation giving an account. Since Hume, 
it has been recognized that the act of giving an account of an event is something over 
and above merely stating the spacio-temporal locations of objects at various 
successive points in time. Nonetheless, we shouldn’t take this to mean that giving an 
explanation of an event or some other phenomenon is the sort of thing we do 
arbitrarily, unguided by reason. Like other forms of counting, it is an a priori 
judgment, but one which is not mere mechanical calculating. 
 8.3.4 Holding to Account. There is a fourth example of counting which we 
might consider – that of holding someone to account. Having given an account of an 
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event, and have assigned the event (in some sense) to the accounts of some person as 
responsible for it, we might then wish to count higher or lower (to praise or to blame) 
a person in light of some role the person played in our account of what happened. To 
count higher or lower is a kind of ranking or valuing which goes beyond mere 
calculation. Holding responsible differs in that we rank one in virtue of what that 
person is responsible for. To hold someone accountable gives us a distinctively 
personal sense of identity, for the purposes of reward, punishment, and so on, which 
is distinct from the qualitative and numerical senses of identity. 
 How are our judgments of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness to be made? 
Again, the fact that these sorts of judgments are not calculable by mechanical 
procedures should not lead anyone to conclude that they need be arbitrary or 
unreasoning (though perhaps, in reality, they often are), or that there is no fact of 
the matter about what judgment one should make. These judgments could be guided 
by a kind of reasoning which is a priori. 
8.4 Counting and Calculating a priori 
 Both counting and calculating can be counted as types of reasoning and 
inference which confer a priori justification when performed properly. One who 
knows the procedure and the input can be justified in the output. One who engages 
in an act of counting or calculating need not further appeal to some empirical basis 
to justify how the counting or calculating occurred.  The procedures which are 
involved in calculating are those which I have in mind when discussing mechanical-
analytic scrutability. Not all that passes as analysis is calculating – some of what 
passes for “conceptual analysis” sounds more like what I have described as counting 
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than calculating. An emergent property is one which cannot be calculated from its 
subvening basal conditions. 
 The procedures involved in counting are the sort I have in mind when I 
discuss a sense of the a priori synthetic. Counting is the sort of thing which requires 
a conscious mind to perform – and yet this does not mean that “anything goes” in 
counting, or that it is equally natural to count in any way one pleases. Some forms of 
counting produce justified beliefs, and some do not. I can hold the wrong person 
accountable despite knowing all of the descriptive facts; I can give a worse 
explanation which lines up with the empirical facts just as well as a good one; I can 
choose to count two steps backwards on the number line for every step forward. But 
I am in none of these cases justified in believing the result of my count. 
 I am not committed to the counting / calculating distinction aligning perfectly 
with a useful notion of the analytic / synthetic distinction for the purposes of 
linguistic or conceptual analysis. I am only interested in it offering an explanation of 
what I mean by “ontologically” analytic or synthetic relations between the natures of 
things, or the “mechanically-analytic” procedures an ideal reasoner might use in a 
deduction.  
§9. Conclusions 
 I have argued in this chapter that the project of cosmic hermeneutics is only 
relevant to the question of whether or not a phenomenon is Emergent when cosmic 
hermeneutics is understood as involving ontological analytic scrutability, as opposed 
to (i) conceptual or sentential scrutability, or (ii) a priori or simulative scrutability. 
This distances emergentism from a dependence on arguments based on our 
intuitions about the applications of phenomenal concepts (or other concepts for 
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purportedly emergent kinds), two-dimensional semantics, what’s a priori for an ideal 
reasoner, or reasoning from an epistemic gap to an ontological gap. 
 One might wonder if this isn’t stacking the deck too heavily in favor of 
emergence. Analytic scrutability is a high burden. However, consider three ways in 
which the paradigm case of emergence – phenomenal consciousness – might turn out 
to be ontologically analytically scrutable from the fundamental facts of physics: 
 (a) It might turn out that the natures of phenomenal properties are already 
present in the fundamental physical things, or that the fundamental things have a 
nature which is both physical and phenomenal. In other words, panpsychism might 
be true. 
 (b) It might turn out that there is a reductive analysis of consciousness in 
fundamental physical terms, though we haven’t found it yet. Once we do find it, 
insofar as we are right in thinking that our concepts align with the natures of 
things, we’ll have reason to think consciousness is ontologically analytic. 
 (c)  It might turn out that, in the case of phenomenal consciousness, our 
concepts for the world simply don’t line up with the true natures of things, and so we 
are unable to understand how the phenomenal is analytic from the physical. 
 On the other hand, consider three ways in which consciousness might turn 
out to be ontologically emergent – two of which are not part of the standard 
conception of emergent consciousness. 
 (d) It might turn out that there is some a priori inscrutable set of conditionals 
which link up conscious properties to their physics basal conditions – that is, 
consciousness might be strongly emergent. 
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 (e) It might turn out that conscious properties are a priori scrutable by an 
ideal reasoner given the basal conditions in physics – even though they aren’t 
scrutable for us – because an ideal reasoner has access to a kind of a priori reasoning 
which justifies the conclusion that something with neurological states like ours is 
conscious. Perhaps this could be something like an extremely powerful version of the 
reasoning which justifies our own belief in other minds. In this case, consciousness 
would be more weakly ontologically emergent. 
 (f) It might turn out that there is a certain perspective or stance such that, 
were an ideal reasoner to see all of the physical facts from it, the ideal reasoner 
would put himself in our shoes, and simulate all of the experiences we are having by 
undergoing them himself – perhaps by rewiring his own brain (or whatever 
subvening base he has for his own consciousness) to match up with our own brains, 
and seeing what happens. This would involve a kind of simulative scrutability of 
consciousness given a knowledge of our brain states – but consciousness would 
nonetheless be ontologically weakly emergent. If there was no analytic way to carry 
out the deduction instead, consciousness would still be weakly ontologically 
emergent. 
 So, it is no challenge to emergentism in the case of consciousness to suggest 
that (e) or (f) might be the case, since both are cases in which ontological emergence 
would be true. Notably, this also opens the door to the possibility of emergence for a 
number of other higher-level phenomena in the world, which are a priori scrutable 
from a microphysical base, but for which the deduction appears to require 
ontologically synthetic premises, much like (e) or (f). Biological functions, for 
example, are arguably more like (e) or (f) than like (b). 
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 Consider that, in some senses of “reducible”, biology, physiology, forestry, 
psychology, sociology, economics, etc., are all reducible to physics – the sense in 
which they are necessitated by physics, ideally a priori deducible from physics, and 
permitting of a functional reduction into physical terms. However, there is also a 
sense in which these fields might not be reducible to physics: it is not likely that 
they can be given a definition in physical terms on the model of (b) on which they 
follow by mere mechanical procedures from the truths of physics. If this is the case, 
some of the distinctive natural kinds in these fields might be considered weakly 
ontologically emergent on my account. This suggests that instead of a one-time event 
in nature which occurs only in the case of consciousness, emergence might be a 
widespread feature of the natural world. 
 In the next three chapters, I will elaborate on this thought that the world is 
full of examples of emergence. Although phenomenal consciousness seems to be the 
most plausible, clear case of emergence, I believe focusing on weaker cases might 
help address the worry that emergentism about phenomenal consciousness is too ad 
hoc to be a satisfying explanation for our experiences.  
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Chapter 5 
THE FAMILIAR SMELL OF EMERGENCE 
§1 Introduction 
 A good explanation has the virtue of applying across a variety of situations, 
not simply the one at hand. An explanation smells fishy when it applies to one 
situation only. “The bulb burnt out” is a better explanation for why the lamp won’t 
turn on than “this lamp has dyslampia”, defined as “the condition which arises if and 
only if it is today and this particular lamp is not functioning.” Dyslampia adds 
nothing; it has no explanatory power. 
 Is ontological emergence a good explanation for consciousness? The 
emergentist295 holds that the mere supervenience of conscious states on physical 
states does not explain consciousness – some further explanation is needed. The 
explanation offered is that consciousness emerges from the physical, yet is not 
identical to it, but has a nature which is something over and above the nature of the 
physical.  
 In this chapter, I will discuss the most historically influential, widely-cited, 
and prima-facie compelling objection to emergentism: the objection of J. J. C. Smart 
(1959) that emergentism fails to mesh with a scientific perspective on the world. 
While Smart’s objection can be interpreted in several ways, its underlying concern is 
                                            
295 “Emergentism” can be applied to a whole range of mutually inconsistent views. 
In this chapter, I will be using “emergentism” to denote only the form which I have 
been defending, a kind of “minimal” emergentism which accepts some form of 
mental-physical supervenience, but maintains a difference in essential nature. 
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that emergentism is an ad hoc explanation which applies to only one case: 
phenomenal consciousness. So long as consciousness has been considered as the only 
plausible case of ontological emergence, Smart’s objection has proven difficult to 
argue against. 
 However, the recent rebirth of emergence as an explanation in the special 
sciences gives us reason to reconsider Smart’s objection. Emergence has become a 
concept with wide explanatory currency across the sciences at many different levels. 
These cases are generally categorized as superficial or “weak emergence”, irrelevant 
to the ontological “strong emergence” alleged to happen in the case of consciousness. 
On the contrary, I believe that philosophers have been too quick to dismiss the use of 
“emergence” in the sciences as a merely epistemic claim. I will argue instead that 
cases of “weak emergence” may equally be cases of ontological emergence: cases 
where the emergent phenomenon has a nature which is over and above that of its 
subvening base.  On my account, there are many things which are ontologically 
emergent in our world, and many kinds of emergence – emergent consciousness is 
only one of them.  
 If it is reasonable to regard cases of weak emergence in the special sciences 
as ontologically significant, then emergence ceases to be an ad hoc explanation for 
consciousness, providing an answer to Smart’s objection. I will not argue in this 
chapter that particular cases of weak emergence in the special sciences are 
reasonably regarded as ontological – I do this elsewhere, in Chapters VI and VII. 
Rather, my task here is to demonstrate how weak emergence might be regarded as 
  284 
ontologically significant, and how regarding it in this way would remove the most 
significant challenge to emergentism generally.296 
 I will begin in section 2 by laying out Smart’s objection to emergent laws. In 
section 3, I will attempt to tie together the so-called “weak” sense of “emergence” 
used in the sciences and the “strong” sense of “emergence” used in debates between 
dualists and physicalists about the mind.297  In section 4, I will give an overview of 
my reasons to think that ontological emergence is a widespread, regular 
phenomenon in nature and that emergence-like explanations are common in the 
special sciences – a case which I will build in more detail in chapters VI and VII. In 
section 5, I will show how these considerations offer a rebuttal to Smart’s objection.  
 §2 Smart’s Objection 
 2.1 Overview  
 Emergentists have traditionally been committed to the existence of “trans-
ordinal laws”298, laws relating low-level physical properties to high-level conscious 
properties. These laws allow us to reliably predict conscious states on the basis of 
                                            
296 Other challenges include concerns about the coherence of emergentism, 
problems involving causal overdetermination and downward causation, and 
objections to drawing metaphysical conclusions from conceptual analysis. I address 
these challenges in chapters II, III, and IV, respectively. 
297 Chalmers (2006) distinguishes “strong” emergence (the notion used in 
philosophy of mind) and “weak” emergence (the notion used in the contemporary 
sciences and complex systems theory), citing Bedau (1997) for the distinction. 
298 Broad (1925), 77-78 
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brain states – to know that activity in one part of the brain indicates that a subject 
is having a certain kind of experience – even though brain states and conscious 
states are not identical. 
 In “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959), Smart observes that laws 
relating high-level to low-level phenomena would be completely unlike the 
fundamental laws which modern physics has discovered. Laws like gravity and 
electro-magnetism are explanatorily simple because they apply equally to objects at 
all levels, rather than relating higher to lower levels. The emergentists forget how 
unprecedented their laws would be in comparison to the laws we know about. They 
would be “nomological danglers.”299 
 Identity theories are simpler and ontologically cheaper than emergent 
theories, and they don’t smell quite so fishy. Identity theories do not require non-
physical natures, and never leave us having to accept consciousness with “natural 
piety.”300 They do not require a complicated backstory for the correlations we observe 
between brains and minds, invoking fundamental laws that link low-level physical 
phenomena with high-level non-physical phenomena.  
 Emergence seems to invoke an entirely novel kind of explanation (emergence) 
for one lonely explanandum (consciousness) and no other. The physicalist recalls 
that emergent vitalism in biology and emergentism in chemistry were long ago 
disproven, and nowhere else in our study of the world have we found the sorts of 
                                            
299 Smart (1959), 144 
300 The expression was famously applied by the early British emergentist Samuel 
Alexander (1920), though it has its origins in Wordsworth’s “The Rainbow.” 
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emergent laws or explanations that we are supposed to accept in the case of 
consciousness. Emergent laws are just plain weird. 
 An immediate reply to Smart’s objection might be that it doesn’t apply to 
emergence with metaphysical necessity. On this interpretation, Smart’s objection 
was historically directed at traditional dualism, in which there were nomologically 
necessary but metaphysically contingent trans-ordinal laws (or “nomological 
danglers”), but doesn’t apply to metaphysically necessary emergence. However, one 
can reformulate Smart’s objection to apply even in the case of metaphysically 
necessary emergence. Consider Hume’s dictum, that there are “no necessary 
connections between distinct essences.” On one interpretation of “distinct essence”, a 
case in which one thing is neither identical to nor grounded in another qualifies it as 
having a distinct essence. On my account, emergentists deny the grounding of 
emergent phenomena in physical phenomena. So, on my account, metaphysically 
necessary emergence would violate Hume’s dictum, where the motivation for 
applying Hume’s dictum is the same as the motivation for Smart’s denial of 
“nomological danglers”: namely, metaphysically necessary physical-phenomenal 
bridge laws which aren’t grounded in physics have a suspicious smell to them, and 
are unlike anything we encounter elsewhere. I will take Smart’s objection to apply 
equally to metaphysically necessary emergence, even if the historical Smart might 
not have been concerned by it. 
 A second immediate reply to Smart’s objection is what we might call the 
weirdness reply. The dualist might say: of course laws linking complex physical 
states to consciousness would be unique, unprecedented, and just plain weird. For 
dualists, consciousness truly is a unique and mysterious thing, something that 
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deserves to be treated as a special case if anything does. But the weirdness reply 
does not go very far. It only reveals the physicalist’s and the dualist’s differing initial 
prejudices about the relative “weirdness” of consciousness. It does nothing to 
assuage the physicalist’s concern about the apparent dissonance between 
emergentism and contemporary science.301  
 Why think emergentism is contrary to contemporary science? In considering 
J. J. C. Smart’s classic work, there seem to be at least four possible interpretations 
of his objection to emergentism: (i) as an application of Occam’s Razor, (ii) as a kind 
of meta-induction of successful reductive explanations elsewhere, (iii) as the 
“nomological danglers” objection that fundamental laws only relate fundamental 
particles, or (iv) as the concern that there is something spooky or suspicious-
smelling about emergent laws. I will lay out each interpretation here. 
2.2 Occam’s Razor: Two Versions 
 Smart writes: 
 
Why do I wish to resist this suggestion? Mainly because of Occam's razor. It 
seems to me that science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby 
                                            
301 For example, the two-dimensional semantics arguments of Chalmers (2010) 
depend on the reader sharing the intuition that zombies are conceptual possibilities 
and consciousness is a very strange phenomenon. While I share these intuitions 
myself, I worry about making them the basis of an argument for an ontological 
difference, when many people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) report not 
having these intuitions. 
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organisms are able to be seen as physicochemical mechanisms: it seems that 
even the behavior of man himself will one day be explicable in mechanistic 
terms. There does seem to be, so far as science is concerned, nothing in the 
world but increasingly complex arrangements of physical constituents. All 
except for one place: in consciousness. 302 
 
 The emergentist claims that emergent phenomena have a different essential 
nature than physical phenomena do. But the emergentist also acknowledges that 
emergent phenomena are entirely dependent upon their physical bases, that they 
can be manipulated through changes in their physical bases, and that they cannot 
be manipulated through any means without producing changes in their physical 
bases. In some sense303, emergent phenomena are necessitated by their physical 
bases, and they supervene upon their physical bases. If the emergentist is willing to 
accept all of this, then why make the further claim that emergents are, as an 
ontological matter, a different kind of thing entirely from their physical base? Why 
admit a new category into our ontology – the immaterial psyche – when everything 
else in the world (including human behavior) can be described successfully in a 
purely mechanical and physical manner? 
                                            
302 Smart (1959), 142 
303 Which sense of necessitated and thus of supervenes upon the emergentist 
should use is disputed (see Chapter 2), but the sort of emergentism I defend in this 
chapter is meant to be compatible with metaphysical necessity. 
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 Occam’s razor advises us not to multiply entities beyond what is necessary to 
give a sufficient explanation of the phenomena we experience. One way to interpret 
Smart’s use of Occam’s razor would be that he advocates this principle: 
 
(OR1) If there are two theories of some phenomenon which provide the 
same304  explanatory power, then, all other things being equal, we should 
prefer the theory which entails the fewest commitments to novel properties or 
entities not occurring in our other theories. 
 
 The consequent of (OR1) conflicts with the emergentist’s commitment to the 
ontological novelty of emergent properties or entities. Of course, there is room for 
the emergentist to debate the antecedent of (OR1). To have equal explanatory power, 
two theories must be equivalent under rational consideration, not merely 
verificationally equivalent (i.e., equivalent with respect to all empirical tests). The 
emergentist will hold that emergence does provide more explanatory power than 
physicalism: the ontological gap explains why there is an explanatory gap. The 
emergentist and the physicalist are thus locked into in a debate over the antecedent 
of (OR1).305 The physicalist’s position is enhanced by the success of physicalist 
                                            
304 I assume that in the case Emergentism provides less explanatory power and 
more commitment to novelty, we should not prefer it over physicalism; (OR1) applies 
in the case where Emergentism provides equal explanatory power. 
305 An emergentist might also reject the consequent of (OR1), but this seems like a 
weak move to me, and I will not explore this option further. 
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explanations for previously mysterious phenomena: the triumph over vitalism, for 
example. 
 Suppose that a physicalist does not accept that non-empirical considerations, 
or considerations about the “natures” or “essences” of things, should be relevant to 
theory choice. One should recognize that this as form of anti-essentialist 
physicalism.306 The anti-essentialist physicalist cannot appeal to principle (OR1). 
For the anti-essentialist, if two theories make the same predictions with respect to 
all empirical tests – if they are verificationally equivalent – then we should remain 
neutral and follow a principle of tolerance with respect to the entities and properties 
invoked by each. Which theory we adopt in this case becomes a matter of convention. 
Occam’s razor could alternatively be understood as: 
 
(OR2) If there are two theories of some phenomenon which are 
verificationally equivalent, then, all other things being equal, we should 
                                            
306 I understand physicalism proper to be committed to the claim that all real 
concreta have a wholly physical nature, whereas anti-essentialist physicalism is a 
view about the empirical adequacy of physics (perhaps in an idealized future) for 
generating the truth values of statements. Emergentism for anti-essentialists is the 
view that some sentences – those about qualia – have a truth value, and yet are not 
analytically derivable from any set of sentences in micro-physics. An essentialist 
makes the further inference from this that qualia have a non-physical nature.  
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prefer the theory whose explanations are most congruent with those used in 
our other theories.307 
 
 Here, the consequent of (OR2) offers a suggestion for how to decide between 
verificationally equivalent theories: congruence with other theories which are 
already in use. Suppose that physicalism is congruent with the purely mechanistic 
explanations utilized in our other scientific theories, whereas emergentism proposes 
a new type of explanation (emergence). Physicalism seems not to require the same 
drastic mutilations to our interconnected beliefs that emergentism seems to require, 
and so it is the preferable theory.  
 For what it’s worth, J. J. C. Smart was no verificationist. His identification of 
sensations and brain processes was a full-fledged metaphysical claim in the 
“Australian” tradition: a sensation by nature is nothing over and above what a brain 
process is by nature.308 Smart endorsed the essentialist version (OR1) rather than 
the anti-essentialist version (OR2) of Occam’s razor: 
 
If it be agreed that there are no cogent philosophical arguments which force 
us into accepting dualism, and if the brain processes theory and dualism are 
equally consistent with the facts, then the principles of parsimony and 
                                            
307 This is more of a principle of Conservativism than the traditional form of 
Occam’s Razor. 
308 See Polger (2011) 
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simplicity seem to me to decide overwhelmingly in favor of the brain-process 
theory.309 
 
 Thus, Smart’s own view was clearly aligned with (OR1), under which the 
emergentist’s task is to demonstrate that emergentism has greater explanatory 
power than physicalism, but “explanatory power” is understood to include rational 
considerations (“cogent philosophical arguments”), not simply empirical ones. A 
philosopher who holds that the only “explanatory power” relevant to Occam’s razor 
is the power to predict empirical data must align with version (OR2) instead, on 
which the emergentist’s task becomes showing that emergentism is more congruent 
with our existing theories of the world than a mechanistic theory. 
2.3  Meta-Induction 
 Smart continues: 
 
So, sensations, states of consciousness, do seem to be the one sort of thing left 
outside the physicalist picture, and for various reasons I just cannot believe 
that this can be so. That everything should be explicable in terms of physics 
(together of course with descriptions of the ways in which the parts are put 
together-roughly, biology is to physics as radio-engineering is to 
electromagnetism) except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be 
frankly unbelievable.310 
                                            
309 Smart (1959), 156 
310 ibid. 
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 While we may not have a sufficient explanation of consciousness in physical 
terms, we may have reason enough to believe that such an explanation in principle 
exists. We have a physicalist portrait of the world, and nearly all of the canvas has 
been filled in. At this point, we have reason to expect the blank spots left on the 
canvas will also be filled in with explanations from physics. We can perform a kind 
of meta-induction: in a universe in which we are continually finding satisfying 
physical explanations for a host of phenomena, where fields like chemistry and 
biology are reducible to physics, why should consciousness be the lone exception? 
Even if we don’t have such explanations yet, we have reason to think that we will 
one day get them. Smart might be understood as adopting this principle: 
 
(MI) If there is some property that many of our established theories have and 
not many lack, then when considering non-established theories, we have a 
reason to prefer a theory which has that property over a competing theory 
which lacks it. 
 
 The physicalist will argue that many of our established theories of the world 
have the property of being either theories of physics or theories which are in 
principle fully explicable in the terms of physics. Emergentism is a theory which is 
not even in principle fully explicable in terms of physics. So, we have a reason to 
prefer competing physicalist theories over it. 
 If we find it a challenge to understand how physical structures could ever 
give a satisfying explanation of consciousness, why appeal to emergence for the 
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answer – as opposed to our own ignorance? Perhaps the simplest explanation of why 
any possible explanation of consciousness in physical terms seems inevitably 
unsatisfying isn’t something in the world but something in us: perhaps we suffer 
from some epistemic limitation or cognitive defect.  
 On this reading, the emergentist’s task is to show that many of our well-
established theories are not explicable in terms of fundamental physics, and that the 
physicalist portrait of the world is inaccurate. 
2.4  Nomological Danglers  
 
Such sensations would be "nomological danglers," to use Feigl's expression. It 
is not often realized how odd would be the laws whereby these nomological 
danglers would dangle. It is sometimes asked, "Why can't there be psycho-
physical laws which are of a novel sort, just as the laws of electricity and 
magnetism were novelties from the standpoint of Newtonian mechanics?" 
Certainly we are pretty sure in the future to come across new ultimate laws 
of a novel type, but I expect them to relate simple constituents: for example, 
whatever ultimate particles are then in vogue. 
 I cannot believe that ultimate laws of nature could relate simple 
constituents to configurations consisting of perhaps billions of neurons (and 
goodness knows how many billion billions of ultimate particles) all put 
together for all the world as though their main purpose in life was to be a 
negative feedback mechanism of a complicated sort. 311 
                                            
311 ibid., 142-143 
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 Smart’s article is often remembered for his use of Feigl’s expression, 
“nomological danglers”, as an objection that fundamental emergent laws seem out of 
place when compared with the fundamental laws of physics. The objection is not that 
all laws in the sciences must be like those of fundamental physics, relating simple 
constituents. Certainly there are well-established laws of economics and sociology 
which do not relate particles to one another. There are also plenty of laws that 
operate between higher and lower levels: there are predictable relationships 
between heightened expectations, economic reversals, and political revolutions.312 
Smart’s objection can’t mean that fundamental laws only operate at the 
fundamental level: the laws of gravity work as well for planets as for particles. It 
also can’t mean that all fundamental laws must be general and operating at all 
levels: while gravity and electro-magnetism operate at all levels, the strong force 
operates only between quarks within the nucleus of an atom.313 Instead, I interpret 
Smart as advocating a principle like this: 
 
(ND) We should only accept laws which either (i) are fundamental, relate 
fundamental particles to fundamental particles, or relate higher-level objects 
only through relating fundamental particles to other fundamental particles, 
or (ii) are non-fundamental and fully explicable in terms of the laws in (i). 
                                            
312 This is commonly known as the “J-Curve” theory of revolutions. See Davies, J. 
C. (1962) 
313 See “strong force”, Encyclopædia Britannica Online Academic Edition (2013) 
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 Gravity and electro-magnetism, like the laws relating the strong force within 
an atom, relate fundamental particles to other fundamental particles. Gravity and 
electro-magnetism also relate non-fundamentals, but only in virtue of relating the 
fundamentals of which those non-fundamentals are composed. There are a 
plentitude of laws which do not relate fundamental particles, like the laws that 
enable predictions about chemical reactions, the weather, birth rates, extinctions, 
voting behaviors, and how much poison it takes to kill a rat. But these laws aren’t 
supposed to be fundamental, or inexplicable in physical terms even in principle. In 
contrast, the laws of the emergence of consciousness are supposed both to be 
fundamental and to relate fundamental particles to complex wholes without relating 
fundamental particles to other fundamental particles.  
 The emergentist’s task, then is to argue that (ND) should be rejected, because 
many of the laws we rightly accept fail to meet either condition (i) or (ii).314 
2.5  A “Queer Smell”  
 Recall that many of the early British emergentists could have resisted (OR1), 
(OR2), (MI), and (ND).315 C. D. Broad believed the emergence of consciousness was 
                                            
314 The emergentist could also make an appeal for the case of consciousness to 
violate condition (i), a version of the “weirdness reply” mentioned earlier. 
315 The British Emergentists could also have more easily resisted the antecedent 
of (OR1) and (OR2), since on their view there were novel emergent forces which 
interacted with lower forces, with the result that they made distinct empirical 
claims from the non-reductive physicalist, and hence could hold out hope for the 
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not the only case of emergence, since he accepted emergent vitalism in biology and 
entertained the possibility that chemistry was emergent.316 Emergence about 
consciousness already fit well with their other theories about the world. There were 
enough possible exceptions to mechanism at the time to block the meta-induction. 
They had no reason to think fundamental laws couldn’t relate non-fundamentals. 
Soon after emergence about chemistry and emergent vitalism were disproven, 
emergence about consciousness went into hibernation.  
 A physicalist may see a lesson for emergentists here. Even if an emergentist 
could develop an account of the world on which emergentism about consciousness 
didn’t conflict with our existing scientific accounts of the world, but in fact was in 
harmony with them – blocking the arguments in (OR1), (OR2), (MI), and (ND) – 
even still there would remain something suspicious about emergentism. Smart 
writes: 
 
Such ultimate laws would be like nothing so far known in science. They have 
a queer "smell" to them. I am just unable to believe in the nomological 
danglers themselves, or in the laws whereby they would dangle. If any 
philosophical arguments seemed to compel us to believe in such things, I 
would suspect a catch in the argument. 317 
                                                                                                                                  
empirical verification of their theory. As discussed earlier, the brand of emergentism 
I am defending does not advocate for the existence of novel emergent forces. 
316 Broad (1925), 72-79 
317 ibid., 143 
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 Smart’s objection could be rephrased as this principle: 
 
(QS) Given any argument for a theory which requires the existence of non-
physical properties, it will always be more likely that there is an error in the 
argument (a false premise, or an invalid move) than it will be that the 
conclusion is true. 
 
 Whereas the prior objections did not presuppose physicalism, objection (QS) 
does presuppose physicalism. Objection (QS) is the other side of the coin to the 
dualist’s weirdness reply that consciousness is just plain weird and no physical 
account (no matter how moderate or non-reductive) will ever be weird enough to 
explain it. The physicalist may intuitively link up “non-physical properties” with 
mental images of haunted houses and horror movies. For a physicalist of any stripe, 
any dualist explanation is just plain weird (no matter how moderate or pro-
supervenience), and no phenomenon will ever be weird enough to justify believing in 
it. Like the dualist’s “weirdness reply”, the “queer smell” objection does little more 
than emphasize the differing initial prejudices of the physicalist and the dualist. The 
physicalist thinks dualism smells funny; the dualist thinks, that’s just how 
consciousness smells. This may be an unbridgeable difference in philosophy, but it is 
not a philosophical debate. 
 However, by relating the use of “emergence” in the sciences to the ontological 
claims made by emergentists in the philosophy of mind, the emergentist may gain 
some ground against (QS). The emergentist can paint a picture on which nature is a 
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place where one should expect surprises: against the background of widespread 
emergence, emergent consciousness should smell familiar, not spooky. 
 In the next section, I will attempt to tie together the ‘strong’ sense of 
emergence, which holds for consciousness, and the ‘weak’ sense of emergence, which 
is supposed to hold for a variety of phenomena in the special sciences. I will begin 
with the case of consciousness. 
§3 Varieties of Emergence 
3.1 Ontological Emergence and Consciousness 
 According to the emergentist, phenomenal consciousness is entirely 
dependent upon its subvening physical base for its existence, but nonetheless has an 
essential nature which is something “over and above” the nature of its physical base. 
Conscious experiences arise from brain states in a law-like way, enabling empirical 
predictions about conscious states on the basis of neurology. We can predict, for 
example, that a certain drug will interact with a patient’s brain in such a way as to 
ease that patient’s experience of pain. However, the emergentist holds that the 
relation between the mind and the brain is ontologically and explanatorily 
fundamental. The correlations are not something any of us could have deduced a 
priori, given only knowledge of what it is to be a brain with a particular structure, 
and what it is to be a mind undergoing a certain experience. Empirical study was 
required for us to learn these correlations between changes in the brain and the 
experience of the easing of pain.  
 A non-reductive physicalist might accept that there can be no a priori 
deducibility of conscious states from brain states, but hold that this “epistemic gap” 
is not ontologically significant. On this view, given our limited cognitive resources, 
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the identities between experiences and brain states are knowable by us only a 
posteriori; nonetheless, token experiences are identical to token brain states. The 
emergentist dualist concludes from the epistemic gap that there is an ontological gap 
as well: experiences and brain states are not identical. While experiences supervene 
upon complex physical states, what it is to be an experience is not the same thing as 
what it is to be a complex physical state.  
 Notice that the non-reductive physicalist and the emergentist dualist both 
accept some form of supervenience and at the same time accept a kind of “epistemic 
gap”.318 They differ on the ontological significance of supervenience and of the gap. 
In contrast, the reductive physicalist rejects the epistemic gap, and the substance 
dualist rejects any form of supervenience. 
3.2 Not that Innocent 
 Traditionally, “Ontological Emergence” is applied only to the case of 
consciousness above. While it is widely acknowledged that the concept of 
“emergence” has a place in scientific discussions (for example, in the science of 
complexity), this sense of “emergence” is widely held to be ontologically innocent.  
Mark Bedau (1997) writes:  
 
                                            
318 This statement holds true only as I have defined each position for the purposes 
of this chapter. There are emergentist dualists who deny supervenience, like Hasker 
(1999). According to Stoljar (2009), many non-reductive physicalists prior to Smart 
(1959) relied on a more restrictive notion of reduction, which did not explicitly 
address the issue of a priori deducibility. 
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An innocent form of emergence – what I call “weak emergence” – is now a 
commonplace in a thriving interdisciplinary nexus of scientific activity – 
sometimes called the “sciences of complexity” – that include connectionist 
modeling, non-linear dynamics (popularly known as the “chaos” theory), and 
artificial life. 319 
 
 The distinction between weak emergence and strong emergence has been 
drawn in a variety of ways320, but, generally, “weak emergence” is supposed to 
capture those cases in which some form of deduction of high-level facts from low-
level facts is in principle possible, but would be surprising or difficult321, and “strong 
emergence” is supposed to capture any mysterious cases in which no deduction of 
high-level facts from low-level facts is possible, even in principle.  
 Notice that these definitions are in epistemic rather than ontological terms. 
Strong emergence might not be ontological emergence (as a non-reductive 
physicalist might hold). Likewise, weak emergence might qualify as ontological 
emergence, not merely a reflection of our epistemic limitations. Consider the 
following options presented in Table 3: 
 
 
 
                                            
319 Bedau (1997), 375 
320 See Chapter 1. Also see Chalmers (2006) and Bedau (2008). 
321 e.g., perhaps possible only through simulation – see Bedau (2008) 
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Table 3 
Reduction and Deduction 
 A priori 
deducibility by pure 
analysis 
A priori 
deducibility by 
synthetic bridge 
A Posteriori 
deducibility only 
Ontological 
Reducibility 
(A) Analytic 
Reducibility 
(B) Epistemic Weak 
Emergence 
(C) Epistemic 
Strong Emergence 
No Ontological 
Reducibility 
X (D) Ontological 
Weak Emergence 
(E) Ontological 
Strong Emergence 
 
 A reductivist physicalist might hold that consciousness is an instance of case 
(A).322 The non-reductive physicalist holds that consciousness is an instance of case 
(C), and the emergentist dualist holds that consciousness is instead an instance of 
case (E).  
 I wish to argue that many of the cases currently categorized as (B) ought to 
be categorized as cases of (D). That is,  I advocate for a kind of ontological weak 
emergence, where some high-level phenomena have a distinct nature from lower-
level phenomena, even though they are deducible from the lower level phenomena. 
This includes forms of emergence found in complexity science and in the special 
sciences. On my view, weak emergence may not be so ontologically innocent after all. 
 
 
 
                                            
322 Arguably, many reductive physicalists actually hold that consciousness is 
really an instance of case (B), insofar as they view the reduction as requiring 
something less than a Nagel-style theory reduction on the Deductive-Nomological 
model. 
  303 
3.3 Deducibility and Ontology 
 Why do I think we should take weak emergence to indicate an “ontological 
gap”? Understanding the answer requires understanding the relationship between 
ontology and the epistemic test of a priori deducibility. 
 In the last chapter323, I discussed the use of epistemic, a priori deducibility as 
a criterion for drawing ontological conclusions about whether the nature of one thing 
is wholly contained in the other. I argued that the emergentist need not be 
committed to the view associated with Chalmers and Jackson’s interpretation of 
two-dimensional semantics324 that the ideal a priori deducibility or non-deducibility 
of one set of concepts from another, if performed correctly, offers a guide to the 
necessitation or non-necessitation of one set of properties from another. Instead, I 
argued that the better question to ask is not whether A is deducible from B a priori, 
but rather one of what resources would have to be a priori for a reasoner to make the 
deduction of A from B. 
 I worked under the assumption that the “essential nature” of a thing is 
something like a “real definition” of the thing – a relation between it and the set of 
properties in virtue of which it has the identity it has. This is different from the 
more conventional account on which the “essential nature” of a thing is only a 
                                            
323 See Chapter 4, “Cosmic Hermeneutics” 
324 See Chalmers, D. and Jackson F. (2001). For a case against this use of two-
dimensional semantics, see Soames (2005). For the purposes of this chapter, I will 
remain neutral on the issue. 
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collection of its modal properties.325 For example, Kit Fine (2004) holds that Socrates 
is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel tower, but on his “real definition” account it is 
not an essential property of Socrates that he be distinct from the Eiffel tower. The 
merit of Fine’s approach is that it explains why we should take a priori deducibility 
to indicate anything about ontology at all: if our concepts accurately reflect the true 
natures of things, then a deduction of one concept from another through analysis 
alone indicates that the nature of the one thing is contained in the other. 
 Under this assumption, I defended a specialized, ontological sense of 
synthetic and analytic pairs of propositions – not conceptual analyticity, or 
analyticity relative to some language like English, but rather a matter of whether 
the “real definition” of one thing is wholly contained in the other.326 Thus, while it is 
synthetic in English that “H2O = Water” is true, and conceptually a posteriori,327 it 
is ontologically analytic that water is H2O.328  If one thing is “nothing over and 
                                            
325 Robertson, Teresa, (2008). I adopt Fine’s account in Chapter 2, because it is 
helpful to get out of the objection that emergence with necessary supervenience is 
incoherent. 
326 “Consider of what would be analytic or synthetic were objects and properties to 
represent themselves, and the essences of things to be identical to analytic 
definitions in the language – or else, a language used by an ideal reasoner in a one-
to-one correspondence to such a language. There is no reason to think any real 
language capable of fitting the bill.” (Chapter 4, section 7.2). 
327 Putnam, H. (1975) 
328 This is just to say that H2O = H2O. 
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above” another, it is ontologically analytic given it; if one thing is “something over 
and above” another, it is only derivable from it given ontologically synthetic bridge 
statements.329 
 Consider what follows from this approach. It follows that we should regard a 
phenomenon as ontologically emergent – as having a nature which includes 
something “over and above” that of its supervenience base – if and only if it is 
ontologically synthetic given its subvening base.  
 An ontologically emergent phenomenon may be deducible a priori from its 
subvening base, provided that even for an ideal reasoner the deduction would 
involve an ontologically synthetic a priori bridge law; a merely-epistemically 
emergent phenomenon may fail to be deducible a priori from its subvening base for 
an ideal reasoner who lacks access to some a posteriori (but ontologically analytic) 
identity. 
 So, the question of whether or not a phenomenon is ontologically emergent is 
not to be answered by considering whether or not it is deducible a priori from a 
supervenience base that necessitates it. After all, were an ideal reasoner given all of 
                                            
329 Thus, Laplace held that every past and future fact was necessitated by the 
present facts, but not that it was ontologically analytic; a monist holds that all of the 
particular facts are ontologically analytic given the fact about the cosmos as a whole. 
The essential properties of the fundamental particles in one part of the world are 
ontologically synthetic given the essential properties of some other fundamental 
particles in some other part of the world for the most part, except in special cases 
involving entangled electrons. 
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the necessary truths as axioms, it would become deducible quite easily, as Kim 
(2010) notes.330  The epistemic question of ideal a priori deducibility is relevant to 
this ontological question only insofar as: (i) we have epistemic access to the whole 
natures of both phenomena331, and (ii) we limit the tools in the ideal reasoner’s a 
priori deduction to analytic moves. We should ask: what cognitive resources or 
inferential abilities would have to be a priori for the ideal reasoner to perform the 
deduction? 
 If an ideal reasoner could perform the deduction given only ontologically 
analytic truths, the phenomenon is not ontologically emergent; if an ideal reasoner 
could only perform the deduction if ontologically synthetic premises were made a 
priori for that reasoner, then the phenomenon is ontologically emergent. Thus, even 
if it were a priori for a very powerful reasoner looking at a bundle of firing neurons 
to conclude that an experience of a certain sort was going on, the ideal reasoner’s 
deduction would involve something more than mere analysis. 
 Suppose that a phenomenon is deducible a priori only by simulation, not by 
analysis, as Mark Bedau (2008) has argued is the case for the “weakly emergent” 
                                            
330 See Kim (2010), 85-104; for my response, see Chapter 2. 
331 e.g., in the case of a posteriori necessities, like the identity of water and H2O, 
condition (i) fails for those living in the age prior to the discovery that water is H2O 
– they did not have access to the whole nature of water, and so did not know that it 
was in fact H2O.  In some cases, a phenomenon which truly is nothing over and 
above another may be “emergent” for us in the epistemic sense only because 
condition (i) does not hold, and so it does not qualify as ontologically emergent. 
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phenomena studied in complexity science. Or, suppose that a normative or 
teleological property can be deduced a priori from a descriptive one, but only by a 
kind of perspective-taking332: as is the case with functional explanations in biology 
and collective behavior in sociology.333 On the account I’ve offered, these “weakly 
emergent” phenomena will qualify as ontologically emergent.  
 In most discussions of “weak emergence”, no distinction has been made 
between ontologically analytic and ontologically synthetic a priori transitions. This 
has resulted in a false sense of confidence that a phenomenon which we suspect to 
be ideally a priori deducible from another (since we so clearly “see” how the one 
necessitates the other) must therefore be ontologically reducible. 
 3.4  Emergence as a Spectrum 
 But how do we distinguish the emergence of consciousness from cases of 
ontological weak emergence? For, even if there are “weakly emergent” phenomena 
which are also ontologically emergent – patterns of waves in the ocean, for instance 
– it is not clear that they should be thought of as emergent in the same way that 
consciousness is supposed to be. The way in which consciousness emerges from brain 
states seems much more striking, or “stronger”, than the “weaker” way in which 
patterns of waves in the ocean emerge. How are we to distinguish them, if not by 
calling one ontological and insisting the other is merely epistemic? 
                                            
332 i.e., if a phenomenon can be deduced a priori from behavioral facts only by 
means of an intentional stance and not by analysis, then the phenomenon is 
ontologically synthetic given the behavioral facts, not reducible to them. 
333 See Chapters VI and VII 
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 Consider that an emergent phenomenon is supposed to be a “genuine 
novelty”: there is something in the nature of the emergent phenomenon which is not 
contained in the nature of its supervenience base.  We could take the relative 
complement of the base’s nature in the emergent’s nature: the set of all elements in 
the nature of the emergent but not in the nature of the base. Call the result the 
“novelty” of the emergent phenomenon, the part of its nature not contained in the 
nature of its basal conditions.334 
 The relationship between consciousness and the brain is different from the 
relationship between patterns of waves and the water in the ocean.335 If the wave is 
                                            
334 Suppose that a murder is by nature an unjustified intentional killing. Let P be 
a complete physical description of a killing K and the brain states and social states 
surrounding it, and M be the murder corresponding to K. M supervenes upon P.  Let 
J be the fact that K was unjustified, which also supervenes upon P; and let I be the 
fact that K was intentional, which also supervenes upon P. The nature of M = <P, J, 
I>. The relative complement of P in M contains the unique elements J and I. So, “J” 
and “I” are the novelty of M, where M emerges from P. 
335 One might propose instead that the difference is all in the head: something 
like the subjective sense of surprise each causes in a scientific researcher (Ronald, 
et. al. (2008)), or the difficulty of predicting or explaining them in a way our minds 
can easily comprehend. But, like most psychologistic proposals, this raises more 
questions than it answers. Scientists don’t get surprised just because they’re feeling 
playful – what about the phenomenon makes it surprising? A phenomenon which is 
difficult to deduce and predict on a given basis is difficult for some reason.  
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emergent, then its nature is almost but not entirely contained in the nature of the 
water, for the same wave could not be realized by substance too physically different 
from water; but an emergentist holds that the nature of consciousness is very 
different from the nature of the brain, and that it could be realized by a substance 
physically very different from the brain.  
 I suggest that we consider the various elements in the nature of a 
phenomenon as weighted – that some hold a kind of ontological priority336 over the 
others, as more integral to its identity than others. This “weighting” might be 
understood as analogous to David Lewis’s notion of counterpart relations. Suppose 
that A and B are both essential properties of S. We might ask this: given a world in 
which some object had A but not B, and another object had B but not A, which would 
be S?337 Alternatively, we might ask: given world w-B in which the closest 
counterpart338 of  S lacks B, and world w-A  in which the closest counterpart of  S acks 
A, ceteris paribus, which world is closer to the actual world, w-A  or w-B ?339 
                                            
336 I have in mind here Fine (1995) 
337 Of course, I hardly mean to suggest that my view commits one to a counterpart 
theory of identity across worlds, as opposed to accepting true trans-world identity. I 
only mean that the notion of weighting the relevance of various essential properties 
to the trans-world identity of an individual should not be seen as outlandish. 
338 Accepting that, since both B and A are essential to S, S exists in neither world. 
339 These two accounts may give different results. I am not offering a complete 
theory of how to determine the weight of a particular essential property relative to 
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 What would determine the answer to a question like this? What would one 
essential property more significant to the identity of a thing than another essential 
property? We ought to find the answer in the explanatory burden carried by the 
property. Consider what it is that a pattern of waves in the ocean explains. Most of 
what is explained by a pattern of waves in the ocean is explained by virtue of its 
having the essential property, being composed of water. Being composed of water is 
very important to the explanations that pattern of waves in the ocean enters into. 
On the other hand, the property of instantiating such-and-such an emergent pattern 
has only a small part in these same explanations. It carries less of the explanatory 
burden than being composed of water: a different pattern in the same water might 
figure in similar explanations. Contrast this with being this conscious experience 
and being realized as this brain state. For most of the explanations which my 
thought enters into, being conscious is far more important than being a brain state. 
Very little explanatory burden is carried by my thought’s being this brain state. In a 
world in which a similar phenomenal experience occurred without the brain state 
(say, in a silicon chip) and a similar brain state occurred without similar 
phenomenology, the counterpart of my thought would be the experience in the 
silicon chip, not the brain state. 
 So, in principle, an ideal reasoner might calculate the ratio between the 
novelty of an emergent phenomenon and its nature as a whole. This ratio would 
allow the ideal reasoner a method of differentiating varieties of emergence on the 
                                                                                                                                  
others, only a sketch of how it might be done, to make the notion of such a 
“weighting” more intuitive. 
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spectrum: a “weaker” form of emergence is one where the novelty is a smaller 
proportion of its whole nature, and a “stronger” form of emergence is one where the 
novelty is a greater proportion of its whole nature. In this sense, consciousness 
might be said to be a stronger form of emergence than patterns of waves in the 
ocean, even though both may qualify as ontological.340 
 Of course, I don’t think it is possible that anyone could quantify over natures 
in this manner. There are too many vague cases, and the relationship between our 
concepts and the natures of things is too uncertain. However, there may be clear 
cases – like the difference between the emergence of consciousness and the 
emergence of a wave – where the framework I have given allows a principled way to 
distinguish “stronger” and “weaker” forms of ontological emergence. 
 To summarize, the clarity of the emergentist’s ontological claim has suffered 
greatly from identification with an epistemic question – whether a phenomenon is or 
isn’t a priori deducible or predictable on the basis of a knowledge of its subvening 
base. Because it’s plausible that all of the phenomena in the world besides the mind 
(normative or otherwise) are a priori deducible at least in principle from a 
knowledge of their physical constituents (apart from the odd cases of a posteriori 
necessities), ontological emergence has been reserved for the mind – a novel case of 
the emergence of novelty. However, as I will discuss in the next section, I believe 
there is a sense of “emergence” which applies to whole host of phenomena at many 
different levels of the cosmos. Far from having a “queer smell”, novel trans-ordinal 
                                            
340 The use of “weaker” and “stronger” here do not match up with the distinction 
between “strong emergence” and “weak emergence” offered earlier. 
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laws should strike us as a familiar part of nature.  The real world is a jungle of 
nomological danglers, and the special sciences are teeming with entities whose 
natures are not fully exhausted by an account of their physical composition.  
Emergence at lower levels of nature is not so dramatic as is the case of 
consciousness. But it establishes a pervasive pattern: a backdrop against which the 
emergence of consciousness fits especially well. 
§4. Instances of Ontological Weak Emergence 
 So, do we have any reason to think that cases of ontological weak emergence 
actually occur? Are there genuine cases, apart from phenomenal consciousness, 
where it is plausible that a phenomenon is ontologically synthetic given its 
subvening base? I will give a preview in this section of why weak emergence might 
apply to a wide array of phenomena. 
 Examples of phenomena which have been called “weakly emergent” include: 
the behaviors of cellular automata341 and other “Artificial life”342 phenomena in the 
computational sciences; the waves in sand dunes or bodies of water, the formations 
of schools of fish, and the mounds constructed by termites343; biological functions and 
norms of success and failure; and the relationship between micro-level and macro-
level behavior in sociology344, especially collective social entities and kinds345. While 
                                            
341 Bedau (2008), 162 
342 Assad and Packard (1992), 231 
343 Crutchfield (2008), 269 
344 Sawyer (2001) 
345 Blau (1977, 1981); Bhaskar (1982); Archer (1995); 
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all of these phenomena unquestionably supervene upon their respective underlying 
physical phenomena, they cannot be deduced by mere analysis from it. 
 All of these examples have something interesting in common: they are all 
cases where some normative property helps define what the emergent phenomenon 
is. The normative properties in the world are not limited to the sort discussed in 
meta-ethics. A normative property is one which relates some actual-world state of 
affairs to some non-arbitrary possible state of affairs. Norms need not have 
prescriptive or moral force to qualify as norms. For example, a computational 
pattern – or a pattern of waves in the ocean – is a normative property which relates 
the actual output of the computer simulation to some possible way in which the 
simulation “ought” to go in order to keep its pattern. A biological function or role is a 
normative property which relates what an organ or organism actually does to what 
it “should” do (in a weak sense of should). A natural grouping, whether a species or a 
social group, marks off non-arbitrary boundaries in order to create a whole that is 
more than the sum of its parts. When an abstract mathematical function is applied 
to a concrete situation – like a macro-economic formula – the actual world is being 
compared to how the model says things ought to go. The special sciences would be 
impossible without natural norms of this sort. 
 Weakly emergent properties have some normative aspect to their nature 
which is not present in their subvening base. This is why they are deducible a priori 
from their base, but not by analysis. Normative properties are widely acknowledged 
to be synthetic – one can’t derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. They are widely held to be a 
priori. Within meta-ethics, this recognition has lead G. E. Moore and others to 
accept a kind of non-naturalism about ethical properties: these properties supervene 
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on the natural, but they have a different nature than the natural. I believe a similar 
view should be taken towards natural norms: they supervene upon the physical, but 
the normative aspect of their nature is not present in physics. 
 The alternative – a kind of anti-realism about natural norms – should not be 
taken lightly. Researchers from biology to sociology do not think they are inventing 
“patterns” or “functions” or “groupings” as convenient fictions. They do not believe 
they are reifying projections of their own psychology, but that these normative 
“patterns” and “groupings” and “functions” are real phenomena which their research 
endeavors to describe. They are ineliminable from theories which explain and 
predict their data. 
 Of course, at least in principle, cases of weak emergence are explanatorily 
reducible to their subvening base. But, insofar as they are genuinely normative, they 
should not be regarded as ontologically reducible: there is some sense in which even 
the pattern of waves is something over and above the water that composes it. 
 Thus, ontological emergence provides a plausible account of how complex 
phenomena across a wide variety of fields of inquiry can supervene upon some set of 
basal conditions and yet qualify as something “over and above” these conditions, or a 
“genuine novelty” which is not wholly contained in the nature of its subvening base.  
 I will provide further argumentation in Chapters VI and VII for the 
regarding weak emergence as pervasive and ontologically significant. However, for 
the remainder of this chapter, I would like to focus on how ontological weak 
emergence – if I am correct about it – could provide a response to the concerns raised 
in Smart’s original objection. 
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§5. Reply to Smart 
5.1  Escaping Occam’s Razor 
 Consider, then, the two objections which we earlier labeled (OR1) and (OR2): 
 
(OR1) If there are two theories of some phenomenon which provide the same 
amount of explanatory power, then, all other things being equal, we should 
prefer the theory which entails the fewest commitments to novel properties or 
entities not occurring in our other theories. 
 
(OR2) If there are two theories of some phenomenon which provide the same 
amount of explanatory power, then, all other things being equal, we should 
prefer the theory whose explanations are most congruent with those used in 
our other theories. 
 
 To reply to (OR1), the emergentist has the task of defending the view that 
emergence has more explanatory power than non-reductive physicalism. If 
emergence would help explain a vast array of phenomena to varying degrees, then 
emergence may in fact have more explanatory power. Consider that emergence does 
not conflict with any of the explanatory power of physics, since the sort of emergence 
I have been arguing for accepts supervenience and denies emergent forces. Consider 
also that the non-reductive physicalist seems likely to accept that many of the 
phenomena which I am calling emergent are, at the very least, not theoretically 
reducible. The non-reductive physicalist has the burden of explaining why, even 
though our theories of higher-level phenomena are not reducible to our theories of 
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lower-level phenomena, nonetheless we ought to regard the natures of higher-level 
phenomena as in principle derivable from the natures of lower-level phenomena 
using analytic intermediary premises which we have no access to. The non-reductive 
physicalist needs a physicalistically-acceptable explanation of why the 
supervenience occurs but the reduction doesn’t.  
 The emergentist can explain the lack of reduction as one case of many in the 
natural world where a higher-level phenomenon has a distinct nature from the 
lower-level phenomena which it supervenes upon.  By relating a variety of 
phenomena, instead of just one, emergence becomes less ad hoc and more powerful 
as an explanation. Of course, emergence admits a larger ontology than physicalism, 
but this is a move justified in exchange for other theoretical virtues. 
 Of course, these are purely rational considerations. Emergentism admittedly 
makes the same predictions with respect to all possible empirical tests as non-
reductive physicalism: they are verificationally equivalent. An anti-essentialist346 
could hold that this suffices to establish equal explanatory power – in which case, 
the discussion should turn to (OR2). However, an essentialist who backs (OR1) 
cannot: for the essentialist there is a further category of explanation over which the 
emergentist and physicalist have a genuine (not merely verbal) dispute: an 
                                            
346 By this, I mean a philosopher who accepts only explanations in terms of 
material and efficient causes, not in terms of essential natures, holding to either an 
eliminativist or deflationary account of modality, and is thereby able to hold that 
verificationally equivalent theories are in all respects explanatorily equivalent. 
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ontological explanation in terms of what it is to be the kind of thing that the 
emergent phenomenon is. 
 Someone might object that this sort of explanation is not significant enough 
to justify increasing the size of our ontology, particularly if it doesn’t make a 
practical difference. But it does make a practical difference! Ontological questions 
help guide our choice of methodology, among other things: they tell us whether the 
As should be investigated by means of investigating the Bs, or the As should be 
investigated in their own right.  An emergentist believes the nature of consciousness 
is immediately apparent to us first-hand, and our inability to deduce this nature 
from the nature of physical phenomena is better explained by an ontological gap 
between physical and conscious phenomena. The kinds of explanations which 
consciousness figures in are not the kinds of explanations which brains could ever 
figure in; hence, consciousness should primarily be investigated in its own right. An 
essentialist physicalist, on the other hand, must believe that the physical nature of 
consciousness is not immediately apparent to us when reflecting on our own 
conscious states – its true (physical) nature is hidden. The kinds of explanations 
which consciousness figures in could ultimately be filled by brains; hence, the best 
investigation of consciousness will primarily be through the investigation of brains. 
 To reply to (OR2), the emergentist had the task of showing that emergence 
was more congruent with our theories of the world than mechanism. Again, if 
emergence is not an ad hoc response to consciousness, but instead emergentist 
explanations already have a home in many of the natural and social sciences, then 
emergentism as a theory is nicely congruent with many of our other theories of the 
world in a way in which mechanistic explanations are not. Of course, this response 
  318 
depends upon the likelihood that the natural and social sciences will continue in the 
direction of adopting emergentist explanations. I’ve provided an account of why 
natural and social scientists should not be as hesitant to accept ontological 
emergence, but I can’t predict that they will accept it. It remains to see what forms 
actual future explanations in these sciences will take.  
5.2 Letting the Laws Dangle 
 At this point, a physicalist may respond that regarding as emergent such a 
wide variety of phenomena commits us to a wide variety of nomological danglers, in 
violation of principle (ND): 
 
(ND) We should only accept laws which either (i) are fundamental and 
relate fundamental particles to fundamental particles, and relate higher-level 
objects only through relating fundamental particles to other fundamental 
particles, or (ii) are non-fundamental and fully explicable in terms of the laws 
in (i). 
 
 But why accept (ND) in the first place? Why shouldn’t nomological danglers 
“dangle”? It can’t be that the reductivist thinks there are no higher-level laws of 
biology or sociology, period. Rather, it is that the reductivist believes all of these 
laws are non-fundamental, derivative from the laws of physics. It is true that this 
conflicts with emergentism in biology or sociology, since an emergent phenomenon 
(like a biological function) would be related to its supervenience base by a 
fundamental law which was not itself a law of physics. However, I believe that there 
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are two ways the emergentist can reply to the objections of the reductivist on this 
point. 
 First, the emergentist can hold that (ND) was only plausible when we were 
certain that emergence didn’t happen at any lower level than the mind itself. If the 
widespread appeal of the concept of emergence tells us that the world really is a 
jungle of nomological danglers, then the better move is to reject (ND) rather than 
reject emergence. 
 Second, the emergentist can point out that, whereas the fundamental 
physical laws are causal laws which relate events over time, the synthetic “bridge 
laws” which the emergentist is committed to are all synchronic laws which relate a 
supervenience base at one time to an emergent phenomenon at the very same time. 
While they are “fundamental” in the sense that they are not reducible to purely 
physical laws, it is not as though the emergentist is asserting that they belong in the 
same category as the fundamental laws of physics. They are laws about a very 
different sort of thing. We should not expect (metaphysically necessary) 
fundamental synchronic laws to be like (metaphysically contingent) fundamental 
diachronic laws, so we should not compare emergence laws with the laws of gravity 
or electro-magnetic charge and then react with surprise at the difference. Calling 
both of them by the same term, “law”, is a way of expressing their epistemic position 
as intermediate premises allowing derivations from statements of initial conditions, 
not to put them in the same ontological category. 
5.3 Resisting the Meta-Induction 
 As I near the conclusion on this chapter, I should quickly review the steps of 
the argument which I believe lead to a way to resist J. J. C. Smart’s objection to 
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emergentism in the case of the conscious mind, an objection which has been 
historically influential and remains so for many philosophers. 
 I began by offering a background of Smart’s objection, and attempting to 
clarify his objection. I then discussed my definition of “emergence”, which differs 
slightly from other definitions that have been offered. I defined emergence not as the 
in-principle impossibility of deducing an emergent phenomenon from its basal 
conditions, but as the impossibility of deriving the nature of the emergent 
phenomenon from the nature of its basal conditions by means of analytic transitions 
alone. I accept that emergent properties supervene in some sense upon their basal 
conditions: there is no way in which the emergent properties could be different 
without some difference in their underlying physical conditions. 
 This definition allowed me to offer an ontological sense in which a 
phenomenon could be “partly” emergent, or emergent to a degree. A phenomenon is 
partly emergent insofar as some part of its nature can’t be derived from the nature 
of its basal conditions by analytic transitions alone. I then followed a strategy of 
arguing that many of the phenomena which philosophers have accepted as “weakly 
emergent”, or emergent in a merely epistemic sense, ought also to be accepted as 
ontologically emergent to a weak degree. In these cases, it is possible to deduce the 
nature of the emergent phenomenon from the nature of its basal conditions, but only 
by means of ontologically synthetic bridge laws. 
 For specific examples, I discuss in Chapter 6 teleological explanations in 
biology, specifically those which are partly grounded in a history of natural selection. 
Teleological explanations have a bad reputation, but I’ll offer some reasons why 
philosophers should fault the past misuse of teleological explanations for this and 
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not the teleological category itself. I’ll argue that biological functions are weakly 
ontologically emergent, insofar as the normative part of a biological function is 
something whose nature is not contained in the evolutionary history and 
environmental circumstances on which it supervenes. I’ll then turn in Chapter 7 to a 
number of other possible cases of emergence in our world: emergent patterns, other 
cases of emergence in biology, and emergence in the social sciences. 
 If we view the emergence of consciousness against this backdrop – 
widespread emergence up and down the board – then emergence gains in 
explanatory power (instead of being a mere “unexplained explainer”) and the 
concerns about emergent laws of consciousness being nomological “danglers” seems 
much less compelling, since lots of emergent laws dangle. 
 This background of widespread emergence also blocks Smart’s objection by 
Meta-Induction (MI). Smart saw the sciences as continually discovering new ways to 
reduce complex phenomena to physics, which then offered justification for the 
conclusion that a similar reduction would someday be found in the case of 
phenomenal consciousness. In contrast, I have offered a picture on which the 
sciences are continually finding the limits of ontological reduction, discovering 
emergent phenomena or patterns which arise unpredictably out of complex systems. 
Consider, then, principle (MI): 
 
(MI) If there is some property that many of our established theories have, 
then when considering non-established theories, we have reason to prefer a 
theory which has that property over a competing theory which lacks it. 
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 My account of emergence is in line with (MI), since the property of utilizing 
explanations in terms of emergence is one which many of our established theories 
already have. Emergence in the philosophy of mind – even if it is to a much more 
extreme degree than lower-level emergence – is nonetheless the same kind of 
explanation which many lower-level phenomena in fields from sociology to biology 
take. 
5.4 The Familiar Smell of Emergence 
 I also suspect that this offers a response to Smart’s objection that emergent 
properties simply have a suspicious smell or “spooky” feel to them, or (QS): 
 
(QS) Given any argument for a theory which requires the existence of non-
physical properties, it will always be more likely that there is an error in the 
argument (a false premise, or an invalid move) than it will be that the 
conclusion is true. 
 
 This objection to non-physical properties is intuitive for Smart because it 
comes from a set of background assumptions – assumptions on which all of the 
phenomena in the sciences are regularly reducible to physics and talk of “non-
physical” natures of things is limited to people telling ghost stories. However, if 
emergence is a widespread category of explanation, and if I am correct that it should 
be regarded even at lower levels as a kind of ontological emergence, then there are 
frequent cases in which complex phenomena have non-physical natures or bear 
properties which are something over and above the properties of physics. It is 
nothing suspicious or spooky at all. There is no need to appeal to the weirdness of 
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consciousness to justify the weirdness of emergence, because emergence is too 
common to be “weird”. 
 Emergence should not smell so strange to the philosopher. By the time we get 
to the emergence of consciousness from its basal conditions, we should already have 
encountered a variety of types of emergence in the natural world. When we face a 
situation in the case of consciousness where the nature of a phenomenon is clearly 
something over and above the nature of its basal conditions, then we should 
recognize the familiar smell of emergence. 
§6 Preview 
 In Chapter 6, I will discuss in more depth how biological functions, while 
partly grounded in evolutionary histories, qualify as emergent properties. Bio-
functional properties supervene upon the set of properties involving an organism’s 
composition and natural history, and they are likely deducible from them a priori. 
However (pan-functionalism347 aside) they are only deducible through a priori 
synthetic premises – premises which go above and beyond the elements in the 
essential definitions of their physical composition and natural history. The property 
of being a “goal” or an “end” is essential to a biological function. It is not essential to 
evolutionary history or fundamental physics. This gives us a (defeasible348) reason to 
                                            
347 That is, someone who holds that functional or teleological properties are part 
of fundamental physics, natural history, and everything else. 
348 If we gain new evidence that we do not understand the real natures of “goals” 
or “ends”, and that they are in fact ontologically analytic from some conglomeration 
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conclude that the goal-directedness of biological functions is emergent from the 
composition and natural history of the biological function, and so biological functions 
are partly emergent.  
 In Chapter 7, I will discuss in greater detail how the weaker kinds of 
emergence can be found in various computational, natural, and social phenomena – 
domains characterized by the presence of some normative element in their nature. It 
seems plausible to me that cellular automata, ocean waves, species, ecosystems, 
social movements, and multi-national corporations are in an ontological sense 
weakly emergent. Some phenomena which have thus far been accepted as 
epistemically emergent relative to our human epistemic position make plausible 
cases for partial ontological emergence as well. I will also make the case that three 
of the hard problems which contemporary philosophers acknowledge – how abstract 
properties come to be instantiated in a concrete world, how moral norms can 
supervene upon the natural world while being distinct from it, and how it is that 
biological and physical states can give rise to the about-ness of meaningful language 
and thought – ought to be accepted as cases of emergence. 
 These two chapters propose that the emergence of novelties in nature may 
not be all that novel. We ought to expect it. Consciousness is just the same old new 
thing. Obviously, phenomenal consciousness is emergence of a stronger kind than, 
say, biological functions. Most of the nature of a biological function, for example, is 
part of the nature of the organism’s composition and evolutionary history – it’s just 
                                                                                                                                  
of physical and historical facts, we would no longer have reason to believe biological 
functions are emergent. 
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the “goal” part that is supposed to be emergent. On the other hand, very little if any 
of the nature of phenomenal consciousness is given in the nature of the brain. 
Consciousness supervenes upon the brain, but not much of what it is to experience 
the sweet smell of a rose is contained in what it is to be a mushy pink substance 
housing a series of electro-chemical reactions. 
 I hope that in these remaining chapters, a picture emerges on which the 
emergence of unexpected novelties in nature is neither unexpected nor novel. 
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Chapter 6 
EMERGENCE AND BIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS 
§1 Introduction 
 The heart has the function of pumping blood. The skin of a chameleon has 
functions like signaling to other chameleons, regulating body temperature, and, as is 
well known, camouflage.349 These functions, in turn, serve the larger function of 
promoting the evolutionary fitness of the chameleon. Biological functions in terms of 
fitness are widespread, serious, respectable forms of explanation in the life sciences. 
Biological functions are also teleological: they explain a state of affairs in the present 
in terms of being for a possible future state. But teleological explanations are not 
generally considered scientifically serious or respectable.350 
 Two ontological questions come to the forefront. First, should biological 
functions be accepted as real, or are they merely a kind of psychological projection or 
convenient fiction? Second, if they are real, should biological functions be regarded 
as reducible to some non-teleological story?  
 Many philosophers and biologists have made strong cases on both sides of 
each question over the years, and there is an extensive literature on how best to 
account for biological functions.351 I do not expect to add anything new to the debate. 
Instead, I plan to stake out one plausible, well-established position on these 
                                            
349 Stuart-Fox, D., and Moussalli, A. (2009) offer camouflage, communication, and 
thermoregulation as “the three primary functions of animal colour patterns.” 
350 Neander, K. (1991) 
351 See the bibliography given in Allen, C., (2009) 
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questions – realism and anti-reductivism about functions – and to show how this 
position could be regarded as a kind of emergentism about biological functions. If a 
phenomenon at one level is inexplicable in the terms of a phenomenon at a lower 
level without loss of content, then we have a reason to accept that the nature of the 
higher phenomenon is not wholly contained in the nature of the lower phenomenon, 
but is in fact a kind of novelty. 
 I will begin with an overview of the non-reductive realist position on 
biological functions that I am adopting here. I will consider in what sense functions 
can be considered normative, what might ground the truth of claims about them, 
what empirical criteria there might be for adopting them, and what relationship 
they have to natural selection. I will then reflect on seven common fallacies in 
teleological reasoning which I intend to dissociate the emergentist position from, and 
suggest that it is these abuses of teleological explanation which led teleology to be 
scientifically discredited in the past, and not anything about teleological 
explanations as such. Finally, I will explain why the non-reductive realist position 
on biological functions is best considered to be an emergentist position. 
§2 Realism and Anti-Reductivism 
2.1  Realism 
 Up through the 1970’s, there was considerable hand-writing among 
philosophers of biology about the ontological status of teleological explanations. Was 
the “function” of the heart in pumping blood really a property of the heart, or was it 
a property of the head of the researcher? Successful accounts in micro-biology of the 
physical composition and causal origins of various organisms and their organs were 
sufficient to explain what hearts were made of and why they happened to beat – no 
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teleological claims were needed to answer those questions. Nonetheless, it was 
extraordinarily inconvenient to try to do serious biology without talking about what 
hearts and habitats were for.352 
 In general, it is far more common now for biologists to be realists about 
biological functions.353 Why? First, it was recognized that contemporary bio-
functional realists were not asserting that biological functions exercised causal 
forces or were needed to fill some “gap” in material-causal accounts of biology.354 
Second, it was accepted that philosophical dogmas ought not to interfere with 
serious scientific inquiry, and discussions of functions were a serious prediction-
enabling part of biology.355 Third, it was recognized that any proposed “analysis” or 
“translation” of functional language into non-functional language, even if it got the 
necessary and sufficient conditions right, would inevitably either leave out the 
“functional” part of functions (the part that did the explaining) or else would import 
new functional concepts with it into the non-functional language.  
 For example, suppose we were to translate “the deer’s heart is for pumping 
blood” into a very complex sentence about the chemical processes in the deer’s DNA, 
the causal account of the origin and survival of hearts due to their pumping blood 
and the enhanced fitness of organisms with them, an evolutionary history of how the 
deer’s heart has adapted over time to the needs of the deer’s environment, and so on. 
                                            
352 Ayala (1999) 
353 Allen (2009) 
354 Ayala (1999) 
355 Milikian (1989a) 
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One of two things will happen. On the one hand, we may begin to intuitively read 
into this account a teleological sense of “adapted” and “survived” and “fitness” and 
“selection” – a sense which carries with it an implication of being goal-directed – and 
in so doing, by the back door, acknowledge realism. On the other hand, we may 
remain anti-teleological purists, and compile a complete causal and material account 
of the heart without any implication of goal-directedness – in which case, we’ve 
failed to give a translation of anything that answers the question: “what is the heart 
for?” If teleological talk (“x is for y”) is merely shorthand, then either it’s shorthand 
for something itself teleological, or else it’s shorthand for a massive non-sequitur, 
irrelevant to the question the biologist is asking.  
 If there are no are teleological facts to make biology true, then we seem 
almost forced to adopt an error theory of biology356: scientists who talk about the 
functions of hearts and chameleon skins have invented a kind of collective illusion, a 
convenient fiction. Physics is the one true science, and biology is a means of fitting 
physics to questions that only arise from a human357 mode of thought or interpretive 
stance. This view has the advantage of ontological parsimony, but is paid for by a 
                                            
356 I omit as an alternative non-cognitivism about biological functions; i.e., that 
“the chameleon’s skin changes in order to conceal itself from predators” is an 
expression of the researcher’s feelings of pity towards the chameleon – because I am 
not aware of anyone who holds this view.  
357 Talk of this sort often seem to me to carry with it a very dualistic connotation 
that humans are somehow alien or unnatural, prone to asking unnatural questions 
or to leaving the engines of language idling. 
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loss in explanatory range and power (by eliminating truths about biological 
functions358) and a lack of coherence with current scientific practice. 
 These are the considerations which lead me to believe that realism about 
biological functions is a respectable and plausible view, and to adopt it for my 
purposes here. But perhaps an anti-realist can, by translating my teleological 
claims, also successfully translate my “ontological” claims about emergence into 
some appropriately purified language, and potentially embrace my thesis in this 
translated way. 
 I should note that I recognize that there might be a sophisticated form of 
nominalism about biological functions, on which there are true statements about 
biological functions, which are true in virtue of the way things really are, but that 
biological functional properties are not themselves real. Assuming the nominalist is 
able to translate my other arguments adequately, this sort of nominalism can be 
regarded as “realism” for my purposes here. 
2.2 Against Psychologism 
 I should acknowledge a strong competitor to this sort of realism. It is 
sometimes claimed that we get our idea of goal-directed explanations in nature by 
analogy with the goal-directed aspects of own psychology. For example, our idea of 
the sense in which Smith’s eyes aim at seeing seems analogous to the sense in which 
Smith himself aims at getting a promotion, or the sense in which Smith aims his 
                                            
358 Except as a kind of truth about the fiction: “the heart is for pumping blood” is 
true of our fiction in whatever sense “Dr. Watson is the friend of Sherlock Holmes” is 
true. 
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own eyes to see an attractive potential mate. It doesn’t seem obvious to me that the 
order of explanation has to go from the psychological sense of “aim” to the biological 
sense of “aim”, and perhaps one could make a case that Smith’s representing an aim 
in his own psychology presupposes that the possibility of correspondence to real 
aims out in the world – including biological aims, like potential mates. Nonetheless, 
suppose the account is right and that Smith’s private ends are conceptually prior for 
him to the notion of a biological end. What should we make of this? 
 I think we should resist any conclusion that psychological aims being 
conceptually prior to biological aims entails that biological “aims” must be merely 
psychological projections onto nature and not part of nature. Consider that a similar 
claim could be made about causal explanations. An agent’s notion of agent-causation 
(the sense in which she causes her hand to move) may be conceptually prior to any 
notion she has of causation in the world. Her idea of how a hurricane causes damage 
is something formed by analogy to the idea of what happens when she causes 
damage to something. (She might even resent the hurricane). But I do not think we 
should conclude that causation is merely a psychological projection upon nature. 
How would agents cause things if we lived in a world without real causes? Similarly, 
I think we can resist the conclusion that biological functions are the products of our 
own psychological projections without having to engage in debates about conceptual 
priority. 
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2.3 Anti-Reductivism 
 Anti-reductivism is a far more controversial thesis than realism. Biologists 
generally accept that the facts about biological functions are reducible to some set of 
non-functional facts.359 But in what sense are they reducible? 
 A biologist likely has in mind a kind of epistemic reduction. In this sense, our 
body of knowledge about biological functional properties can be reduced to our body 
of knowledge of some lower-level account of evolutionary histories, roles in 
promoting fitness, selection pressures, underlying physical and chemical processes, 
etc. The epistemic reduction could result from a theory reduction from our theories 
of biological function to the theories in the corresponding low-level account, on the 
model given by Ernest Nagel, in which the bio-functional theories can be deduced 
from the underlying theories by means of bridge laws.360 However, over the last 50 
years, Nagel-style theory reductions have proven difficult or impossible in 
practice.361 More likely, the epistemic reduction results from a kind of explanatory 
                                            
359 Allen (2009) 
360 Nagel, E., (1961) 
361 For example, Kitcher (1984) argues that there are no bridge laws allowing the 
derivation of classical genetics from molecular biology in the manner of a theory 
reduction, and hence there can be no reduction of one theory to the other. Waters 
(1990) argues in opposition to Kitcher, holding that the theory of classical genetics is 
indeed reducible to the theory of molecular biology, but concedes that this requires 
“reformulating the postpositivist conception of theoretical reduction” away from 
Nagel-style theory unification.  
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reduction, by which every causal process that is explained by biological functions is 
equally explained by the corresponding low-level account. Each bio-functional 
property might be “translated” into a sentence about its causal role362 relative to 
other properties (i.e., by a kind of Ramsification), and then it might be shown that 
the lower-level account fills each of the bio-functional property’s causal roles.363 For 
example, insofar as the heart’s function is being that which makes blood circulation 
happen, the underlying account of the heart (including its composition, structure, 
and entire natural history) fills the role of that which makes blood circulation 
happen. I see no immediate reason to be an anti-reductivist about biological 
functions in this epistemic sense: it seems plausible that what biological functions 
explain causally could in principle be equally explained by an exhaustive low-level 
account. 
 Suppose that a biologist has in mind a stronger claim, that there is a 
metaphysical reduction of biological functions to the underlying account. Perhaps 
the biological functions of the organism are metaphysically necessitated, given the 
underlying account of an organism’s evolutionary history, as well as its current 
environment and the laws of nature. If one accepts a sense in which there are facts 
in the present about the evolutionary history of an organism through the distant 
past, then we might say that the biological functions of an organism supervene upon 
the present facts about its evolutionary history: it is impossible that a heart have the 
                                            
362 Putting aside for the moment that “causal role” is itself a functional, normative 
category. 
363 Kim (1999), 132-133 gives a good sketch of how this might work. 
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natural history and composition and structure that it does, and nonetheless fail to be 
for pumping blood, and instead be for digesting food.364 Once again, I see no reason 
to be an anti-reductivist about biological functions in this sense. The emergentist 
about biological functions also accepts that, once the underlying conditions were in 
place, nothing else is needed to add in the biological functions. 
 The claim that I do not suspect biologists generally mean to make – and the 
claim which I mean to deny – is that there is an ontological reduction of the 
functional properties in biology to some underlying, non-teleological account. In this 
sense of reduction, it is ontologically analytic, given the properties of the underlying 
account, that the teleological properties in biology are what they are. I do suspect 
that some philosophers of biology hold this view. However, reductivism in this 
ontological sense leads to an unsavory dilemma. 
 2.3.1 Option 1 An ontological reductivist in biology could accept a radical 
view, much like Nagel’s panpsychism in the philosophy of mind365, that teleological 
properties are themselves part of the underlying account. On this view, the heart’s 
property of being for pumping blood is nothing over and above the account of its 
evolutionary history because evolution itself is a teleological process, and this in 
turn is nothing over and above a microphysical account because microphysical 
properties can be teleological or goal-directed.366 
                                            
364 Thus, unlike moral norms, biological-functional norms do presuppose a regular 
pattern of success at following the norm in the actual world. 
365 Nagel, T. (1979). 
366 Hints of this approach are in Nagel, T. (2012) 
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 2.3.2  Option 2 An ontological reductivist can hold three beliefs in tension: (i) 
that bio-functional properties are real, neither eliminable from biology nor a 
convenient fiction, (ii) that their nature is nothing over and above the nature of the 
properties in the underlying account, which is ultimately a physical one, and (iii) 
that there are no normative, teleological, or functional properties in the underlying 
account of microphysics. Natural norms like biological functions are ontologically 
analytic given microphysics. There is a correct “analysis” of relations like x is for y 
and x occurs in order for y to occur, at least within the domain of biology, into 
relations between various microphysical objects properties. 
 I reject both Option 1 and Option 2. I reject Option 1, because I see no 
evidence for normative properties in microphysics. I reject Option 2, because it has 
three unpleasant consequences. First, it entails that there exists a proper analysis of 
an “ought” in terms of an “is”.367 Given the unsuccessful record of the positivist 
program, and the utter failure over the last three centuries since Hume to derive 
ought statements from is statements, for there to be an ontological analysis of 
functional “oughts” in non-functional “is” terms would require that the true natures 
of functional properties be drastically unlike the ordinary concepts we’ve been 
mistakenly using to represent them.368 Second, it entails that the true natures of 
                                            
367 Albeit in the language of ontology rather than in any natural language 
368 The inability of material-causal concepts to answer teleological questions 
seems as well established as the inability of teleological concepts to answer material 
or causal questions. For the reductivist to be correct, teleological properties must be 
real – we successfully refer to them with our teleological concepts – and yet unlike 
  336 
biological functions are massively disjunctive, given their multiple realizability, 
considering, for example, the many physical differences in organs for seeing or for 
hearing.369 Third, it entails that there exists in principle a Nagel-style theory 
reduction from biological functions to microphysics,370 even though contemporary 
reductivists in biology rarely promote this idea. While it is widely accepted that 
there is an explanatory reduction from biological functions to some underlying 
account371, Nagel-style theory reductions have ceased to be a primary focus for 
reductivists in biology.372 
 So, it is in this distinctively ontological sense of “non-reductivism” that I am 
staking out a position as a non-reductivist about biological functions. It should be 
understood that when I say the emergentist offers a “non-reductive” account of 
biological functions, I do not mean to deny epistemic or metaphysical reducibility, 
                                                                                                                                  
how we represent them as being, since they are really just material-causal 
properties. 
369 Fodor, J., (1974) 
370 In other words, if it is ontologically analytic that functional property F = 
microphysical property P, then an ideal reasoner could deduce F from P for every 
instance in the theories in which it appears. 
371 That is to say that every event explained by biological functions can be 
explained by some lower-level causal story, and every biological function can be 
explained by some lower-level account in terms of composition, structure, and 
natural history. 
372 Brigandt, I. and Love, A. (2012). 
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but only that the natures of biological functions are nothing over and above the 
natures of their underlying account. 
§3 Normativity and Grounding 
3.1 Functions as Natural Norms 
 I understand biological functions to be one category of “natural norm”, a 
normative property instantiated concretely in the natural world. Natural norms are 
not prescriptive imperatives that regulate human action in the sense that norms of 
moral behavior do. They are normative only in the broad sense, that they specify one 
particular possibility out of many possibilities in a non-arbitrary way, to be 
compared with actual states of affairs.373 
 Functional explanations in biology sometimes use the same sort of normative 
language that norms of human behavior do. People say that the heart ought to pump 
blood, and that the temperature of the human body should be around 98.7 degrees. 
Sometimes they use normative language that is more specifically teleological. People 
say that herds migrate in order to find water, that flocks travel south so as to avoid 
the winter, that prey aim to evade their predators, that the function of predators in 
an ecosystem is to prevent overpopulation of prey, and that the purpose of a cat’s 
                                            
373 In other words, a natural norm is a modal property with a modal logic whose 
syntactic rules are equivalent to system D, the deontic logic of moral norms; but 
whereas the semantics of moral norms specify ideal worlds on the basis of features 
like intrinsic goods or fulfillment of obligations, natural norms specify ideal worlds 
some alternative but non-arbitrary basis – for instance, as the worlds in which a 
certain pattern continues or a system functions properly. 
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grooming behavior is to promote hygiene. Only slightly more disguised, teleological 
explanations can speak of the role of a flower to attract bees to pollinate a plant and 
the job of the pigment arrangers on a chameleon to blend into its background. 
Biological functions may specify what is normal or healthy as a contextual backdrop 
to counterfactual causal explanations: in asphyxiation, the cause of death is the lack 
of oxygen, not the lack of CO2  O2 conversion capabilities in the lungs, even 
though it is true that, had either been present, death by asphyxiation would not 
have occurred. 
 What we should not infer from this language is that biological functions or 
other natural norms carry weight in our moral deliberations. What we should infer 
is that the weakly normative “ought” quality of biological functions is irreducible to 
descriptive facts in the same way that the stronger moral “ought” is often recognized 
as irreducible to descriptive facts. 
3.2 Grounding 
 I have accepted that biological functions are real, ontologically irreducible, 
and essentially normative. One might ask: what grounds the truth of claims about 
them? That is, in virtue of what features of the world are some claims about 
biological functions true, and others false? One position is that all true claims about 
biological functions are partly grounded in the fitness of an organism given as a 
background its evolutionary history and the process of natural selection. Another 
positions acknowledges that, while some true claims about biological functions are 
partly grounded in fitness, there are other true claims about functions which are 
instead grounded in an organism’s success in some non-historical sense. 
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 Consider a colony of birds which use the roof of an old mission for their nests. 
Is the function of the roof to serve as a nesting area for the birds? In one sense, yes – 
the birds are successfully using the human artifact for nesting. In another sense, no 
– there is no evolutionary history linking the use of the roof with the well-
adaptedness of the birds.374 The name spandrel –after the architectural features in 
San Marco where birds have taken up just this sort of nesting behavior – has been 
given to any functional biological structure which did not originally serve the 
function of enhancing fitness, but which nonetheless resulted from constraints 
imposed by other biological structures which did serve the function of enhancing 
fitness.375 Exaptation is the more general case where a structure which evolved to 
serve one function is co-opted to serve some other function. For example, it may be 
that feathers evolved at first as a means of regulating body temperature, and only 
later were exapted for the function of flying.376 For example, a present function of 
the human tongue and vocal chords may be to support language, but language may 
not have been the driving force which lead to the evolution of the tongue and vocal 
chords just as they are – they may have originally evolved to serve other fitness-
                                            
374 Gould, S.J. and Vrba, E.S. (1982). 
375 ibid. 
376 Gould, S.J. and Lewontin, R.C. (1979). Note that Gould sees exaptations as 
non-functional. But I do not see why one can’t simply say that exaptations are 
functional in virtue of their present usefulness, just not in a way which is grounded 
in evolutionary history. 
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enhancing functions, some of which may for modern humans be less fitness-
enhancing than linguistic abilities.  
 I accept that there are many different senses of “function” which are useful 
for biological explanation. Some of these do refer to an evolutionary history and 
make reference to natural selection. Some of these do not, and only refer to a role 
that something plays in the present success of an organism. Consider the flippers of 
a turtle, which it uses to bury an egg on a sandy beach.377 In the narrow 
evolutionary sense, the flippers are for swimming, but not for burying the egg in the 
sand. In the broader sense of biological function, the flippers are for both. If an 
animal adopts a non-innate behavior in order to survive, the behavior is functional 
in the broad sense but not in the narrow sense. An artificial heart, made of plastic 
but functioning within a human body, functions to pump blood in the broad sense 
but not in the narrow evolutionary sense. There may be borderline cases between 
the two. 
 Because I don’t want to take further sides in this debate, I will focus in the 
remainder of this Chapter exclusively on biological functions whose explanations 
appeal to the evolutionary history of an organism, since these are the sorts of 
functions most generally accepted. But this doesn’t mean I presume that all 
functional explanations must work in this way. I will address the possibility of 
biological functions which aren’t grounded in evolutionary histories in Chapter 7. 
 
 
                                            
377 ibid. 
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§4 Empirical Criteria for Teleological Explanations 
 There must be empirical criteria for assigning teleological explanations to 
phenomena. Not all phenomena have teleological explanations – unlike Aristotle, I 
do not want to say that a rock falls in order to hit the ground. At the same time, I do 
want to say that a bird has wings in order to fly. This means I need some means of 
distinguishing the rock’s falling from the bird’s wings. It may be intuitive to me that 
the bird’s wings are for flying but the rock’s downward motion is not for the purpose 
of hitting the ground. But it is more likely that I have these intuitions because I 
have internalized some set of empirical criteria than it is that I have a priori 
knowledge of the natures of rock-fallings and bird’s wings. 
 Under what conditions can we say that one event occurs for another event to 
occur, at least in the sense used in biology? I will abandon all hope up front of 
finding a counterexample-free set of necessary and sufficient conditions for A is for 
B. I am working off the assumption, already discussed, that the “for” relation is 
irreducible to more basic explanatory relations. Nonetheless, some discussion of the 
empirical criteria we use for assigning teleological judgments may provide an 
illuminating non-reductive explanation of what biological functions are. First, I will 
consider two proposals for empirical criteria, and note their deficiencies. Then, I 
offer a third proposal for what criteria to use when judging whether something is or 
is not a case of a biological function. 
4.1 Rejected Proposals 
 4.1.1  Proposal 1: A is for B means if B, then A.  
 For example, the heart is for circulating blood. Every vertebrate circulates 
blood. A vertebrate circulates blood only if it has a heart. So, if a vertebrate 
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circulates blood, then it has a heart.  However, as mentioned earlier, every 
vertebrate makes a regular beating noise in its chest only if it has a heart. 
Nonetheless, the heart is not for making a beating noise.378 
 4.1.2 Proposal 2: A is for B means that A plays a causal role as part of a 
system of which B is a regular outcome. 
 For example, the gills of a fish play a causal role in a system of which 
respiration is a function. So, in fish, gills are for respiration. However, the notion of 
a causal role, as opposed to a mere causal influence, depends upon the notion of a 
teleological explanation. The ability of a fish to respirate also causally depends upon 
the fish remaining in motion, which depends upon its having the flexible skeletal 
structure it has. But the skeletal structure of the fish does not play a causal role in 
respiration precisely because the skeletal structure is not for respiration. The gills of 
the fish are also partly responsible for the mass of the fish being what it is. But the 
gills do not play a causal role in the mass of the fish, because they do not function to 
promote the mass of the fish. Alternatively, consider the gills of a dead fish. The gills 
do not presently cause the fish to respirate – the fish is dead. Do the gills play a 
causal role in a system of which respiration is the outcome? If one says yes, then one 
can only say so in light of what the gills are supposed to do – that is, what their 
function is. 
4.2 Another Proposal 
 What criteria do we use to judge that something is a case of a biological 
function? I understand our judgment that x is the function of y to work as a kind of 
                                            
378 This example is from Milikian (1989b) 
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inference to the best explanation: it is not that we observe functions themselves, or 
that we derive them from our observations, but rather that we infer them in 
situations where they help explain the regular patterns we observe. I’d propose the 
following: 
 4.2.1 Proposal 3: if event A occurs in order for event B to occur, then 
generally the following conditions hold: 
 (i) Possibility. Given event A, B is a distinct non-arbitrary future possibility, 
but not the only possibility. 
 This condition reflects the normative character of a biological function. The 
heart is for pumping blood. Given the event of the heart’s existing, one particular 
future possibility is that the heart pumps blood. It need not be actual – the hearts of 
dead animals do not pump blood. It is not the only possibility – the heart might 
pump kool aid, or it might explode. A norm selects non-arbitrarily one future 
possibility, that of pumping blood. 
 (ii) Manipulability. There is a possible intervention upon A which would lead 
to a manipulation of the state of B. 
 This condition reflects that there was some truth in the “causal role” account 
rejected earlier. That the function of the gills is respiration tells us that, while the 
gills may not actually cause respiration (for example, in a dead fish), there is a 
possible intervention upon the gills which would lead to a change in the state of 
respiration – for example, in the possible world where the fish is alive, shutting 
down the gills would stop respiration. 
 (iii) Stability. For some range of possible interventions upon A, it is the case 
that some new event C occurs in order for B to occur with its prior value. 
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 The causal patterns which support biological functions must be stable in the 
sense that in many cases the final cause (B) would have been brought about by some 
other mechanism (C) even if its original cause (A) had not occurred. For example, the 
nose plays a causal role in breathing. The nose also plays a causal role in the growth 
of nose hairs. But the nose is for breathing, not for growing nose hairs. Why? At 
least part of the explanation can appeal to the fact that, in certain situations where 
the nose is blocked, an organism may continue breathing normally through some 
other mechanism – the mouth. However, there are no situations in which a nose 
cannot grow nose hair, but the nose hairs still grow by an alternative means. There 
are not many cases where the heart of an organism breaks down and, nonetheless, 
the blood is still pumped. But there are some cases – like humans who perform CPR 
– where an event may happen to pump the blood in place of the heart. Should the 
beating noise of the heart stop, nothing will “step in” take its place. 
 Stability is most significant when considering evolutionary explanations over 
time. Suppose an organism has some adaptation which serves one function, but 
changes in the organism’s environment prevent it from serving that function. We 
could predict some new adaption over time (if the organism is to survive in the new 
environment) would arise to take the place of the prior adaptation. We would not 
predict the same response for some non-functional property of an organism.  
 (iv) Failure-Explicability.  If A occurs and B does not occur, then necessarily 
some C has occurred and has prevented B from occurring. 
 As mentioned, that B is the function of A does not guarantee that A actually 
causes B. However, if B is the function of A, then there must be a causal explanation 
of what has interfered, or gotten in the way of the process of A causing B. One 
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purpose of the gall bladder is to store bile and secrete it into the small intestine in 
order to promote digestion, to promote the overall fitness of the organism. The gall 
bladder just happens to produce gall stones. If a gall bladder fails to produce gall 
stones, we have no right to expect an answer to the question “why didn’t it produce 
gall stones?” beyond, perhaps, a purely statistical or probabilistic explanation. If a 
gall bladder fails to secrete bile into the small intestine, we do have a right to expect 
an explanation of what happened. 
 I am certain that there are other generally true qualities of functional 
explanations. As I mentioned, my purpose has not been to undertake a reductive 
analysis of what a functional explanation is. I’ve only wanted to provide a few 
examples of empirically investigable criteria for functional explanations, to establish 
that the criteria for functions are not purely a matter of “intuition” or the special 
quirks of human psychology, but the same sorts of interests in prediction and 
manipulation of the world which lead us to seek causal explanations of the 
phenomena we encounter. 
§5 Natural Selection 
 I have said that I am discussing cases of biological functions partly grounded 
by evolutionary histories: cases where x is the function of y in part because y 
promotes the fitness of the organism in which y occurs by means of producing y. (By 
“in part”, I indicate that functions are not wholly grounded in fitness; they are 
emergent.) For example, birds’ wings promote their fitness by enabling flight. The 
wings’ design has been selected for fitness. But “selected” is teleological language. In 
what sense is fitness a telos? 
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 We don’t want to risk anthropomorphizing natural selection. There is a 
danger in the language of analogy. It is not as though nature “selects” a feature for 
its fitness in the same sense in which I select the chicken over the beef on the menu 
for its tastiness. Nature does not desire fitness in the way in which I desire chocolate 
pie. 
 Of course, we also shouldn’t make too much of the disanalogy. I do desire 
chocolate pie in part because the organism I am desires chocolate pie, which is in 
part because chocolate is full of the sugars and fats that have tended (until recently) 
to promote the fitness of organisms like me.379 So, it is not entirely off to say that 
there is something in common between the way I desire chocolate pie and the way 
nature selects fitness as an end. 
 In what sense, then, is fitness an end for organisms, or whole species? Again, 
clearly it is not an “end” in the sense that it has imperative force or moral weight. 
Birth control may not necessarily enhance fitness, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t 
achieve a legitimate end. Birth rate is not a measure of eudemonia. 
 If fitness is not analogous to a moral end, and it is not analogous to an end 
that somebody has in mind, in what sense is fitness nevertheless the end or goal of 
biological functions? A better analogy might be the sense in which a clock’s hand at 
noon points towards the number XXII, or in which a person’s outstretched arm 
might point at a nearby rock even if he does not intend it to.  The hand of the clock is 
                                            
379 I say in part, because if you dare try to reduce my desire to some abstract 
formulation about fitness, then it’s clear you’ve never had the phenomenal 
experience of chocolate pie eating like I’ve had. 
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directed at XXII, and the action of the person’s hand is directed towards the rock. 
Similarly, a biological function is a kind of directed action towards the end of fitness 
(or, more properly, towards a variety of other ends which have reproductive success 
as their end), in a sense that does not imply a corresponding mental act. 380  
§6 The Seven Deadly Sins of Teleological Explanation 
6.1 Teleology and its Abuses 
 So far, I have staked out a position as a realist and non-reductivist about 
biological functions, and have chosen to focus on biological functions which are 
partly grounded in and supervene upon evolutionary histories. 
 Nonetheless, at this point, I suspect many readers will still harbor skepticism 
about biological functions, period. Teleological explanations and “natural norms” 
have a bad reputation among many philosophers. I think this bad reputation is 
partly justified – not because there is anything wrong with teleological explanations 
as such, but because teleological explanations have been so badly misused in the 
past. Before I proceed with a realist account of teleology and natural norms 
generally, it will be necessary to distance my own understanding of natural norms 
from these past abuses. 
 By a “biological function” or “teleological explanation in biology”, I mean a 
partially normative explanation of some phenomenon in terms of its function, or 
                                            
380 One difference is that the rock a demonstrative act refers to is in the present 
whereas the biological function’s end of enhanced fitness lies at least partly in the 
future. Another difference is that pointings and clocks include a history of 
consciously intentions by agents. 
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what it is for. Because I will be arguing that natural norms are emergent, I will hold 
that they emerge at different levels – the individual organism level as opposed to the 
organ, or the individual as opposed to the social group. The natural norm applies 
only at its respective level: it is a norm which is internal to its level and does not 
indicate anything about norms at a higher or lower level. So, what something is for 
at one level may not be the same as what it is for at another level, and the 
teleological explanations at each level may be incongruent. On one level, an 
individual organism may have the function of surviving and reproducing. On 
another level, the same organism may have a social function within its pack which 
requires it not to reproduce.  
 I accept pluralism about natural norms – there may be multiple, true, 
conflicting norms that apply to the same entity or event, whether at different levels 
or at the same level. When the immune system is hijacked by a virus, the immune 
system may both serve the function of protecting the organism from viruses and the 
function of spreading the virus in the organism. This pluralism need not devolve into 
anti-realism. There are other things true of the immune system that are clearly not 
its function: leukocytes are white-colored, but it is not their function to be white-
colored; the heart causes me to hear a sound, but it is not the function of the heart to 
cause me to hear a sound. 
 I regard teleological explanations to be a category of explanation on a par 
with causal explanations, material explanations, and formal explanations. I 
recognize sharp boundaries between each category of explanation, and do not admit 
that one sort of explanation can substitute for another: no matter how much you tell 
me about what the heart is for, you will not have told me how it came to be there, 
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and vice-versa. We are thus justified under the principle of parsimony in being 
realists about normative or teleological properties and relations so long as they are 
the minimum necessary for teleological explanations of real phenomena, regardless 
of how exhaustive our causal and material explanations of the phenomena are. At 
the same time, no teleological explanation could even in principle suffice to explain a 
“gap” in our existing causal and material explanations of the universe.  
 To distinguish this account of teleological explanation from its abuses, I wish 
to attempt to identify the nature of the most common abuses which have tarnished 
its reputation or the “Seven Deadly Sins” of teleological explanation. 
6.2 Investigative Sloth 
 An especially satisfying teleological explanation can lead researchers to 
prematurely abandon causal and material explanations. Consider how 
investigations of the brain have historically tended to focus disproportionately on 
individuals with psychological disorders: we feel no compelling reason to investigate 
the causes and composition of a healthy psychology, since we can understand it in 
terms of reasons. A similar bias lead to the stagnation of scientific inquiry generally 
in the West up until the last five centuries. We understood that the function of an 
acorn was to grow into an oak tree – to move from potentiality to actuality – and it 
seemed that was all there was to say about why the acorn became an oak tree. This 
hardly scratched the surface of explaining why acorns grew into oak trees, of course. 
 So, abandoning confidence in teleological explanations at the dawn of the 
scientific revolution was the only way to shake the West out of its intellectual 
slumber. Of course, the error was not in affirming that the function of an acorn is in 
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fact to grow into an oak tree, but in the sleepy satisfaction that this was all there 
was to say. 
6.3 Explanatory Adultery 
 In the humanities, a history is an artful weaving of efficient-causal 
explanations with teleological ones – the purposes of Napoleon are thwarted by the 
Russian winter, and weather patterns save Europe. Natural history is tempted to 
follow suit. A bare, purposeless, efficient-causal history of the natural world lusts 
after a meaningful teleology, and teleology longs to make itself impure by 
adulterating itself with efficient-causal claims. This unrighteous union of 
teleological and causal explanations is what I call “explanatory adultery.” 
 Consider the first case: struck with wonder that the complexity of life has 
arisen from purposeless matter, one infers that teleological principles of order must 
have intervened and placed a causal role in producing over time the complexity of 
life. Into the causal story of the events leading up to life, it is inserted that these 
events were caused to happen because they were for the purpose of bringing about 
future life. Notice that the error is not in the sense of wonder, not in holding 
biological life has teloi that matter does not, and not in holding that part of what 
makes life what it is are these teloi and hence what life is cannot be reduced to 
purposeless matter. Rather, the error is in substituting a teleological explanation in 
the middle of a series of causal explanations to fill an efficient-causation-shaped gap. 
We force into the picture a piece from a different puzzle: d happened because c 
happened, c happened because b happened, and b happened because d ought to 
happen. This implies a kind of backwards-causation, with future ends producing 
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past events. The resulting explanation never lasts long, but it often gives us 
temporary satisfaction. 
 Consider the opposite case: in the middle of an explanation of what war is for, 
one inserts an explanation from natural history – the survival of phenotypes with 
greater fitness – and so, war to purge the weak from a strong society is justified by 
inserting an efficient-causal claim into a teleological account. Similar accounts 
might be offered to justify eliminating charitable social programs or international 
humanitarian aid. One might invoke the evolutionary account of human origins to 
justify a controversial medical experiment as the next step in human evolution. 
Again, one has placed a piece from the wrong puzzle: how something came to be does 
not in itself tell us all there is to what it is for, any more than what something is for 
tells us all there is about how it came to be. 
6.4 Hasty Judgments 
 When we are considering human practices, there is a case to be made for 
giving serious regard to human intuitions – regarding the appropriate use of 
language, the principles of ethics, or so on. But when we are not considering human 
moral norms, or semantic norms, but natural norms in the world, an intuitive 
judgment is a sign of impatience. It may seem intuitive that the brain is for heating 
the blood, not for directing action. It may seem intuitive that, because most organs 
in the body have a function that serves the overall function of the body, every organ 
in the body must have a function that serves the function of the body. It might even 
seem intuitive to some that rabbits have ears in order to make them easier for 
hunters to carry, or that the beavers built the dam in the creek in order to give us a 
swimming hole (or – the villains! – to flood us out when it rains). Intuitions are not 
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trustworthy here. We must not be so quick to judge. There must be empirical criteria 
to tell us when we have a case of a function or other natural norm and when we 
don’t.  
6.5 Elitist Greed 
 I have suggested that we should be pluralists about natural norms, and 
functions, even for functions of the same object, at the same level, at the same time. 
For example, the intestines have many functions: digesting and breaking down food, 
reabsorbing liquids and absorbing nutrients, removal of wastes, and so on. This is 
parallel to the way in which an event may have a plurality of efficient causes. 
Opposed to this pluralist view are exclusivism about functions, and relativism about 
functions. For the exclusivist, it is not enough to say that something is a function or 
one function of a thing. It is necessary to say that it is the function of the thing, the 
real function (or at least the only important one) – that the other functions we might 
have thought it had were more or less illusory. The exclusivist wants to encompass 
all of the teleological explanatory power: a kind of greedy elitism. 
 So, one exclusivist says the function of religion in society is to reconcile the 
proletariat to their oppressed state, another that it is to promote social cohesion and 
to solve prisoners dilemma scenarios, another that it is a form of resistance to the 
state; someone says that the function of the universities is to pursue knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake, another that it is to prepare a skilled workforce, and another that 
it is to legitimate the rule of the technocratic elite; someone says that the function of 
the civil war was to eliminate slavery, and another that it was really about 
industrialization and the agrarian economy, and another that it was a tragic 
accident, and so on. The same exclusivistic approach applies when someone says 
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that organisms are just mechanisms for the transfer and perpetuation of genes, or 
that social behavior in chimps is just to promote their own long-term welfare, or that 
altruistic behavior in humans is merely hidden selfishness. 
 The relativist, upset by this greed, responds by turning profligate. The Every 
teleological claim obtains its truth value relative to some perspective or other. It is 
true from one perspective that altruism is only selfishness, and false from another, 
on which altruism is only altruistic. Nonetheless, the relativist maintains the 
exclusivist’s assumption: teleological claims remain exclusivistic, “just” or “only” 
claims, albeit within a perspective. The pluralist resists this move. Teleological 
claims are rarely “just” or “only” claims. One can maintain that an entity or event 
serves one function without ruling out that it serves other, possibly incongruent, 
functions. 
6.6  All-Consuming Gluttony 
 Sometimes a teleological explanation at one level is not satisfied to remain 
‘internal’ to that level from which it emerged, and endeavors to consume the role of 
teleological explanation from other levels. One level of explanation attempts to be 
all-consuming, a kind of gluttony. On the organism level, the function of grooming 
behavior in a cat is the cat’s own hygiene. But on the level of an individual cat’s 
psychology, the function of grooming behavior may be a reaction to ease anxiety in 
stressful situations. It would be reaching too far to assert that cleanliness must also 
be the function of grooming in the cats psychology.  
 We are most apt to confound explanatory levels in a top-down, 
anthropocentric way – like the hunter who assumes that rabbits have ears so that 
he can hold them better. As an antidote to this tendency, someone may overreact in 
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the opposite direction: saying that an animal exists for the purpose of carrying its 
genetic code around, or that the function of eating is to funnel nutrients to one’s 
individual cells. This is a failure to explain the phenomenon on the level at which it 
occurs – on which eating is to nourish the organism as a whole. 
6.7  Morality Envy 
 As I’ve stated earlier, the “natural norms” and teleological properties of 
natural objects I have been discussing should not be confused with moral norms – 
those norms which apply to conscious reasoners. Unfortunately, natural norms begin 
to envy for moral norms. They want to have the force of imperatives too.  
 Many people are familiar with arguments from the premise that one thing is 
the natural purpose of another to the conclusion that the one thing is the moral 
purpose of the other. Unless it is the case that there is an independent moral 
principle of the form “follow the natural purposes of things in situations of this sort,” 
there is no reason to accept these sorts of arguments. I accept that one function of an 
organism is to reproduce. I also had my dog spayed. One may be a realist about 
teleologies and coherently support monasteries, birth control, equal rights for same-
sex couples, the exaltation of perpetual virginity, and so on. Moral norms do not 
eliminate natural norms – the function of the heart is still to pump blood, even if the 
pro-death penalty retributivist is right that the serial killer’s heart ought to be 
stopped. Moral norms supersede natural norms. Even though there may be a sense 
in which a highly infectious disease is very “successful”, the disease is not morally 
good.  
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6.8  Anthropomorphic Pride 
 The final and greatest temptation when considering teleological explanations 
in nature comes from the fact that that we ourselves have various purposes and ends 
that we pursue, and so we are apt to reason by analogy that something must be true 
of the ends in the natural world because it is true of our ends. But human purposes 
are very different from natural purposes. We err in thinking so highly of ourselves 
that the purposes in nature must be like our own. Three examples: 
 First, human technological artifacts are distinguished by having one all-
encompassing telos. The primary function of the hammer is for hitting things, and a 
light bulb is for giving light. However, as I have argued, natural objects often don’t 
have one all-encompassing telos: is the function of a pigeon to survive and 
reproduce, to recycle the trash of the city, to play its role in pigeon society or the 
urban ecosystem, or to incubate worms?  
 Second, conscious human intentions are typically unified. I cannot at the 
same moment knowingly intend two contrary things. If I have two contrary 
intentions, it is because I am not consciously aware of it; if I become aware of it, I 
must dismiss the one (or, at least, repress or sublimate it) in order to consciously 
pursue the other. If I have one end, and a choice between two means to that end, 
then in a state of complete information I will likely choose the more efficient of the 
two means. However, natural functions need not display this sort of obvious unity. 
The function of a mosquito that bites a leg is at odds with the function of the leg. The 
function of a low-heat forest fire in promoting the health of an ecosystem is at odds 
with the function of the smaller brush killed in it. Further, the various natural 
functions of organisms may be fulfilled inefficiently with respect to their other 
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functions – consider the high rate of women who die in pregnancy, as a result of the 
failure of female anatomy to adapt in sync with increased infant brain capacity. 
Even if there turns out to be a deep harmony to the cosmos (a final end of all ends), 
it is presumptuous to think it will involve unifying all of the pieces together 
efficiently in a manner similar to a conscious human intention. 
 Finally, teleological explanations are always mixed with efficient-causal 
explanations in accounts of human action. Suppose that Jenny kisses Jimmy in 
order to cheer him up. If the observer does not understand that cheering Jimmy up 
is one of the causes of the kiss, the observer has not really understood what 
happened. Similarly, histories in the humanities must be of this form: they must cite 
desires for some end as efficient causes. It is a serious debate as to whether the 
cause of bombing of Hiroshima was in order to prompt Japan to surrender, or in 
order to impress the USSR. But, while causal and teleological explanations are 
married in human action, uniting them together outside of human action is, again, 
an act of explanatory adultery: we cannot cite the desire of the acorn to become a 
tree as the efficient cause of its becoming a tree. This is anthropomorphizing the 
acorn. Likewise, we cannot cite a purpose for the cosmos to become a place such as it 
is, with things like us in it, as the efficient cause of the structure of the cosmos. This 
is anthropomorphizing. 
6.9  A Final Diagnosis 
 In considering these several deadly sins that might be committed with 
teleological explanations, it does not seem to me that any of them reveal essential 
flaws in teleological explanations as such. There may be independent reasons for 
skepticism about teleological explanations in nature, of course (I have asserted that 
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they must have empirical criteria, but one might wonder what these criteria are). 
However, skepticism or suspicion of teleological explanations that is motivated by 
observing the abuses listed above should be reconsidered – the fault is not in the 
type of explanation, but in the person who does the explaining. 
§7 The Emergence of Biological Functions 
7.1  Motivations for Bio-Functional Emergentism 
 By this point, I hope that I have cleared the way for a level-headed discussion 
of the emergence of biological functions. I have explained how there can be weaker 
and stronger forms of ontological emergence, and the consistency of both with the 
possibility of ideal a priori deducibility. I have offered reasons to think that realism 
and anti-reductivism about biological functions are plausible, and not merely cases 
of observers reading themselves into their observations. I have distinguished the 
sense of function which I am using from many of the past abuses of teleological 
explanations, and I have described how functions can be grounded in natural 
selection. It’s about time I get on with it – why think biological functions are 
ontologically emergent? 
 On the definition of emergence I have been working with, an emergent 
phenomenon is entirely dependent for its existence upon its subvening physical base 
(it supervenes upon it), and at the same time its essential nature is something “over 
and above” the nature of its physical base.  
 In the case of biological functions, the supervenience claim is not 
controversial. Both reductivists and non-reductivists accept that any two possible 
worlds which were exactly alike with respect to their physical environments and 
past evolutionary histories would be exactly alike with respect to what everything 
  358 
biological was for. There is no possible world exactly like ours in these respects 
where the heart isn’t for pumping blood. Functions depend on their subvening base. 
Given a radically different environment and history, it might have been that the 
beating noise of the heart conferred survival advantages leading to the development 
of the heart and the pumping blood did not. We would then say that the heart was 
for making a beating noise, not for blood-pumping. 
 It is more difficult to establish the something “over and above” claim. I have 
defined this claim in terms of being ontologically synthetic: it amounts to the claim 
that the nature of the heart’s function in pumping blood contains some element 
which could not be derived by purely analytic moves from the nature of its 
subvening base in physical environment, material composition, evolutionary history, 
and so on.  
 Consider that the mammary glands have the function of producing milk. 
Imagine writing out a list of all of the events in the natural history of mammals 
which lead to the evolution of mammary glands, including various feedback loops 
involving the successful production of milk and the increased survival chances of 
offspring. Then, imagine writing out a list of all of the chemical and biological 
structures which compose the mammary glands. You might add to this whatever 
other facts about present and past events involving mammary glands that you 
prefer, if you believe they belong in its subvening base. Now, go back, and purge 
each of your lists of any unnecessary teleological language: talk of roles or jobs or 
purposes or means and ends which are not essential to physical and causal 
descriptions. What remains of your lists will necessitate that the function of the 
mammary glands is to produce milk. Because you are smart, you can also likely 
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intuit that the function of the mammary glands is to produce milk. But could you 
derive, using only the rules of logic and various translations of the terms you’ve used 
in your descriptions, that the mammary glands are for producing milk? No – you’ve 
gotten rid of everything teleological that was in the base. Perhaps you could derive 
something like: “mammary glands regularly produce milk and would not exist if 
they didn’t”, or any number of other sentences involving “mammary glands” and 
“milk” that suggest, intuitively, that they are for milk. However, the derivation could 
not go forward without some additional synthetic premise that included the operator 
for in it. (If you could derive it, then either you didn’t completely purge the 
unnecessary teleological language from your physical descriptions, or, much to 
everyone’s surprise, teleological explanations are essential to physics and causation.) 
 A similar consideration applies to all biological functions: a derivation of the 
function from its basal conditions will require some bridge statement relating the 
non-teleological properties in the base to the teleological properties in the function. 
This bridge statement may be necessarily true and perhaps even highly intuitive. 
However, assuming anti-reductivism is true in the sense given in section 3.1.3, this 
will be a synthetic statement, not an analytic one.  
7.2 Objections to Bio-Functional Emergentism 
 There are a number of objections which are likely to be leveled against 
emergentism about biological functions. 
 First, an anti-reductivists may be willing to accept that biological functions 
are weakly emergent (which they understand as merely epistemic), but they reject 
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strong emergence (which they understand as ontological).381 They understand “weak 
emergence” as a kind of inability to derive or predict the emergent phenomenon from 
the underlying phenomenon except by means of non-analytic bridge principles, like 
those learned through simulation.382 Nonetheless, they deny strong emergence, 
insofar as the derivation is possible given adequate computational and conceptual 
resources. This is sometimes expressed as the view that emergence is a function of 
present ignorance – a phenomenon is emergent only relative to the scientist’s 
inability to predict it with the cognitive resources he has. However, on my account, 
weak emergence need not be merely epistemic – I have advocated for ontological 
weak emergence.  Ideal deducibility does not rule out ontological emergence, so long 
as non-analytic bridge principles are needed for the deduction – something the weak 
emergentist admits. On my account, “weak emergence” is just a weaker kind of 
ontological emergence, where a lesser part of the nature of emergent phenomenon is 
something over and above its base. I would suggest that these authors should accept 
the full ontological consequences of their view, and accept that “weakly emergent” 
biological functions are in fact ontologically emergent.  
 Second, some reductivist-leaning critics are likely to complain that reductive 
accounts of biological functions are available in terms much like those I’ve offered as 
a subvening base – evolutionary history, composition, environment, and so on. 
However, I’ve acknowledged that there are senses of reduction which are consistent 
with ontological emergence, including epistemic reductions on which the causal role 
                                            
381 See Rothschild, L. (2006) 
382 Bedau, M. (1997), (2008) 
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of biological functions is fully explained and filled by that of their subvening base. 
What the reductivist has yet to show is that the quality of for-ness is ontologically 
reducible to some physical quality.  
 Third, the reductivist might attempt to provide an analysis of the concept of 
biological function, or at least hold out hope that such an analysis is forthcoming. 
The analysis could show that the concept of a function really was merely analytic 
given the relevant physical background. I would resist this approach on two 
grounds. First, the task of providing conceptual analyses for biological functions, as 
opposed to supervenience conditions, has not met with much success.383 Second, even 
if the concept of a function were found to be latent somewhere in the concepts of its 
physical background, this would be insufficient to show that the nature of a function 
is latent in the nature of the physical background – conceptual priority does not 
always match up with ontological priority, nor conceptual analyticity with 
ontological analyticity. It is conceptually analytic (and a priori) that the standard 
meter bar in Paris is one meter long. It is also contingent that the standard meter 
bar is one meter long, not essential (or ontologically analytic) to it. 
 Fourth, there is a kind of Quinean physicalism which would reject the whole 
metaphysical discussion altogether, denying that there is such a thing as the 
“nature” of a function and the “nature” of a microphysical substance. In place of the 
“ontological analyticity” and “ontological syntheticity” distinction which I have 
offered, the Quinean will insist upon “ontological relativity” given the internal 
ontology of a given language. For the Quinean, function-language is just a kind of 
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linguistic short-hand derived from a series of observation statements, the common 
source of our physical material-causal descriptions of the world. There is a kind of 
radical translation (however indeterminate) which is possible between function-
language and physical material-causal language. This approach is immune to my 
argument about the non-derivability of functions from physical descriptions. 
However, those adopting this view should be cautioned that their view is not a 
metaphysical variety of physicalism: it does not hold that all concrete realities have 
a physical nature, since it rejects the category of a language-independent “nature” 
outright. So, it is no more opposed to emergentism than it is to the metaphysical 
physicalism which the emergentist is debating against. 
 Fifth, one might complain that the talk of “essential natures” in metaphysics 
is misguided, and there is nothing more to essence than modality. If emergentism 
about biological functions makes the same exact epistemic and empirical and modal 
claims as non-reductive-physicalism about biological functions, then there is no 
serious difference between the views. If the way in which bees are needed in order to 
pollinate the flowers follows logically from non-functional facts about flowers and 
bees, and makes no empirical claims that could not be expressed without the in 
order to language, and yet can’t be reduced to non-functional facts, then what is left 
to argue about? I would reply that talk of “natures” in fact helps clarify the debate 
between two otherwise indistinguishable views – a debate which has tended, for the 
sake of distinction, to force emergentists into weaker modal claims (like denying 
supervenience) or reliance on an epistemic gap (which not even a mathematical 
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archangel384 could bridge), both of which are positions that may be plausible for 
phenomenal consciousness but are not plausible for biological functions. The 
emergentist’s real interest has always been the “something over and above” claim, 
and the non-reductive physicalist has always insisted on the “nothing over and 
above” claim. If these are empty claims, at least we know what they are supposed to 
be about, and how we would go about answering them. 
 Sixth, a critic might cite Hume’s dictum, that “there are no necessary 
connections between distinct essences.” The emergentist seems to be claiming just 
that: that emergent phenomena are necessitated by their subvening bases, but 
nonetheless are distinct in essence from their subvening bases.385 However, Hume’s 
dictum should be understood as ruling out necessary connections between wholly 
distinct essences, not partially distinct essences. There is a necessary connection 
between being Socrates and being a person, but Socrates is not identical in essence 
with personhood, though personhood is part of the essence of Socrates. The 
emergentist is not claiming that emergent phenomena are wholly distinct in nature 
from their subvening base, only that they are partially distinct: that there is some 
additional novelty which is part of their essence. This is consistent with Hume’s 
dictum. 
 Finally, a critic might revert to anti-realism. One might adopt an account on 
which biological functions are mere metaphor based on human mental states, or 
                                            
384 The reference is to Broad (1925) 
385 Some discussion of this can be found in Stoljar (2010), 151 
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merely in the mind of the observer.386 While this move is plausible for many of the 
emergent phenomena which I will be discussing later, it does not seem as plausible 
in the case of biological functions. (Consider that if biological functions were in the 
mind of the observer, liver disease would be in the mind of the observer. Medical 
science would be mere metaphor.) In any case, the fallacy seems to be in reasoning 
that because human mental ends are conceptually prior to biological ends, then 
human ends must be ontologically prior as well. However, biological ends are 
undoubtedly historically and materially prior to mental ends, which often reflect 
biological ends, and this makes it odd to say that they depend on analogies with 
human mental ends. 
§8 Conclusions 
 In Chapter 5, I argued that the ontological question of whether one thing has 
a nature which is or isn’t wholly contained in another is really the question of 
ontological analyticity – whether an ideal reasoner, given the nature of the basal 
conditions, could derive from it the nature of some higher-level phenomenon using 
only analytic moves, like translation sentences and logical transitions. Neither the 
failure nor the success of ideal deducibility tests in themselves guarantee us any 
metaphysical conclusions, but they are ontologically significant only when we 
consider the deductive resources available to the ideal reasoner. Insofar as we are 
confident that we understand the nature of a higher-level phenomenon, and we are 
confident that we are not able to deduce it from the set of lower-level conditions 
which necessitate it using only analytic transitions, then we have prima facie reason 
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to believe that the higher-level phenomenon is emergent, a genuine ontological 
novelty.  
 In this chapter, I have argued that Biological functions supervene on the 
physical, but they are also by nature normative properties – properties which can 
only be deduced a priori from physical properties by non-analytic methods. Unless 
we wish to embrace anti-realism about biological functions, which comes at great 
cost, we ought to accept biological functions as a weak kind of ontological emergence.  
 Much like the case against emergence in any particular domain is most 
plausible when viewed against the backdrop of apparent reductions across the 
sciences, so also the case for emergence in a particular domain is most plausible 
when viewed against a backdrop of other apparent emergent phenomena across the 
sciences. In Chapter 7, I hope to paint this backdrop. I will to consider cases of weak 
emergence in a variety of other domains in the special sciences, as well as the 
emergence of representational accuracy and the emergence of instantiations of 
abstract properties, and argue that – much like biological functions – they should be 
viewed as ontologically significant.   
  366 
Chapter 7 
EMERGENCE EVERYWHERE 
§1. Introduction 
 A recurring objection to emergentism in the philosophy of mind has been that 
emergence invokes a novel, ad hoc sort of explanation for a single phenomenon. For 
instance, since J. J. C. Smart (1959) argued that fundamental laws linking low-level 
states to high-level states would be unlike the other fundamental laws in the 
sciences – the suggestion has a “fishy smell” to it. Holding that consciousness 
emerges from the physical – that it supervenes upon it, and yet has some novelty in 
its nature387 – seems to offer no gains in explanatory power over a simpler identity 
theory, violating Occam’s razor. Emergence is simply not the sort of explanation 
which regularly appears outside of the philosophy of mind. 
 This objection may be becoming outdated. Emergence is the sort of 
explanation which appears outside of the philosophy of mind. It is no longer a one-
time ad hoc form of explanation applied only to the case of phenomenal 
consciousness, but an explanation used across a wide spectrum of fields of inquiry, 
from the life sciences to the social sciences. Elsewhere in philosophy, emergence 
accurately captures mainstream views in meta-ethics and the study of 
intentionality. Emergence is everywhere. Relating the case of consciousness to these 
other cases gives “it emerges” greater explanatory weight, possibly enough to justify 
the addition to our ontology. 
                                            
387 See chapter 2 for discussion of the relevant definition of ‘supervenience’, and 
chapter 4 for discussion of the relevant definition of ‘novelty in its nature’. 
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 In general, philosophers of mind have tended to push back against the 
suggestion that the “weak” sense of “emergence” in the special sciences is an 
ontological concept, in the same way in which the “strong” sense of emergence which 
is supposed to hold for consciousness is ontological. In Chapter 5, I laid the 
groundwork for admitting a kind of ontological weak emergence, on which the 
emergent facts are deducible a priori from the underlying facts they supervene upon 
(hence “weak” as opposed to “strong”388), but this deduction is not possible by means 
of analysis389 alone (for instance, it requires a form of simulation), indicating that 
some part of the nature of the emergent phenomenon is something over and above 
the nature of its basal conditions. In this regard, while the emergence of 
consciousness is of a stronger kind than the emergence of computational patterns, 
both can be regarded as ontologically significant.  
 In Chapter 6, I applied this to a particular case, and argued that biological 
functions, while grounded in facts about their composition and an evolutionary 
history of natural selection, should be regarded as a case of ontological weak 
emergence. Insofar as biological functions are regarded as both real and as 
essentially normative, they should not be regarded as ontologically reducible to the 
facts about their composition and history. A major section of my argument was 
                                            
388 Insofar as “strong” emergence indicates the impossibility of an a priori 
deduction, even in principle. 
389 I use both “synthetic” and “analytic” in a specialized, ontological sense, with 
respect to the essential definitions of things as opposed to conceptual or linguistic 
meanings. See Chapter 4. 
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devoted to dissociating the emergentist view of biological functions from common 
abuses of teleological explanations. For instance, I rejected the claim that 
teleological properties in nature could play a causal explanatory role over and above 
the causal explanatory role played by their basal conditions. Nonetheless, I held 
they should be regarded as having a distinct nature from those basal conditions, 
because they play a role in non-causal forms of explanation which are ineliminable 
from the practice of biology, a role which their non-normative basal conditions can 
not fill. 
 I have two goals in this chapter. The first is to give the reader a picture of 
how wide a range of phenomena the concept of emergence can explain outside of the 
philosophy of mind. My discussion will be broad rather than deep. The second is to 
show in each case that the emergent phenomenon is (i) essentially normative in a 
way which its basal conditions are not, and (ii) cannot be eliminated from the field of 
inquiry, and so, insofar as one regards the field as studying real phenomena, as 
opposed to convenient fictions or projections of the researcher’s psychology, the 
emergent phenomenon should be regarded as real as well. 
 I will focus my discussion of the role of emergence in the special sciences: 
computational, natural, and social. Near the end of the chapter, I will reflect briefly 
on other philosophical debates outside of the philosophy of mind where emergentist 
thinking holds some promise – such as those over the nature of intentionality, the 
presence of concrete instantiations of abstract properties, and Moorean non-
naturalist views in meta-ethics.  Put together, I hope the resulting picture will 
provide a more accurate backdrop for future discussions of emergence in the 
philosophy of mind. 
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§2. Emergence and Patterns 
2.1 Computational Patterns 
 The so-called “re-emergence” of emergence from intellectual dormancy over 
recent years has been fueled most notably by the success of emergence at explaining 
phenomena in computational sciences. Emergent behavior has been considered “one 
of the fundamental characteristics”390 of an Artificial life system, and is the basis of 
most Artificial life studies.391 Emergence is used to describe the appearance of high-
level “life like” phenomena in a purely computational system where every event is 
fully determined by low-level rules. 
 The most prominent example of emergent computational patterns can be 
found in cellular automata. Cellular automata were developed by Stanislaw Ulam 
and John von Neumann in the middle of the twentieth century.392  Ronald, Sipper, 
and Capcarrere describe them in this way: 
 
a cellular automaton consists of an array of cells, each of which can be in one 
of a finite number of possible states, updated synchronously in discrete time 
steps according to a local, identical interaction rule. The state of a cell at the 
next time step is determined by the current states of a surrounding 
neighborhood of cells.393 
                                            
390 Assad and Packard (1992), 231 
391 ibid. 
392 See Ronald, Sipper, and Capcarrere (2008), 294 
393 ibid. 
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 Popularized by Conway’s “Game of Life”394, cellular automata are noted for 
giving rise to complex two-dimensional patterns – “gliders”, “puffers”, “blinkers”, and 
“glider guns” – whose behavior follows predictable patterns at the macro-scale, but is 
not readily predictable from the states of the cells which compose them and their 
local interaction rules. 
 Thus, Mark Bedau (2008) cites many properties of cellular automata as 
examples of “weak emergence”, systems whose behavior “cannot be determined by an 
computation that is essentially simpler than the intrinsic natural computational 
process by which the system’s behavior is generated.”395 For instance, the property of 
indefinite growth – “glider guns” have this property, since a configuration consisting 
of only a glider gun will spawn new gliders indefinitely, but a configuration 
consisting only of “blinkers” will not exhibit this sort of indefinite growth. 
Nonetheless, there is no way to predict which patterns will or won’t exhibit 
indefinite growth without actually running the computational simulation.396 
 Running a simulation and watching the outcome is a synthetic procedure, 
rather than an analytic procedure.397 Assuming the natures of computational 
                                            
394 ibid., 295 
395 Bedau (2008), 162 
396 ibid., 163 
397 See discussion on this topic in Chapter 4. Of course, each step of the 
simulation is analytic and a priori: it follows directly by application of the rules. 
However, the process of running the situation in order to see what happens – a kind 
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patterns are transparent to us, it follows that these patterns are ontologically 
synthetic with respect to their basal conditions. Thus, by my account, Bedau’s “weak 
emergence” is rightly categorized as a kind of ontological emergence: there is some 
small novelty in the nature of the glider gun which is not present in the nature of its 
base. 
 Of course, there is a tendency to identify the source of emergent patterns in 
the observer, rather than in the phenomenon itself. Ronald, Sipper, and Capcarrere 
(2008) argue that emergence lies in the phenomenology of “surprise” experienced by 
an observer who perceives it given a certain epistemic background.398 However, it 
may be that these patterns are represented as surprising because they are 
ontologically something over and above their component parts: surprise is the result, 
not the constitutive cause, of emergence. The pattern becomes unsurprising only 
when someone is in an epistemic position to have the synthetic bridge laws needed 
to predict it. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
of experimentation or “trial and error” – is a posteriori. Having seen how the 
outcome of the simulation follows a priori from the rules and starting conditions, the 
belief that the simulation will have such an outcome may then be justified a priori. 
However, the proposition that the simulation has such an outcome remains 
synthetic: the outcome is not contained in the rules or starting conditions, as shown 
by the fact that it could never have been learned by any means except an a posteriori 
experiment. 
398 Ronald, Sipper, and Capcarrere (2008), 299-301 
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2.2 Natural Patterns 
 Many patterns in nature have been discussed as possible examples of 
emergence: the waves in sand dunes or bodies of water, the shape of a hurricane, the 
formations of flocks of birds or schools of fish, or the mounds constructed by 
termites.399 Often, it is found that these formations are predictable, but only by 
means of the same sorts of computer simulations used to generate emergent 
computational patterns. Once again, the procedure by which they are deduced is 
synthetic rather than analytic.400 
 For example, defending the claim that there are genuine novelties in nature, 
James Crutchfield cites as emergent “the convective rolls of Benard and Couette 
fluid flows, the more complicated flow structures observed in weak turbulence, the 
spiral waves and Turing patterns produced in oscillating chemical reactions, the 
statistical order parameters describing phase transitions, and the forms appearing 
in biological morphogenesis.”401  
 Even in these fields of study very close to physics where no one is tempted to 
regard phenomena as remotely “spooky”, we find a kind of difficulty in predicting the 
qualities of the phenomena which arise given only a knowledge of various 
component parts. While natural patterns are physical things with largely physical 
natures, insofar as part of what they are is a pattern, they may be regarded as 
                                            
399 Crutchfield (2008), 269 
400 See Chapter 4 on this topic. 
401 ibid., 270 
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having some novel element in their nature which is something over and above their 
physical nature. 
2.3 Chemical Patterns 
 In Chemistry, Anderson (1972) discusses the distinction between the sort of 
reductionism which is accepted for chemical explanations – that everything can be 
fully explained in terms of physical particles and fundamental laws – and the 
“constructionist thesis” that one could start from those laws and reconstruct the 
universe. In fact, Anderson argues, chemistry is not always constructible in this 
way. For instance, there is a failure of symmetry in the distinction between “left-
handed” and “right-handed” sugar molecules or the existence of an electric dipole 
moment.402 Similarly, Scerri (2006) argues that Brian McLaughlin (1992) has 
oversimplified the extent to which chemical properties are reducible to quantum 
mechanics, misstated the importance of quantum mechanical explanations in 
chemistry to the decline of emergentism, and falsely implied that quantum 
chemistry enables predictions of how two elements might react together. In the 
current state of quantum chemistry: 
 
. . . we can predict particular properties such as ionization energies but not 
chemical behavior.  In the case of compounds what can be achieved is an 
accurate estimate, and in many cases even predictions, regarding specific 
properties in the compounds that are known to have formed between the 
                                            
402 Anderson (1972). Similar failures of symmetry are discussed in the context of 
emergence by Morrison (2006). 
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elements in question.  Quantum mechanics cannot yet predict what 
compounds will actually form. Broad’s complaint about the inability of 
mechanistic or classical chemistry to predict the properties of elements or the 
outcome of chemical reactions between any two given elements remains 
unanswered to this day. 403 
 
 I have no reason to doubt that in a future or idealized chemistry all natural 
patterns and behaviors of chemical compounds will be predictable on the basis of 
fundamental physics, given that so many are predictable in this way, even if it is 
correct that some are not yet. However, if we find that the prediction requires 
synthetic bridge statements, rather than analysis, we may regard novel chemical 
patterns as a very weak kind of ontological emergence. 
§3 Natural Norms in the Life Sciences 
3.1 Natural Norms 
 In one sense, physics is the most fundamental science, and all of biology can 
be, and is being, reduced to physics. We can explain hereditary genetics in terms of 
DNA, DNA in terms of chemistry, and chemistry in terms of physics. In another 
sense, biology is something more than physics. A revolution in quantum physics is 
unlikely to change biological theories of natural selection. To understand peacock 
tails, it is more important to understand competition for mating privileges than it is 
the physio-chemistry of feathers. To understand the physical structure of a neuron, 
                                            
403 Scerri (2006), 6. Emphasis added. 
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it is helpful to know what the brain is for.404 Reducing biology to simple fundamental 
physical laws does not give us the ability to reconstruct all of biology given only the 
laws. 
 Bauchau (2006) has argued that is compatible to be a reductionist about 
biology in the former sense and an emergentist in the latter sense. If we accept 
emergentism about the computational patterns in artificial life simulations, and 
artificial life provides a successful model for biological life405, then we should regard 
biological life as emergent in the same way: it can be predicted a priori from the 
fundamental laws only by means of simulation.406 This is a weaker kind of 
emergence – a kind which is compatible with a sense of reduction – but one which is 
ontologically significant: there is something about the nature of biological 
phenomena which is not merely analytic give the nature of lower level phenomena. 
 Likewise, Mayr (1996) in defending the autonomy of biology from physics, 
holds that biological concepts are not reducible to the concepts of physics, 
particularly given biology’s interest in distant historical causes as well as proximate 
causes, and that: 
 
Many properties of systems, such as higher levels of integration, cannot be 
explained by a study of their isolated components. The integration of systems 
results in the emergence of new properties because “the whole is [often] more 
                                            
404 Bauchau (2006), 37 
405 Heudin (2006), among many others, holds that it does so. 
406 ibid. 
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than the sum of the parts.” The emergence of new properties is characteristic 
of higher levels in any hierarchy of systems, even in inanimate ones.407 
 
 What is distinctive about these biological properties? In this section, I hope to 
make the case that it is a normative element which is an essential part of biological 
properties but not present in physical properties. What I advocate have sometimes 
been called “natural norms”.  
 Natural norms do not depend upon any agent’s having established, intended, 
appreciated, understood, or accepted the norm.408 At the same time, they are not a 
purely descriptive notion: they are something over and above a statistical average. 
Like the norms of biological function discussed in Chapter 5 (e.g., “the heart should 
pump blood”), these normative properties are generally acknowledged to supervene 
upon the fundamental physical facts, yet are not likely to be analytically derivable 
from the fundamental physical facts. Insofar as there is a case to be made that these 
natural norms are real and necessary for scientific explanations, there is a case to be 
made that natural norms generally – like biological functions specifically – are 
emergent. 
 In her final book, Natural Goodness (2003), Philippa Foot notably dedicated a 
chapter to the topic of “Natural Norms”. Foot’s discussion focuses on the work of 
Michael Thompson (1995) on species and generics. Generics are statements like 
“Tigers have stripes” which give defining characteristics of species membership, yet 
                                            
407 Mayr (1996), 102 
408 In this, I align with Burge (2010), 314-315 
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remain true even when individual members of the species violate the criteria (some 
tigers don’t have stripes). Thompson observes that attributing species membership 
to an individual requires the individual to meet some, but not all, of these (often 
changing) criteria, making the judgment a normative one. Foot draws out the 
conclusion that biology is rich with normative properties which make reference to a 
role in the life cycle of a given species. Thus, an owl should have a certain quality of 
vision and a deer a certain degree of swiftness – any less is a defect – insofar as 
these play a role in hunting (for the owl) and fleeing from predators (for the deer), 
parts of the species’ respective life cycles.409 
 The work of Fransisco Varela and others on autopoiesis resonates with 
emergentist themes.410 Biologists routinely switch between two domains: the domain 
of physical and chemical laws as such, and the specifically biological domain which 
selects certain physical and chemical events as especially significant (a normative 
quality). Varela considers a study of a bacterium swimming in a sucrose gradient. 
The properties studied by the researcher, such as flagellar beat, are only interesting 
because the bacterium as a unit points to these properties as especially relevant; 
apart from the bacterium as a unit, properties like flagellar beat are no more 
significant than any other physical or chemical transformations. Selecting one 
compound of micro-level properties like this to form an especially “significant” 
macro-level whole is something that some believe is essentially perspectival. Varela 
                                            
409 Foot (2003), 25-30 
410 For an overview of the history and motivations behind this approach, see 
Damiano (2012) 
  378 
agrees, but rejects the typical psychologistic view on which this perspectival quality 
is located in the observer. Instead, he locates the perspectival quality in the 
“autopoietic system” itself – roughly, the bacterium is a kind of self-organizing unity 
which depends upon an underlying set of physical-chemical properties, and yet 
actively maintains its distinct identity from them through a kind of reflexive 
feedback.411 While there are obvious similarities between this view and 
emergentism, the form of emergentism I discuss here is not committed to biological 
entities or norms having an essentially perspectival quality. 
 I will not be drawing further from the literature surrounding the work of Foot 
or Varela, and leave it for the reader to determine to what extent either of these 
views are consistent with the form of emergentism I am advocating. One will notice 
both similarities and contrasts with some of the examples of “natural norms” in the 
life sciences which I now turn to. 
 For convenience, I have sorted uses of natural norms in the life sciences into 
six categories: natural expectations, natural groupings, norms of group membership, 
natural roles, norms of success and failure, and norms of directed action. Many of 
these categories arguably apply to higher-level phenomena as well, like traffic 
patterns and social groups (and perhaps some lower-level phenomena too, like 
geological or climatic patterns), but I will leave it to the reader to apply these to 
other domains. 
 
 
                                            
411 Varela (1992) 
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 3.2  Natural Expectations 
 Suppose a tree is planted by a creek. One year, it rains at normal levels, but 
the creek’s path is diverted away from the tree by natural forces. The tree dies for 
lack of water. What caused the tree’s death? The diversion of the creek, obviously: 
were it not for that, the tree would not have died. Of course, it’s also true that, had it 
rained more than usual, the tree would have survived. But there is no reason to 
expect more rain, whereas it is in some sense natural to expect the creek to continue 
on its path. Causation often seems to depend on a background of natural 
expectations – a way that things are normally “supposed to go”, in the absence of 
intervention or manipulation. These need not be expectations held by a subject. A 
natural expectation is whatever state of affairs a natural system makes it 
reasonable to expect, whether anyone expects it or not.412 Natural expectations are 
norms which emerge from statistical and probabilistic properties, but are not 
themselves merely statistical properties. 
 Recently, Christopher Hitchcock and Joshua Knobe (2009) have argued, 
using survey data, that that the ordinary folk concept of causation is heavily 
influenced by normative considerations – where these norms can be part of the way 
the world is “set up”, without any implication of moral blameworthiness. Consider 
the following case: 
 
                                            
412 Two distinct natural systems may thus give conflicting natural expectations: it 
is reasonable to expect it to be a sunny day outside, given average climate patterns, 
yet not reasonable, given a local weather system. 
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A machine is set up in such a way that it will short circuit if both the black 
wire and the red wire touch the battery at the same time. The machine will 
not short circuit if just one of these wires touches the battery. The black wire 
is designated as the one that is supposed to touch the battery, while the red 
wire is supposed to remain in some other part of the machine. One day, the 
black wire and the red wire both end up touching the battery at the same 
time. There is a short circuit. 
 
. . . people were more willing to say that the red wire touching the battery 
caused the short circuit than they were to say that the black wire touching 
the battery caused the short circuit.413  
 
 Both of the following counterfactuals are true: “were the red wire not to touch 
the battery, the machine wouldn’t have short circuited” and “were the black wire not 
to touch the battery, the machine wouldn’t have short circuited.” These represent 
two equally true causal dependence claims. However, the fact that the black wire is 
supposed to touch the battery and not the red wire means that the red wire is more 
causally responsible than the black wire for the short circuit, leading to the 
judgment that it is more appropriately designated as the cause. 
 There doesn’t seem to be anything especially “folksy” about this ordinary 
concept of causation – it is the same concept which figures in many scientific 
explanations. Whenever it is more natural to expect that p will occur than that q will 
                                            
413 Hitchcock, C., & Knobe, J. (2009), page 28 of manuscript. 
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occur, where some effect r causally depends on both p and q, q will be deemed more 
causally responsible for r than p. An infestation of invasive bark beetles is causally 
responsible for the death of the trees in the forest, more so than trees’ absence of 
natural anti-beetle defenses. The failure to find shelter is causally responsible for 
the squirrel’s death by hypothermia, more so than the predictable weather patterns 
of an average cold winter. The absence of insulin is more responsible for the 
symptoms of type 1 diabetes than the mere presence of glucose in the blood: it is 
reasonable to expect glucose (a person’s got to eat), and reasonable to expect insulin 
(that is how the body is supposed to function). This would remain true even if, at 
some future point, a majority of the human population were to suffer from type 1 
diabetes. 
 Again, suppose that there are two variants of a gene, r and r*, and that 
people with r* (‘non-readers’) suffer from a condition that makes them less likely to 
learn to read than people with r (‘readers’). Our background knowledge tells us that 
it is natural to expect that people will have the ability to learn to read if taught. It 
seems appropriate to say that r* is the cause of why the non-readers do not read, 
even in cases where therapy might be available to overcome the effects of r*. 
However, it does not seem appropriate to say that r is the cause of why the readers 
read, because there are many other events which are less natural to expect than 
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having r, such as a decent education, which are thus more causally responsible for 
reading than r.414 
 Ordinary causation415 plays a role in the life sciences. Ordinary causation 
depends on a background of natural expectations – a sense of what is “normal”. 
Natural expectations are normative properties which emerge from statistical 
properties, but are themselves statistical properties. So, emergent natural norms 
play a role in the life sciences. 
3.3 Natural Groupings 
 From these causal patterns or natural expectations of a system, there emerge 
certain natural groupings of molecules into cells, cells into tissues, tissues into 
organs, and even collections of individual organisms into species. Again, by 
“groupings”, I do not mean to imply that there must be some mental activity of 
grouping carried out by a subject. I mean that there is a normative property which 
specifies a certain grouping as the most natural one. In the absence of any norm, 
there is no rule to specify grouping neighboring cells of a similar sort into a single 
instance of bone tissue, as opposed to grouping together some of the cells in the bone 
area with other nearby cells in the bloodstream, or distant cells in the brain. There 
is no law of physics which demands we consider the stomach lining to be part of the 
                                            
414 This example is adapted from James Woodward (2010), who attributes it to 
Richard Dawkins. Woodward’s own account of causation, and of this case, is far more 
sophisticated than the account I offer here. 
415 As opposed to specialized uses of “causation” that involve transfers of force or 
energy and apply in physics. 
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stomach, but not the beef tripe being digested in the stomach. Physics gives us no 
non-arbitrary reason to regard one cat as a member of felis catus along with the 
other cats, as opposed to a member of the species delphinapterus leucas alongside 
the beluga whales. Yet these are not arbitrary choices. 
 Consider the apparent paradox of cell differentiation: that there exist cells of 
different types within a single organism, even though each cell contains the same 
genetic information.416 Liver cells, red blood cells, and neurons are all very different 
groups of cells – but the chromosomes within each do not differ. One cannot predict 
given only the genetic composition of the cell what sort of cell it will become. Rather, 
the presence or absence of various proteins in the cell will cause different genes in 
the cell’s DNA to be expressed or repressed, and the expression or repression of one 
will cause the presence or absence of other proteins, which in turn cause the next 
gene to be expressed or repressed, and so on.417 In the end, about a third of the genes 
are expressed. (The red blood cells end up with hemoglobin; the others don’t). Cells 
will change which genes are expressed by responding to external signals. The 
process which gets us from identical DNA to distinct groups of cells with differing 
biological functions could be modelled as a network of cellular automata.418 In other 
words, the nature of a given cell emerges from processes and interactions within the 
whole complex system responsible for assigning distinctive functions, not simply its 
                                            
416 Weisbuch (2006) 
417 See Albert (2002), Chapter 7. 
418 Weisbuch (2006) 
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material composition. Groupings into liver cells, kidney cells, etc., are a kind of 
natural norm. 
 Species differentiation provides another good example of a “natural 
grouping.” Ernst Mayr, who is responsible for formulating the concept of a species 
which is dominant in modern biology, insisted that species are real, concrete 
phenomena of nature, the principle units of evolutionary laws, not arbitrary 
artifacts of the human mind.419 That species change over time, but are not mere 
aggregates of their members, is consistent with an emergentist view on which 
species depend on their members for their existence (a new species can emerge) and 
yet have a nature over and above them. Thus, Mayr endorses emergentism as one of 
the “two pillars of the explanatory framework of modern biology,” next to genetics.420 
 The same considerations also apply to larger-scale natural groupings. The 
hierarchy of natural kinds and the divisions into vertebrate and invertebrate, 
mammal and reptile and so forth, all involve a kind of grouping norm which is not 
found in any individual species. 
 Biology and other life sciences could go nowhere if we were not for directing 
research attention to these groupings – but the groupings themselves are not part of 
the laws of physics.  Some groupings are simply more natural than others given our 
knowledge of the whole system. Grouping things together in a “natural” way is not a 
                                            
419 Mayr (1996b), 262-263 
420 Mayr (1997), 19. He defines emergence as follows: “that in a structured 
system, new properties emerge at higher levels of integration which could not have 
been predicted from a knowledge of the lower-level components. 
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merely analytic procedure given the underlying causal patterns and qualities of the 
component parts, but a synthetic one. So, emergent natural norms are part of the 
life sciences. 
3.4  Norms of Group Membership 
 Given these groupings, there arise norms which apply to the particular 
members of the group. These groupings emerge from the kind as a whole and not 
from the properties of the individual member. For example, even though a dog may 
be born with only three legs due to a genetic defect, and nothing in the composition 
of the dog indicates that it ought to have four legs, we still regard it as a genetic 
defect or anomaly, because it is normal for members of the class of dogs to have four 
legs. 
 Consider how population thinking has replaced typological thinking in 
biology.421 The Aristotelian brand of essentialism about species identification has 
been abandoned – biologists no longer look for one single trait in common between 
all individuals within a species, but instead recognize that the whole population of 
the species is more fundamental. Instead of reducing species membership to low-
level properties of individual species members, the whole population is recognized as 
having the properties which are characteristic of a species. The whole organized 
population of a species is the entity subject to evolutionary laws. While the 
population has the properties it has because of the properties of its individual 
members, the whole population in turn gives rise to certain normative properties for 
its members. For example, it is normal that a particular cat will groom itself, and 
                                            
421 see Mayr (1959) and Sober (1980) 
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that a particular sparrow will fly. This is because cats (as a species) groom 
themselves, and sparrows (as a species) fly. An individual cat or sparrow may fail to 
follow the norm. But understanding the norm – which arises from the whole species 
– is an ineliminable part of understanding why particular species members do the 
things they do. The norm for species members is more than an approximation or 
generalization from the properties of the individuals in the species – it’s partly 
definitive of what the whole population of the species is.  
 The older, morphological conception of a species focused on identifying 
definitional traits – necessary and sufficient conditions which some organism had to 
have to be a member of the species. On this conception, it would be analytic, given 
that Charlie is a cat, that Charlie has the various cat-properties. However, this 
conception does not account for gradual species changes or adaptations. On Mayr’s 
modern definition, “species are groups of interbreeding natural populations that are 
reproductively isolated from other groups”.422 Notably, “reproductive isolation” does 
not rule out individual cases of hybridization between members of related species – 
it is the normal state for the species as a whole. The morphological characteristics of 
species (coloration, number of legs, keen sense of smell) are normative, but not 
definitional.  
 Norms of group membership are a standard part of contemporary biology. 
The fact that they are fuzzy and that they change over time through evolutionary 
processes (unlike Aristotelian views), yet are not mere statistical properties of their 
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aggregated members (unlike reductivist views), supports the claim that they are 
emergent properties. 
3.5 Natural Roles 
 One particular norm of group membership that can emerge is that of a 
natural role within the group. Consider the roles played by mitochondria within 
cells, the roles an organ within a physiological system, or the roles of a system 
within the life of the body as a whole. Or, at a larger scale, consider an ant colony. 
Within the colony, various ants will have different natural roles. Ants do not have 
rich conscious lives, so far as we know, nor do they collaborate together to distribute 
the various roles. Nonetheless, through a kind of biological signaling system, the 
colony acts as a whole, distributing roles to the various members. 
 A “role” in this sense is more than just a series of causes and effects, though 
it may supervene upon causal patterns. It relates what the particular member does 
to the activities of the group or system as a whole.  
 In Chapter 6, I discussed biological functions. The sense of “biological 
function” I relied upon in that chapter is sometimes called the selected effect (SE) 
model or etiological model,423 grounded in a history of natural selection. For 
example, the eye is for seeing, and in seeing it fills its role in the body, and this ‘for 
seeing’ is grounded in the contribution of seeing (and thus the eye) to the 
evolutionary fitness of the ancestors of the organism. Biological functions in this 
sense are one type of natural role property. However, there is a broader sense of 
“biological function” which is sometimes used, which grounds the function in its 
                                            
423 Brandon (2006), 267 
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causal role (CR) within a more complex system.424 This is a different type of natural 
role property. As I noted in Chapter 6, the notion of a “causal role” is dependent 
upon some underlying teleological explanation.425 
 For example, features of the Australian landscape play a (CR) function in the 
life-cycles of its invasive rabbit population, even though they have no (SE) function 
in their lives, insofar as these landscape features have no historical connection to 
their evolution. Another example comes from Brandon (2006): 
 
Consider the characteristic shape of some particular species of tree, e.g. the 
American beech. That shape is a product of the branching pattern of the tree, 
in particular, the distance between branch points and the angles of the 
branches. These in turn are properties of the growth dynamics of the 
meristem. In other words, the overall shape of the tree emerges from the 
dynamics of meristematic growth.  
 
Let us suppose that natural selection has played no role in molding the 
dynamics of meristem growth in the American beech. That being the case, 
                                            
424 The causal role account of function remains controversial. Advocates of this 
approach include Brandon (2006), and Amundson and Lauder (1994); the account 
has its origins in Cummins (1975). 
425 In Chapter 4, section 4.1, I argued that every event causally depends on a 
whole series of events, but only a few of these causal dependencies count as causal 
“roles”, because they are relevant to the teleology of some larger system.  
  389 
then clearly the meristem growth pattern has no SE function, has no 
evolutionary purpose. But it does have a CR function in determining the 
overall shape of the tree. That is because à capacity of the large system, the 
overall shape of the tree, is explained in terms of the growth patterns of the 
meristems. 426 
 
 At the many different levels at which they occur, natural roles provide 
examples of “natural norms” which play an essential role in scientific explanations of 
the world. Because they are so thoroughly natural (that is, not the least bit spooky 
or mysterious) it may be easy to overlook their normativity, an essential feature of 
“roles” but not of physical processes as such. 
3.6 Norms of Success and Failure 
 Closely related to the idea of a natural role or function is the notion of 
“success” at fulfilling that role or achieving that function. This applies whether the 
“end” at which the function aims is promoting fitness on a particular occasion or not. 
Success and failure should be understood as criteria of adequacy – the system 
succeeds by doing “well-enough” to achieve its function or role. Obviously, one 
system might be better than another at fulfilling a specified function. Norms of 
success and failure exist at every level at which a natural role or function exists. 
 It is not controversial to hold that there is a sense of “success” or “failure” 
with respect to biological functions that promote fitness, but it may help to see that 
success and failure are norms that can arise independent of whether an individual 
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organism’s fitness is enhanced by success. For instance, at the organ level, the lungs 
and circulatory system succeed in fulfilling their role in respiration, even if a 
creature breathes in a toxic gas that is quickly carried by the bloodstream to the 
brain, damaging fitness. At the level of a group of organisms, among wolves, the role 
of mating is reserved for the alpha-female.427 While the alpha-female succeeds at its 
role by mating, the other females in the pack succeed at their role by not-mating – 
even though this does not maximize their individual fitness.428 At an even higher 
level, within a complex ecosystem, the various parts of the ecosystem – the flora and 
fauna, the river itself – may each play a role in the overall health of the ecosystem, 
at which they can succeed or fail. A species may fail at this role by being too 
successful at enhancing its own fitness: as in the case of the deer which overrun the 
forest. Thus, there are measures of success and failure at biological roles which do 
not appeal to maximizing individual fitness on a particular occasion. 
 The laws governing successes and failures of these sorts can be quite robust 
and justify many of our predictions. However, categories like “success” and “failure” 
are undeniably normative. Insofar as we accept laws of this sort as real, not merely 
convenient fictions, we should accept a kind of emergent natural norm. 
3.7 Norms of Directed Action 
 The life sciences do not merely study events. They also study the actions of 
organisms as a whole. Pacific salmon swim upstream in order to spawn. Canada 
geese migrate north for the summer, and south for the winter. Tyler Burge (2010) 
                                            
427 Derix, R., Van Hooff, J., De Vries, H., and Wensing, J. (1993). 
428 Of course, given the scarcity of prey, it does maximize the fitness of the pack. 
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has developed the notion of primitive agency: the directed action of a whole 
organism towards some end, even if the end is in no sense represented by the agent. 
A whole variety of “natural norms” arise once a primitive agent has entered the 
scene. For instance: 
 Consistency. The actions of a primitive agent should be consistent. A fox 
chasing its prey should not stop to take a drink of water. A plant should not grow 
roots away from the source of water. The salmon do not alternate between 
swimming up and down the stream at the same time. Organisms which do not act 
with this sort of “natural rationality” do not often survive to reproduce. Those that 
do survive, follow this normative standard by acting in a way that does not 
contradict the goal of their action.429 
 Success. Just a thing can be successful or unsuccessful at fulfilling its natural 
role or function, a primitive agent can perform an action in a way which is successful 
or unsuccessful at achieving the goal of the action. The salmon may succeed at 
making it upstream, or run out of energy. The fox may catch its prey, or lose it. Note 
that an animal’s success at performing an action does not imply success at fulfilling 
its biological function, or vice versa. Suppose the prey is part of a fox-hunter’s plot to 
catch and shoot the fox. In this case, the fox which succeeds at the action fails at its 
biological function, and the fox which fails the action enhances likelihood of survival. 
 Benefits. We may also quantify over goals of an action or goals for an 
organism, and ask whether the action was beneficial or harmful for the organism. 
                                            
429 Notice that it is not logical consistency or logical contradiction we are talking 
about here: there is no contradiction in swimming upstream and downstream. 
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This is a normative category – though not necessarily one with any prescriptive 
force. In asking how much the fox benefits from catching the prey, we are not asking 
how much pleasure the fox experienced from the kill and the taste of the meat, but 
what functions the fox is more able to fulfill as a result: perhaps more of its young 
will survive. This allows us to weigh the trade-offs in terms of harm and benefit for 
an organism and try to predict what strategies it will use to maximize its benefits.430 
 Similar sets of norms apply not only to individual actions, but to coordinated 
group actions, such as the migration of the Canada geese. In these cases, 
consistency, success and failure, and benefit and harm are measured with respect to 
the group, rather than the individual. 
 In all of these cases, we can give a good, naturalistic explanation for why the 
organism takes the action it does and why the corresponding norm applies to that 
action.431 The natural norm itself, however, has a nature which is not to be found in 
the phenomena which appear in the underlying explanation. For this reason, it can 
be regarded as emergent. 
 
                                            
430 I don’t mean this list to be exhaustive. Depending upon the organism, more 
specific natural norms may arise for the actions of that organism.   
431 One should not misinterpret this as meaning that the norms are just 
shorthand for the corresponding explanation, or that the normativity itself is 
naturalistically reducible in some way, or that the normativity is contributed 
entirely by the observer’s interpretive stance (this later view is found in Dennett 
(1989)). 
  393 
§4 Emergence and the Social Sciences 
4.1  Overview 
 I wish to turn now to a few examples from the social sciences432 where 
emergence can play an explanatory role. Obviously, the social sciences are about 
human society and activity, and human beings are conscious. So, consciousness 
(which I have been arguing is emergent) may need to be considered among the basal 
conditions for the emergence of complex social states – the state of a massive panic 
in a community, for example, supervenes upon the individual conscious panic-states 
of those in the community. However, the case for regarding social science 
explanations as emergent does not depend upon consciousness itself being emergent. 
Rather, emergence finds a place in the social sciences in describing how unintended 
macro-level group behaviors can arise from micro-level decisions.  
 I recognize that the concept of emergence is used in different ways in 
different social sciences, with greater and lesser degrees of controversy, and will not 
be able to explore debates within each field here. I will give a sampling of a few 
works in the social sciences and in the philosophy of social science which either 
explicitly use or strongly suggest emergentist themes.  
4.2  Sociology and Emergence 
 Talk of “emergence” is widespread in contemporary sociology. Because 
explaining the micro-macro link is so essential to the sociological enterprise, 
                                            
432 In this section, I will only be discussing emergent phenomena in those social 
sciences which do not involve the study of representational states – thus excluding 
linguistics and psychology. I will discuss these in section 5. 
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emergence is naturally invoked to explain the apparent micro-macro gap. However, 
the term “emergence” is often used in imprecise and conflicting ways.433 Helpfully, 
Keith Sawyer, in his article “Emergence in Sociology” (2001), clarifies the use of 
emergence in sociology and reconnects the discussion with the contemporary 
discussion of emergence in the philosophy of mind. Sawyer distinguishes two broad 
camps in sociology which utilize the notion of emergence. 
 (A) Among collectivist emergentists (so named because they tend to follow 
methodological collectivism), collective phenomena are “emergent” in that they 
depend upon the collaborative actions of individuals, but have properties which 
cannot be reduced to individual properties. Some methodological collectivists hold 
that only collective properties emerge, while others make the stronger claim that 
distinctive social kinds and entities emerge. 
 (B) Among individualist emergentists (so named because they tend to follow 
methodological individualism), collective phenomena are fully reducible and 
explainable in terms of the properties of individuals, yet are still in some sense 
“emergent”. 
 Sawyer recognizes that the contemporary use of emergence in the philosophy 
of mind is more in line with (A) than (B).434 He discusses various collectivist 
                                            
433 Sawyer (2001) 
434 ibid. 
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emergentists in sociology who at times have advocated for (A)435 and  suggests his 
own non-reductivistic brand of emergentism on this model. 
 To the extent that sociology accepts emergentist accounts of the micro-macro 
link like (A), it appears to support a strong kind of ontological emergence of 
collective properties (and, possibly, collective entities and kinds).436 
 To the extent that sociology tends instead towards emergentist accounts like 
(B), it either supports a kind of ontological weak emergence, like that in 
                                            
435 ibid. The major references are to Blau (1977, 1981); Bhaskar (1982); Archer 
(1995); additional papers besides these are cited. Sawyer alleges certain 
inconsistencies in their work, particularly when it comes to whether social entities 
should be regarded as real, whether they accept supervenience, how they account for 
causation, and how they understand reducibility. However, Sawyer’s own discussion 
is at times unclear on the relationship between reducibility, supervenience, and the 
ontological significance of emergence.  In more recent work, Sawyer (2005) has given 
further arguments in favor of emergence, which he interprets as a kind of “non-
reductive individualism”, but it is not clear that he has resolved these issues. 
Sawyer does offer the emergence of social networks and the emergence of “group 
mind” in improvisational theatre dialogues as examples of irreducibly social 
phenomena. 
436 However, it needs to clarify why social properties are supposed to be 
ontologically irreducible. Is it because they are essentially normative, or involve a 
kind of social intentionality? Why not say they are merely epistemically irreducible, 
without having a different nature? 
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computational patterns, or else it supports a merely epistemic kind of emergence. 
The answer depends on whether or not social properties are regarded as real, and 
whether they are ontologically reducible or only explanatorily reducible.437 
 While there is a great deal of clarification and precision needed about the role 
of emergence in sociology, it is a field which has made ample use of the concept. I 
will discuss some examples of type-A or “strong” emergence, followed by examples of 
type-B or “weak” emergence. 
4.3 Strong Emergence in Sociology 
 Durkheim is best known for his role in founding sociology as an independent 
discipline, autonomous from psychology. He defended the view that there were sui 
generis social facts, over and above the psychological facts about various individuals 
in society.438 He writes: 
 
[The autonomy of Sociology] implies that collective tendencies and thoughts 
are of a different nature from individual tendencies and thoughts, that the 
former have characteristics which the latter lack . . . society has no other 
                                            
437 If social properties are real, and yet only explanatorily but not ontologically 
reducible to individual actions, then they may be regarded as weakly ontologically 
emergent. However, if they are merely analytic constructs out of micro-level 
phenomena, or deducible from the actions of individuals, using analytic procedures 
alone, then they are at most epistemically emergent rather than ontologically 
emergent. 
438 Rosenberg (1993), 130-131  
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active forces than individuals; but individuals by combining form a psychical 
existence of a new species, which consequently has its own manner of 
thinking and feeling. Of course the elementary qualities of which the social 
fact consists are present in germ in individual minds. But the social fact 
emerges from them only when they have been transformed by association 
since it is only then that it appears. Association itself is also an active factor 
productive of special effects. In itself it is therefore something new.439 
 
 Durkheim can be interpreted as advocating a kind of strong emergentism on 
the basis of these and other comments.440 In the context of debates at the time about 
the ontological status of social facts, Durkheim seems to be seeking a middle ground 
between reductivistic individualism and Hegelian organicist holism. In Rules of the 
Sociological Method, he argues for a compromise view, where social facts are 
determined by the associations of individuals but have a sui generis nature. Sawyer 
(2002) notes that “Durkheim never used the term ‘emergence’; rather, his phrase ‘sui 
generis’ was used in a sense synonymous with contemporary uses of the term 
‘emergent.’”  
 In Suicide (1897), Durkheim sought empirical evidence for this sui generis 
character of social facts in a study of suicide rates. Of all things, suicide would seem 
to be a phenomenon best explained by the reasons given by individuals. However, he 
                                            
439 Durkheim (1897), 310. Emphasis added. 
440 Sawyer (2002), 227-228 cites a number of sources who take this interpretation 
of Durkheim. 
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observed that suicide rates were much higher for Protestants than Catholics, higher 
for officers than conscripts, and higher for the newly rich than the longtime poor. 
This remained true, even controlling for other reasonable-seeming factors. The 
individual reasons provided for suicide were the same in each case and fell in 
roughly the same proportions: family troubles, pain, love, jealousy, and so on. So, the 
cause of the difference had to involve something about the group, not the individual 
reasons given. Durkheim found this in the degree to which individuals were 
integrated into society and its social norms. Both Catholics and Protestants 
disapproved of suicide, but Catholics were more tightly integrated than Protestants 
into their system of norms. Army officers were more tightly integrated than 
conscripts into a system of norms which approved of a kind of self-sacrificial suicide 
for the good of the unit. And the newly rich found themselves detached from any 
system of norms at all – they were left normless and disoriented.441  Understanding 
the âme collective, or “group mind”, was necessary to understanding the behavior of 
the group.  
 Interestingly, Durkheim appears to have been sympathetic to early British 
Emergentism at the time,442 and defended a similar kind of downward causation for 
sociological entities. It is possible he endorsed a kind of supervenience of society on 
                                            
441 Rosenburg (1993), 131-133 
442 Durkheim (1895), 104 states: “there is between psychology and sociology the 
same break in continuity as between biology and the physiochemical sciences”, 
evidently an illusion to Lewes. 
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individuals, much as emergentists endorsed between the mind and the brain.443 If 
so, sociology as a discipline was founded on an emergentist ontology. 
 A more contemporary advocate of Type-A or “strong” emergence in 
contemporary sociology is Margaret Archer. Archer advocates a “morphogenetic” 
approach to social structure.444 On her account, social structures are emergent 
properties – although they are products of interactions by human individuals, they 
have distinct causal powers of their own. Social structures cannot be reduced to their 
individual components, and their powers cannot be reduced to the powers of 
individuals. No individual or aggregation of individuals may have the power to 
change a social phenomenon, but the social phenomenon most certainly may have 
the power to change them.445 David Elder-Vass, in defending Archer’s account, gives 
the following example: 
 
Customers, suppliers, and others who interact with an organization always 
do so through the human individuals who occupy roles within it, but the way 
they interact with these individuals is conditioned by their understanding 
that the role incumbents represent the organization concerned, that they act 
                                            
443 Sawyer (2002), 233, cites Durkheim’s essay "Individual and Collective 
Representations" (1898) 
444 Archer (1995). Unfortunately, Archer’s account of emergence seems to be taken 
straight out of Mill’s System of Logic, including making use of a (long outdated) 
analogy with the “emergent” chemical properties of water. 
445 Elder-Vass (2007) 
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on its behalf. Thus the existence of the organization also affects how these 
external individuals behave towards the individuals who are its parts. 446 
 
 Interestingly, the philosopher John Wisdom also advocated a kind of strong 
emergence for collective social properties. Responding to the individualism of Karl 
Popper447, Wisdom (1970) advocated a brand of “emergentism” in the social sciences 
as a compromise between the holistic defense of sui generis social phenomena and 
the individualist’s opposition to independent social entities. According to Wisdom, 
the “social pathology of Great Britain” (a kind of collective, post-imperial ennui) was 
a phenomenon whose causes could only be discussed and debated at the level of the 
nation, not the level of individual psychology. What made this social pathology 
“emergent” was that it was not merely an unintended consequence of individual 
                                            
446 Elder-Vass (2007) 
447 Popper was a strong proponent of individualism in the social sciences: for him, 
society really was just the sum of its members. While he acknowledged that there 
could be unintended consequences to the actions of individuals – a kind of “invisible 
hand” – the social facts were ultimately just collected facts about the members of a 
society. However, his strong individualism may have been based on a belief that it 
was the only alternative an extreme holism and “historicism”, the Hegelian or 
Marxist approach to social science on which society was an organic unit following a 
deterministic historical path, independent of the individuals in it. See Thornton, 
Stephen (2011) 
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behaviors, but something whose nature could never have been predicted or deduced 
considering only the actions of individuals: 
 
. . . a psycho-social depression, is an example of such an emergent 
phenomenon. It is not at all just a social reflection of widespread individual 
depression. It is not just a surprising occurrence that might have been 
otherwise; it is not the kind of thing at all that might or might not be 
expected. It is a different order of eventuality. And not only is it 
unforeseeable but it may even be unrecognized (like a psychological 
depression) after it has arisen. (And it may exercise some control over our 
behavior without our being aware of it).448 
 
 I have categorized these views as advocating “strong” emergence, insofar as 
they hold that the sociological facts are not ideally deducible a priori from the 
underlying relations between individuals. I am a bit wary of framing sociological 
emergence in this way – it seems quite plausible to me that an ideal reasoner with 
infinite computing powers, given a complete knowledge of the underlying facts about 
individuals (including their mental states), could deduce the social facts by a 
running through a kind of “mental simulation” of the entire social system. It is more 
likely that what these authors have in mind is that no deduction of the social facts 
could ever be performed in practice, because the deduction would require access to 
ontological synthetic bridge laws which we do not have access to (such as those we 
                                            
448 Wisdom (1970), 292 
  402 
come to by watching a simulation), not a mere analysis of facts about individuals. In 
this sense, it is characterized properly as a “weak” kind of emergence – a subject 
which I will turn to next. Nonetheless, I believe these authors are right in 
recognizing this as ontological emergence: the essential properties of social 
structures and other social phenomena are no where to be found in the essential 
properties of the individuals which compose them. 
4.4 Weak Emergence in Sociology 
 Perhaps one of the most well-known examples of emergence in the social 
sciences is Schelling’s account of racial segregation.449 In Micromotives and 
Macrobehavior, Schelling applies game theoretic constructs and rules about the 
behavior of individuals to predict characteristics of the aggregate of people – 
particularly in situations where the choice one individual makes, like where to sit in 
a cafeteria, depends on the choices made by individuals before him. Schelling found 
that very minor preferences on the individual level to be of the same race as a 
certain number of one’s neighbors could lead, on a macro-scale, to sharp lines of 
segregation. Because no individual making the decision intended maliciously for 
segregation to be the result, and yet segregation supervenes upon the facts about 
individual preferences, segregation could be understood as an emergent 
phenomenon. It is arguable that, even if all racism among individuals in our society 
ceased, the small-scale interactions of individuals could still lead to a malignantly 
racist society with a great deal of inequality.  This is not merely a case of epistemic 
difference between our ability to understand macro-scale and micro-scale 
                                            
449 Schelling (1978), 135-164 
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phenomena, but an ontological one, insofar as ‘pushing towards segregation’ 
properly explains the phenomena at the macro-scale but does not explain the 
behavior of any individual at the micro-scale. 
 Mark Granovetter, in “The Strength of Weak Ties” (1973), similarly 
undertakes to relate micro-level and macro-level behavior in sociology. Granovetter 
considers how our weak interpersonal ties (acquaintances rather than close friends) 
form the basis for the transmission of information (or rumors, or job opportunities) 
across vast distances and between different social strata. While our closer friends 
are most likely to have a set of closer friends who overlap with our own, our weakest 
acquaintances are most likely to have sets of acquaintances which do not overlap 
with our own. From these two-person dyadic ties, large scale social networks and 
communication patterns can emerge. 
 Of course, the sort of emergentism suggested by Granovetter and Schelling’s 
work is much different from the emergentism of Durkheim and Wisdom. Both 
Durkheim and Wisdom are advocates of strong emergence in the social sciences: 
there are macro-level social phenomena which cannot be deduced on the basis of a 
knowledge of individual psychologies. Granovetter and Schelling’s work describe a 
phenomena much more like the weak emergence which occurs in computational 
patterns: a higher level phenomenon is deducible and predictable based on a 
knowledge of the lower-level phenomenon. Nonetheless, these macro-level 
phenomena should be understood as ontologically emergence, insofar as they have 
some novelty in their nature which is not included in its base. 
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4.5  Emergence and Social Norms in Anthropology 
 Much like the “natural norms” in the life sciences, social norms might be 
regarded as emergent properties. I understand social norms (the norms which 
govern the behavior of a society) to be distinct from moral norms (norms with 
prescriptive force).450 
 Social norms (or cultural norms) can include such things as: what clothes are 
fashionable, how many hours a day is reasonable to work, the respective duties of 
hosts and guests, and how, at what age, and with whom it is acceptable to marry. 
Following the wrong set of norms identifies a member of a community as an outsider 
– someone who can't be trusted to cooperate. 
 Consider a few of the processes generally believed to be involved in the 
development of social norms – a process which may occurs without much in the way 
of individual intentions to do so: 
 Cultural learning is the process by which individual members of a group pick 
up on which norms to follow. 
 Prestige bias is the tendency to model one's behavior over the most successful 
individuals.451 
                                            
450 Although moral norms may be instantiated as particular social norms, social 
norms may also be grossly immoral. Behind apartheid stood a powerful social norm, 
but not a moral one. 
451 One who wants to be a good philosopher may try to model his tactics on the 
most successful philosophers (though he is sure to pick up no shortage of bad habits 
along the way). Prestige bias tends to favor non-cooperative behaviors, whereas 
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 Conformist transmission is simply taking those nearby as a model for one's 
behavior, a process which spreads the behaviors of the majority.  
 Punishment of norm violators, and of those who fail to punish norm violators, 
aids the survival of cooperative norms.452  
 Reputations, a practice of social accounting, make punishment cheaper. By 
collectively keeping track of when members of the community violate cooperative 
norms and docking their reputations for it, the costs of punishment can be spread 
out over the entire community.453 
 Both social norms themselves, and the package of phenomena which provide 
for the transmission of social norms – reputations, prestige, punishment, and 
conformity – could be regarded as emergent phenomena. Despite not being moral 
imperatives454, they nonetheless have an essentially normative element in their 
                                                                                                                                  
conformist transmission can support cooperative and even altruistic behaviors, so 
long as they are not too costly. 
452 Henrich and Henrich (2007), 67. 
453 ibid. 65. For example, those with a bad reputation may be denied the benefits 
of cooperative interactions with others or assistance in times of need. Of course, 
communities may become forgiving of certain violations over time or in light of other 
positive contributions to reputation, but other violations may prompt expulsion from 
the community or serious physical harm. 
454 That is to say, while social norms may be expressed in terms of a society’s 
beliefs about morality, and may prescribe behavior for those in the society, they are 
as likely to be morally vicious as they are to be virtuous. 
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nature, and are unlikely to be merely analytic given descriptions of the social 
behavior patterns which they supervene upon.  
4.6  Emergence and Collective Actions 
 Systems of social norms make possible the emergence of goal-oriented 
collective action. Collective action is how societies effectively get around the 
“prisoners dilemma” problem, which otherwise would plague us. Rationally, we 
ought to be much more suspicious of each other, since everyone has a lot to gain by 
cheating when someone else cooperates, and a lot to lose by cooperating when 
someone else cheats. However, norms which operate at the social level have 
produced a society in which most of us choose to cooperate most of the time – and 
expect others to cooperate most of the time. We each take an individual loss to gain a 
collective benefit. Because these norms operate at the social level, no individual need 
be aware of what the group norm is, what a certain pattern of behavior is for, or how 
the cooperative behavior will maximize benefits to the group – each individual need 
only think to herself “the group is doing it, so I guess I will do it too,” or “I’ll be nice 
to people, since they’re being nice to me.” We might even speak of group 
intentionality on this basis: the group may intend to produce some effect which no 
individual member does.  
 In the case of group action, the nature of the group’s action may be distinct 
from the nature of any individual’s action in the group, even though the group’s 
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action is fully determined by the actions and interactions of the individuals in the 
group.455 
 In this section, I have given a variety of examples of cases where weaker and 
stronger kinds of ontological emergence can prove useful for explaining the world: at 
the level of pattern-emergence, at the level of the life sciences, and at the level of 
whole societies. I will now move on to examples involving the emergence of 
representational states in perception, language, and thought. 
§5 Emergence and Representational States 
5.1 Emergence and Perception 
 There are a multitude of accounts of perception in philosophy. “Perception” is 
sometimes used to discuss (i) any subjective phenomenal state (“I perceived a 
horrible monster in my dream”), (ii) the mode of presentation of an object in 
perception (“I perceived a sheep, but it was really a white rock”), (iii) the registration 
of information even by an inanimate object (“this car perceives your seatbelt isn’t 
on”), (iv) our conceptualized judgments about what we perceive (“I perceived that 
Wal-Mart was closed”), (v) any causal connection to the sensations of a subject (“in 
his sweat, he perceived global warming”), and (vi) the conditions under which it is 
acceptable to say of someone, “he perceives”, such as that a person has the ability 
and right to say “I perceive” (cf. Ordinary Language Philosophy). However, for this 
section, I will be focused on only one type of account of perception. On this account, 
                                            
455 For much more sophisticated philosophical defenses of collective intentionality 
(and even collective responsibility), see Bratman (1992) and French (1984). Smiley 
(2011) offers an extensive bibliography. 
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(i) - (vi) are legitimate but secondary senses of “perception”, which depend upon the 
primary and strict sense of perception, as a distinctive kind of objective sensory 
representation. Though it is distinct from conceptual or propositional 
representations, like them perception is an intentional mental state – it is about the 
world – and representational accuracy with respect to the world is characteristic of 
perception.  
 Tyler Burge has recently given an account on which the notion of 
representational accuracy is closely tied to the evolutionary history of a whole 
organism and its capacity for directed action.456 Perception arises from biological 
systems – systems for sight and hearing are the most obvious of these systems, 
though a capacity for proprioception and other capacities may also count as 
perceptual. At the same time, the nature of perception (its about-ness and its 
representational accuracy) is something over and above anything we find in the 
nature of biological systems. 
 Burge’s account of perception in animals is non-reductive. He resists 
attempts to reduce the representational quality of perception to merely the 
registration of information or some series of causal patterns. Perception aims at 
veridicality. “Accuracy” or “veridicality” is not part of physics, but is an essential 
part of understanding animal and human psychology. In explaining what perception 
and perceptual accuracy are and how they link up to the underlying biology, Burge 
explicitly appeals to the notion of a natural norm. On this topic, he writes: 
 
                                            
456 Burge (2010) 
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By ‘natural norm’ I do not mean naturalistically reducible norm. I mean a 
level of performance adequate to fulfill a function or a purposiveness, and 
that constitutes an explanatorily relevant kind, independently of any 
individual’s having a positive or negative attitude towards the function or the 
norm . . . usually, natural norms are also independent of any individual’s 
appreciating them . . .  
 There are natural norms constitutively associated with 
representational functions, as well as natural norms constitutively associated 
with biological functions. I think that for every function, it is apriori that 
there are various natural norms associated with it. 
 There are natural norms for perceptual representation. The primary 
natural representational norm that is constitutively associated with 
perceptual capacity is to perceive things as they are – to form veridical 
perceptual representational. Veridical perception fulfills perception’s primary 
constitutive representational function.457 
 
 Burge connects the notion of an individual function to the idea of “primitive 
agency”, the sense in which a spider as a whole jumps on, bites, and eats its prey, in 
contrast with processes which are merely internal to the spider, like digestion.458 
The phrase “primitive agency” seems to suggest a kind of emergentism.  
                                            
457 ibid, 312 
458 ibid., 327 
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 Is Burge’s account of perception an emergentist account? While Burge does 
not seem to endorse emergentism directly, his account of perception could easily be 
interpreted as an emergentist account. By denying the possibility of reducing 
perception to some non-normative information-state, Burge seems to acknowledge 
that perceptual accuracy is something more than a mere information-preserving 
arrangement of physical structures. Instead, Burge holds that information states 
become representational states when they reach a level of organization which is 
susceptible to a semantic standard of “being correct” – an appeal to natural norms. 
Burge’s account also clearly accepts some form of supervenience of representational 
states upon the physical structures of an organism and their relations to the 
environment (including causal-historical relations that secure reference). The nature 
of perception is something over and above the nature of the biological constitution of 
the perceiving animal, even though it is fully determined by it. If one accepts an 
account of perception which has these features, then one should regard perceptual 
representations as emergent. 
5.2 Emergence and Language 
 Although it is different in many ways from perception, language is also a 
representational system. A distinctive aspect of human language is that it allows 
speakers to combine discrete parts in order to construct novel, meaningful wholes. 
One can utter a sentence which no one has spoken before, and the sentence still be 
understood by speakers of the language. 
 There are two ways in which language has been discussed as an emergent 
phenomenon. The first involves the emergence of language (particularly, syntax) 
from some underlying neurological structure, in an attempt to explain how it is that 
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we can acquire language. The second involves emergence as an explanation of the 
hierarchy of various levels in language. 
 5.2.1 Emergence in Language Acquisition. How did we learn our native 
languages? Our parents generally did not sit us down and give us language lessons. 
In spite of this, we attained a level of fluency that it takes someone learning a 
second language years or more to achieve. Since the work of Chomsky (1959, 1965), 
the underdetermination of linguistic outputs by stimulus inputs has been recognized 
as effectively refuting behaviorism. A child learning the phonology and syntax of a 
language is not engaged in mere mimicry. In fact, young children often utter 
ungrammatical sentences which they have never heard before in a kind of 
“overcorrecting”, showing that they have mastered one rule but not another. 
Sometimes known as the “poverty of the stimulus” argument, linguists have 
observed that of the many possible structures which a language might have, 
language learners are never exposed to enough information to rule out most of the 
options. 
 The Chomskyan interpretation of this data is to conclude that there is a kind 
of innate knowledge or grammatical theory present in children, a “Universal 
Grammar” which all human languages in the world have in common. The process of 
learning a language requires only enough information to select from a small set of 
options, to indicate that one’s own language has this or that feature (for instance, 
that the language is head-initial rather than head-final). Our knowledge of various 
aspects of language can be localized as distinct modules within the brain (hence, the 
differing effects on language ability of differing sorts of head injury), which come 
“pre-programmed” in some sense to detect and organize linguistic data. 
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 However, emergentist theories within the study of language acquisition have 
lately begun to challenge the Chomskyian view. MacWhinney (2001, 2006) and 
Hollich et. al. (2000) are among those who advocate this approach. Rather than 
viewing the process of learning a language as a bit-by-bit copying of the various 
rules of the language to particular nodes or modules in a pre-programmed brain 
(irregular verbs go here, regular verbs go there), an emergentist approach views 
knowledge of the rules of language as emerging out of an entire neural architecture, 
context, and history.459 
 The emergentist joins the Chomskyan in rejecting behavioristic, reductivistic, 
and eliminativistic accounts of language and accepting the existence of innate 
structures in the brain which constrain language.460 However, whereas the 
Chomskyan explains the poverty of the stimulus in terms of the innate 
representations of Universal Grammar; the emergentist holds we can explain why 
certain rules and structures exist in human languages, and how children learn 
                                            
459 O’Grady (2010) makes a thorough but unpersuasive attempt to give an 
emergentist account of syntax of this sort. O’Grady’s account suffers from explaining 
purely accidental features of English as the necessary result of such features as 
“computational efficiency”; examples from a broader array of languages would help 
clarify things. 
460 Thus, while emergentism in other fields appears as an anti-reductionist’s 
response to reductivistic orthodoxies, emergentism in language acquisition is 
motivated by a desire to link back together high-level phenomena to their low-level 
base, against a more strongly dualist tendency. 
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language in spite of the poverty of the stimulus, in terms of a “high-level” 
phenomenon which emergences from the complex “low-level” system of observed 
linguistic behavior, the interactions within a neural network, biological limitations, 
the pragmatics of conversation, efficiency given limited memory, and so on – even 
though it cannot be reduced to these.461 Although emergentism in the field of 
language acquisition remains a minority position, and has failed so far to produce 
the explanatory depth and breadth of the Chomskyan approach, it remains an 
interesting application of emergentist thinking to a serious problem in linguistics.462 
 5.2.2 Levels of Language. A different way in which to view language as an 
emergent phenomenon is not to begin with the emergence of language from neural 
structures and social interactions, but to notice the application of emergentist 
thinking to the relationship between the “higher level” and “lower level” phenomena 
in language. 
 At the most basic level, spoken human languages consist of sounds. Phonetics 
is the field which studies these sounds as such. But it is not the sounds as such 
                                            
461 O’Grady (2011). O’Grady notes that emergentism in the field of language 
acquisition is often associated with connectionist approaches to psychology. Evidence 
usually cited for emergentism involves the pattern of “exceptions” typically found 
whenever a feature of universal grammar is proposed; “Universal Grammar” is seen 
as more of a very strong norm than an exceptionless innate universal. 
462 Notably, MacWhinney (2001) explicitly appeals to the widespread use of 
emergence in the biological and physical sciences as reason to accept emergence in 
linguistics. 
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which are the building blocks of individual units of meaning, but phonemes: the 
“roles” played by the sounds or functional units which make a difference to which 
word is expressed, yet may be realized in many different ways. Two dialects of the 
same language may have the same phonology, but drastically different phonetics – 
contrast the many phonetic realizations in different geographic regions of the 
English phoneme /r/. Two distinct phonemes in one language may be one phoneme in 
the other. Consider how ‘t’ in ‘talk’ isn’t pronounced the same way as the ‘t’ in ‘bat’ or 
the ‘t’ in ‘bottle’: in English these sounds are all one phoneme, /t/, but in other 
languages they are distinct phonemes. Phonology depends upon the underlying 
phonetics and is constrained by it, but the phonology of a language cannot be 
predicted simply by a list of the sounds which occur in it.463 The nature of a phoneme 
depends on its role in the morphological structure of the language, not what it 
sounds like. During the “Great Vowel Shift” in English – when the /i/ in “wipe” 
stopped sounding like the “ee” in “weep”– the phonetics shifted, but the phonology 
remained the same. 
                                            
463 The phonology of a given language weakly locally supervenes upon its 
phonetics – there is no difference in phoneme without a difference in sound – but 
does not globally supervene on it: that is, there could be a language identical to ours 
with respect to which sounds were uttered at what times, but in which the 
phonology of the language is entirely different, given that it has different units of 
meaning. 
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 In turn, the morphemes of a language – its smallest units of meaning464  – are 
composed out of phonemes, but the nature of a morpheme has almost nothing to do 
with its phonological composition and almost everything to do with its role in the 
syntax and semantics of the language. A different morphology could been realized 
identically in a language with very different sounds. Without sounds, there would be 
no case or tense markings, but a case or tense marker is something with a nature 
over and above the nature of the sounds which constitute it. So, there is some sense 
in which morphology might be regarded as emergent from phonology, and phonology 
from phonetics, insofar as the nature of each higher-level phenomena does not 
depend on the parts which compose it.  
 To go down a different track: the semantics of a language – the meanings of 
the morphemes in a language – supervene upon the actual uses of those words by 
individual speakers in that language. If, over time, individual speakers adjust their 
use of a word and begin to mean something new by it – if “meat” is applied only to 
edible flesh and not to the inner part of a nut, for example – then the meaning of the 
word as a whole will change. Nonetheless, the nature of meaning is something over 
and above a kind of averaging-out of the uses of individuals. Individuals use words 
the way they do because words have the meaning they do in their community. The 
majority of individuals might even misuse a specialized term in a way which is 
inconsistent with its meaning. So, semantics might be regarded as emergent. 
 The syntax of a language is at an even higher level of organization, 
something which can be and often is studied entirely independently of the low-level 
                                            
464 e.g., the word repossessing contains 3 morphemes, and possessive contains 2. 
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sounds or words which realize the language. A syntax is a kind of logical structure – 
the order in which subjects, verbs, and other particles stand to each other and 
combine with each other – which depends for its existence on being instantiated in a 
meaningful and communicable way, but which has a nature which has little to do 
with the meanings of the words which are arranged within its structure and even 
less with the sounds those words are composed of. So, syntactic structures might be 
regarded as emergent phenomena. 
5.3 Emergence and Intentionality  
 A third representational system is thought. Like language and perception, 
thought is characterized by intentionality: our thoughts and beliefs can be about 
various properties and persons and entities in the real world.  Suppose that I am 
unaware that Mark Twain is identical to Samuel Clemens, and I believe that they 
are two different men who lived at different times. When I say (or think, or believe) 
that Mark Twain is not Samuel Clemens, I say something false, even though I 
believe that I have said something true. This is because my uses of the names 
“Samuel Clemens” and “Mark Twain” refer to the same individual whether I know it 
or not. 
 But how is it that words (or thoughts, or beliefs) are about something in the 
world? Again, this is a tricky and well-worn philosophical problem, and I do not hope 
to answer it here. However, insofar as many philosophers have concluded that 
intentionality is something which is over and above any possible physical description 
of the world, I can advocate that those who accept this view also consider themselves 
to be emergentists. It is not clear how bodies or brain states can be about something 
in the way that my thoughts are about something: my thought has a very different 
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nature from my brain state. Nonetheless, were it not for the brain state, I would not 
be thinking this thought – and I could not think another thought without a 
corresponding change in my underlying brain state. 
 One might respond that our thoughts are physical, but their physical 
composition is larger than the body or the brain – it includes the causal history of 
our thoughts. Consider how “Aluminum” is about the metal which is actually used in 
soda cans and foil wrap (even if I think incorrectly that the word refers to shiny 
plastic). Any world which is an exact physical duplicate of our world would be one in 
which my thought of “aluminum” would be about the same thing – the facts about 
the historical origins of the world are sufficient to ground its reference to the metal 
used in soda cans and foil wrap. Nonetheless, it does not follow that what it is to be 
the referent of “aluminum” is just this historical origin. In fact, we could imagine a 
scenario in which a very different historical pattern occurred, but reference was still 
secured from “aluminum” to the metal. So, the intentionality of our thoughts 
emerges from our brain states and these causal-historical chains, but has more to its 
nature than them. 
 The sense in which my thoughts are about various objects or properties in the 
world could be plausibly described as a case in which the intentional aspect of my 
words, beliefs, and thoughts emerges from certain facts about my neurology as well 
as the causal-historical chains and facts about my community which link my use of 
the words or concepts to what they refer to in the actual world, without being 
reducible to these facts. 
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§6. Emergence and Instantiations 
6.1 Emergence and Abstract Property Instances 
 I have been discussing cases where emergence is a plausible hypothesis in 
our scientific investigation of complex phenomena in the concrete world. However, I 
also want to briefly suggest a few cases in which emergence might be appealed to as 
an explanation for certain philosophical conundrums which arise for issues of how 
abstract properties relate to their concrete instantiations in the world. There is, of 
course, a vast and historically extensive literature already on these questions. I have 
no hope of interacting successfully with this whole literature in the limited space 
available here. Instead, my goal is to briefly suggest that one plausible position on 
these issues is equivalent to emergentism: one on which the instances of these 
norms depend upon the existence of the physical world despite having a nature 
which is in no part physical. 
 6.1.1 Norms of Reasoning. Logic captures the truth-preserving relations 
between various propositions. Logical relations are not physical relations. However, 
logical relations could be regarded as providing norms of thought and reasoning, or 
norms of proper inference.465 The inferences which logical norms of reasoning apply 
to are events which occur in space and time.  
 In addition to logic, there are also epistemic norms which might be regarded 
as abstract, necessary truths: there are norms for when one ought to believe an 
uncertain claim, and when one ought to reserve judgment, or when one ought to 
                                            
465 This is a very recent area of debate in philosophy, on which much remains to 
be said. See MacFarlane (2004). 
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make an inference to best explanation, and when one ought to seek further evidence. 
Again, these norms apply to events of reasoning which occur in space and time. 
 The instantiations of these norms supervene on physical events: the norms of 
how credible one ought to consider a claim will not change unless the situation 
presents more evidence; whether an argument a lawyer is making is valid will not 
change unless the lawyer changes his argument. However, the norms are not in any 
sense physical events – unlike “natural norms” their nature does not depend upon 
the nature of the physical world even in part.  
 6.1.2 Mathematical Properties. Consider the cases of abstract mathematical 
properties – the property of two-ness, or the property of being a square. According to 
many traditional accounts in philosophy, these are necessary properties which are 
not themselves located in the concrete world. Nonetheless, in certain situations, they 
are instantiated in the concrete world: there might be two bananas on a roughly 
square countertop. How is it that abstract properties can be located in a concrete 
world? One response is Platonism: the concrete objects participate in the form of the 
abstract object, where this “participation” has a mysterious quality to it. The 
alternative is some kind of attack on the traditional account of abstract 
mathematical properties – to identify them as reflecting the limits of our experience 
(Kant) or truths of our language (Carnap) rather than metaphysical realities.  
 An emergentist, it seems to me, could plausibly hold that instantiations of 
abstract mathematical properties were emergent in a way which is consistent with 
the traditional view, but which does not require Platonic talk of participation in the 
forms. Instead, the emergentist could hold that instantiations of abstract 
mathematical properties “arise from” their physical basal conditions, while having 
  420 
natures which are partly abstract and mathematical in addition to being concrete. 
From the placement of the bananas and the construction of the countertop, it is 
necessitated that the bananas have two-ness and the countertop as square-ish-ness. 
These instances of two-ness and square-ish-ness arise from the physical 
arrangement of the bananas on the countertop. Nonetheless, their essential natures 
are partly abstract: the bananas arranged as so have the abstract property of being 
two in number. 
 6.1.3 Unity of a Fact. Consider the set of problems raised by what is 
sometimes known as “Bradley’s regress”, after F. H. Bradley (1893). There is some 
sense in which the various constituent parts of a relational fact are (i) ordered and 
(ii) unified into a whole. The fact that Angelina loves Brad is distinct from the fact 
that Brad loves Angelia, as well as distinct from the set with the elements 
{Angelina, Brad, loves}. Suppose one holds that for there to be a difference between 
two things, the two things must have different constituents. It follows that there 
must be some fourth constituent C which is part of the fact that Angelina loves 
Brad, which differentiates it from the fact that Brad loves Angelina. Or, by a similar 
argument, there must be some fourth constituent C in the fact that Angelina loves 
Brad which is not a constituent of the set {Angelina, Brad, loves}. However, 
whatever this fourth item is, the same problem arises: if C unifies the fact, then 
what unifies C to the fact? If C grounds the asymmetrical ordering of the elements 
in the fact, then what grounds C’s asymmetric ordering within that fact? A similar 
problem arises with propositions (rather than facts) and with objects (when objects 
are conceived of as bundles of properties). 
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 Bradley’s problem is essentially one of how a whole (the relation, relational 
fact, relational proposition, etc.) can have a property which is not analytic given its 
constituents. Arguably, an emergentist could respond that nothing further is needed 
than the constituents of the relational fact for the relational fact, yet the relational 
fact is not fully grounded in its constituents – and so the fact fits the standard 
definition of ontological emergence. 
 6.1.4 Musical Properties. Musical properties might also be regarded as 
abstract properties which come to be physically instantiated, and so qualify as 
“emergent” in this sense. For example, one might regard “dissonance” as a real 
property which can be instantiated in physical wave patterns (with a serious 
physical explanation), a property which exists independent of whether anyone hears 
the dissonance as dissonant or experiences a feeling of tension or having one’s teeth 
set on edge. On this account, a subject perceives the dissonance that is present in a 
pair of musical tones; it is not created in the subject’s psychology. Yet the dissonance 
is not itself a physical property either – there is nothing in the laws of physics to 
offer us rules of counterpoint. Thus, some have argued that some musical properties 
should be regarded as emergent properties – see Wright & Bregman (1987). 
 6.1.5 Economic Properties. Economics is a field in which sociology meets 
mathematics. Thus, the properties studied by economists might partly fall into the 
category of sociological properties discussed earlier, in the weak emergence of macro-
level phenomena from micro-level phenomena, but might also fall into the category 
of instantiations of complex mathematical properties or functions. Thus, the market 
value of a good might be considered as being emergent out of the dispositions of 
individuals to trade various goods in the marketplace. Rarely in these individual 
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trade decisions does anyone have the market-value of the good in mind; each 
individual only has the values that he or she places on various goods in terms of 
trade-offs for other goods. The market value of a good is something over and above 
these decisions (and subject to its own economic laws at a macro level) and yet it 
supervenes upon them. Further, whether or not one feels confidence towards 
“invisible hands”, the market is notable for providing an efficient (in some ways) 
distribution of goods without any individual engaged in the market having in mind 
the goal of providing for an efficient distribution. So, the efficiency of markets is also 
to some degree emergent from these individual decisions, supervening upon them 
but different in nature. 
6.2 Emergence and Vagueness 
 The issue of vagueness in language seems related to the issue of emergent 
natural patterns. Consider vague predicates like “is bald” or “is a heap”. When 
objects to which these predicates apply are considered to be composed of some 
denumerable quantity of more basic objects, one can construct a sorites paradox: a 
man will never go from being bald to non-bald by the loss of one hair, nor will a heap 
of sand go to being a non-heap by the loss of one grain of sand. However, when 
objects to which these predicates apply are considered as ontologically basic rather 
than mere compositions of parts, such that their parts are non-denumerable, sorites 
paradoxes cannot be constructed (since sorites paradoxes rely on mathematical 
induction, which applies only to denumerable sets).  
 We should expect emergent properties to correspond to vague predicates. 
Since the nature of the emergent phenomenon is not entirely dependent upon the 
nature of its parts, it is not properly described as constructed out of some 
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denumerable set of low level-phenomena, but instead the whole is more basic. Yet, 
since an emergent phenomenon remains partly dependent upon its parts for its 
existence, there are still clear cases in which the absence or presence of some 
quantity of low-level phenomena will determine the existence of the emergent 
phenomenon. 
 Thus, although it is beyond the scope of my project to do so here, one might 
develop an emergentist account of vagueness. On this view, vague phenomena have 
a nature which is not defined by their component parts – rather, their nature is 
defined by their relation to some greater whole. Nonetheless, they depend upon their 
component parts for their existence. Thus, when one makes large changes to the 
component parts, the vague phenomenon ceases to exist, but there is no small 
change to the component parts which can produce a change in the nature of the 
vague phenomenon, since its nature does not come from its parts but from the whole 
of which it is a part. 
6.3 Emergence and Moral Non-Naturalism 
 6.3.1 Moral Non-Naturalism as Emergentism. In contrast to the “natural 
norms” and “social norms” discussed earlier, moral norms have a particular kind of 
prescriptive, imperative force which makes them obligatory – one who fails to keep 
them is rightfully blamed. Non-cognitivists hold that this “prescriptive force” should 
clue us in that moral norms aren’t statements about the world at all, but rather 
something more like attempts to get one another to adopt attitudes of approval or 
disapproval. In contrast, moral realists hold that moral statements have cognitive 
content which can be true or false in light of how the world is: it is true that you 
ought not to cause suffering to an innocent creature for no good reason. 
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 Moral realists disagree about whether moral properties are natural or non-
natural properties. Both sides accept the supervenience of moral properties on 
physical states of affairs – there is no way the world could be morally different 
without being physically different. However, non-naturalists wish to say that moral 
properties are something over and above the physical, whereas naturalists wish to 
say that moral properties are just complicated bundles of physical properties. 
 Non-naturalists follow G. E. Moore in holding that the “badness” which 
makes a killing into a murder is not a natural property. Moore’s argument for non-
naturalism is sometimes known as the “Open Question Argument”. Suppose that 
one offers an analysis of “goodness” in purely natural terms, so that “a more 
equitable society is a good thing” could be rephrased as something like “a more 
equitable society is the sort of thing that causes people to smile and results in fewer 
acts of violence,” (or something more sophisticated). Well, then, it would remain an 
open question as to whether all this was a good thing: “are more smiles and less 
violence good?”.466 
 In contrast, naturalists hold that badness is equivalent to some physical 
state. Naturalists can be divided into two camps. The analytic naturalists, following 
Frank Jackson (1998), hold that the moral facts are synonymous with descriptive 
facts about the natural world and could be derived through conceptual analysis from 
these natural facts. The non-analytic naturalists hold that, in spite of the 
impossibility of such a conceptual analysis, moral facts just are natural facts.467 This 
                                            
466 Dancy (2006), 125-126 
467 ibid. 
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“non-analytic” naturalist position is committed to the view that no analysis of moral 
language is possible in purely descriptive terms from our epistemic standpoint, but, 
given an ideal reasoner, the moral properties would be ontologically analytic given 
the natural properties. This position differs from Jackson’s position in holding that 
conceptual analysis is an imperfect guide to ontology, but not in denying the 
possibility of an ideal reasoner’s deducing the moral facts from the non-moral facts 
by purely analytic468 moves.  
 It should not to be difficult to see how Moorean non-naturalism qualifies as a 
form of emergentism about meta-ethical properties, since it accepts supervenience, 
yet holds that in spite of this moral properties are distinct from descriptive ones. Of 
course, moral properties, much like the epistemic norms and logical norms discussed 
earlier, are perhaps best seen as abstract properties whose instantiations are the 
emergent phenomena. A killing is a natural phenomenon located in space and time, 
but the killing’s being subject to moral evaluation, and thus being a murder, 
involves the emergence of a non-natural moral property. 
 Notably, emergentism offers a new response to a question which has long 
plagued moral non-naturalists: why do the moral properties supervene on the 
natural properties, if they aren’t identical to them?469 Whereas traditional non-
naturalism has been silent on this question, the emergentist non-naturalist can add 
a bit of explanation: “it emerges!” 
                                            
468 That is, ontologically analytic: we might not have the concepts to perform any 
kind of conceptual analysis 
469 see Blackburn (1985). 
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 Of course, how effective an explanation “it emerges!” is depends upon 
whether or not one sees it as ad hoc, or whether one sees it an explanatorily 
powerful concept which applies to a wide variety of phenomena. I hope that, in the 
course of this chapter, I’ve shown how many different kinds of emergence of varying 
degrees of strength feature regularly in the natural world. We should expect 
novelties to arise within nature, and moral properties are one of those novelties. 
Thus, what explains the supervenience of moral properties is that they are yet 
another instance of emergence. Of course, one might ask a further question: why do 
things emerge at all? This is a mysterious question, which I can only touch on briefly 
in chapter 8. 
 6.3.2 The Emergence of Tragedy. There is an interesting idea which is 
suggested by emergentism about moral norms, over and above non-naturalism as 
such. In my work, I have been discussing emergence as a synchronic phenomenon 
wherever it occurs. I have not been making any claims about the development of 
social or biological phenomena over time as emergent, or asserting that “high-level” 
phenomena are in some way chronologically later than “low-level” phenomena. 
However, emergence about moral phenomena suggests – though it hardly implies – 
an interesting thesis for the diachronic emergence of instances of moral properties 
(that is, the property of being subject to moral evaluation). I will briefly sketch this 
thesis before concluding the chapter. 
 Suppose that social structures and conscious states are part of the 
supervenience base for instantiations of moral norms. While moral norms 
themselves are abstract universals, whether or not an event in space and time is 
rightly subject to moral evaluation might depend on whether or not certain complex 
  427 
structures exist or not. Given structure s1, moral evaluability for phenomenon p1 
emerges; given structure s1, moral evaluability for both p1 and p2 emerges, and so on. 
As social structures develop over time, the subject matter of moral evaluation grows 
progressively larger – not that the society itself subjects more things to practices of 
moral evaluation, but that features within the society which were previously 
innocent now have the emergent property of being instances where a judgment of 
moral rightness or wrongness applies (or vice-versa). 
 For instance, persons as such might begin as the objects of moral evaluation: 
one ought to live in accordance with one’s proper function as a person. Person is a 
distinctly moral category over and above that of human, and the well-functioning of 
a person has moral force in a way in which the well-functioning of a human does not. 
Given this moral category, and a certain level of organization of one’s social group, 
the subject of moral evaluation might change: the question is not just whether you 
are a well-functioning person, but whether you are well-functioning member of the 
group, so that when the group acts, your actions aren’t in conflict with it, and so that 
when other members of the group cooperate with you and offer aid to you, you 
reciprocate and cooperate back. Given the moral commitment to being a good 
member of the group and the further organization of the group, there emerges the 
normative category of a legitimate authority or power over the group, capable of 
issuing commands the group genuinely ought to follow. From the practice of 
legitimate commands, there emerges the moral evaluation of what is actually 
commanded, and whether or not the outcomes or consequences of the command are 
harmful or beneficial on the whole to everyone in the group. At the same time, the 
commands might be evaluated in a different way – not on what is beneficial, but 
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whether it is just or fair. Given the increasing significance of individual identity, 
morality may become individualized again – there emerges the question, am I acting 
in such a way that it could be justly and beneficially commanded for everyone to act? 
Or, if relationships to others become more important, the question might be: am I 
fulfilling my responsibilities? Whom am I responsible for caring for? And beyond 
these, still other moral categories might be realized.470 
 What is notable about this picture is that, while the emergentist is committed 
to moral realism, the emergentist is not committed to the view that ought implies 
can, or that one could coherently fulfill all of one’s obligations. Far from it: one might 
have an obligation under one moral system, and an opposing obligation under 
another equally real moral system. It is consistent with the possibility of genuine 
moral tragedies: of cases where one might violate one’s obligations in order to fulfill 
them. Suppose that my relative commits a heinous crime and is unwilling to turn 
himself in: do I turn him over to the law, or do I protect him from it? The outcome is 
tragic either way: either it is the tragic story of how justice trumps over individual 
loyalties, or it is the tragedy of how family loyalties are more fundamental than law. 
Suppose one is stuck in a trolley-case, and must cause the death of one as a means to 
saving the lives of many. Perhaps it is best to say that one has two conflicting 
obligations, and, whichever ends up trumping the other – the more fundamental 
obligation or the less fundamental one – the outcome will be tragic. 
                                            
470 This paragraph is very loosely inspired by the work of Jonathan Haidt on 
moral psychology. 
  429 
 Of course, the emergentist about moral norms is not in any way committed to 
this diachronic account of moral emergence. However, insofar as disagreement about 
moral questions is often cited as evidence for moral anti-realism, the emergentist 
responds by providing an account on which moral realism would quite naturally be 
accompanied by disagreement over which real moral norm to violate, and which to 
fulfill. 
§7. Conclusions 
 Emergence is far from being an unprecedented kind of explanation devoid of 
explanatory power. Emergence is everywhere. In a wide variety of fields, from the 
computational sciences, natural sciences, and social sciences, through the study of 
representational systems and philosophical questions about the instantiation of 
abstract norms, emergence appears as a plausible and well-regarded, if sometimes 
controversial, thesis. To the extent to which these fields discuss ontological issues, 
emergence is meant ontologically, to indicate a difference in the nature of the 
phenomenon from its basal conditions, and it is not primarily being used as a merely 
epistemic claim. For many fields, debates over emergence are intended to guide 
methodological questions: should we investigate the higher-level phenomena in its 
own right, or should we regard the higher-level phenomena as nothing more than 
our own psychological projection upon a lower-level phenomena and focus our 
attention there? 
 In my review of the literature, it was surprising to find that the most 
common objections against emergence in these fields were not that it was somehow 
unscientific, fishy-smelling, or unlike the sorts of explanations used in other fields. 
Far from it: emergence tends to be seen as a popular (if sometimes faddish) 
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explanation which other scientific fields already rely on. Instead, the primary 
objections to emergence are taken straight out of the philosophy of mind: in my own 
informal survey of literature on emergence, it seems to me as though Jaegwon Kim’s 
objections to the coherence of downward causation were the most widely cited and 
discussed objections, followed at a distant second by concerns about the coherence of 
emergentist claims about non-reducibility, predictability, and supervenience. 
 The philosophy of mind should pay more attention to what happens in these 
fields, much as these fields are paying attention to what happens in the philosophy 
of mind. In no way would I advocate the idea that philosophers should uncritically 
accept whatever ontology a scientific field hands them (especially when a special 
science may very well have a motive embrace a richer ontology in order to legitimize 
its research program). However, when philosophers do develop critical ontologies, 
they should keep their picture of the cosmos updated – even if it turns out to contain 
forests with vines descending from the trees, and less of a desert landscape. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
§1 Summary 
1.1 Overview 
 In this work, I have defended Emergentism against four objections: (i) the 
objection that emergence is either incoherent or collapses into non-reductive 
physicalism or traditional dualism, (ii) the objection that emergence entails 
widespread causal overdetermination, (iii) the objection that emergence is wrongly 
defined in terms of the impossibility of the ideal a priori deducibility of emergent 
phenomena from their basal conditions, and (iv) the objection that emergence lacks 
explanatory power because it applies only in the special case of consciousness. 
1.2 Coherence 
 An emergentist says that the world being the way it is physically is sufficient 
for the phenomenal, but the phenomenal remains distinct from the physical. I 
proposed interpretations for “sufficient for” and “distinct from” which distinguish 
emergence from other views. Traditionally, the emergentist’s distinctness claim is 
interpreted as involving the failure of the a priori deducibility of emergent 
phenomena from their basal conditions. However, to whatever extent the a priori is 
taken to be a guide to metaphysical necessity, this seems to conflict with the 
emergentist’s sufficiency claim, often interpreted as meaning that emergent 
properties supervene upon their physical basal conditions with metaphysical 
necessity. The alternative is to adopt a weaker interpretation of the sufficiency 
claim, but this threatens to collapse into traditional dualism. 
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 I interpret the distinctness claim as indicating that a particular form of 
ontological explanation, or grounding, fails to hold between physical phenomena and 
emergent phenomena: emergent phenomena are not grounded in their physical 
basal conditions. As many have recognized, supervenience is not a grounding 
relation – one thing can necessitate another without explaining it. A physicalist 
needs “superdupervenience” to hold between the physical and the phenomenal: the 
phenomenal must both supervene upon the physical and its nature must be wholly 
grounded in the nature of its physical base. However, the emergentist can plausibly 
deny this grounding claim, distinguishing emergentism from physicalism. The 
emergentist simply denies both: 
 
(D1)  mental properties are identical to physical properties; and 
 
(D2) there is some ontological explanation of mental properties in terms of 
physical properties, other than identity, such that mental properties are no 
addition to ontology. 
 
 The emergentist is a dualist insofar as the emergentist accepts: 
 
(GD): mental phenomena are not wholly grounded in physical phenomena. 
 
 However, to distinguish emergentism from traditional dualism, I hold that 
the emergentist must reject the claim that phenomenal properties have an 
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independent existence from their basal conditions, a claim which at a minimum a 
traditional dualist must accept: 
 
(PEIP): mental phenomena do not wholly depend for their existence on 
physical substances. 
 
 I then interpret the emergentist’s sufficiency claim as indicating the total and 
exclusive dependence of emergent phenomena on their basal conditions. This can be 
expressed as a kind of supervenience what I call manipulative necessity, as opposed 
to the strictly stronger notion of metaphysical necessity: 
 
x manipulatively necessitates y is true in world w iff if there is no successful 
manipulation w* of w for y through any z, where z is not identical to x and 
not on the path between x and y. 
 
 The manipulative supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical is 
consistent with the possibility of a world in which the same physical properties are 
present, but the phenomenal properties fail to emerge. However, it strictly denies 
that there is any means through which phenomenal properties can be manipulated 
except by an intervention upon their basal conditions, where the notions of 
“manipulation” and “intervention” is taken from Woodward (2005) and do not imply 
an action by some agent or other. Thus, while there may be two physically identical 
possible worlds which differ with respect to the distribution of their phenomenal 
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properties, nothing else could differ between such worlds, including the set of 
fundamental laws: neither world would be accessible from the other. 
 On the resulting definition of emergence, emergent properties are those 
which (i) wholly depend for their existence on (or manipulatively supervene upon) 
their basal conditions, yet (ii) have natures which are not grounded in the natures of 
their basal conditions. Because traditional dualists will reject (i), and physicalists 
will reject (ii), emergentism can be distinguished from both positions in a coherent 
way. 
1.3 Overdetermination 
 Jaegwon Kim argues that an emergentist’s commitment to supervenience, 
the distinctness of mental and physical properties, and realism about mental 
causation, entails either epiphenomenalism or widespread overdetermination. His 
argument relies on two principles: 
 
(CCPD) Causal Closure of the Physical Domain. If a physical event has a 
cause (occurring) at time t, it has a sufficient physical cause at t. 
 
(EP) Exclusion Principle. No event has two or more distinct sufficient causes, 
all occurring at the same time, unless it is a genuine case of 
overdetermination. 
 
 Suppose a mental event M at t causes a mental event M* at t+1, where P is 
the subvening base of M at t, and P* is the subvening base of M* at t+1. First, Kim 
argues that since M causes M*, and M* supervenes on P*, then M must be a 
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sufficient cause of M* in virtue of being a sufficient cause of P*. After all, had M 
occurred but P* not occurred, then M* still would have occurred, since M* 
supervenes on P*; it can’t be that M adds something which is missing to P* or that 
M and P* jointly, coincidentally are sufficient for M*. So, M must be a sufficient 
cause of P*. Second, Kim argues that since M causes P*, then according to (CCPD), 
P* must have a sufficient cause at t – namely, P. P* thus has two sufficient causes: P 
and M. But this is not “a genuine case of overdetermination,” so it violates (EP). 
 I argue that there are two senses of “sufficiency” which should be 
distinguished: a deductive sense of sufficiency, and a completive sense of sufficiency. 
On the completive sense, A is sufficient for B if and only if nothing else is needed 
besides A for B to occur. On the deductive sense, A is sufficient for B if and only if it 
is not possible for B to occur and A not to occur. Overdetermination is a problem for 
an event which has two deductively sufficient causes, but not for an event which has 
two completively sufficient causes. While CCPD might be interpreted as 
guaranteeing that every physical event has a deductively sufficient cause (a question 
I remain neutral on), the downward causation by M of P* is only plausibly 
considered a case of a completively sufficient cause: nothing else is needed but M for 
P*, but it’s not as though one could construct a valid argument to model the 
derivation of P* from M.  
 After adding my own response to several other plausible responses to Kim’s 
argument, I argue that an emergentist has many ways of avoiding Kim’s 
overdetermination problem, and need not be lead by it into epiphenomenalism. 
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1.4 Cosmic Hermeneutics 
 The distinctness of emergent properties has been defined since C. D. Broad in 
terms of the non-deducibility of emergent phenomena from their basal conditions, 
even by an ideal reasoner. However, it is not clear why a failure of ideal deducibility 
should entail anything about the ontological distinctness of the phenomenon which 
cannot be deduced. After all, (i) many have held since Saul Kripke that the 
properties of H2O are not ideally deducible a priori from the properties of water, yet 
water is not ontologically distinct from H2O, while (ii) many non-naturalists in meta-
ethics hold that ethical properties are a priori, and thus deducible given a 
description of the natural properties, yet maintain that the ethical properties are 
ontologically distinct from the natural properties. 
 Tracing through the recent history of ideal deducibility tests, I attempt to 
connect this project of “cosmic hermeneutics” with my interpretation of the 
distinctness of emergent properties in Chapter 2, in terms of emergent properties 
being those which are not grounded in their subvening base. I argue that, instead of 
a priori scrutability, emergentists should look to analytic scrutability as a means of 
marking the distinction between emergent and non-emergent properties. On my 
account emergent properties may be a priori deducible from their subvening base, 
but they will only be deducible by means of non-analytic inferential processes on the 
part of an ideal reasoner. When an ideal reasoner is limited to analytic inferential 
processes, and the deduction is carried out in the language of ontology (as opposed to 
a natural language, or a language of concepts), then all of the cases in which one 
thing wholly grounds the nature of another will be cases in which the ideal reasoner 
can deduce the grounded thing from its ground. That something is water will be 
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deducible from its being H2O, since in the language of ontology each will have the 
same nature. On the other hand, the ethical properties will not be deducible from 
the natural properties, assuming non-naturalists are correct, because ethical 
properties do not follow by mere analysis from the natures of descriptive 
phenomena, even if they are a priori.  
 When a phenomenon supervenes on a set of basal conditions, but its nature is 
not analytically scrutable from the nature of its basal conditions, then we have 
reason to think that the non-deducible phenomenon is emergent. 
1.5 Nomological Danglers 
 J. J. C. Smart’s objection of that emergentism fails to mesh with a scientific 
perspective on the world is perhaps one of the most compelling and influential 
objections to emergentism about the mind. On my interpretation of Smart’s 
objection, Smart’s complaint is that ontological emergence is an ad hoc explanation 
which applies to only one case: phenomenal consciousness.  
 However, I argue that emergence has wide explanatory currency across the 
special sciences at many different levels: at the level of computational and natural 
patterns, at the level of biological functions and other natural teleological properties, 
at the level of human psychology, at the level of standards of representational 
accuracy, at the level of abstract properties and normative epistemic and ethical 
properties, and at the level of phenomena in the social sciences. These cases are 
generally categorized as superficial or “weak emergence”, irrelevant to the 
ontological “strong emergence” alleged to happen in the case of consciousness. 
However, I argue that there is no reason to regard weak emergence in the special 
sciences as a merely epistemic claim. I will argue instead that there are cases of 
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ontological weak emergence: cases where an emergent phenomenon has a nature 
which is over and above that of its subvening base. On my account, there are many 
things which are ontologically emergent in our world, and many kinds of emergence 
– emergent consciousness is only one of them.  
 When examples of purportedly emergent phenomena in the special sciences 
are considered on a case-by-case basis against a physicalist backdrop, it is 
reasonable to assume that some form of ontological reduction to physics nonetheless 
holds, in spite of the absence of a reductive analysis of the special science into 
physics, because emergence would require giving the phenomenon under 
consideration a radically different account than everything else. However, when this 
whole variety of emergent phenomena is allowed to form the backdrop against which 
individual cases are considered, ontological reductivism to physics suddenly becomes 
far less plausible, and emergence becomes a form of explanation which unites our 
theories of phenomena at a variety of levels to one another. Emergence isn’t an ad 
hoc form of explanation which applies only to consciousness, but a form of 
ontological explanation which goes all of the way up and all of the way down. 
§2 A Final Objection 
2.1 Mysterious Questions 
 One challenge remains for emergence which I have not addressed yet. 
Consider that emergence may be proposed, by a kind of “inference to the best 
explanation”, as an answer to fill the explanatory gap between the phenomenal and 
the physical. At the same time, in this role, emergence is what Horgan (2009) calls 
an “unexplained explainer” – while emergence explains why there is an explanatory 
gap, emergence itself is by definition inexplicable. Someone might sensibly ask: why 
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should these physical basal conditions give rise to those emergent properties? Why 
should anything have emerged at all? What fills this explanatory gap? 
 On my account, emergent phenomena cannot be fully explained by their 
underlying physical conditions, and yet emergent phenomena cannot be explained 
by anything but their underlying physical conditions. 
 Sometimes there arise mysterious questions for which, even were we to know 
the answer to every other question, we would have no idea how to answer the 
original question. It is not for lack of understanding the question that we find 
ourselves unable to answer it based on any other question. We understand the 
question fully – but we can’t answer it, and no further information would allow us to 
answer it. At best, we can speculate that there is some further fact which would 
push the question forward another level: if someone asks “why p?”, we can respond 
“because q”, and hope that this buys us some time before we are asked, “why q?” 
2.2 Personal Identity 
 One such question, as Parfit (1984) has identified, is the question of personal 
identity. There are answerable questions of personal identity, such as questions 
about the qualitative differences between persons and questions about under what 
conditions a person survives or can be held responsible. However, this question is 
not answerable: 
 
(Q1) Why am I me and not someone else? 
 
 The question most naturally expressed by these words is perfectly 
understandable. Of course, it is a priori that I am me and not someone else – for “I 
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am someone other than myself” is a logical contradiction. It is impossible that I 
should not be myself. Nonetheless, the question being asked is not the trivial one it 
appears to be, which should be no more mysterious than why 1 = 1, but instead a 
question which seems both contingent and interesting: why should I be this person 
that I am and not some other person, such as one in another body? One can push 
back the question: “you are your body” or “you are your immortal soul” or “you are 
that emergent consciousness for which that body serves as the basal conditions.” 
However, it only stalls a moment before one asks, “but why should it be my body or 
soul and not someone else’s?” or “why should I be this body or soul and not an exact 
duplicate of it?” For any further fact we specify to answer the question, no matter 
how esoteric or how concrete, the same question will arise for that fact – and so on, 
endlessly, hopelessly. 
2.3 Identity 
 I bring up the example of personal identity in part because it is the sort of 
question which motivates some traditional dualists, and someone might think that 
emergentism provides an advantage in answering the question. Since consciousness 
is often linked to personal identity, and emergentism has been offered as an 
explanation of consciousness, it might be natural to think of emergentism as offering 
an explanation for personal identity. We can address the answerable questions 
about personal identity – survival, memory, and responsibility – with facts about 
qualitative conscious states, and so emergentism is relevant to these questions. 
However, the unanswerable questions about personal identity are of the sort which 
remain even when one has specified all of the qualitative conscious states, and so 
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they are no more answered by emergentism than they are by physicalism or by 
traditional dualism. 
 However, my primary motive in bringing up personal identity is as a 
particularly salient example of a genuinely mysterious question. There are many 
other such questions in philosophy, which all have the same character. For instance, 
in addition to the problem of personal identity, but there is the problem of identity 
as such: 
 
(Q2) Why is this thing this thing and not some other thing? 
 
 Such a problem is expressed by Black (1952) and his question of why, given 
two qualitatively identical spheres, the two spheres are nonetheless numerically 
distinct. Even though all of the qualitative facts are in, the numerical identity 
questions remain unanswered. One could invoke a fundamental identity fact, a 
haeccity, to answer the question. This would push back the question a step. 
However, the question can always be asked, “why is this thing’s thisness this 
thisness and not some other fundamental thisness?” 
2.4 Reference 
 The problem of identity leads naturally into the problem of reference. On the 
one hand, what my words or thoughts refer to isn’t answered, even if one has an 
answer to all of the questions about what is going on in my head. I believe Napoleon 
was the Emperor of France. But my use of “Napoleon” would refer to that particular 
individual it refers to, even if that individual spent his life as a humble Corsican 
peasant and someone else became Emperor of France; similarly, “Water” would refer 
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to that natural kind it refers to in virtue of its causal history, H2O, even if part of my 
concept of water was that “water is the stuff in our lakes and streams”, and the stuff 
in our lakes and streams turns out to be XYZ.  
 On the other hand, what my words or thoughts refer to isn’t answered, even 
if one has an answer to all of the questions about what is going on in the world 
outside of my head. Given only a description of the world’s history and the behavior 
of myself and everyone else in my linguistic community, how would one determine 
whether my use of “Napoleon” referred to the whole man, or only to a proper part of 
the man? How would one determine whether my use of “water” referred to H2O in 
general, or only to H2O prior to the year 2525, and XYZ thereafter? One might think 
that the facts about reference are fixed by a certain pattern of causes, for example: 
our utterances of “water” are caused by H2O. But when we trace the causal history 
of a term back to its referent, what guides the story we tell? It isn’t that these causal 
dependencies are particularly salient compared to others: our utterances of “water” 
are caused by a whole host of things, including thirst. The intentions of speakers to 
refer to this or that are necessary to tell us which history of causes and effects to 
follow. 
 Consider, then, an example adapted from Evans (1982): 
 
Suppose, for example, that on a certain day in the past, a subject briefly 
observed two indistinguishable steel balls suspended from the same point 
and rotating about it. He now believes nothing about one ball which he does 
not believe about the other. This is certainly a situation in which the subject 
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cannot discriminate one of the balls from all other things, since he cannot 
discriminate it from its fellow.471 
 
 Contrary to Evans, it has seemed clear enough to Burge (2010) and others 
than a subject can meaningfully say, “I am thinking about that steel ball”, and that 
his use of “ball” will refer to one of the balls – the one he intends to refer to, that he 
has in mind – and not the other. Yet, if this is so, it is not in virtue of any 
phenomenal difference between the two balls for the speaker, since all will appear 
the same to the speaker regardless of which ball he refers to, nor is it in virtue of 
any behavioral or physical difference in the worlds in which the speaker is referring 
to one of the steel balls and not the other. Thus, what the speaker is referring to 
remains a question which can’t be answered even if one has access to all of the 
physical and phenomenal information – unless one is the speaker himself or herself. 
One can provide evidence that a speaker or speech community is referring to this 
thing or that, but one could have all of the evidence in, and still be left without an 
answer for why it is that the speaker’s thought of “N” refers to N. 
 
(Q3) Why does “N” refer to N? 
 
2.5 Time 
 We cannot neglect the “mystery of time”, as Bouwsma (1954) put it. Once 
again, the fact that it is now seems to be as good a fact as any other. But why should 
                                            
471 Evans, 90 
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it be now, and not some other time? A four-dimensionalist about time, who holds 
that other times in the past and future exist in the same sense that the present 
exists, must offer some further explanation for why it is that we are actually at the 
time we are at and not at one of the many other times in the past and the future. Yet 
a three-dimensionalist about time, who holds that only the present exists, doesn’t 
get off the hook – for the three-dimensionalist must explain why it is that of the 
many possible times it could be, the present is the one which really is. None of the 
facts about the present are the facts which make it the present. So then, we’re left 
asking without answer: 
 
(Q4) Why is now when it is? 
 
2.6 The Cosmological Questions 
 Then there are those questions identified by Aquinas quite some time ago, 
where a perfectly good form of explanation which serves us quite well most of the 
time, if pursued to the very end, turns out to be interminable. Many people 
intuitively accept that some things cause others and that sometimes people do 
things for a reason. Many philosophers accept that wholes depend upon their parts 
for their existence, and that some facts – even necessary facts – are grounded in 
other facts. Yet pursuing these forms of explanation leads us quickly into the 
cosmological questions: 
 
(Q5) “What caused the cause of everything?”, or “Why did the event which 
explains every event happen?” 
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(Q6) “What’s that which everything is for, for?”, or “What is the point of the 
point of everything?” 
 
(Q7) “Why does the supervenience base exist?”, or “What does that on 
which everything depends for its existence depend upon for its existence?” 
 
(Q8) “What grounds the fundamental facts?” or, “In virtue of what are the 
fundamental facts fundamental?” 
 
 No answer to these questions will be an answer which is not itself subject to 
the same question. For instance, for any event which we cite as the cause of some 
effect, we can ask what its cause was. It is insufficient to say that the answer to (Q5) 
– (Q8) is some necessary fact, since necessities also require an explanation. If we 
posit some brute, metaphysically necessary, fundamental fact, then this fact will 
still give rise to (Q8): why is it fundamental?  
2.7 The Question of Actuality 
 All of these questions are reflections of the question of actuality: that is, given 
that the actual world is one of many ways the world could be, why is this world 
actual and not some other world? Suppose there is some further fact about this 
world which selects it as the actual way things are instead of just another way 
things could have been. Such a fact is part of the facts in the world – and so, it is 
part of the world about which we are asking, “why is it actual?” 
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 (Q9) Why is the actual world this world? 
 
 To insist, as some do, that this world is not the only real world, and that 
there are perhaps other universes which are equally as real as our own, is a move 
which does nothing to answer the question. I am not having an experience of those 
other universes right now – it is the actual universe which I am experiencing. So, 
the question of why one of many realities should be actual has advanced little from 
the question of why one of many possibilities should be actual. 
2.8 The Emergence Question 
 My point is not to suggest a particular answer to any of these questions here, 
since that would defeat my point. My point is instead that there are many questions 
of this sort, which remain in spite of the fact that they can never be properly 
formulated as questions without appearing to be trivial or self-contradictory – what 
is being asked with the question is perfectly clear, even though the form of the 
question itself is not clear. 
 Our question, “why should these basal conditions give rise to these emergent 
properties?”, is a variation on these sorts of questions. We might compile an 
exhaustive list of all of the physical properties in the world by means of which 
emergent properties can be manipulated or brought out of existence – and the result 
will manipulatively necessitate the emergent properties. However, despite having an 
exhaustive list, we won’t have an answer to why the emergent properties must have 
occurred. If we suppose there must exist some further fact which brings about the 
emergence of consciousness – as the traditional dualist does – then we are still left 
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with the question of why such and such a non-physical substance or other further 
fact should guarantee that an experience like mine occurs. 
 Again, the emergentist denies that emergent properties are wholly grounded 
in their basal conditions. Someone might ask, “what grounds the emergent 
properties, then?” The emergentist responds that they are fundamental. Yet it seems 
like fair game to ask, in virtue of what are they fundamental? 
 The difficulty applies whether one holds that emergent properties supervene 
with nomological, manipulative, or metaphysical necessity. If emergence is only 
nomologically necessary, then the question “why are there fundamental trans-
ordinal laws?” ought to answer itself – the laws are fundamental – but it doesn’t 
seem to. If emergence is metaphysically necessary, then the question “why does 
phenomenal emerge from the physical” ought to be as uninteresting as the question 
“why is 2 not identical to 3?”, yet it isn’t. If emergence is manipulatively necessary, 
the position I am inclined towards, then there is nothing besides the physical which 
explains why emergence happens, and yet the physical does not metaphysically 
guarantee that emergence should occur, in that it doesn’t rule out the possibility of it 
not occurring. In this case, “why does the phenomenal emerge from the physical?” is 
a question for which no answer in the world exists, and yet the question suggests a 
clearly conceivable, genuine possibility. 
 So it seems reasonable to say that the following question belongs to the same 
class as the other questions discussed here: 
 
(Q10) Why do unexplainable novelties emerge? 
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 Since, if one could explain why emergence occurred, then the phenomena in 
question would neither be unexplainable, nor novel, nor emergent. 
2.8 Fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris. 
 The attitude one takes towards these questions is to an extent a reflection of 
temperament. A certain reactionary temperament adopts an attitude which involves 
pounding one’s fist very hard on a podium and insisting that the questions do in fact 
stop somewhere. A more radical temperament suggests that we dispose of our old 
concepts of identity, personal identity, reference, time, causation, teleology, 
supervenience, grounding, emergence, and actuality and replace them with cropped 
and culled concepts which stop short before leading to interminable questions. 
Alternatively, a more pragmatic temperament proposes that we have no choice but 
to work with concepts which apply quite well to the vast middle of reality, and are 
thus valuable for their utility, but become nonsensical at the edges or when the 
engine idles. 
 A more disciplined temperament holds that a question without an answer 
isn’t a real question at all. It is a confused question. It is trivially true that it is 
presently now, and that I am myself. If emergence is ideally a priori scrutable, then 
for the ideal reasoner is it just as obvious why things should emerge as they do as it 
is that the actual world is the world. We have only an illusion of understanding a 
question, but nothing in fact has been asked which we could have comprehended. 
What we think we are trying to ask cannot be formulated in words in the first place 
– no answer could ever be properly represented – and the question is trivial 
nonsense. 
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 There is another attitude which one can take towards these questions, 
including the question of why anything should have emerged at all. What appeared 
to be confused questions are in fact the most important questions.  Yet, that the 
question cannot be properly represented is perhaps an indication that the answer 
cannot be properly represented either – how things are in the world will not answer 
that it exists at all.472 One cannot answer the question of being with beings. For the 
temperament I have in mind, these things are to be accepted with natural piety.  
                                            
472 c.f. Wittgenstein (1922), 6.4 – 6.522 
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